Yes / The concept of the self and its relation to moral action is complex and subject to varying interpretations, not only between different academic disciplines but also across time and space. This paper presents empirical evidence from a cross-cultural study on the Buddhist and Confucian notions of self in SMEs in Vietnam and Taiwan. The study employs Hwang’s Mandala Model of the Self, and its extension into Shiah’s non-self-model, to interpret how these two Eastern philosophical representations of the self, the Confucian relational self and Buddhist non-self, can lead to moral action. By demonstrating the strengths of the model, emphasizing how social and cultural influences constrain the individual self and promote the social person leading to moral action, the paper extends understanding of the self with empirical evidence of the mechanisms involved in organizational contexts

Yes / The nature of moral action versus moral judgment has been extensively debated in numerous disciplines. We introduce Virtual Reality (VR) moral paradigms examining the action individuals take in a high emotionally arousing, direct action-focused, moral scenario. In two studies involving qualitatively different populations, we found a greater endorsement of utilitarian responses±killing one in order to save many others±when action was required in moral virtual dilemmas compared to their judgment counterparts. Heart rate in virtual moral dilemmas was significantly increased when compared to both judgment counterparts and control virtual tasks. Our research suggests that moral action may be viewed as an independent construct to moral judgment, with VR methods delivering new prospects for investigating and assessing moral behaviour. / Plymouth University and Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-PEOPLE-2013-ITN-604764)

Yes / Advances in Virtual Reality (VR) technologies allow the investigation of simulated moral actions in visually immersive environments. Using a robotic manipulandum and an interactive sculpture, we now also incorporate realistic haptic feedback into virtual moral simulations. In two experiments, we found that participants responded with greater utilitarian actions in virtual and haptic environments when compared to traditional questionnaire assessments of moral judgments. In experiment one, when incorporating a robotic manipulandum, we found that the physical power of simulated utilitarian responses (calculated as the product of force and speed) was predicted by individual levels of psychopathy. In experiment two, which integrated an interactive and life-like sculpture of a human into a VR simulation, greater utilitarian actions continued to be observed. Together, these results support a disparity between simulated moral action and moral judgment. Overall this research combines state-of-the-art virtual reality, robotic movement simulations, and realistic human sculptures, to enhance moral paradigms that are often contextually impoverished. As such, this combination provides a better assessment of simulated moral action, and illustrates the embodied nature of morally-relevant actions. / Plymouth University and Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-PEOPLE-2013-ITN-604764)

Yes / Recent advances in virtual technologies have allowed the investigation of simulated moral actions in aversive moral dilemmas. Previous studies have employed diverse populations to explore these actions, with little research considering the significance of occupation on moral decision‐making. For the first time, in this study we have investigated simulated moral actions in virtual reality made by professionally trained paramedics and fire service incident commanders who are frequently faced with and must respond to moral dilemmas. We found that specially trained individuals showed distinct empathic and related personality trait scores and that these declined with years of experience working in the profession. Supporting the theory that these professionals develop resilience in moral conflict, reduced emotional arousal was observed during virtual simulations of a distressing dilemma. Furthermore, trained professionals demonstrated less regret following the execution of a moral action in virtual reality when compared to untrained control populations. We showed that, contrary to previous research, trained individuals made the same moral judgements and moral actions as untrained individuals, though showing less arousal and regret. In the face of increasing concerns regarding empathy decline in health care professionals, we suggest that the nature of this decline is complex and likely reflects the development of a necessary emotional resilience to distressing events.

Yes / In this chapter we will review experimental evidence related to pharmacological moral enhancement. Firstly, we will present our recent study in which we found that a drug called propranolol could change moral judgements. Further research, which also investigated this, found similar results. Secondly, we will discuss the limitations of such approaches, when it comes to the idea of general “human enhancement”. Whilst promising effects on certain moral concepts might be beneficial to the development of theoretical moral psychology, enhancement of human moral behaviour in general – to our current understanding – has more side-effects than intended effects, making it potentially harmful. We give an overview of misconceptions when taking experimental findings beyond the laboratory and discuss the problems and solutions associated with the psychological assessment of moral behaviour. Indeed, how is morality “measured” in psychology, and are those measures reliable?

Yes / Rationale: Hypothetical moral dilemmas, pitting characteristically utilitarian and non-utilitarian outcomes against each other, have played a central role in investigations of moral decision-making. Preferences for utilitarian over non-utilitarian responses have been explained by two contrasting hypotheses; one implicating increased deliberative reasoning, and the other implicating diminished harm aversion. In recent field experiments, these hypotheses have been investigated using alcohol intoxication to impair both social and cognitive functioning. These studies have found increased utilitarian responding, arguably as a result of alcohol impairing affective empathy. Objectives: The present research expands existing investigations by examining the acute effects of alcohol on affective empathy and subsequent moral judgments in traditional vignettes and moral actions in virtual reality, as well as physiological responses in moral dilemmas. Methods: Participants (N = 48) were administered either a placebo or alcohol in one of two dosages; low or moderate. Both pre- and post intervention, participants completed a moral action and moral judgment task alongside behavioural measures of affective empathy. Results: Higher dosages of alcohol consumption resulted in inappropriate empathic responses to facial displays of emotion, mirroring responses of individuals high in trait psychopathy, but empathy for pain was unaffected. Whilst affective empathy was influenced by alcohol consumption in a facial responding task, both moral judgments and moral actions were unaffected. Conclusions: These results suggest that facets, beyond or in addition to deficits in affective empathy, might influence the relationship between alcohol consumption and utilitarian endorsements.

Thesis advisor: Pamela J. Grace / Nurses working in newborn intensive care units (NICU) report experiencing ethical dilemmas related to treatment decisions for infants in their care. The opportunity for nurses to contribute to the formulation of treatment plans for these infants is increasing, but often nurses are required to implement treatment plans with which they may not agree. This causes conflict for the nurse and has been shown to have implications for the nurse and, ultimately, nursing and healthcare practice. Not taking action to resolve the perceived dilemma is especially problematic on several counts (Raines, 1996). Nurse Activism, the outcome variable, is defined as the range of likely actions nurses may take to resolve ethical dilemmas in practice (Penticuff & Walden, 1987). This cross-sectional study investigated the range of likely actions that nurses would take in response to a hypothetical ethical dilemma. The web-based survey was completed by 224 NICU nurses from seven Massachusetts hospitals. Subjects responded to the Nurses Ethical Involvement Survey (Penticuff & Walden, 1987) and demographic questions. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis found that NICU nurses with greater concern for the ethical aspects of clinical practice (p = .001) and an increased perception of their ability to influence ethical decision-making (p = .018) were more likely to exhibit nurse activism to resolve an ethical dilemma and these findings explained just 8.5 percent of the variance. Future research is necessary to determine other factors contributing to, and inhibiting the actions of, nurses to resolve ethical dilemmas encountered in the NICU. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Connell School of Nursing. / Discipline: Nursing.

When Brian Friel’s play The Freedom of the City premiered in 1973, just a year after the events of Bloody Sunday, it was met with harsh criticism and called a work of propaganda. In the play, three peaceful protestors flee a civil rights demonstration turned violent and end up trapped inside the Guildhall in Derry, Northern Ireland. By the end of the play, they are shot dead. These three protestors, disoriented by violence as well as the aftereffects of life-long poverty, on the surface are not emblems of morality. However, this thesis employs Ami Harbin’s theorization of disorientation and moral action to challenge traditional virtue ethics and showcase that even in the midst of all-encompassing disorientation, moral action can easily emerge, even from the most unexpected person. Specifically, I look at the character Skinner, a flippant hooligan who leads the other trapped protestors through a series of games ultimately meant to encourage them to embrace their disorientation as he has. Within Friel’s drama, accepting and embracing disorientation as opposed to fighting it, I conclude, is what frees one from the bounds of disorientation, and in this case, allows a person to more fully perpetuate moral action.

Le présent texte porte sur la question du ressort ou mobile (« Triebfeder ») de l’action morale chez Kant. L’interprétation qui y est soutenue consiste à dire qu’il n’y a pas qu’un seul ressort de ce type chez Kant, comme le soutiennent maints commentateurs, mais plutôt deux : la loi morale et le sentiment de respect. Le nerf argumentatif de cette thèse réside dans la prise en compte systématique des aspects des facultés de l’esprit humain impliquées dans la question du ressort moral chez Kant. Deux éléments jouent ici un rôle particulièrement important : (i) les deux sens explicites attribués par Kant au mot « volonté », mot qui peut signifier (a) la raison pratique et (b) la faculté de désirer, et (ii) la division de la faculté de désirer en (a) (libre) arbitre et (b) raison pratique. Plus d’une douzaine d’interprétations, réparties sur plus d’un siècle, sont analysées de manière critique, et deux modifications du manuscrit allemand de la « Critique de la raison pratique » sont proposées pour le chapitre « Des ressorts de la raison pure pratique ». / This text focuses on the question of the incentive (“Triebfeder“) of moral action in Kant’s philosophy. The interpretation that is supported here is that there isn’t only one incentive of this sort in Kantian morality, as argued by many commentators, but rather two: the moral law and the feeling of respect. The argumentative nerve of this thesis lies in the systematic consideration of aspects of the faculties of the human mind involved in the question of the moral incentive in Kant. Two elements are here particularly important: (i) the two meanings explicitly assigned by Kant to the word “will”, a word which can mean (a) practical reason and (b) the faculty of desire, and (ii) the division of the faculty of desire in (a) (free) power of choice (“Willkür”) and (b) practical reason. More than a dozen interpretations spread over a century are critically analyzed, and two changes of the German manuscript of the “Critique of practical reason” are also proposed, in the chapter “Incentives of the pure practical reason”.

This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.