本研究以2005年勞退新制為例，探討資遣費對資遣率之影響。在勞退新制實施之後，資遣費的給付額度不僅大幅減少，還多了上限，因此，基於資遣費往往被視為雇主所直接面對的資遣成本，資遣率是否會受到勞退新制中資遣費改變的影響，為本研究欲探討分析的議題。本研究資料來源為人力運用擬-追蹤調查資料庫，研究方法使用差異中之差異法(difference in differences)，並依據員工是否適用於勞基法，將樣本劃分為實驗組與對照組進行分析。實證結果顯示，資遣費對於資遣率並無顯著的影響力，因此政府若希望資遣費制度能有預防雇主任意資遣員工的效果，則現行的資遣費制度可能無法達到此目標，而未來是否需要針對資遣費進行修法仍有討論空間。 / This study uses the 2005 Labor Pension Act (LPA) in Taiwan as the quasi-experiment to analyze the impact of severance pay on the layoff rate. After implementation of LPA, severance pay is reduced significantly and constrained by an upper boundary. Since severance pay is often considered as the firing cost, whether the layoff rate is affected by the largely reduced severance pay is what this study expects to analyze. Data used in this study are drawn from the Manpower Utility Quasi – Longitudinal Survey (MUQLS). In order to apply the difference in differences method, the observations are divided into the treatment group and the reference group according to the coverage of the Labor Standards Act (LSA). The empirical results suggest that severance pay has no significant impact on the layoff rate. Therefore, if severance pay is expected to prevent the arbitrary layoff, the current severance pay system might not achieve this goal and some modifications of this system might be necessary.

退休金的會計處理原本即具複雜性，加上最近退休金制度的變革，形成退休金會計獨特且豐富的情境背景，提供了許多的研究機會。本論文包含三個與退休金會計相關之議題；其中第一個議題是「勞工退休金新制之股價效應」；第二個議題是「退休金精算假設選用之誘因」；第三個議題是「退休金精算假設選用之價值攸關性」。三個議題均以效率市場假說為基礎，針對勞工退休金新制之實施與退休金精算假設之選用，分別深入探討其與股價之關聯性。 首先，本論文第一個議題探討勞退新制之股價效應。事件日股票報酬與公司特質的關聯分析，雖然部分的實證結果不顯著，然而部分的證據顯示，勞退新制公布實施時，公司股票報酬與退休金提撥不足程度、員工平均服務年資、退休金提撥率、退休金成率等公司特質具有關聯性，隱含資本市場在某種程度上，似乎可以依據勞退新制對公司不同之衝擊程度，反映於公司股票報酬。 其次，本論文第二個議題探討退休金精算假設選用之誘因。實證的結果顯示，我國上市上櫃公司精算假設選用的橫斷面差異，可能源於債務契約、提撥不足之成本以及損益平穩化等誘因。最後，本論文第三個議題探討退休金精算假設選用之價值攸關性。實證結果顯示，退休金精算假設選用具價值攸關性，投資人對公司選用精算假設保守程度有所評價，對於裁量性 (隱藏的) 預計給付義務亦有所反映，似乎適當地根據精算假設選用對於預計給付義務之影響幅度來調整對公司之評價，隱含資本市場並未功能性固著於報導的退休金義務。 / There are three essays in this dissertation. The first essay examines the impact on equity prices of the Promulgation of Labor Pension Act. Evidence reported in the paper shows that negative abnormal returns are most pronounced for firms with large underfunded level of pension plan, firms with little average years of employment, firms with low contribution ratio, and firms with low pension cost ratio. The second essay explains the cross-sectional variation in firms’ selected actuarial assumptions (rate of increase in compensation and discount rate) used to measure the projected benefit obligation (PBO). Evidence shows that firms with relatively larger debt ratio, larger underfunded level of pension plan, and larger decline in earnings tend to select more aggressive (obligation-reducing) estimation parameters. The last essay studies the association between actuarial assumptions and firm value. The results indicate that firm value is lower, conditional on the reported PBO, for firms that use higher discount rates and lower rate of increase in compensation. This is consistent with investors seeing through managers’ opportunistic choices of obligation reducing assumptions. The evidence suggests that the stock market does not fixate on reported PBO numbers, but properly appreciates the value relevance of the discretionary component of the PBO.

勞動基準法、勞工退休金條例課予雇主於成就一定要件下，有給付勞工退休金、資遣費之責，以保護照顧勞工。然時至今日，為因應全球化趨勢，經營者透過交互協力的經營網絡，使人事調動亦趨於頻繁，產生多法人格經營組織形態下的調職。惟勞工退休金與資遣費係本於勞動契約之請求，故其求償對象為「勞動契約上雇主」，當事人一方(事業單位)改變，工作年資重新計算，將衍生應以誰承擔雇主責任及工作年資併計、平均工資計算等債權範圍問題。甚或雇主透過關係企業交叉控制，濫用公司法人格、掏空資產，導致關廠歇業，勞工之債權求償無門。 勞動基準法各條文所規範之雇主(責任主體)，須斟酌各該法條的立法意旨與目的予以審酌認定，且未包含多重勞動關係之處理。我國公司法第154條第2項規定引進揭穿公司面紗原則，惟勞工如係因關係企業、家族企業調動，導致工作年資中斷或勞動條件不利益變更，損及其權益，尚難逕以該法條要求控制股東負清償之責，以擴張雇主責任。又104年2月4日修正公布勞動基準法第28條規定，提升退休金與資遣費之受償順位，並納入墊償，該條文對勞動債權之保護及施行以來之適用問題，亦為本文關切之重點。 　　本文將從雇主範圍、跨法人格企業調動、經營主體消滅等變動因素下，探討勞工退休金及資遣費之求償對象、求償範圍及債權保護等，並透過檢視現行勞動法制、公司法關係企業債權人保護之規定，介紹美國「揭穿公司面紗原則」、日本「法人格否認理論」、我國實務發展「實體同一性」概念等，試圖描繪擴充退休金與資遣費求償與保護法制之輪廓，並對於擴張勞工退休金與資遣費追償對象之可能，提出相關建議以供參考。

勞退新制即將在 94年 7 月 1 日起正式實施，在新的退休金體系下，勞工可由舊制的確定給付制轉換到擁有資產配置與投資決策權利的確定提撥制。台灣的勞退新制可分為兩種退休金制度供勞工選擇－個人帳戶制及其他年金制。確定提撥制與確定給付制在本質上有諸多的差異性，分別具有不同的優缺點，在本文的假設下，轉換選擇權存在於個人帳戶制與其他年金制之間。另外，在期望達到勞工退休金財富極大化的目標下，勞工會選擇在適當的時點，由個人帳戶制轉換到其他年金制。 　　雖然本文是採定值模型來分析，但是提供一個直觀上充分的洞悉與表徵，來解釋勞退新制下之個人帳戶制及其他年金制之間，若存在一最適轉換時點，其在經濟意涵中所表示之抵換關係與經濟價值為何。本文建構一個退休金財富極大化之模型，結合數值模擬的方法來分析其要點。研究結果發現，最適轉換時點之衡量，是由兩種制度下的變動率，而非帳戶內金額之大小來決定；此外，年金精算現值計算經折現後的給付率和剩餘工作年數，對於勞動工作者的選擇也屬重要變數之一。另外，本文針對年輕的勞工，在不同投資報酬率環境下，計算出兩種制度間抵換的價值；最後，本文也探討了執行轉換選擇權對於不同年紀的勞動工作者影響的幅度。總而言之，本文希望提供勞動工作者在勞退新制下，一個退休金財富配置最適化的準則，及執行轉換選擇權時參考的方針。 / The newly Labor Pension Act will be carried out in 2005 soon. Under this new pension system, employees will be given the choices of converting their traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plan into an individual-account defined contribution (DC) pension plan with full control over assets allocation and investment decisions. Under DC pension plan in Taiwan, there are two types of pension plan- Individual Account System and Commercial Pension Plan System- for employees to choose. DC and DB pension plan are totally different in essences, so on the basis of our assumptions, switch options will exist among Individual Account System and Commercial Retirement Plan System. Thus, in order to maximum employees’ retired wealth, employees might choose the optimal time to convert Individual Account System into Commercial Pension Plan System. Although our model is deterministic in nature, we believe that it provides an intuitive insight about switch options. We find not only the optimal switch time between Individual Account System and Commercial Retirement Plan System but also the “trade-off” economic values. This paper designs a model of maximizing retired wealth and makes numerical simulation to analyze optimal switch time. We find it is the “rate of change” of these two different pension systems affects the times for employees to exercise switch options. Besides, both the payment-rate scaled present value of the DB pension annuity and the retirement horizon are significant parameters in our analysis. Third, we also calculate the threshold investment returns between Individual Account System and Commercial Pension Plan System under various investment environments. Finally, we also contrast the effects of exercising switch options between younger and older employees. In short, we want to provide some principles for employees to make the optimal retired wealth allocation under Newly Labor Pension Act, then exercise switch options at the proper time.