Yes / This contribution focuses on two fundamental features of the African continent that will affect both sides of the Mediterranean in the 21st Century. On the one hand, the huge migration potential of Africa. On the other, the speed of economic change of a continent increasingly regarded as ‘the next China’. The challenge facing both the European Union and Africa is to ensure that African growth and demography will be sustainable. The paper argues that Europe will be the part of the world the most directly affected by developments in Africa, be they the worst random shocks or the most virtuous economic trends. It therefore calls for an ambitious renewed EU-Africa economic partnership, similar in scope to the Chinese cooperation model in Africa but without imitating it, to avoid a migratory haemorrhage and make African development sustainable to the benefit of both sides of the Mediterranean.

Les Asiatiques n‘ont, jusqu'à présent, jamais eu l‘occasion d‘organiser leur paix propre. C‘est sur ce chemin qu‘il faut chercher une forme de coexistence et de coopération asiatique tout comme l‘Europe l‘a réalisée après la seconde guerre mondiale. C‘est pour cette raison que l‘idée d‘unification européenne et en particulier celle de Jean Monnet est capitale. Bien entendu, il ne s‘agit pas de transposer mécaniquement et intégralement un modèle européen théorique, en écartant tout particularisme asiatique, mais plutôt de reprendre l‘esprit et les idées du modèle ainsi que la démarche (voire la méthodologie) adoptée lors de sa construction. / (no summary)

La pénurie de charbon a constitué une des préoccupations incessantes de la politique énergétique à partir des années trente en France. Dès la Libération, ce problème a conduit le gouvernement à adopter le programme de modernisation du charbonnage. Vers le début des années cinquante, la pénurie absolue en charbon a été endiguée. Dans le même temps, l'ouverture de la CECA a fourni davantage de facilités aux Français pour importer les charbons. Toutefois, le choix du gouvernement a plutôt consisté à accélérer le programme de renforcement de la production de charbon en vue de satisfaire les besoins le plus possible grâce à sa propre production dans une période où le pays souffrait d'une aggravation de la situation de la balance des comptes commerciaux. Cette politique s'est basée sur des hypothèses prévoyant une progression continuelle des besoins en charbon et que les mines françaises se trouvaient en mesure d'améliorer suffisamment leur compétitivité pour concurrencer leurs homologues étrangères. Cependant, ces hypothèses n'ont pas été confirmées par les faits. La crise du charbon de 1958 a provoqué un gonflement des stocks qui a obligé le gouvernement à annoncer le Plan Jeanneney. Le gouvernement a essayé par ailleurs de résoudre le problème de l'accumulation des stocks. Cet effort s'est concrétisé par la conclusion d'un contrat entre l'EDF et les CDF en 1965 par suite de l'intervention des pouvoirs publics. Ces derniers ont contraint l'EDF à accepter tous les charbons proposés par les CDF. L'EDF devait ainsi supporter les charges résultant de la politique d'accroissement de la production charbonnière menée par le gouvernement selon des prévisions erronées. / One of the most urgent tasks for French economy after Libération was to increase coal production. French government nationalized coal industry in 1946 and decided to increase coal production in the framework of Monnet Plan by concentrating financial and material resource to coal industry. France succeeded in increasing coal production according to Monnet Plan by the early 50's. The government estimated that national demand for coal would increase constantly through 50's and 60's. On the other hand, France had easier access to coal importation than before in 1952 with the institution of ECSC. However, French government decided to continue to increase national coal production in order to meet national demand for coal by its own production, and in order not to deteriorate current account. But in fact, national demand for coal did not increased as the government estimated. Coal crisis in 1958 forced the government to revise coal production programme to reduce national coal output. Meanwhile, French government made efforts to secure outlets of national coal. These efforts were concretized by the conclusion of contract between Électricité de France (EDF) et Charbonnages de France (CDF). By this contract, EDF was obliged to receive all quantity of national coal that CDF hoped to sell to electric sector. Thus, electric sector had to pay the price for coal policy that the government drew up according to the wrong estimation of national demand for coal.

Ma thèse mêle analyse les effets de la mondialisation des sciences sur la façon dont les Etats-nations modifient leur façon de concevoir leur souveraineté et leurs intérêts nationaux. Partant du cas de la mondialisation de la science nucléaire d’après-guerre, j’explique la genèse de communautés supranationales dans le domaine nucléaire proposées par les gouvernements américain et européens des années quarante aux années soixante-dix. A partir d’une démarche socio-historique, ma recherche donne des réponses aux questions suivantes : comment les Etats-nations ont-ils été convaincus de déléguer leur souveraineté sur le contrôle des risques nucléaires à des organisations internationales ? Quel rôle les réseaux transnationaux ont-ils joué dans ce processus ? Pour répondre à cette question, je compare le rôle de deux réseaux transatlantiques – tenants du cosmopolitisme et du libéralisme internationale pour le premier, et du fédéralisme européen pour le second – dont les savoirs experts, le capital social et l’accès aux élites politiques divergent. Comme je le montre, ces deux réseaux réussirent à atteindre leurs buts comme entrepreneurs de normes, entrepreneurs de politiques publiques, et traducteurs de politiques publiques / My dissertation examines how the globalization of modern science and technology has redefined the power and legitimacy of modern nation-states. Taking the transatlantic history of postwar nuclear science as a case in point, I focus on proposals to establish international organizations and/or supranational nuclear communities, formulated by the US government and West European governments between the 1940s and the 1970s. Drawing and expanding on the literature in historical sociology and political science, I ask: How were national governments persuaded to delegate control over the regulation of nuclear activities to international organizations? How did informal transatlantic networks successfully convince national political leaders, bureaucracies and experts to support their plans? To answer these questions, I compare the role of two transatlantic networks of nuclear scientists and policymakers whose expert skills, social capital, and access to political elites varied—liberal and cosmopolitan internationalists as opposed to European federalists. As I show, these two transatlantic networks succeeded in achieving their goals, as norm entrepreneurs, as policy entrepreneurs, as policy translators

Immédiatement après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, sous l’impulsion du Général de Gaulle et de Jean Monnet, le Gouvernement provisoire de la République française décida d’engager dans le système capitaliste français une politique économique à moyen terme désignée par le terme de « planification ». Le Plan, en tant qu’outil d’élaboration et de mise en œuvre de politiques industrielles, dirigea l’industrie française pour qu’elle puisse se développer et s’adapter aux différentes circonstances. Quatre plans furent successivement mis en œuvre dès la Libération jusqu’en 1965 par le Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP) sous la direction successive de trois commissaires généraux du Plan, à savoir Jean Monnet, Etienne Hirsch, Pierre Massé. Dans ce laps de temps furent lancés les plans suivants : Plan Pinay-Rueff, Plan intérimaire, Plan d’adaptation des charbonnages, Plan de stabilisation. Imbriquée de multiples manières à une « expansion industrielle », la planification française réussit à transformer la France rurale en une société industrielle et à faire passer l’industrie française de la situation fermée et protégée à la confrontation de la concurrence internationale. Elle joua aussi un rôle important dans le mode de rapport entre le secteur public et privé et en particulier, le fonctionnement des entreprises nationales. À plus long terme, c’était encore au Plan que revenait le mérite de tracer les lignes d’un harmonieux développement des régions françaises, surtout de l’aménagement du territoire. / Immediately after the Second World War, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, under the leadership of General de Gaulle and Jean Monnet, decided to engage in the French capitalist system a medium-term economic policy designated by the term "planning". The Plan, as a tool for the elaboration and implementation of industrial policies, directed French industry so that it could develop and adapt to different circumstances. Four Plans were successively implemented from the Liberation until 1965 by the General Planning Agency under the successive direction of three commissioners, namely Jean Monnet, Etienne Hirsch, Pierre Massé. Meanwhile, the Rueff-Pinay Stabilization Plan, Interim Plan, Plan d’adaptation des charbonnages, Giscard d’Estaing’s Stabilization Plan were launched. Interwoven in many ways with an "industrial expansion", French planning succeeded in transforming rural France into an industrial society and to shift French industry from the closed and protected situation to the confrontation of international competition. It also played an important role in the relationship between the public and private sectors and, in particular, the functioning of national enterprises. In the longer term, it was again in the Plan that the merit of drawing the lines of a harmonious development of the French regions, especially of the Spatial planning.

Pretendendo evidenciar uma leitura jurídico-política sobre o começo da integração europeia - iniciada por meio da fundação jurídica da CECA, esta Tese visa a responder à pergunta: quando, como e por meio de quais instituições, países europeus tradicionalmente opostos em termos militares estabeleceram entre si, após o término da Segunda Guerra Mundial, de maneira inédita e inaudita em sua História, um novo modo de relações responsável por tornar impossível e impensável a deflagração de nova Guerra regional? Para responder a essa pergunta, o presente trabalho assume a perspectiva de uma Pesquisa interdisciplinar em Direito, recorrendo não apenas ao Direito Positivo, mas também a outras áreas do conhecimento, tais como a Filosofia Política Antiga e Contemporânea e a História Contemporânea da Europa. O objetivo consiste em formular um aparato discursivo racional conceitual a partir de matriz de leitura fornecida pela Filosofia Política Antiga e Contemporânea para, em seguida, aplicá-lo sobre elementos da experiência histórica e jurídico-normativa positiva da CECA. A chave de leitura conceitual formada a partir de contribuições da Filosofia Política tem sua origem principalmente na aproximação das reflexões de POLÍBIO e de Claude LEFORT. O trabalho evidencia a importância de normas jurídicas institucionalmente previstas para lidar com oposições escalares na construção e na manutenção de um sistema de relações jurídico-Politicamente organizado, de maneira a que tensões entre distintas dimensões existenciais - institucionalmente absorvidas e encaminhadas - não possam significar a ruptura violenta desse sistema. Este aparato racional conceitual pode ser aplicado sobre os elementos da experiência histórica e normativa originária (Tratado de Paris de 1951) da CECA, o que permite diferenciar histórica e institucionalmente esta iniciativa em particular dos demais Projetos de Europa Unida do imediato pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial. Para os fundadores da CECA (Konrad ADENAUER, Jean MONNET e Robert SCHUMAN), um regime juridicamente regulado de simples cooperação política (Unionismo Europeu) não era considerado como suficiente para instaurar um novo modo de relações na Europa. Ao mesmo tempo, eles não visavam à construção jurídica de uma Unificação Política da Europa em torno de um Estado Federal Europeu (Federalismo Europeu). Nesse sentido, a CECA pode ser entendida como exemplo histórico singular de organização jurídico-Política de países europeus. Foram criados pelo Tratado da CECA órgãos comunitários supranacionais e intergovernamentais voltados a compartilhar com os Estados-Membros e com os respectivos povos europeus a formação do sentido normativo que deveria ser impresso sobre questões concretas sensíveis tornadas comuns. A nenhum deles foi atribuída uma posição central na nomogênese comunitária. A leitura jurídico-política da integração europeia iniciada com a CECA se mostra possível assim a partir da constatação de que a arquitetura das instituições do Tratado desta Organização Internacional mesmo das instituições que se referiam a normas jurídico-econômicas - foi responsável pela afirmação e pela conservação de um novo modo de relações entre os países europeus. Buscava-se, não um Estado Europeu, nem uma singela cooperação intergovernamental institucionalizada, mas um meio termo de organização jurídico-Política: um sistema de relações estruturado por um engenhoso mecanismo institucional orientado para promover, por meio de freios e contrapesos, de forma ininterrupta, oposições entre os participantes da vida comunitária. / Aiming to unveil a legal-political reading of the beginning of European integration - initiated by the legal foundation of the ECSC, this Thesis intends to answer the question: when, how and through which institutions, European countries traditionally opposed militarily established between themselves, after the end of the Second World War - unprecedentedly and unparalleled in their history, a new kind of relationship, which was responsible for making impossible and unthinkable the outbreak of new regional war? In order to answer this question, this study follows the path of an interdisciplinary Research in Law, resorting not only to Positive Law, but also to other fields of knowledge, such as Ancient and Contemporary Political Philosophy and Contemporary History of Europe. The objective is to read experience elements given by ECSCs History and positive legal rules through lens framed according to a rational conceptual apparatus grounded on Ancient and Contemporary Political Philosophy. The hermeneutical key framed according to Political Philosophy has its main origins in the conjoint discussion of POLYBIUS thought and Claude LEFORTs contributions. This work highlights the importance of legal institutions dealing with dimensional oppositions within the construction and maintenance of a legal-Politically organized relationships system, by which tensions institutionally absorbed and addressed - between different existential dimensions do not disrupte violently this system. This conceptual apparatus can be applied to understand ECSCs historical and and normative (Treaty of Paris, 1951) experience and helps differentiating from both a historical and institutional perspective this peculiar initiative from alternative European Union Projects immeadiately proposed after the Second World War. For ECSC founding fathers (Konrad ADENAUER, Jean MONNET and Robert SCHUMAN), a mere legal regime of political cooperation (European Unionism) was not regarded as sufficiently capable of creating a new kind of relationship in Europe. At the same time, they did not pursue a legal Political Unification of Europe within a European Federal State (European Federalism). In this sense, the ECSC can be seen as an unique historic example of a legal-Political organization of European countries. Supranational and intergovernmental community bodies were created by ECSCs Treaty in order to share with its own member-States and their respective peoples the construction of the normative sense which would conduct issues concerning sensitive common problems. To none of them was assigned a central position in Communitys normative process. A legal-political reading of European integration - started with the ECSC - seems possible because the institutional framework whithin its Treaty - even when referred to legal and economic rules - was responsible for the affirmation and preservation of a new kind of relationship between European countries. It was envisaged, neither a European State, nor an institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation, but a middle-way legal-Political organization: a relationship system erecte by an ingenious institutional mechanism conceived to promote - through checks and balances - nonstop oppositions between participants of Communitys life.

Pretendendo evidenciar uma leitura jurídico-política sobre o começo da integração europeia - iniciada por meio da fundação jurídica da CECA, esta Tese visa a responder à pergunta: quando, como e por meio de quais instituições, países europeus tradicionalmente opostos em termos militares estabeleceram entre si, após o término da Segunda Guerra Mundial, de maneira inédita e inaudita em sua História, um novo modo de relações responsável por tornar impossível e impensável a deflagração de nova Guerra regional? Para responder a essa pergunta, o presente trabalho assume a perspectiva de uma Pesquisa interdisciplinar em Direito, recorrendo não apenas ao Direito Positivo, mas também a outras áreas do conhecimento, tais como a Filosofia Política Antiga e Contemporânea e a História Contemporânea da Europa. O objetivo consiste em formular um aparato discursivo racional conceitual a partir de matriz de leitura fornecida pela Filosofia Política Antiga e Contemporânea para, em seguida, aplicá-lo sobre elementos da experiência histórica e jurídico-normativa positiva da CECA. A chave de leitura conceitual formada a partir de contribuições da Filosofia Política tem sua origem principalmente na aproximação das reflexões de POLÍBIO e de Claude LEFORT. O trabalho evidencia a importância de normas jurídicas institucionalmente previstas para lidar com oposições escalares na construção e na manutenção de um sistema de relações jurídico-Politicamente organizado, de maneira a que tensões entre distintas dimensões existenciais - institucionalmente absorvidas e encaminhadas - não possam significar a ruptura violenta desse sistema. Este aparato racional conceitual pode ser aplicado sobre os elementos da experiência histórica e normativa originária (Tratado de Paris de 1951) da CECA, o que permite diferenciar histórica e institucionalmente esta iniciativa em particular dos demais Projetos de Europa Unida do imediato pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial. Para os fundadores da CECA (Konrad ADENAUER, Jean MONNET e Robert SCHUMAN), um regime juridicamente regulado de simples cooperação política (Unionismo Europeu) não era considerado como suficiente para instaurar um novo modo de relações na Europa. Ao mesmo tempo, eles não visavam à construção jurídica de uma Unificação Política da Europa em torno de um Estado Federal Europeu (Federalismo Europeu). Nesse sentido, a CECA pode ser entendida como exemplo histórico singular de organização jurídico-Política de países europeus. Foram criados pelo Tratado da CECA órgãos comunitários supranacionais e intergovernamentais voltados a compartilhar com os Estados-Membros e com os respectivos povos europeus a formação do sentido normativo que deveria ser impresso sobre questões concretas sensíveis tornadas comuns. A nenhum deles foi atribuída uma posição central na nomogênese comunitária. A leitura jurídico-política da integração europeia iniciada com a CECA se mostra possível assim a partir da constatação de que a arquitetura das instituições do Tratado desta Organização Internacional mesmo das instituições que se referiam a normas jurídico-econômicas - foi responsável pela afirmação e pela conservação de um novo modo de relações entre os países europeus. Buscava-se, não um Estado Europeu, nem uma singela cooperação intergovernamental institucionalizada, mas um meio termo de organização jurídico-Política: um sistema de relações estruturado por um engenhoso mecanismo institucional orientado para promover, por meio de freios e contrapesos, de forma ininterrupta, oposições entre os participantes da vida comunitária. / Aiming to unveil a legal-political reading of the beginning of European integration - initiated by the legal foundation of the ECSC, this Thesis intends to answer the question: when, how and through which institutions, European countries traditionally opposed militarily established between themselves, after the end of the Second World War - unprecedentedly and unparalleled in their history, a new kind of relationship, which was responsible for making impossible and unthinkable the outbreak of new regional war? In order to answer this question, this study follows the path of an interdisciplinary Research in Law, resorting not only to Positive Law, but also to other fields of knowledge, such as Ancient and Contemporary Political Philosophy and Contemporary History of Europe. The objective is to read experience elements given by ECSCs History and positive legal rules through lens framed according to a rational conceptual apparatus grounded on Ancient and Contemporary Political Philosophy. The hermeneutical key framed according to Political Philosophy has its main origins in the conjoint discussion of POLYBIUS thought and Claude LEFORTs contributions. This work highlights the importance of legal institutions dealing with dimensional oppositions within the construction and maintenance of a legal-Politically organized relationships system, by which tensions institutionally absorbed and addressed - between different existential dimensions do not disrupte violently this system. This conceptual apparatus can be applied to understand ECSCs historical and and normative (Treaty of Paris, 1951) experience and helps differentiating from both a historical and institutional perspective this peculiar initiative from alternative European Union Projects immeadiately proposed after the Second World War. For ECSC founding fathers (Konrad ADENAUER, Jean MONNET and Robert SCHUMAN), a mere legal regime of political cooperation (European Unionism) was not regarded as sufficiently capable of creating a new kind of relationship in Europe. At the same time, they did not pursue a legal Political Unification of Europe within a European Federal State (European Federalism). In this sense, the ECSC can be seen as an unique historic example of a legal-Political organization of European countries. Supranational and intergovernmental community bodies were created by ECSCs Treaty in order to share with its own member-States and their respective peoples the construction of the normative sense which would conduct issues concerning sensitive common problems. To none of them was assigned a central position in Communitys normative process. A legal-political reading of European integration - started with the ECSC - seems possible because the institutional framework whithin its Treaty - even when referred to legal and economic rules - was responsible for the affirmation and preservation of a new kind of relationship between European countries. It was envisaged, neither a European State, nor an institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation, but a middle-way legal-Political organization: a relationship system erecte by an ingenious institutional mechanism conceived to promote - through checks and balances - nonstop oppositions between participants of Communitys life.

The origins of European integration and the factors that made it possible in the post-1945 era have been examined from different perspectives and interpreted in various ways. While federalists argue that the concept of European unity had been developed over centuries by different intellectual movements, the realist approaches of Milward and Dinan stress the importance of economic, political and security motives. Referring to the factors that contributed to the implementation of the Schuman Plan, both the federalist and realist approaches highlight the chief importance of states and their representatives. Yet, the ideas that inspired Jean Monnet, who designed the Schuman Plan, have received little attention. While the state is seen in the literature as the main actor that made the outcome possible, the role of Monnet and that of some of his close associates are almost ignored. By investigating Monnet's thought, this study shows that the source of his inspiration was not the countless plans for European unity put forward by European federalist movements or the random concepts that he came across, such as the New Deal. Rather, it is argued here that he was in fact constantly exposed to a coherent and well-structured philosophy. This thinking reached him through his direct contacts and frequent encounters with Felix Frankfurter and his associates, who formed an epistemic community, as defined by Peter M. Haas. The core concepts of this thinking inherited from Louis Brandeis and developed by Frankfurter – restoring and overseeing free competition – can be identified in Monnet's 1950 plan. The evidence shows that it became a shared philosophy of Monnet's group of friends. This is a fundamental aspect since, once the Schuman Plan was made public, Monnet's friends rallied around his project and contributed not only to overcoming stalemate at critical moments of the negotiations on the future treaty, but also to convincing statesmen of the value of the project. / Graduate