The overarching focus of this research is to examine the role and effectiveness of formal network organizations in mitigating barriers to disaster relief. I address this larger focus by examining the impacts of one formal network organization, the Partnership for Quality Medical Donations (PQMD) on its twelve NGO members. Specifically, the study addressees the following questions: 1) How does PQMD function? 2) What effects has PQMD had on its NGO members' relationships with each other, especially in the context of disaster response efforts? The research design for this study uses a qualitative framework. The study includes a literature review, content analysis of PQMD's website, research from a previous study with the same organization, and new interviews with representatives from nine NGO members, as well as the executive director of PQMD. My findings indicate that PQMD has been able to successfully bring together 27 different organizations (private and nonprofit), and mitigate the barrier of lack of central authority and lack of trust, to discuss their concerns, learn from one another, learn about one other, and create relationships that lead to better communication and collaboration in humanitarian relief. Although PQMD is working on a much smaller scale, I argue that researchers can look at this formal network organization to better understand how to improve the coordination of humanitarian aid on a worldwide scale and can glean lessons from this group. / Master of Public and International Affairs

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在當前的治理環境下，公共任務比以往更需要整合政府及各部門組織的行動方能克盡其功。因此，多數的公共管理者應會同意，行政組際協調已成為「治理時代」重要且迫切的議題之一，公共管理者需要擁有全新的能力，從解決民眾問題的角度來回應民眾需求。本文將行政組際協調定義為「藉由兩個或兩個以上行政組織的一致行動，使特定政策或計畫的執行，能達成最少的冗餘、不一致與空隙的執行結果」。在此定義下，本文討論的行政組際協調涉及三個層面：第一個層面為跨行政組織如何產生一致行動的問題；第二個層面為行政組織間的互動關係；第三個層面為跨行政組織執行成果的問題。 本文建構的「行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型」假定官僚制度中的專業分工與獲利轉換機制的制度設計，是造成行政組織分工但不合作的主因。在此前提下，筆者引入「效用損失」的概念，做為發展行政組織行為效用函數的基礎。在行政自主性「效用損失」的概念下，筆者僅保留與行政組織政策或計畫執行最相關的自變項，分別是相依關係、溝通、管轄領域、民意監督、外部課責與內部課責等六種，來解釋行政組織的合作行為以及協調的結果等兩種依變項。由於本文將制度視為對參賽者的限制與機會，在制度陳述概念的輔助下，筆者得以清楚地設定行政組際協調的賽局情境，並將行政責任的思考轉化為外部課責與內部課責等兩種課責參數型態。在此課責制度框架下，筆者建立行政組際協調的空間結構，透過行政組織自主性效用之簡單損失函數以及制度空間模型的運用，成功建立起一個階層管理者、兩個行政組織的行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型。這個模型依據外部課責是否一致，以及內部課責是否存有共識等兩個面向，將行政組際協調賽局情境區分為四種類型，並在分別推演參賽者的行為變化後，提出十項理論命題。為詮釋這些命題在現實環境中的意義，筆者在臺北市政府研考會的同意下，引用該會於2010年10月辦理之1999跨機關陳情案件問卷調查資料，進行次級資料分析。 綜合而言，本文建構的「行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型」，是建立在一個嚴格的假定條件之上的，因此其理論的解釋力與預測能力都僅能限縮在一定的範圍內，特別是一階層管理者、兩行政組織的三人完全訊息賽局。換言之，超出這個範圍之外的行政組際協調現象，就不適合使用本模型進行解釋。本文雖然只使用極精簡的相關研究變項，卻也足以展現一個理論模型應具備的解釋與預測能力。當然，本文的研究僅是一個開端，不論在模型的廣博性以及適用性都還有極大的待改善空間。筆者也鼓勵後繼的學者，能持續地擴展與修改本文提出之理論模型，讓行政組際協調研究領域能朝向更正面的發展。 / Under the present governance environment, the government would need more efforts to coordinate different organizations’ actions than before to make sure the public services would be provided successfully. Thus, most public managers would not only agree that the interorganizational coordination has become one of the important and urgent issues in the governance era, but also they need to learn new abilities to response the citizens’ needs. The author defined the concept of interorganizational coordination as “The end-state of a public policy or program which is implemented by two or more organizations in a consistent way is characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae.” Under this definition, the author discussed three different questions of interorganization coordination in public administration. The first question is How can we formulate a set of consistent actions for implementing a public policy or program? The second question is “How can we explain the interactive relationship between the organizations in public administration?” The third question is “What kind of results would be produced by multi-organizational implementation?” The nested game model of this dissertation has been assumed that the specification and unique side payment system of bureaucracy are the fundamental institution of interorganizational coordination. Under this assumption, the author introduced the concept of simple loss function and structure-induced equilibrium to create an utility function of public organizations and a spatial model for deducing propositions of interorganizational coordination in public administration. In order to verify the propositions of the nested game model of this dissertation, the author did a case study which was including 52 appealed cases of 1999 Citizen Hotline of Taipei City Government and tested the hypothesis derived from the propositions. Finally, the author concluded that there are six independent variables, including interdependency, communication, territory, supervision, outside accountability and inside accountability which can be used to explain two dependent variables, including cooperative behaviors and the result of interorganizational coordination. The author admitted that the interorganizational coordination is a contingent process and should be carefully defined its game rules before discussing what happened in this process. This dissertation has provided a simplicity model for explaining interorganizational coordination with one hierarchical organization and two horizontal organizations within four different situations. The author hoped that other researchers can modify this simple model to explain more complex situations of interorganizational coordination. Thus, this field could be continually developed in a positive way.

Submitted by Andre Luis de Castro (ancastro@gmail.com) on 2017-08-05T12:57:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE - O FANTASMA NA MAQUINA - ANDRE CASTRO - Versao Final - 2017.pdf: 2023758 bytes, checksum: f1d27c99ae1d44a54e033be627f867ba (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Tereza Fernandes Conselmo (maria.conselmo@fgv.br) on 2017-08-07T16:59:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE - O FANTASMA NA MAQUINA - ANDRE CASTRO - Versao Final - 2017.pdf: 2023758 bytes, checksum: f1d27c99ae1d44a54e033be627f867ba (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-07T17:23:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE - O FANTASMA NA MAQUINA - ANDRE CASTRO - Versao Final - 2017.pdf: 2023758 bytes, checksum: f1d27c99ae1d44a54e033be627f867ba (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-07-11 / The increasing complexity of the State, in particular the use of new information and communication technologies have led to the emergence of new types of bureaucracies such as system-level bureaucracy and screen-level bureaucracy. The first is composed of specialists who develop information systems for public policies, while the screen-level bureaucracy is formed by middle-level and street bureaucrats who act at the end of the provision of public services, depending on the systems to perform the work. The present work has as object of study the analysis of the relations between these bureaucracies in the implementation of public policies, with emphasis on the coordination problem. In this inter bureaucratic relationship, communities of practice, discretion and expertise are important analytical elements, since they allow the creation of strategies of action by the actors and the coordination of the policy. The theoretical references on bureaucracy and implementation of public policies were constructed not only in classical texts such as Weber (2007), Wildavsky and Pressman (1973) and Lipsky (1980) that discuss the relations between bureaucracies in the implementation of But also in the more recent work by Guy Peters (1998) and Bovens and Zouridis (2002) on the coordination and role of ICTs in policies. From a methodological point of view, it is a case study comparing two public policies that differ in the way in which the relations between system level bureaucracy and screen level bureaucracy occur. In the two informal, mutually dependent, close and complementary, informal learning networks allow actors to create and use action strategies that contribute to coordination. The distinction between policies has occurred in the identification of greater coordination problems in education policy. The explanation first relates to the substantive difference of the tax collection policy, which is of greater importance to the government and has a greater maturity in the development of information systems than other secretariats, which provides greater expertise and more collaborative relationships. Empirical evidences related to the organizational characteristics of the secretariats contribute to explain this distinction, such as: the greater turnover of the bureaucrats of the Department of Education (SEED); The separate physical location of the education systems and teams development team, different from what occurs at the Treasury Department (SEFA). / A complexidade crescente do Estado, em particular, o uso de novas tecnologias de informação e comunicação, tem gerado novos tipos de burocracias, como a system-level bureaucracy (SYB) e a screen-level bureaucracy (SCB). A primeira é composta por especialistas que desenvolvem sistemas de informação para as políticas públicas, enquanto a SCB é formada por burocratas de nível médio e de rua que atuam na ponta da prestação de serviços públicos, dependendo dos sistemas para realizar seu trabalho. O presente trabalho tem como objeto de estudo a análise das relações entre essas burocracias na implementação de políticas públicas, com destaque para a problemática da coordenação. As referências teóricas sobre burocracia e implementação de políticas públicas foram construídas a partir de Weber (2007), Wildavsky e Pressman (1973) e Lipsky (1980) que discutem as relações entre burocracias na implementação de políticas públicas, e também se baseou em trabalhos mais recentes de Guy Peters (1998) e Bovens e Zouridis (2002), concernentes à coordenação e ao papel das TICs nas políticas. Do ponto de vista metodológico, trata-se de um de caso comparado entre duas políticas públicas: a de arrecadação fiscal e de educação básica do estado do Paraná enfocando os processos de desenvolvimento de sistemas de informação com a participação da CELEPAR (Companhia de Tecnologia da Informação e Comunicação do estado do Paraná). Tais políticas se diferenciam pela forma como ocorrem as relações entre a SYB e a SCB. Nas duas políticas, redes informais de aprendizado, mutuamente dependentes, próximas e complementares, permitem aos atores a criação e utilização de estratégias de ação que contribuem com a coordenação. A distinção entre as políticas se deu na identificação de maiores problemas de coordenação na política de educação. A explicação relaciona-se primeiro, à diferença substantiva da política de arrecadação fiscal, que possui maior importância para o governo e maturidade maior no desenvolvimento de sistemas de informação se comparado a outras secretarias, que confere maior expertise e relações mais colaborativas. Características organizacionais das secretarias contribuem para explicar as implicações dessa distinção, como a rotatividade maior dos burocratas da Secretaria de Educação (SEED); a localização física separada da equipe de desenvolvimento de sistemas e equipes da educação, diferente do que ocorre na Secretaria da Fazenda (SEFA).