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In the first chapter of this thesis it is shown that Hume has not denied a "real connection" between physical causes and effects. It is argued that Hume is not mainly concerned with the ontological status of causal necessity. His main contention is epistemological; he aims to explain the grounds we have for asserting causal connections. When we look for the grounds of casual interference we find nothing but constant conjunction, which accounts for the mental determination to pass from an impression to the idea of its usual attendant. But it does not follow from this psychological theory that Hume denies "real connections" between physical objects and events. On the contrary, he is committed, as the texts reveal, to admitting that there is a "real connection", although he denies that we have any insight into the nature of that connection. Chapter two is intended to settle the dispute over the status of Burne's two definitions of "cause". It is shown that thev are not incompatible, and it is only when both the definitions are taken together that Hume's analysis of causation is complete. In chapter three a detailed defence is undertaken of Hume's claim that we do not know causal connections a priori and that the inference from past experience to future prediction is not rationally justifiable. Although predictions of future events can not be rationally defended, Hume does not reject them, but gives them a naturalistic, psychological explanation. By considering all relevant factors it is shown that Hume's analyses of causation are quite consistent and not subjectivist in the sense often attributed to them. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Cette présentation examinera le degré de certitude qui peut être atteint dans le domaine scientifique. Le paradigme scientifique est composé de deux extrêmes; causalité et déterminisme d'un côté et probabilité et indéterminisme de l'autre. En faisant appel aux notions de Hume de la ressemblance et la contiguïté, on peut rejeter la causalité ou le hasard objectif comme étant sans fondement et non empirique. Le problème de l'induction et le sophisme du parieur proviennent d’une même source cognitif / heuristique. Hume décrit ces tendances mentales dans ses essais « Of Probability » et « Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion ». Une discussion sur la conception de la probabilité de Hume ainsi que d'autres interprétations de probabilité sera nécessaire. Même si la science glorifie et idéalise la causalité, la probabilité peut être comprise comme étant tout aussi cohérente. Une attitude probabiliste, même si elle est également non empirique, pourrait être plus avantageuse que le vieux paradigme de la causalité. / This presentation examines the degree of certainty which can be attained in science. The scientific paradigm is composed of two extremes; causality and determinism on one end and probability and indeterminism on the other. By appealing to Hume’s notions of resemblance and contiguity, we can dismiss any claim of objective causality or chance as being ungrounded for lack of an empirical basis. The problem of induction as well as the gambler’s fallacy stem from the same cognitive/heuristic source. Hume describes these mental tendencies in his essays ‘Of Probability’ and ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion’. This will necessitate a discussion of Hume’s notion of probability, as well as other interpretations of probability. While science has glorified and romanticized causality, probability can be understood as being just as consistent. While a probabilistic stance is as non-empirical as a causal stance, it will be remarked that we may benefit from a paradigmatic switch to probabilism.

Esta dissertação apresenta a inerência do problema do inconsciente à trajetória intelectual de Gilles Deleuze. Tendo como horizonte Diferença e Repetição, que responderia, entre outros, à tentativa de construir uma noção de inconsciente como um campo imanente correlata à crítica da imagem tradicional do pensamento, mostramos como este projeto já estava em germe em seus estudos monográficos sobre Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche, Proust e Sacher-Masoch. Junto à problematização do inconsciente como um campo ou um plano assubjetivo, Deleuze pensa os processos sintéticos de constituição do sujeito no tempo ou as individuações impessoais a partir da repetição, conceito ontológico maior, através de sínteses operadas pelo hábito, pela memória, pelo eterno retorno e pelo instinto de morte. Primeiramente apresentadas nas monografias de Deleuze, Diferença e Repetição reapresenta estas sínteses do tempo ou do inconsciente, refundando a estética transcendental. Recolocar o problema do inconsciente fornecendo-lhe um estatuto ontológico positivo depende de sua interlocução com as psicanálises freudiana e lacaniana e com as ontologias do negativo das quais eram tributárias. / The following dissertation introduces the \"unconscious\" as an intrinsical matter of Gilles Deleuze\'s intellectual path. Having as a horizon \"Difference and Repetition\", which would answer, among others, the attempt of constructing a notion of the \"unconscious\" as an \"immanent field\", simultaneously with the critic of the traditional image of thought, it is shown how this project was already being developt on his monographic studies about Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche, Proust and Sacher-Masoch. Together with the \"unconscious\" issue as a field, Deleuze thinks both the temporal and the constitutional of the subject, or of the unpersonal individualizations, processes from the repetition, major ontological concept, through the description of syntheses operated by habit, memory, the eternal return and by the death instinct. Firstly introduced on Deleuze\'s monographys, \"Diference and Repetition\" reintroduces these synthesis as of the \"time\" or of the \"unconscious\", refunding a transcendental esthetics. Replace the \"unconscious\" problem giving it a positive ontological status, depends on it\'s dialogue with Freud\'s and Lacan\'s psychoanalysis and with the ontologies of the negative, which they were tributed to.

O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação. / The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.

Cette présentation examinera le degré de certitude qui peut être atteint dans le domaine scientifique. Le paradigme scientifique est composé de deux extrêmes; causalité et déterminisme d'un côté et probabilité et indéterminisme de l'autre. En faisant appel aux notions de Hume de la ressemblance et la contiguïté, on peut rejeter la causalité ou le hasard objectif comme étant sans fondement et non empirique. Le problème de l'induction et le sophisme du parieur proviennent d’une même source cognitif / heuristique. Hume décrit ces tendances mentales dans ses essais « Of Probability » et « Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion ». Une discussion sur la conception de la probabilité de Hume ainsi que d'autres interprétations de probabilité sera nécessaire. Même si la science glorifie et idéalise la causalité, la probabilité peut être comprise comme étant tout aussi cohérente. Une attitude probabiliste, même si elle est également non empirique, pourrait être plus avantageuse que le vieux paradigme de la causalité. / This presentation examines the degree of certainty which can be attained in science. The scientific paradigm is composed of two extremes; causality and determinism on one end and probability and indeterminism on the other. By appealing to Hume’s notions of resemblance and contiguity, we can dismiss any claim of objective causality or chance as being ungrounded for lack of an empirical basis. The problem of induction as well as the gambler’s fallacy stem from the same cognitive/heuristic source. Hume describes these mental tendencies in his essays ‘Of Probability’ and ‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion’. This will necessitate a discussion of Hume’s notion of probability, as well as other interpretations of probability. While science has glorified and romanticized causality, probability can be understood as being just as consistent. While a probabilistic stance is as non-empirical as a causal stance, it will be remarked that we may benefit from a paradigmatic switch to probabilism.

O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação. / The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.

Toute économie ainsi que toute science a pour mission d’atteindre un certain progrès dans son domaine. Or si nous pouvons tous être d’accord sur ce point, nous ne partageons pas forcément la même définition du progrès. Pour élucider cette divergence de compréhension, nous avons pris le parti d’adhérer à une distinction entre éthique et morale : là où tout ordre moral consiste à ordonner les éléments d’un cadre déterminé pour une fin donnée, une posture éthique consiste à adopter et à adapter un principe faisant autorité pour découvrir un environnement alors inconnu. Nous avançons alors que le domaine de l’économie ainsi que toute idée de progrès ne peuvent être rattachés qu’à un ordre moral et non à une posture éthique. Pour illustrer ces propos, nous menons une réflexion sur la question de l’identité, notion certes vide et idéologique mais qui permet tout de même, couplée avec la distinction entre éthique et morale, de nous concentrer notamment sur les notions d’Etat, de personne ou encore de pouvoir. Ces réflexions nous éclairent sur certains fondements de l’économie et sur la philosophie utilitariste, philosophie avant tout liée au langage et de ce fait à la notion d’identité une fois encore ; utilitarisme et économie seraient en un sens déterministes, nous permettant d’accéder à un bonheur identifiable et vers lequel nous pourrions progresser. Ainsi nous avançons que le progrès ne peut qu’être conçu à partir d’un ordre moral et qu’il faille plutôt rechercher un certain équilibre pour que la dimension éthique puisse être elle aussi cultivée, au même titre que la catallaxie puisse être encouragée au côté de l’économie. / Every economics or science has to reach some progress in its field. But, if we can agree on this point, we do not necessarily share the same definition of progress. To clarify this divergence of understanding, we have chosen to distinguish between ethics and morals: if a moral order permits to order elements in a determined frame for a specific goal, an ethical posture means to adopt and to adapt an authoritative principle for the discovery of an unknown environment. We advance that the economic field and the idea of progress can only be associated with a moral order and not with an ethical posture. To illustrate that, we conduct a reflection about identity, which is an empty and ideological notion but which allows us, along the distinction between ethics and morals, to focus especially on notions like State, person or power. These reflections can enlighten us about some foundations of economics and utilitarianism which is a philosophy deeply related to language and then with the notion of identity once again; utilitarianism and economics are in a certain way playing a defining role, allowing us to reach a well-being which we can identify and to which we can progress. Thereby, we are advancing that the progress can only be conceived from a moral order and that we should search a kind of equilibrium to let the ethical dimension be cultivated, as well as to encourage catallaxy outre economics.

O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação. / The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.

Esta dissertação apresenta a inerência do problema do inconsciente à trajetória intelectual de Gilles Deleuze. Tendo como horizonte Diferença e Repetição, que responderia, entre outros, à tentativa de construir uma noção de inconsciente como um campo imanente correlata à crítica da imagem tradicional do pensamento, mostramos como este projeto já estava em germe em seus estudos monográficos sobre Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche, Proust e Sacher-Masoch. Junto à problematização do inconsciente como um campo ou um plano assubjetivo, Deleuze pensa os processos sintéticos de constituição do sujeito no tempo ou as individuações impessoais a partir da repetição, conceito ontológico maior, através de sínteses operadas pelo hábito, pela memória, pelo eterno retorno e pelo instinto de morte. Primeiramente apresentadas nas monografias de Deleuze, Diferença e Repetição reapresenta estas sínteses do tempo ou do inconsciente, refundando a estética transcendental. Recolocar o problema do inconsciente fornecendo-lhe um estatuto ontológico positivo depende de sua interlocução com as psicanálises freudiana e lacaniana e com as ontologias do negativo das quais eram tributárias. / The following dissertation introduces the \"unconscious\" as an intrinsical matter of Gilles Deleuze\'s intellectual path. Having as a horizon \"Difference and Repetition\", which would answer, among others, the attempt of constructing a notion of the \"unconscious\" as an \"immanent field\", simultaneously with the critic of the traditional image of thought, it is shown how this project was already being developt on his monographic studies about Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche, Proust and Sacher-Masoch. Together with the \"unconscious\" issue as a field, Deleuze thinks both the temporal and the constitutional of the subject, or of the unpersonal individualizations, processes from the repetition, major ontological concept, through the description of syntheses operated by habit, memory, the eternal return and by the death instinct. Firstly introduced on Deleuze\'s monographys, \"Diference and Repetition\" reintroduces these synthesis as of the \"time\" or of the \"unconscious\", refunding a transcendental esthetics. Replace the \"unconscious\" problem giving it a positive ontological status, depends on it\'s dialogue with Freud\'s and Lacan\'s psychoanalysis and with the ontologies of the negative, which they were tributed to.