Network, organizational, and policy learning literatures indicate that when interest groups face failure they will seek out alternative ideas and strategies that will enhance their potential for future success. Research with regard to interest groups and legal change has found that interest groups, using arguments that were once accepted as the legal standard for Supreme Court decisions, were unwilling or unable to alter their arguments when the Court reversed its position on these legal standards. This research project examined the conflicting findings of these literatures. Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework as a guide, this project studied the separationist advocacy coalition in cases regarding state aid to elementary and secondary sectarian schools from 1971 to 2002. The legal briefs filed by members of the separationist advocacy coalition with the Court were examined using content analysis to track changes in their legal arguments. Elite interviews were then conducted to gain an understanding of the rationale for results found in the content analysis. The research expectation was that the separationist advocacy coalition would seek out and incorporate into their briefs new and innovative legal arguments to promote their policy goals. The research results demonstrated that prior to legal change interest groups did seek out and incorporate new legal arguments borrowed from other fora and sought to expand or reinterpret established legal arguments to better aid their policy goals. The changes that seemed to have the potential for adoption by the Court were quickly incorporated into the briefs of the other members of the coalition. Following legal change interest groups continued to analyze the decisions of the Court in order to seek out the best possible legal arguments to use in their briefs; however, the main focus of legal arguments examined and used by the coalition narrowed to those cited by the swing justice in the funding cases. Two innovative arguments were developed, but were either ignored or considered unsuitable, and were not used by the other members of the coalition. Counter to this project's research expectations new and innovative legal arguments were not adopted by the coalition. As the Court discontinued the use of various legal arguments the coalition quickly responded to these changes and dropped those obsolete legal arguments. Therefore, contrary to prior research, the interest groups and the coalition altered their arguments following legal change. Only those interest groups who no longer participated in coalition discussions reverted back to using pre-legal change arguments. Learning continued to occur in the coalition following legal change; however, the focus of analysis and the pool of arguments deemed worthy of use narrowed considerably. / Ph. D.

The starting point for a consideration of law in former colonies is often a law/custom binary whereby law is the formal legal system imposed during the colonial occupation and retained at independence, and custom the local law disrupted by colonialism. In most South Pacific small island countries, this dichotomy of law and custom has been formalized by the protection of custom by constitutional or statutory provisions. The protection of custom was carried out as a celebration of local culture at Independence, but the effect has been to stymie the development of local custom and to reinforce custom’s post-colonial subsidiary position relative to the formalized legal system. The Kingdom of Tonga avoided the indirect rule of late colonialism and as a result Tonga’s legal system was never dichotomized into law and custom. There was no constitutional protection of custom because custom was never characterized as something other than law. Although it is undeniable that the direction of the development of law in Tonga was impacted by the presence of the Imperial project in the region, the legal change that occurred was led by Tongans. The starting point for legal change in Tonga was, and continues to be Tongan legal traditions even though local custom has not been formally protected. This project considers the two human concepts of apology and the protection of reputation. In Tonga’s hierarchical society both concepts already represented important legal traditions when the formal British-style legal system was adopted. However, these legal traditions were not relegated to something ‘other’ than law. The former continued as an informal legal tradition that addressed legal harms not recognized by adopted legal traditions, while the latter was incorporated into the adopted formal legal system with provisions that continued to reflect the distinctive Tongan society. Both legal traditions have faced challenges recently. Apology was no longer recognized as an efficacious remedy for women in the case of domestic abuse. The protection of the inviolable reputations of the monarch and nobility was limited by the exercise of the constitutional right of the freedom of the press. In both cases Tongans chose to exercise adopted constitutional rights in order to limit what was perceived to be an abuse of the exercise of power in the hierarchical society. Because local legal traditions had not been preserved as something apart from Tongan law, this development did not signal the end of Tongan legal traditions. Rather, it demonstrated the continuing development of Tongan law. / Graduate

Under the hopeful atmosphere of Turkey's accession to full membership to European Union, Turkey became oriented towards realizing extensive legal and constitutional amendments, as well as juridical reforms in restructuring the contemporary body of law and judicial institutions based on the promise of strengthening access to justice mechanisms and improving human rights laws and practices in Turkey that was shaped by the discourses of democratic governance, rule of law, and economic progress. At the beginning of the second decade of 2000, the affective atmosphere in Turkey abruptly changed by a series of national and international crises, leading into an impasse in the ordinary life in Turkey. This dissertation aims to examine the promise of legal change as the history of the present of law and legal practice in Turkey. Focusing on everyday personal and professional practices of avukats (attorneys) in addressing the legal issues of gender and sexuality, I explore how the narratives of legal change historically inform the aesthetic formation of the contemporary body of law, as well as the differences between ordinary and professional bodies. Building on theories of affect and queer theories, I argue that the law constitutes both a historical site of socio-cultural belonging and an everyday social space within and through which professional bodies become oriented towards generating the possibilities of socio-legal change, depending how their personal and professional experiences and encounters shape their everyday legal practices and how they reside within judicial and professional positionalities in practicing the law. / Doctor of Philosophy / Starting from early 2000s, the contemporary body of law and judicial institutions underwent drastic changes, which accelerated by Turkey's accession to full membership to European Union. Under the discourses of democratic governance, rule of law, and economic progress, Turkey realized extensive legal and constitutional amendments, as well as juridical reforms with an emphasis on strengthening access to justice mechanisms and improving human rights laws and practices in Turkey. A series of national and international crises, which broke out at the begging of the second decade of 2000s, led Turkey to enter into a political and economic deadlock. In this dissertation, I examine the historical meanings attributed to the body and practice of law in discussing how the legal professional bodies are affected from the recent crises. Focusing on everyday personal and professional practices of avukats (attorneys) in addressing the legal issues of gender and sexuality, I explore how the historical narratives concerning legal change shaped the conventions of the form and content of the law, as well as the differences between the personal and professional identities. I argue that law constitutes a historical site in which socio-cultural norms and hierarchies are negotiated and a social space within and through which professional bodies negotiate the possibilities of social change, depending on how they shape their everyday personal and professional practices and how they position themselves within judicial and professional relations.

Mi tesis utiliza la noción de contrato relacional para explicar pautas aparentemente contraintuitivas de organización vertical. El primer capitulo muestra que, cuando existen externalidades entre empresas, la integración vertical reduce la tentación de sus ejecutivos de bajar el esfuerzo, haciendo sus promisas de cooperar más creibles. El segundo capitulo muestra que, cuando una regulación europea prohibió los territorios exclusivos en la distribución de automóviles, los fabricantes impusieron estándares de servicio y precios maximos, estos últimos para reducir la tentación de los concesionarios de romper pactos informales para no competir. El tercer capitulo muestra que, pese a la asignación simétrica de derechos de decisión en sus contratos de franquicia, los fabricantes de coches dictan estándares a los concesionarios, remunerandolos con descuentos discrecionales. Eso sugiere que los fabricantes son delegados informalmente para tomar decisiones, y usan sus podéres contractuales como recurso extremo contra la tentación de los concesionarios de rechazarlas. / My thesis applies the notion of relational contracts to explain seemingly counterintuitive vertical arrangements. The first chapter shows that, in the presence of spillovers between an upstream and a downstream firm, vertical integration reduces the downstream manager's present gains from shirking, making her promise to cooperate with the upstream firm credible. The second chapter shows that, after a European regulation prohibited exclusive territories, car dealership contracts switched to a mix of service standards and price ceilings, and argues that price ceilings were introduced to reduce the dealers' short-run profits from reneging on an informal "no-compete" agreement. The third chapter shows that, despite the even allocation of decision rights in dealership contracts, car manufacturers dictate performance standards ex post, and reward dealers through discretionary discounts. This suggests manufacturers are informally delegated to set standards, and use formal decision rights as a last resort against the dealers' temptation to overturn their decisions.

The aim of this dissertation is to illuminate the interplay between female agency and legal regulation in Sweden during the period 1760-1860. The material chosen for the study relates to matters concerning women that were brought before the Judiciary Inspection, the highest legal authority in Sweden. From its central position in the state hierarchy, this court was an arena in which the central power could identify and find solutions to problems important for the stability and development of society. The study identifies issues that encouraged women to bring proceedings before the court, or prompted other parties to bring women to court. The dissertation has analysed the actions taken and arguments made in these cases by women, their counterparts, and court representatives, in relation to the regulations or the absence of regulations in each particular situation. This has shown the room for manoeuvre that could be achieved, and how the women could achieve it – in terms of right to manage property, economic agency and debt responsibility, finding ways to support themselves and their families, or affirming their positions as mothers and mistresses of households. In this way, the dissertation illuminates the freedom of agency in practice that has often been seen as contradictory in a strictly patriarchal society like early modern Sweden. The dissertation also traces some important changes over time, including the increasingly diverse class background of litigants over the period in question, shifts in understandings of property, work, family, and the meaning of legal majority. The central diachronic claims are firstly that the legal system shifted over time from one primarily based upon status, circumstance, and local opinion to one based on formalized understanding of the law founded upon contract and clear legal definitions, and that this had important implications for women’s room for manoeuvre in the courts and in society. Secondly, that the negotiation process contributed to historical change by forcing solutions to contradictions and specifying terms of property ownership and legal majority.