O trabalho tem por objetivo analisar em que medida o Poder Executivo está autorizado pela Constituição Federal e pela lei estadual paulista a conferir a contribuintes do Imposto sobre Operações relativas à Circulação de Mercadorias e sobre Prestação de Serviços de Transporte Interestadual e Intermunicipal e de Comunicação (ICMS) tratamentos tributários diferenciados, mediante a expedição de norma individual e abstrata que modifique a sua regra-matriz de incidência ou a forma de cumprimento de obrigações instrumentais. Cumpre-nos examinar a legitimidade da concessão de regime especial diante dos princípios da legalidade, igualdade e devido processo legal. Esta análise pressupõe o exercício da função administrativa discricionária quando da identificação dos casos especiais nos quais o contribuinte encontra dificuldades para cumprir com suas obrigações tributárias sem prejuízo de sua atividade econômica. A preocupação é como compatibilizar a possibilidade de modificação do tratamento tributário aplicável a este contribuinte com (i) a regra-matriz de incidência do ICMS delineada no texto constitucional e veiculada pelo Poder Legislativo estadual e (ii) a manutenção da neutralidade do Estado e das condições de livre concorrência. Buscaremos examinar em quais condições normativas poderia o Poder Executivo Estadual conceder regimes especiais consensuais de tributação pelo ICMS. / The work aims to analyze to which extent the Executive Branch is authorized by the Federal Constitution and by the São Paulo State law to grant to taxpayers of the State Value Added Tax (ICMS) special tax treatments upon the issuance of an individual and abstract rule that modifies the general legal provision on the levy of this tax or that modifies how to comply with the instrumental obligations. We shall examine the lawfulness of the concession of the special tax regime in view of principles of legality, equality and due process of law. This analysis assumes the exercise of discretionary administrative function when identifying the special cases in which the taxpayer finds it difficult to meet their tax obligations without jeopardizing its economic activity. The concern is how to reconcile the possibility of modifying the tax treatment applicable to that taxpayer with (i) the general legal provision on the ICMS levy outlined in the Constitution and enacted by the state Legislative Branch and (ii) maintaining the neutrality of the state and the free competition conditions. We will seek to examine in which normative conditions the State Executive Branch could grant consensual special ICMS tax regimes.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-02-09T11:23:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Júlio César Maggio Stürmer_.pdf: 2323770 bytes, checksum: fdfa09d6e4ea4c23c8913aba6208b4bf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-09T11:23:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Júlio César Maggio Stürmer_.pdf: 2323770 bytes, checksum: fdfa09d6e4ea4c23c8913aba6208b4bf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-12 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho pretende, a partir da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito de Lenio Streck, que tem por base uma visão hermenêutico-filosófica do Direito, estudar o processo, estabelecendo uma nova concepção teórica e prática. Para tanto, foi investigado como o processo é compreendido e manejado no Direito brasileiro, em especial no tocante às suas eventuais amarras ao direito privado (instrumento) e ao trato regionalizado (divisão por ramos), confrontando esses elementos com a ideia de unidade ou núcleo fundamental existente no processo. Essa unidade fundamental, cujo conteúdo é atravessado por elementos paradigmáticos, é apresentada como o ponto a partir do qual se deve pensar o processo. Assim, sob aportes filosóficos de Heidegger e Gadamer, procura-se demonstrar que a compreensão é um fenômeno que ocorre de forma única, partindo da pré-compreensão do intérprete, que é povoada por pré-conceitos, alguns legítimos (devem ser considerados), outros não. Fazendo a conexão entre Filosofia e Direito, sustenta-se que é preciso atribuir um sentido adequado ao processo, como processo democrático. Trata-se de uma concepção de processo que respeita os paradigmas entregues pela tradição (jurídica e filosófica). São eles que darão o mundo inserido no qual o intérprete deve compreender adequadamente o processo (direitos, garantias etc.) para a obtenção de repostas (decisões/interpretações) adequadas, na linha defendida por Lenio Streck. Aliado a essa nova visão teórica, tem-se o aspecto prático daí decorrente, em relação ao qual se entende que é necessária a existência de critérios ou de filtros que orientem o intérprete em sua atividade, permitindo que, em sua reflexão, ao “se dar conta de seus pré-juízos”, possa avaliá-los como legítimos ou ilegítimos. Da mesma forma, tais critérios/filtros irão permitir que, além do decisor, os demais membros da comunidade jurídica – partes e doutrina, por exemplo – possam avaliar a adequação da decisão, viabilizando o “constrangimento” (Streck) em busca da resposta adequada. Defende-se, assim, que: a) o processo democrático deve ser considerado como elemento da pré-compreensão e, portanto, condição de possibilidade de toda e qualquer compreensão; b) o processo jurisdicional (seja civil, penal, trabalhista etc.) possui uma unidade – ou núcleo fundamental –, pensada a partir dos paradigmas entregues pela tradição e que dão sentido ao que se nomina de processo democrático. Portanto, considerando o lugar de fala desta tese (paradigmático, como já exposto), a ideia de processo democrático deve atravessar, com todo seu conteúdo, qualquer perspectiva disciplinar de processo, informando, também, o intérprete/aplicador do direito; c) O processo democrático, cujo conteúdo paradigmático é uniforme em todas as áreas do Direito, é um pré-conceito legítimo que deve ser considerado pelo intérprete para que se obtenha uma resposta constitucionalmente adequada. Caso o intérprete não se dê conta desse pré-conceito, ou não o aceite, decidindo sem considerá-lo, a resposta judicial será marcada pela arbitrariedade; d) É necessária a existência de critérios ou de filtros que orientem o intérprete em sua atividade, permitindo que, em sua reflexão, ao “se dar conta de seus pré-juízos”, possa avaliá-los como legítimos ou ilegítimos, contribuindo para a interpretação/resposta adequada. / From Lenio Streck’s Hermeneutical Critique of Law and its hermeneutical-philosophical reading of Law, the present study seeks to study the legal process, establishing new theoretical and practical conceptions. In order to do that, this work investigates how the legal process actually works in the Brazilian legal system, especially regarding its possible bindings to private law (instrumental) and its separation into branches, confronting these elements to an idea of unity and fundamental core to legal procedures. This fundamental unity and its content crossed by paradigmatic elements is presented as the starting point from which the legal process must be thought. This way, under philosophical insights from Heidegger and Gadamer, this study aims to show that the process of understanding is a phenomenon that happens in a unique way, starting from the interpreter’s pre-understanding and its pre-judgments (some of them are legitimate and should be considered, while others should not. Connecting Philosophy and Law, this work seeks to establish an adequate conception of legal process as a democratic process, a conception that respects the paradigms that come from the legal and philosophical tradition. These are the paradigms that will support the world in which the interpreter shall adequately understand the process (its rights, guarantees, etc.) in order to reach adequate interpretations and decisions. From this new theoretical conception, the consequent practical aspect is the need for criteria and filters that guide the interpreters and their activity, allowing them to understand their own pre-conceptions and therefore evaluate them as legitimate or illegitimate. In the same way, such criteria/filters allow not only the judge, but all the legal community – the parties and legal scholars, for instance – to evaluate if a sentence is adequate, making it possible for a public “constraint” (Streck) in search of an adequate decision. This study defends that: a) the democratic process should be considered an element of the pre-understanding step, and therefore condition of possibility of every understanding; b) the legal process has a unity – or fundamental core – established by the paradigms of tradition that give significance to the conception of a democratic process. Therefore, considering the paradigmatic role of this thesis, the idea of a democratic process shall be present with all of its content in any legal process approach by the Law interpreter. c) The democratic process, and its paradigmatic content that is uniform to all legal areas, is a legitimate pre-conception and must be considered by the interpreter in order to obtain a decision according to the Constitution. If the judge/interpreter does not consider such pre-conception, or does not accept it, deciding a case without considering it, arbitrariness will taint the legal decision. d) It is necessary to establish criteria and filters that guide the legal interpreters in their activity, allowing them to understand their own pre-conceptions and therefore evaluate them as legitimate or illegitimate, contributing to an adequate interpretation and one right answer in the legal decision.

Šiuolaikinė tarptautinė teisė įtvirtina pagarbą žmogaus teisėms bei užtikrina šių teisių įgyvendinimą šalių nacionalinėje teisėje. Žmogaus teisės apima įvairias asmens teises ir laisves, tačiau kad šios teisės būtų realiai įgyvendinamos visų pirma būtina užtikrinti teisę į asmens teisių ir laisvių gynybą. Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucijoje įtvirtinta teisė kreiptis į teismą. Teisė į teismą savo apimtimi yra gerokai siauresnė, nei teisė į teisingą teisinį procesą, tačiau neužtikrinus pirmosios nebus įmanoma ir antroji, ką ne kartą savo nutarimuose yra pabrėžės ir Lietuvos Konstitucinis Teismas. Šio magistro baigiamojo darbo tikslas išanalizuoti ir nustatyti teisės į teisingą teisinį procesą įtvirtinimo Lietuvos Konstitucinio teismo ir kitų valstybių konstitucinės kontrolės institucijų jurisprudencijoje teorinius ir praktinius aspektus. Darbo pradžioje aptariamas žmogaus teisių įgyvendinimas demokratinėje visuomenė, trumpai apžvelgiant jų istorinę raidą ir teisinį įtvirtinimą. Antrajame skyriuje nagrinėjama teisės į teisingą teismą samprata ir jos pagrindiniai elementai Europos žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvencijos aspektu, bei atsižvelgiant į jų įtvirtinimą Lietuvos teisinėje sistemoje. Trečiasis skyrius skiriamas teisės į teisingą teisinį procesą sampratos lyginamajai analizei, t.y. analizuojama teisės į teisingą teisinį procesą sampratos interpretavimas Lietuvos Konstitucinio, Lietuvos Aukščiausiojo ir Lietuvos vyriausiojo administracinio teismų... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Contemporary international law declares the respect to human rights and guarantees the implementation of these rights in the national law of states. Human rights involve various rights and freedoms, but in purpose the mentioned rights could be implemented in reality, first of all it is necessary to guarantee the right of protection of human rights and freedoms. The human right to apply to the court is set in the Constitution of Republic of Lithuania. Right to trial is much more tight than right to a fair legal process, but if the first is not guaranteed, it is not possible and the second one, this was pointed in the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania for several times. The aim of the present thesis is to analyze and to determine the theoretical and practical aspects of fixation of the right to fair legal process in the jurisprudence of Constitutional Court of Lithuania and of institutions of constitutional control of other states. The thesis begins with review of implementation of human rights in democratic society, with short review of historical development and legal fixation. The second part analyses the concept of right to a fair trial and it‘s basic elements in the aspect of Convention of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, considering their fixation in the legal system of Lithuania. The third part of thesis is designed for the comparative analysis of concept of right to a fair legal process i.e. analyses interpretation of concept... [to full text]

In the first half of the 20th Century, the United Kingdom’s counter-terror laws were couched extremely broadly. Consequently, they bestowed upon the executive extraordinarily wide powers with which it could address perceived threats of terrorism. In that period of time, the internal affairs of any state were considered sacrosanct and beyond the reach of international law. Consequentially, international human rights law was not a feature of the first half of the 20th Century. Following the war, however, international human rights law grew steadily, largely through the propagation of international treaties. As the 20th Century progressed, the United Kingdom became increasingly involved in international human rights law, particularly by way of the ratification of a number of treaties. Prior to the year 2000, none of these treaties had been directly incorporated into the United Kingdom’s municipal law. The traditional Dualist understanding of the relationship between international treaty law and municipal law in the United Kingdom, would hold that these unincorporated human rights treaties would form no part of that state’s domestic law. This Dualist assumption is called into question, however, by a legislative trend which neatly coincides with the United Kingdom’s increased involvement with international human rights. This trend consists of two elements, firstly, the progressively plethoric and specific ways in which the United Kingdom began to define its anti-terror laws. The specificity in which this legislation was set out curtailed the executive’s powers. The second element is that, over time, the United Kingdom’s counter-terror laws increasingly began to include checks and balances on the executive. There is a clear correlation between these trends and the United Kingdom’s evolving relationship with international human rights law. That nation’s enmeshment with international human rights law from 1945 onwards is undeniably linked with the parallel evolution of its domestic counter-terror laws. v One of the grounds on which the status of international law is questioned is that it is ineffectual. This thesis calls such arguments into question, as it shows that international human rights treaties have meaningfully impacted on the United Kingdom’s evolving counter-terror laws and thereby successfully enforced the norms they advocate. / Public, Constitutional, & International / LL.D.

In the first half of the 20th Century, the United Kingdom’s counter-terror laws were couched extremely broadly. Consequently, they bestowed upon the executive extraordinarily wide powers with which it could address perceived threats of terrorism. In that period of time, the internal affairs of any state were considered sacrosanct and beyond the reach of international law. Consequentially, international human rights law was not a feature of the first half of the 20th Century. Following the war, however, international human rights law grew steadily, largely through the propagation of international treaties. As the 20th Century progressed, the United Kingdom became increasingly involved in international human rights law, particularly by way of the ratification of a number of treaties. Prior to the year 2000, none of these treaties had been directly incorporated into the United Kingdom’s municipal law. The traditional Dualist understanding of the relationship between international treaty law and municipal law in the United Kingdom, would hold that these unincorporated human rights treaties would form no part of that state’s domestic law. This Dualist assumption is called into question, however, by a legislative trend which neatly coincides with the United Kingdom’s increased involvement with international human rights. This trend consists of two elements, firstly, the progressively plethoric and specific ways in which the United Kingdom began to define its anti-terror laws. The specificity in which this legislation was set out curtailed the executive’s powers. The second element is that, over time, the United Kingdom’s counter-terror laws increasingly began to include checks and balances on the executive. There is a clear correlation between these trends and the United Kingdom’s evolving relationship with international human rights law. That nation’s enmeshment with international human rights law from 1945 onwards is undeniably linked with the parallel evolution of its domestic counter-terror laws. v One of the grounds on which the status of international law is questioned is that it is ineffectual. This thesis calls such arguments into question, as it shows that international human rights treaties have meaningfully impacted on the United Kingdom’s evolving counter-terror laws and thereby successfully enforced the norms they advocate. / Public, Constitutional, and International / LL.D.