[pt] Esta dissertação tem por objetivo apresentar os resultados da pesquisa de mestrado em que se procurou evidenciar algumas características da relação de David Hume com a indução. Segundo a interpretação corrente, Hume é o responsável por mostrar que nossa razão não é capaz de justificar qualquer um de nossos raciocínios indutivos. O problema de Hume também se caracteriza por ser um problema acerca da racionalidade da ciência, pois se seu método principal, a indução, não pode receber suporte racional, parece lícito afirmar que o resultado de uma inferência indutiva é irracional. A fim de delinear o campo exato em que se insere a crítica humeana, este texto irá mostrar como Hume apresenta suas teorias acerca do raciocínio causal em seu Tratado da natureza humana, traçar as características exatas do raciocínio causal de Hume e confrontá-las com as formas de interpretação presentes em alguns de seus principais comentadores. Procuramos tornar claras as falhas apresentadas nestas interpretações. Em seguida trataremos de discutir algumas das mais celebradas interpretações da filosofia de Hume, centrando nossa análise nos textos de Mackie, Beauchamp e Mappes. O capítulo final tem por objetivo mostrar as características racionais que podem ser atribuídas aos raciocínios causais humeanos, salientando o caráter particular de suas inferências. Finalizando, mostraremos como a origem do princípio da cópia pode ser um exemplo do uso de inferências indutivas por parte de Hume, o que nos leva a considerações heterodoxas a respeito de sua visão a respeito da racionalidade. / [en] The aim of this work is to present the results of my master´s degree research, which tried to show some of the characteristics of David Hume´s approach to induction. According to the standard interpretation, Hume is responsible for showing that our reason is not able to justify any of our inductive reasonings. Hume´s problem also characterizes itself by being a problem about the rationality of science, for, since his main method, induction, cannot receive a rational foundation, it seems licit to assert that the result of any inductive inference is irrational. In order to precisely describe the Humean criticism I am going to show how Hume presents his theories concerning causal reasoning in this A Treatise of Human Nature, define the exact characteristics of causal reasoning according to him, and compare this analysis to those by some of his main critics. We shall try to bring to light the proposed inadequacy of the latter. Next we will discuss some of the most celebrated interpretations of Hume´s philosophy, specially those by of Mackie, Beauchamp and Mappes. The final chapter aims at showing the rational characteristics that can be assigned to Humean causal reasoning emphasizing the particular character of his inferences. Finally, we show how the origin of the copy principle can be an instance of the use of inductive inferences by Hume, which allows us to risk some heterodox hypotheses concerning his view of rationality.

La sympathie comme principe par lequel une idée se convertit en impression n’est pas la seule espèce de sympathie employée par David Hume dans ses ouvrages. Le terme «sympathie» possédait des sens variés dans le langage courant au XVIIIème siècle, et il arrive que le philosophe écossais se serve du terme «sympathie» dans l’un ou l’autre de ces sens. C’est ainsi que, outre son concept philosophique, Hume se sert du terme «sympathie» suivant cinq autres sens. L’identification des différentes sortes de sympathie présentes dans les ouvrages de Hume a permis de mieux comprendre ce qu’il en était de la nature de son concept philosophique de sympathie. Ainsi, on a pu comprendre quels rapports la sympathie entretenait avec un autre principe de production d’affections mentionné à l’occasion par Hume : la contagion. Ainsi, on a également pu comprendre quels rapports la sympathie entretenait avec d’autres éléments de la philosophie humienne, tels que les esprits animaux, leurs mouvements et les émotions. Les analyses ont démontré, par ailleurs, que les esprits animaux et leurs mouvements jouaient un rôle de premier plan dans la théorie humienne des passions et que le principe de la sympathie, au final, désignait l’augmentation de l’agitation des esprits animaux. C’est ainsi que la sympathie entendue comme principe par lequel une idée était convertie en impression désignait un mécanisme physiologique chez Hume. Les analyses ont également démontré que les impressions que Hume nommait «émotions» désignaient plus particulièrement le mouvement des esprits animaux. Qu’ainsi, l’on devait considérer qu’il y avait dans la taxonomie du philosophe écossais non seulement des perceptions de l’entendement humain (idées, passions, sentiments, etc.) mais également des perceptions du corps humain (émotions) et que celles-ci étaient en correspondance étroite avec celles-là. On peut ainsi faire l’hypothèse qu’il y a dans la philosophie humienne des éléments susceptibles de fonder une théorie de l’union entre l’âme et le corps. La considération de la sympathie comme un principe physiologique d’agitation des esprits animaux permet que l’on jette un regard nouveau sur la façon dont David Hume concevait la nature humaine. / Sympathy, as a principle by which an idea is converted into an impression, is not the only kind of sympathy that David Hume employs in his works. Hume refers to several of the multiple distinct meanings that the term afforded in 18th century vernacular. The thesis argue that in the end the Scottish philosopher uses the word “sympathy” with five different meanings, besides his own philosophical concept. Identifying these meanings as they appear throughout Hume’s body of work provided a greater understanding of the nature of his own philosophical concept of sympathy. This brought to light the relationship between sympathy and another affection-producing principle that Hume occasionally mentions: contagion. Similarly, this granted insight into the interplay between sympathy and other elements in Hume’s philosophy, especially the animal spirits, their movements, and emotions. Indeed, this analysis has uncovered the key role that animal spirits and their movements play in Hume’s theory of passions, observing that his principle of sympathy merely describes an increase in the agitation of animal spirits. Consequently, sympathy as a principle of conversion of an idea into an impression describes what is in fact in Hume’s thinking a physiological mechanism. Further, this investigation has shown that those impressions which Hume calls “emotions” specifically refer to the movement of animal spirits. Therefore, we must recognize that Hume’s taxonomy not only includes perceptions in human understanding (ideas, passions, sentiments, etc.), but also integrates perceptions in the human body (emotions), and that they are closely correlated. This leads to the hypothesis that there are in Hume’s philosophical works enough elements to delineate a theory of the relationship between body and mind (or soul). Understanding sympathy as a physiological mechanism involving the agitation of animal spirits offers a new outlook on David Hume's conception of human nature.

[pt] A dissertação apresenta e discute as idéias desenvolvidas por Crispin Wright no livro Frege´s Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983), em particular, a sua tese de que a aritmética é analítica. Wright deposita toda sua força argumentativa (em relação à analiticidade da aritmética) na derivação dos axiomas da aritmética de segunda ordem de Dedekind-Peano a partir do Princípio de Hume. Assim, é nosso principal objetivo apresentar e discutir em que medida o Princípio de Hume é capaz de fornecer, segundo Wright, um relato da analiticidade da aritmética, assim como, as objeções a esse relato. / [en] The dissertation presents and discusses the ideas developed by Crispin Wright in his book Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983), in particular his thesis that arithmetic is analytic. Wright concentrates all his argumentative efforts (in relation to the analyticity of arithmetic) on the derivation of the axioms of Dedekind-Peano's second order arithmetic from Hume's Principle. Thus, it is our main goal to present and discuss how Hume's Principle provides, according to Wright, an explanation of the analytic character of arithmetic as well as some objections to this account.

Ce mémoire porte sur les fondements naturels du jugement moral et l'objectif principal de ce travail est de faire ressortir l'importance de revoir nos conceptions philosophiques sur ce sujet. C'est en nous appuyant sur deux principaux modèles philosophiques, le sentimentalisme et le rationalisme, que nous identifions les éléments constitutifs du jugement moral. L'étude de ces modèles se réfère aux travaux de David Hume et Emmanuel Kant et permet de souligner que la définition du rôle des émotions et de la raison dans la formation du jugement moral diffère dans chacune de ces conceptions. Ensuite, c'est en nous appuyant sur le modèle intuitionniste social proposé par Jonathan Haidt que nous étudions l'influence humienne sur la conception contemporaine du jugement moral. La problématique soulevée se trouvant essentiellement dans une dichotomie entre les définitions que proposent les modèles sentimentaliste et rationaliste en ce qui a trait aux rôles respectifs des émotions et de la raison, nous tentons d'éclairer le problème en exposant différentes études neuroscientifiques sur la question afin de reconsidérer les définitions présentées. Pour ce faire, nous nous intéressons à la question morale d'un point de vue phylogénique et ontogénique. D'abord, en étudiant les fondements génétiques, les bases neuronales, les fondements émotionnels et les mécanismes fondamentaux, ensuite en étudiant les déterminants sociaux et culturels. Finalement, nous concluons avec l'idée que les théories philosophiques contemporaines peuvent tirer certains bénéfices en considérant les observations scientifiques récentes au sujet des fondements du jugement moral. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Jugement moral, sentimentalisme, rationalisme, intuitionnisme social, neurosciences.

This essay focus on Jean-Jacques Rousseau and David Hume and how they in their writings describe the doctrine of the original sin, and what they replace it with. The theoretical framework this essay work form, is Peter. L Bergers theories concerning society and religion as a social construction, were religious systems purpose is to establish order and previewed a meaning for people. From a history point of view religious system and institutions have had a significant role in establish system that will provide people with explanations about the world. In the eighteenth century, during the period in Europe often named as the enlightenment a new sort of criticism took place against religion. My study shows that in the part of Rousseau’s work Émile that goes under the name The Savoy priest's confession the doctrine of the original sin, is replaced with a faith in the human nature. Doctrines such as the original sin is for Rousseau something that is formed by humans in society, and has nothing to do with God. In the second part of Hume’s work Dialogues concerning natural religion, the dialogue shifts and focus on more moral concepts of religion, and also the question of evil, sin etc. Hume’s work presents three solutions instead of one.

This thesis examines the representation of social conditions and historical events in Isabel Allende's first novel from a moral perspective. Using David Hume's moral theory, we explore Allende's judgement of the causes of the 1973 Chilean coup d'etat based on her representation of both the event itself and the social conditions surrounding it. The thematic focus of this study is on issues of affectivity and violence in the novel. This thesis is written in Spanish.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Full text release at OhioLINK's ETD Center delayed at author's request

This thesis examines the representation of social conditions and historical events in Isabel Allende's first novel from a moral perspective. Using David Hume's moral theory, we explore Allende's judgement of the causes of the 1973 Chilean coup d'etat based on her representation of both the event itself and the social conditions surrounding it. The thematic focus of this study is on issues of affectivity and violence in the novel. This thesis is written in Spanish.

El problema de la causalidad es, probablemente, una cuestión atingente a casi todas las áreas del saber humano. En el reconocimiento de determinadas relaciones causales se funda en gran medida toda nuestra vida cotidiana, nuestra subsistencia como especie y por supuesto nuestras ciencias.

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