[pt] Nos Fundamentos da Aritmética (parágrafo 68), Frege propõe definir explicitamente o operador-abstração ´o número de...´ por meio de extensões e, a partir desta definição, provar o Princípio de Hume (PH). Contudo, a prova imaginada por Frege depende de uma fórmula (BB) não provável no sistema em 1884. Acreditamos que a distinção entre sentido e referência e a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos foram motivada para justificar a introdução do Axioma IV, a partir do qual um análogo de (BB) é provável. Com (BB) no sistema, a prova do Princípio de Hume estaria garantida. Concomitantemente, percebemos que uma teoria unificada das extensões só é possível com a distinção entre sentido e referência e a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos. Caso contrário, Frege teria sido obrigado a introduzir uma série de Axiomas V no seu sistema, o que acarretaria problemas com a identidade (Júlio César). Com base nestas considerações, além do fato de que, em 1882, Frege provara as leis básicas da aritmética (carta a Anton Marty), parece-nos perfeitamente plausível que as estas provas foram executadas adicionando-se o PH ao sistema lógico de Begriffsschrift. Mostramos que, nas provas dos axiomas de Peano a partir de PH dentro da conceitografia, nenhum uso é feito de (BB). Destarte, não é necessária a introdução do Axioma IV no sistema e, por conseguinte, não são necessárias a distinção entre sentido e referência e a introdução dos valores de verdade como objetos. Disto, podemos concluir que, provavelmente, a introdução das extensões nos Fundamentos foi um ato tardio; e que Frege não possuía uma prova formal de PH a partir da sua definição explícita. Estes fatos também explicam a demora na publicação das Leis Básicas da Aritmética e o descarte de um manuscrito quase pronto (provavelmente, o livro mencionado na carta a Marty). / [en] In The Foundations of Arithmetic (paragraph 68), Frege proposes to define explicitly the abstraction operator ´the number of …´ by means of extensions and, from this definition, to prove Hume´s Principle (HP). Nevertheless, the proof imagined by Frege depends on a formula (BB), which is not provable in the system in 1884. we believe that the distinction between sense and reference as well as the introduction of Truth-Values as objects were motivated in order to justify the introduction of Axiom IV, from which an analogous of (BB) is provable. With (BB) in the system, the proof of HP would be guaranteed. At the same time, we realize that a unified theory of extensions is only possible with the distinction between sense and reference and the introduction of Truth-Values as objects. Otherwise, Frege would have been obliged to introduce a series of Axioms V in his system, what cause problems regarding the identity (Julius Caesar). Based on these considerations, besides the fact that in 1882 Frege had proved the basic laws of Arithmetic (letter to Anton Marty), it seems perfectly plausible that these proofs carried out by adding to the Begriffsschrift´s logical system. We show that in the proofs of Peano s axioms from HP within the begriffsschrift, (BB) is not used at all. Thus, the introduction of Axiom IV in the system is not necessary and, consequently, neither the distinction between sense and reference nor the introduction of Truth- Values as objects. From these findings we may conclude that probably the introduction of extensions in The Foundations was a late act; and that Frege did not hold a formal proof of HP from his explicit definition. These facts also explain the delay in the publication of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic and the abandon of a manuscript almost finished (probably the book mentioned in the letter to Marty).

This thesis enquires into the question of the hidden nature of things and reality in the context of David Hume's philosophy. In the context of a Humean approach to reality, it discusses whether the things which we perceive and which are considered to be perceptions can have some sort of non-empirical correlation that lies beneath them and whether it can be called the hidden nature of these things. The first half of the thesis is focused on the philosophy of David Hume. In the second half of the thesis two original considerations about the hidden nature and its characteristics are presented. The thesis starts with three selected theories of substance as presented in A Treatise of Human Nature. The theory of John Locke and the theory of the peripatetics are presented from Hume's critical perspective. Consequently is presented an interpretation called the New Hume. In the context of this interpretation, Hume presumes that there are hidden entities lying beneath empirical reality. Then, there are two considerations focused on the hidden nature of things and its characteristics which are presented. These characteristics are consequently being described in an indirect manner. And finally an original suggestion of how to understand the hidden nature is presented. It has the character of mere...

PhDr. Tomáš Kunca The Humanist Virtuoso: Beginnings, Idea and Illustration of Hume's experimental philosophical anthropology in Treatise of Human Nature UK FHS, Praha 2013 Thesis introduces a concept of "The Humanist Virtuoso" as distinctive feature reflecting Hume's effort to introduce an idea of experimental philosophical anthropology based on study of human nature and manifested in his A Treatise of Human Nature. Concept is justified by three steps, through analysis of the beginnings of Hume's philosophy, explication of his "science of man" idea in Treatise and illustration of this idea in action, as appears in analysis of passions (Book 2). The beginnings of Hume's way to experimental philosophical anthropology are explained thorough interpretation of historical facts connected with his early study at College of Edinburgh. First meetings with culture of science ( both British Christian tradition of experimental philosophy and Newtonian mathematical philosophy) are considered as particularly important. Detailed analysis of pre-Treatise letters (the Letter to Physician and to Michael Ramsey) is provided to make explicit the beginnings of his "science of man" idea, turn to study of human nature. Castration of Treatise is observed and discussed via analysis of his letter to Home (1737). The second...

No description available.

No description available.

Hur resonerar spelare kring ett icke-binärt moralsystem som utgår ifrån Humes tre handlingsmotiv i ett textspel? Detta är den problemformulering som det här arbetet har undersökt. Digitala spel med moraliska val som utgår ifrån ett binärt gott eller ont val kritiseras för sin simplicitet, som sällan lämnar mycket utrymme åt spelarens egna moraliska reflektioner. Därför har det i arbetet skapats en textspelsprototyp, som vägleder spelaren igenom ett narrativ med fem moraliska val. Dessa val är designade utifrån filosofen David Humes teori om de tre motiven, som ligger till grund för våra handlingar. Samtliga respondenter reflekterade och resonerade kring sina val utifrån ett moraliskt perspektiv. De grundade även dessa val i någon mån på hur de hade gjort i verkligheten. Eventuella framtida arbeten bör dock expandera undersökningsomfånget får att kunna erhålla resultat som är mer representativa för spelare i allmänhet.

PhDr. Tomáš Kunca The Humanist Virtuoso: Beginnings, Idea and Illustration of Hume's experimental philosophical anthropology in Treatise of Human Nature UK FHS, Praha 2013 Thesis introduces a concept of "The Humanist Virtuoso" as distinctive feature reflecting Hume's effort to introduce an idea of experimental philosophical anthropology based on study of human nature and manifested in his A Treatise of Human Nature. Concept is justified by three steps, through analysis of the beginnings of Hume's philosophy, explication of his "science of man" idea in Treatise and illustration of this idea in action, as appears in analysis of passions (Book 2). The beginnings of Hume's way to experimental philosophical anthropology are explained thorough interpretation of historical facts connected with his early study at College of Edinburgh. First meetings with culture of science ( both British Christian tradition of experimental philosophy and Newtonian mathematical philosophy) are considered as particularly important. Detailed analysis of pre-Treatise letters (the Letter to Physician and to Michael Ramsey) is provided to make explicit the beginnings of his "science of man" idea, turn to study of human nature. Castration of Treatise is observed and discussed via analysis of his letter to Home (1737). The second...

El auge de la filosofía anglosajona de inicios del siglo XX dedicada al análisis del lenguaje moral, convirtió este tema en núcleo de buena parte de la ética contemporánea. Hume, cuyo pensamiento fue revalorizado sobre todo en el campo epistémico, fue ulteriormente convertido en interlocutor, precursor y defensor de posiciones que atendían al lenguaje de la evaluación. Pero hay que señalar y distinguir desde el inicio que Hume se ocupó de elaborar una teoría general de la evaluación moral, constituida por una descripción del proceso mismo y por el estatuto de los objetos que dicho proceso evalúa, como veremos, las tendencias del carácter. Hume no dedicó ningún estudio orientado a analizar la función y estatuto del lenguaje moral. Estamos pues ante dos problemas distintos. Esta observación es importante porque delimita qué cosas preocuparon a Hume y qué cosas no fueron atendidas por él. La argumentación de Hume se dedica al proceso de la evaluación moral. Este proceso no desestima la cooperación entre pasiones y razonamiento, si bien éste tiene rasgos peculiares, y, a la vez, rechaza la afirmación según la cual los elementos más afectivos de dicho proceso no sean significativos.

No description available.

No description available.