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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
71

Descartes and tradition: the miracle of the Eucharist

Lewis, Eric P. 08 June 2009 (has links)
Descartes and the followers of his new mechanistic physics were subject to condemnation as a result of a reaction against his philosophy on the basis that it could not adequately explain the miracle of the Eucharist. Descartes, however, firmly believed that he could give an explanation of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist which was not only consistent with his physics and metaphysics, but which was also consistent with the orthodoxy demanded by the Church. His explanation exploited the ambiguity of the language adopted by the Council of Trent, yet rejected the Aristotelian philosophy traditionally relied upon to explain the miracle. Descartes' explanation of transubstantiation remained provocative to his scholastic contemporaries not because it was internally inconsistent, but rather because Descartes attempted to overthrow the whole of traditional philosophy. Descartes' confidence in his own explanation of the sacred rite ultimately obscured the long and troubled history of the issue from him, leading him to believe that he could win converts to his philosophy by publishing his own theory of the Eucharist. Consequent to this excursion into theology, Descartes' philosophy came under fire and was condemned in part because it could not give a traditional explanation of the Eucharist. / Master of Arts
72

The role of welfare in an egalitarian metric

Nicholas, Jeffrey Lynn 11 June 2009 (has links)
I argue that welfare considerations should play an important role in egalitarian thought. Ronald Dworkin, in contrast, has argued that welfare should play no role in a principle of equality of distribution. I explore his discussion of this issue, finding that many of his arguments presuppose the truth of his alternative account, which focuses on resources rather than welfare. His remaining arguments rely on the counter-intuitive nature of compensating for expensive tastes. I argue that if we examine this case more carefully, it is not as counter-intuitive as it first appears. Having replied to his objections to the welfare account, I turn to his positive argument for the principle of equality of resources, namely, that it is the only principle which respects the equal worth of persons. I explore several examples to demonstrate that pure welfare deficiencies merit compensation. These examples suggest, I argue, that respecting the equal worth of persons requires us to consider welfare in a principle of equality of distribution. Finally, I argue that if we should compensate for welfare deficiencies, we should also compensate for expensive tastes; indeed, considerations of equal worth require this compensation. / Master of Arts
73

Contextual Knowledge Ascriptions and Non-Contextual Knowledge

Zarella, Michael Stephen Jr. 03 January 2014 (has links)
In this paper I pair a contextualist theory of knowledge ascriptions with a non-contextual definition of knowledge, specifically the principle that knowledge is infallible belief. This combination is unusual because proponents of contextualism, understood as a semantic thesis, either do not engage epistemology or suggest that the criteria for knowledge are also context sensitive. In order to sustain the pairing that I suggest, the truth conditions of a knowledge ascription must be distinct from the criteria for knowledge. I believe that this distinction is important and fruitful for two reasons: 1) the distinction allows us to preserve both the principle that knowledge is infallible belief and the conviction that we know a lot; 2) the distinction explains the paradox that certain skeptical arguments are not obviously unsound even though their conclusion does seem absurd. Since I uphold a definition of knowledge that is not context sensitive, my treatment of skepticism is unlike prominent contextualist treatments. / Master of Arts
74

Une Application Des N-Univers A L'argument De L'apocalypse Et Au Paradoxe De Goodman

Franceschi, Paul 11 1900 (has links)
Several philosophical problems are based on an analogy between a real situation and a probabilistic model. Such problems are based on urn analogies. The present dissertation aims to describe and implement a methodology oriented towards the resolution of philosophical problems based on an urn analogy. This methodology is based on the use of the n-universes. To this end, I describe first the n-universes in a detailed way. I also discuss the difficulties of the theory of n-universes related to the demultiplication of the criteria and to the relation one/many between the objects and a given criterion.On the one hand, I present an application of the framework of n-universes to the Doomsday argument and to the problems recently appeared in the literature in keeping with the Doomsday argument. My concern is also with showing how the application of the framework of n-universes to several problems and thought experiments related to the Doomsday argument helps clarifying the problem data and making disappear the associated ambiguity. I present then an analysis of the following problems related to the Doomsday argument: the two urn case, God's Coin Toss, the Sleeping Beauty Problem, the Presumptuous Philosopher, Lazy Adam, and the Shooting-Room Paradox. I present lastly a solution to the Doomsday argument, based on a third route, by contrast to two types of solutions classically described.On the other hand, I present an application of the framework of n-universes to Goodman's paradox. I replace first Goodman's statement in the framework of n-universes. I propose then a solution to the paradox, based on a distinction between two different modelizations of Goodman's statement in two structurally different n-universes.
75

Der Mensch und die 'Künstliche Intelligenz': Eine Profilierung und kritische Bewertung der unterschiedlichen Grundauffassungen vom Standpunkt des gemäßigten Realismus

Eraßme, Rolf 11 1900 (has links)
After a short introduction concerning the problem of "Artificial Intelligence" (AI) the work continues with a summary of the state of the art.Thereafter, it goes on to profile four different basic scientific views of human beings and AI: symbolism, connectionism, biologism and physicalism. The emphasis is on the elucidation of anthropologically relevant statements to intelligence, spirit, thinking, perception, will, consciousness, self-consciousness, feelings and life.It is demonstrated that the basic views referred to represent greatly abbreviated and distorted pictures of human beings. Theories that do not go beyond the quantifiable level cannot adequately encompass the nature of relevant concepts and capabilities. That is above all because of the fact that generally a philosophical materialism is advocated, which considers the existence of intellectual substances impossible. For this reason a philosophical critique is necessary. The position of moderate and critical realism is advocated, whose anthropological statements are secured by epistemological and metaphysical investigations.The work comes to the conclusion that human beings cannot be understood symbolistically, connectionistically, biologistically or physicalistically. Man is a physical-intellectual entity, endowed with reason, a living social being. He is formed and led by his intellectual and therefore immortal soul, which gives him uniqueness, irreplaceability and the value of personhood. He is capable of thinking and thus of objective, abstract perception, and therefore is intelligent. Humans have an unfettered will, which, led by mental perception, is to be directed toward the good. They are moreover, through reflection, self-conscious. Humans live an intellectually determined life, which essentially differs, despite biological similarity, from that of animals and cannot possibly, due to its substantial superiority, have developed from animal life.All substantial anthropological abilities (such as intelligence, will, consciousness etc.) presuppose spirit. Because it is not within the power of human beings to create a simple substance such as spirit, a thinking, perceptive, intelligent, willing, self-conscious, sentient living being can at best be only technically imitated, modelled or simulated but never be reproduced, copied or created. The relationship of humans to AI is thus determined by an insuperable difference between their natures.
76

Boron-bridged constrained geometry complexes and related compounds

Breitling, Frank Michael 08 1900 (has links)
Group 3 and 4 complexes bearing linked cyclopentadienyl amido ligands, often referred to as constrained geometry complexes (CGCs), have experienced considerable interest due to their superior ability to copolymerise ethylene and higher alpha-olefins when activated with suitable co-catalyst.The work presented in this thesis aimed to replace the most commonly applied bridge in CGCs, which is silicon based, by one containing boron. The potential of the bridging element to have Lewis acidic character was expected to positively alter the catalytic activity of the activated species and possibly allowing for self-activation.Synthetic approaches to ligand precursors based on aminoboranes, diaminodiboranes(4) and ferrocenylboranes are described. Starting from the dihalo derivatives of these boranes, sequential substitution of the halides by one equivalent each of a cyclopentadienide derivative and an amide allowed the synthesis and isolation of a broad range of new CGC ligand precursors.Complexation of these ligand precursors to Group 4 metals was studied by utilising various protocols. The reaction with Group 4 tetraamides via amine elimination was the most successful yielding numerous new boron-bridged CGCs and related complexes in which the boron-bridged ligand binds in a non-chelating fashion.The newly synthesised compounds were fully characterised by multinuclear NMR spectroscopy, supplemented by X-ray diffraction studies where applicable.Studies on the reactivity of boron-bridged CGCs in the presence of alkylating agents indicated susceptibility of the boron atom to nucleophilic attack resulting in a decomposition of the linking moiety between the cyclopentadienyl and amido fragments. This is as well reflected in the data gathered from polymerisation experiments, in which methylaluminoxane activated boron-bridged CGCs displayed a low activity towards ethylene polymerisation, but a high activity towards styrene polymerisation. Such characteristics are comparable to unbridged compounds, e.g. [(eta5-C5H5)TiCl3], rather than silicon-bridged CGCs, thus suggesting degradation of the boron-bridged CGCs to unbridged complexes under polymerisation conditions.
77

Intension, substance and calculus:the leibnizian vision in Frank Ankersmit’s philosophy of history

Oja, A. (Aleksi) 29 May 2019 (has links)
Abstract. F. R. Ankersmit’s philosophy of history features three distinct categories. Historical research is epistemological. It deals with historical theory and language and logic as they ordinarily are thought of in analytic philosophy. History-writing is the most prominent part of his work and it is explained in terms of representation and aesthetics. Finally, there is historical experience, which could be called the metaphysics of his system. The latter two categories have been Ankersmit’s focus all his career, while the first one is only referred to when establishing how the latter two are distinguished from it. In this master’s thesis an account is given for how all these categories can be explained in terms of G. W. Leibniz’s theory of substance. While historical research is potentially analogous to Leibniz’s ideas about corporeal substance, Ankersmit expresses little interest in it. Instead, his focus is on the idealistic metaphysics presented in Leibniz’s monadology. In this system the substance is defined as simple, unextended, and complete in the sense that it is an individual, that is utterly independent of outside influence apart from God. On the other hand, substance in the monadology is defined as perception, sometimes conscious, as is the case with souls. This dichotomy is central for Ankersmit’s theory of historical representation as he argues that the main product of historiography, the historical representation, is analogous to Leibniz’s substance. It is an indivisible individual and therefore requires to be thought of as a whole and evaluated in aesthetic terms instead of traditional analysis. On the other hand, with the theory of historical experience the status of the monad as pure experience is central. These two aspects are for him two sides of the same coin that is the basis of his philosophy of history. Thirdly, just as Leibniz’s discovery of the calculus had a profound effect on his metaphysics, so it is important in the application of Ankersmit’s representational logic. The notion is applied analogically in his explanation of what the historian aims at in writing of history. It also explains how philosophers of history collectively may decide upon which representation of a given topic is best. I argue that a clear vision about Ankersmit’s Leibnizianism is beneficial if one is to understand the motivations and goals of his philosophy. Just as it was characteristic for Leibniz to appear a conciliator of different sects in the philosophy of his time, so it is Ankersmit’s most important aim to provide philosophy of history an apriorist platform upon which genuine debate based on contesting representations is possible.Tiivistelmä. F. R. Ankersmitin historianfilosofiassa on kolme selkeää osa-aluetta. ”Historiantutkimus” on epistemologista. Siinä keskiössä ovat teoria ja kieli, siten kuin aikamme analyyttinen filosofia näitä asioita lähestyy. “Historiankirjoituksella" hän viittaa historioitsijoiden tekstien representatiiviseen olemukseen. Kokonaistekstejä voi hänen mielestään arvioida vain esteettisin perustein, sillä ne ovat ensisijaisesti representaatioita. ”Historiallinen kokemus” taas käsittelee historian ontologiaa. Kaksi jälkimmäistä käsitettä ovat hänen työssään keskiössä. Tässä työssä esitän, että kaikki nämä kolme osa-aluetta voidaan ymmärtää G. W. Leibnizin substanssiteorian puitteissa. “Historiantutkimus” voidaan nähdä analogisena Leibnizin ulottuvan (corporeal) substanssin teorian kanssa, vaikkakaan Ankersmit ei tätä vertausta itse tee. Sen sijaan hän soveltaa Leibnizin monadologian idealistista metafysiikkaa. Monadologiassa substanssi on yksinkertainen, jakamaton ja täydellinen yksilö, johon mikään ulkopuolinen ei vaikuta. Toisaalta Leibnizin substanssi tulee määritellyksi myös havaitsemisena, joka voi olla tietoista, kuten on esimerkiksi sielujen laita. Molemmat määritelmät tulevat osaksi Ankersmitin historianfilosofiaa hänen vetäessään analogian Leibnizin substanssin ja oman käsitteensä, historiallisen representaation, välille. Representaatio on holistinen yksilö, jota ei voi siten analysoida, vaan jonka arviointi on esteettistä. Toisaalta, historiallisen kokemuksen teoriassa substanssin asema nimenomaan puhtaana perseptiona ja kokemisena korostuu. Historiallinen representaatio ja historiallinen kokemus muodostavat Ankersmitin filosofiassa rikkumattoman kokonaisuuden. Lisäksi, Leibniz oli uranuurtaja differentiaali- ja integraalilaskennasta. Tällä matemaattisella ymmärryksellä oli vaikutus myös hänen metafysiikkansa kehitykseen. Analogisesti Ankersmit näkee sille sovelluksen myös omassa työssään. Differentiaalikalkyylin käsitteen avulla tämä selittää tarkemmin historiallisen representaation luonnetta niin yksittäisen historioitsijan kuin myös koko yhteisön näkökulmasta. Yksilö pyrkii parhaaseen mahdolliseen representaatioon ja yhteisö pyrkii yhteisymmärrykseen parhaasta mahdollisesta representaatiosta. Väitän, että Ankersmitin “Leibnizilaisuuden” ymmärtäminen on tärkeää, mikäli halutaan ymmärtää paitsi hänen filosofiaansa yleensä, myös hänen motiivejaan ja tavoitteitaan. Leibniz halusi aikanaan luoda järjestelmän, jonka pohjalta kaikki filosofiset erimielisyydet voitaisiin rationaalisesti ratkaista. Ankersmit pyrkii samanlaiseen sovittelevaan rooliin historianfilosofiassa väittäessään, että hänen järjestelmänsä on aprioristinen perusta, jonka pohjalta erilaiset historialliset näkökulmat voidaan asettaa aitoon vuoropuheluun keskenään.
78

Discontinuity as theoretical foundation to pedagogy:existential phenomenology in Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s philosophy of education

Koskela, J. (Jani) 30 October 2012 (has links)
Abstract This study examines German educational philosopher Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s (1903–1991) existential-hermeneutic theory of discontinuous forms of education, unstetige formen der Erziehung. At the core of this theory is a view of human being subjected to education that appears disruptive and critical, influencing the development of disclosing the true powers of a person and unfolding of truths about oneself that could not be uncovered otherwise. Typically, this theory has been interpreted on the continuum of hermeneutic philosophy, as hermeneutic pedagogy with an extension of Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, antisubjectivism and especially his theory of truth as unconcealment. According to this line of interpretation, Bollnow’s project brings an existential addition to classical pedagogical theories, as a level of appealing pedagogy. According to this existentialist view, education in a strict sense cannot really take place: it could not affect the true core of a person, nor this person could be subjected under any pedagogical influence in any meaningful way. The only task left for education is to appeal to the conscience of an already autonomous person. However, in this study it is claimed that this line of interpretation falls short to the fact that Bollnow’s philosophy of education builds heavily on his overall philosophical-anthropological project, which springs from Kant’s first critique and especially, as shown in this work, from Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. The study shows, that Bollnow’s discontinuous forms of education are not resulted from hermeneutic educational reality, with an extension of existential potentiality to authenticity of a person. In fact, one could not derive such a view from mere hermeneutics. Instead, what Bollnow’s structural view of educational reality indicates, is that it should be understood as a phenomenological description of a priori categorical structures. It is claimed in the work, that the discontinuous forms are the products of phenomenological reduction. They are derived from the direct experience within consciousness, from the essence of what is experienced, from the very nature of what is it like to be in a process of becoming human. From this perspective, from the subject-point, education cannot be described as a paradox of freedom and restriction between educator and educatee, nor transmission of culture between generations, but instead could be described as the subjective experience of being educated or educating oneself, disclosing oneself to oneself, which is constituted only by the necessary conditions of these subjective experiences of discontinuity. / Tiivistelmä Tämä tutkielma tarkastelee saksalaisen kasvatusfilosofi Otto Friedrich Bollnowin eksistentiaali-hermeneuttista teoriaa kasvatuksen epäjatkuvista muodoista, unstetige formen der Erziehung. Tämän teorian ytimessä on näkemys ihmisestä altistettuna kasvatukselle joka näyttäytyy katkonaisena ja kriittisenä, vaikuttaen yksilön todellisten kykyjen ja itseä koskevien totuuksien paljastumiseen. Tyypillisesti tämä teoria on tulkittu hermeneuttisen filosofian jatkumolle, hermeneuttiseksi pedagogiikaksi jossa yhdistyy piirteitä Martin Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologiasta, antisubjektivismista sekä erityisesti teoriasta totuudesta paljastumisena. Tämän tulkintalinjan mukaisesti Bollnowin projekti tuo eksistentiaalisen lisän perinteisiin pedagogisiin teorioihin vetoamisen pedagogiikan tasona. Tähän eksistentialistiseen näkemykseen liittyen, kasvatus sen tiukassa mielessä ei ole mahdollista: se ei voisi vaikuttaa yksilön todelliseen ytimeen, eikä tämä yksilö voisi olla kasvatuksen kohteena millään mielekkäällä tavalla. Kasvatuksen ainoaksi tehtäväksi jää vetoaminen jo valmiiksi autonomisen yksilön omaantuntoon. Kuitenkin, tässä tutkimuksessa esitetään että tämä tulkintalinja epäonnistuu jättäessään huomiotta Bollnowin kasvatusfilosofian rakentumisen hänen filosofis-pedagogisen antropologian kokonaisprojektinsa pohjalta. Tämä projekti kumpuaa Kantin ensimmäisestä kritiikistä ja erityisesti, kuten tässä työssä osoitetaan, Edmund Husserlin transsendentaalista fenomenologiasta. Tämä tutkimus osoittaa, ettei Bollnowin epäjatkuvan kasvatuksen muodot pohjaudu hermeneuttiselle kasvatustodellisuudelle, jota on jatkettu yksilön eksistentiaalisen autenttisuuden mahdollisuuden ajatuksella. Itse asiassa, kyseistä teoriaa ei voisi johtaa hermeneutiikasta. Sen sijaan, Bollnowin kasvatustodellisuuden tasorakenne indikoi tulkintatapaa, jossa se nähdään a prioristen kategoriarakenteiden fenomenologisena kuvauksena. Työssä väitetään, että epäjatkuvat muodot ovat fenomenologisen reduktion tuotetta. Ne on johdettu tietoisuuden sisällöistä, välittömistä kokemuksista, niiden olemuksesta, toisin sanoen, sen luonteesta miltä tuntuu olla ihmiseksi tulemisen prosessissa. Tästä yksilönäkökulmasta käsin kasvatusta ei voida kuvailla vapauden ja pakon välisenä ristiriitana eikä kulttuurin välittämisenä sukupolvelta toiselle, vaan sen sijaan sarjana subjektiivisia katkonaisuuden kokemuksia kasvatetuksi tulemisesta ja itsekasvatuksesta, jossa yksilö paljastaa itseään itselleen. Tämä näkemys kasvatuksesta konstituoituu subjektiivisten kokemusten välttämättömyysehtojen kautta.
79

Deschooling philosophy and freedom in education:teachers’ views of principles and practices in the Finnish primary school

Similä, J. (Juho) 08 December 2015 (has links)
The goal of this thesis is to study definitions of freedom in education and compare them to find out similarities and differences. The aim is not to come up with practical applications for freedom in education, but to understand what freedom can be and to find out whether there are similarities or differences between the definitions. The theoretical research question of this study is how freedom is defined in the deschooling philosophy, and the empirical research question is how freedom is defined in education according to the collected data. The theoretical framework is based on deschooling philosophy and on texts mainly written by authors from the 1960s and 1970s, but there are also some texts included in the study produced by some more recent authors. The theoretical framework comes from a very different educational context and era which is why it is not directly compared to Finnish primary education. Hence, this thesis does not aim to criticize Finnish primary education. Freedom according to the theoretical framework exists within limits, and does not mean that students can do whatever they want. What matters in freedom according to deschooling authors is the existence of choice and in particular, meaningfulness of the choices. As freedom exists within limits, the limits are seen as providing security for students who can then safely engage in activities that they are interested in. The data comes from five Finnish primary school teachers who answered open questions about freedom in education. The methodological paradigm is closest to constructivism, but borders on pragmatism. Content analysis was chosen for analysis method, since the data was textual and the research was concerned of the latent thematic content. The analysis is qualitative, but quantitative in the sense that code frequencies are given. Code categories were formulated deductively but revised after trial coding. Four actor categories and seven thematic categories were formulated, after which the segments of data were coded accordingly. The analysis was carried out along the order of the thematic categories, and every code combination was analyzed separately. The findings were summarized to answer the empirical research question. The interpretation indicates that freedom in education is always controlled by authority. Freedom is suggested to include practical choices, and possibilities to affect one’s own education. Limits are seen as necessary, and responsibility is seen as a necessary competence for using freedom. There are both similarities and differences in definitions of freedom, yet the definitions recognize the importance of limits and the role of authority. Security and providing choices are also seen as important elements of freedom. The data suggests that responsibility is a necessary competence for freedom though it does not appear in the theoretical framework. The findings are based on subjective interpretation and therefore, they cannot be generalized more widely. As the main methodological paradigm is constructivism, the thesis does not claim to provide universal results and thus recognizes the subjective rather than objective quality of the study. / Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on tarkastella määritelmiä vapaudesta ja vertailla niitä keskenään erojen ja samankaltaisuuksien löytämiseksi. Työllä ei pyritä löytämään vapauteen liittyviä sovelluksia kasvatusta varten, vaan ymmärtää mitä vapaus voi olla ja pohtia määritelmien eroja ja yhteneväisyyksiä. Teoreettinen tutkimuskysymys tutkielmassa on miten kouluttomuusfilosofia määrittelee vapauden kasvatuksessa, ja työn empiirinen tutkimuskysymys on miten tutkimusaineisto määrittelee vapauden kasvatuksessa. Työn teoreettinen viitekehys perustuu kouluttomuusfilosofiaan, ja teoriaa rakennetaan pääasiassa 1960- ja 1970-luvun kirjoittajien näkemysten kautta, mutta mukana on myös muutamia uudempia aihetta käsitteleviä tekstejä. Teoreettinen viitekehys perustuu hyvin erilaiseen kasvatus- ja aikakontekstiin, mistä syystä sitä ei suoraan verrata suomalaiseen peruskouluun. Näin ollen työ ei tähtää suomalaisen peruskoulun kritisoimiseen. Teoreettisen viitekehyksen mukaan vapaus on olemassa rajoitusten sisällä, joten vapaus ei tarkoita oppilaiden voivan tehdä ihan mitä haluavat. Vapauden kannalta onkin merkittävää valinnanvapaus sekä erityisesti vaihtoehtojen mielekkyys. Rajojen nähdään myös luovan turvallisuutta, jonka avulla oppilaat voivat rauhassa syventyä itseään kiinnostaviin aktiviteetteihin. Tutkimuksen aineisto on saatu viideltä suomalaiselta peruskoulun opettajalta, jotka vastasivat avoimiin kysymyksiin vapaudesta kasvatuksessa. Tutkimuksen metodologinen paradigma on lähinnä konstruktivistinen, mutta osin myös pragmatistinen. Tekstimuotoisen aineiston analyysimenetelmäksi valittiin sisällön analyysi, jossa keskeisiksi nousivat tutkimuksiin liittyvät teemat. Analyysi on laadullista, mutta koodien lukumääristä annetaan myös määrällistä tietoa. Koodikategoriat luotiin teoriapohjaisesti, ja kategorioita korjattiin testikoodauksen jälkeen. Lopulta luotiin neljä tekijäkategoriaa sekä seitsemän teemakategoriaa, minkä jälkeen aineiston segmentit koodattiin tämän mukaisesti. Analyysi tehtiin teemakategorioiden järjestyksen mukaisesti, ja kaikki koodiyhdistelmät analysoitiin erikseen. Löydökset on kirjoitettu auki yhteenvedossa, jolla myös vastataan empiiriseen tutkimuskysymykseen. Aineiston voidaan tulkita kuvaavan näkemystä vapaudesta, jonka mukaisesti vapaus kasvatuksessa on aina auktoriteetin kontrolloimaa. Vapauden nähdään sisältävän käytännönvalintoja, sekä mahdollisuuksia vaikuttaa omaan kasvatukseen. Rajat vapaudessa nähdään välttämättöminä, ja vastuu nähdään tärkeänä kompetenssina vapauden käytölle. Vapauden määritelmissä on eroja ja yhtäläisyyksiä, joskin ne tunnustavat rajojen merkityksen sekä auktoriteetin roolin vapauteen liittyen. Turvallisuus sekä valinnanmahdollisuudet nähdään ensiarvoisen tärkeinä. Aineistosta voidaan nostaa vastuun merkitys vapaudelle, mikä ei kuitenkaan nouse esille teoreettisessa viitekehyksessä. Tutkimuksen tulokset ovat subjektiivinen tulkinta, eikä niitä siten voi laajemmin yleistää. Koska tutkimuksen paradigma on suurelta osin konstruktivistinen, ei tutkimuksella yritetäkään todentaa yleispäteviä tuloksia, vaan tunnustetaan niiden olevan ennemmin subjektiivisia kuin objektiivisia.
80

"Dobro" v klasické řecké filosofii a literatuře / Good concept at classical greek philosophy and literature

Fleischerová, Andrea January 2012 (has links)
The matter of the Good in classical Greek philosophy and literature is so important and extensive that it can hardly be covered in one document. Therefore the aim of the first part of the thesis is to express both fundamental context and critical attitude towards the concept of the Good in the philosophy of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The second part provides a coherent perspective on the development of archaic literature in terms of forming the idea of gods, virtues, good and evil in classical Greek epic and tragedy. Theoretical basis of the thesis relies on the studies of important philosophers, literature historians, religionists and mythologists, whose views are connected systematically or outlined comparatively in corresponding chapters. Both main parts of the thesis are divided into chapters which follow in logical sequence. The thesis is theoretical and corresponds to the assigned topic.

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