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Make Me Gay: What Neuro-interventions Tell us about Sexual Orientation and Why it Matters for Gay RightsVierra, Andrew J 12 August 2016 (has links)
This thesis challenges the restrictive definition of ‘gay’ used in legal discourse, argues for the adoption of a broader definition that is inclusive of more gay individuals, and demonstrates that the adoption of a broader definition would help frame gay rights debates in a way that is more acceptable to both progressives and conservatives. Current legal arguments for gay rights use ‘gay’ to refer almost solely to individuals that have exclusively—largely immutable—same-sex erotic desires. However, ‘gay’ should be understood to include a more diverse group of individuals. Thus, the current restrictive use of the term ‘gay’ either captures too many people or too few. Too many people, for conservatives, because gay rights are extended to many gay individuals that are not included in the restrictive definition. Too few people, for progressives, because the restrictive use of the term ‘gay’ doesn’t capture the entire gay community.
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Livre-arbítrio e culpabilidade: a responsabilização penal em face das contribuições da neurociência / Free will and culpability: the criminal liability in light of the contributions of neuroscienceCoelho, Thales Cavalcanti 19 October 2015 (has links)
O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar as implicações, na estrutura de imputação penal, das recentes pesquisas em neurociência voltadas a investigar os processos de formação da vontade no cérebro humano. Considerando-se que, dos resultados de experimentos acerca do funcionamento do sistema nervoso central, alguns pesquisadores têm interpretado que as condutas humanas são desencadeadas a partir de processos determinísticos, e não originadas da vontade livre do indivíduo, busca-se verificar de que maneira tais conclusões impactam a responsabilidade penal, notadamente no que diz respeito à culpabilidade, uma vez que sua concepção tradicional e consolidada está fundamentada fortemente na ideia de livre-arbítrio. Com esse escopo, valendo-se do método teórico-bibliográfico, o trabalho se desenvolve em três grandes etapas. Assim, primeiramente, visa-se compreender a relação entre culpabilidade e livre-arbítrio, inicialmente expondo-se de que maneira o primeiro conceito arrogou o segundo como pressuposto no decorrer de seu desenvolvimento epistemológico, para tornar possível, depois de realizada uma análise das razões da consolidação - e da posterior crise - de sua concepção normativa no pensamento penal, examinar quais são (e se são firmes e coerentes) as alternativas teóricas a esse conceito apresentadas pela doutrina contemporânea. Em seguida, volta-se ao estudo da relação entre livre-arbítrio e neurociências. Nessa etapa, investiga-se a natureza dos argumentos utilizados pelos penalistas tanto para sustentar, quanto para refutar a ancoragem da responsabilização penal no livre-arbítrio, examinando-se, ainda, eventuais fragilidades e inconsistências, além dos possíveis aportes que as pesquisas em neurociência podem lhes proporcionar. Tudo isso, com o intuito de se verificar se o advento da neurociência representa uma mudança de paradigma na polêmica em torno da liberdade de vontade. Na fase final do trabalho, o estudo é orientado a traçar um esboço do futuro da responsabilização penal em face dos aportes da neurociência, analisando-se se representam (ou não) o fim da culpabilidade na estrutura de imputação e, além disso, qual o modelo de punição mais adequado tendo-se como parâmetro as finalidades da pena aos postulados neurocientíficos. / The goal of this study is to analyze the implications on criminal liability of the recent researches in the field of neuroscience that relates to will-formation in human brains. Taking into account that some researchers have interpreted, based on experiments about the functioning of the central nervous system, that human behavior become from deterministic processes, instead of the free will of the person, we aim to verify in what ways those conclusions affects the criminal liability. The focus of the review is on criminal culpability, whose traditional concept is based on the idea of free will. With three major portions, the thesis is developed by the bibliographic method. At first, the target is to understand the relationship between criminal culpability and free will and how that one is grounded on this one. Then, after the analysis of the reasons of the consolidation, and subsequent crisis, of the normative concept of culpability among the criminal authors, the purpose is to assay the theoretic alternatives to this notion that are provide by the contemporary doctrine. After that, the work follows with the study of the relationship between free will and neuroscience. At this stage, we investigate the nature of the arguments used by criminalists both to support and to refute the anchor of the criminal liability in free will. We also examine possible weaknesses and inconsistencies, as well as likely contributions that research in neuroscience can provide them. All this in order to verify if the advent of neuroscience represents a paradigm shift in the controversy surrounding free will. In the final phase of the work, there is the attempt to draw a sketch of the future of criminal responsibility in light of the contributions of neuroscience. Thus, we analyze whether these represent (or not) the end of culpability in the structure of criminal liability and what is the most appropriate punishment model to neuroscientific postulates, taking as parameter the purposes of the penalty.
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Livre-arbítrio e culpabilidade: a responsabilização penal em face das contribuições da neurociência / Free will and culpability: the criminal liability in light of the contributions of neuroscienceThales Cavalcanti Coelho 19 October 2015 (has links)
O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar as implicações, na estrutura de imputação penal, das recentes pesquisas em neurociência voltadas a investigar os processos de formação da vontade no cérebro humano. Considerando-se que, dos resultados de experimentos acerca do funcionamento do sistema nervoso central, alguns pesquisadores têm interpretado que as condutas humanas são desencadeadas a partir de processos determinísticos, e não originadas da vontade livre do indivíduo, busca-se verificar de que maneira tais conclusões impactam a responsabilidade penal, notadamente no que diz respeito à culpabilidade, uma vez que sua concepção tradicional e consolidada está fundamentada fortemente na ideia de livre-arbítrio. Com esse escopo, valendo-se do método teórico-bibliográfico, o trabalho se desenvolve em três grandes etapas. Assim, primeiramente, visa-se compreender a relação entre culpabilidade e livre-arbítrio, inicialmente expondo-se de que maneira o primeiro conceito arrogou o segundo como pressuposto no decorrer de seu desenvolvimento epistemológico, para tornar possível, depois de realizada uma análise das razões da consolidação - e da posterior crise - de sua concepção normativa no pensamento penal, examinar quais são (e se são firmes e coerentes) as alternativas teóricas a esse conceito apresentadas pela doutrina contemporânea. Em seguida, volta-se ao estudo da relação entre livre-arbítrio e neurociências. Nessa etapa, investiga-se a natureza dos argumentos utilizados pelos penalistas tanto para sustentar, quanto para refutar a ancoragem da responsabilização penal no livre-arbítrio, examinando-se, ainda, eventuais fragilidades e inconsistências, além dos possíveis aportes que as pesquisas em neurociência podem lhes proporcionar. Tudo isso, com o intuito de se verificar se o advento da neurociência representa uma mudança de paradigma na polêmica em torno da liberdade de vontade. Na fase final do trabalho, o estudo é orientado a traçar um esboço do futuro da responsabilização penal em face dos aportes da neurociência, analisando-se se representam (ou não) o fim da culpabilidade na estrutura de imputação e, além disso, qual o modelo de punição mais adequado tendo-se como parâmetro as finalidades da pena aos postulados neurocientíficos. / The goal of this study is to analyze the implications on criminal liability of the recent researches in the field of neuroscience that relates to will-formation in human brains. Taking into account that some researchers have interpreted, based on experiments about the functioning of the central nervous system, that human behavior become from deterministic processes, instead of the free will of the person, we aim to verify in what ways those conclusions affects the criminal liability. The focus of the review is on criminal culpability, whose traditional concept is based on the idea of free will. With three major portions, the thesis is developed by the bibliographic method. At first, the target is to understand the relationship between criminal culpability and free will and how that one is grounded on this one. Then, after the analysis of the reasons of the consolidation, and subsequent crisis, of the normative concept of culpability among the criminal authors, the purpose is to assay the theoretic alternatives to this notion that are provide by the contemporary doctrine. After that, the work follows with the study of the relationship between free will and neuroscience. At this stage, we investigate the nature of the arguments used by criminalists both to support and to refute the anchor of the criminal liability in free will. We also examine possible weaknesses and inconsistencies, as well as likely contributions that research in neuroscience can provide them. All this in order to verify if the advent of neuroscience represents a paradigm shift in the controversy surrounding free will. In the final phase of the work, there is the attempt to draw a sketch of the future of criminal responsibility in light of the contributions of neuroscience. Thus, we analyze whether these represent (or not) the end of culpability in the structure of criminal liability and what is the most appropriate punishment model to neuroscientific postulates, taking as parameter the purposes of the penalty.
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Norms and the Brain – an Investigation Into the Neuroscience of Ethical Decisions and the Ethics of NeuroscienceSchleim, Stephan 22 August 2011 (has links)
This cumulative dissertation consists of investigations the brain processes related to legal and moral decision-making as well as a philosophical reflection. The behavioral main finding is that lawyers perceive themselves to be less emotionally involved during legal and moral decision-making than other academics. Regarding brain processes, the major finding is that legal decisions are correlated with stronger activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, suggesting a stronger engagement of rule application. The philosophical part reflects the normative implications of these investigations and comprises a wider discussion of neuroimaging in the context of clinical research.
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Normativités et usages judiciaires des technologies : l’exemple controversé de la neuroimagerie en France et au Canada / Normativities and judicial uses of technologies : the controversed illustration of neuroimaging in France and CanadaGeneves, Victor 12 April 2019 (has links)
L’observation du système nerveux, de son métabolisme et de certaines de ses structures est possible grâce à la neuroimagerie. Une littérature importante issue du « neurodroit » véhicule des imaginaires et des fantasmes relatifs aux possibilités judiciaires qu’offriraient ces technologies.Qu’il s’agisse de détection du mensonge, d’identification cérébrale des individus dangereux ou encore de prédiction de comportements déviants, la neuroimagerie, en l’état actuel des technologies, ne peut pourtant être sérieusement conçue comme pouvant faire l’objet de telles applications.L’utilisation de la neuroimagerie dans le cadre d’expertises est néanmoins une réalité, dans les tribunaux canadiens comme dans la loi française.Cette thèse souligne que les conceptions des technologies dont témoignent les deux systèmes juridiques étudiés s’avèrent lacunaires, ce qui engendre des risques. Elle évoque les conditions du recours à une normativité extra-juridique, la normalisation technique, qui pourrait s’élaborer dans ce contexte controversé, et esquisse les traits d’un dialogue amélioré entre les normativités juridique et technologique. / Neuroimaging allows the observation of the nervous system, of both its metabolism and some of its structures. An important literature in “neurolaw” conveys illusions and fantaisies about the judicial possibilities that imaging technologies would contain.Whether it is about lies detection, cerebral identifications of dangerous individuals through their neurobiology or predictions of criminal behaviors, neuroimaging, in the current state of technologies, can not be seriously conceived as being able to offer such applications.Judicial uses of neuroimaging through expertise are a reality nonetheless, in Canadian courts as in French law.This thesis emphasizes that the conceptions of imaging technologies integrated in the two legal systems studied are incomplete, which creates an important amount of risks. It discusses the conditions for the use of an extra-legal normativity, the international technical standardization, which could be elaborated in this particular and controversial context, and outlines several features of an increased dialogue between legal and technological norms.
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Le cerveau «immature» : genèse et diffusion d’un nouveau discours social sur les jeunes délinquants aux États-UnisWannyn, William 08 1900 (has links)
Cette thèse prend pour objet la place des savoirs neuroscientifiques sur le cerveau adolescent dans les mutations contemporaines du champ de la justice des mineurs aux États-Unis. Plus spécifiquement, elle analyse les logiques sociohistoriques ayant conduit la théorie de l’immaturité cérébrale des adolescents à jouer un rôle clé dans trois arrêts de la Cour Suprême qui, entre 2005 et 2012, ont rendu la peine de mort et la prison à vie inconstitutionnelles pour les délinquants mineurs. Située au croisement de la sociologie des sciences et de la sociologie du champ pénal, cette recherche propose de saisir ce « triptyque juridique » à la lumière de l’histoire longue du traitement pénal des mineurs aux États-Unis. Elle analyse les débats contemporains entourant l’âge de la majorité pénale à l’aune des luttes symboliques qui se sont historiquement nouées autour de la définition du « problème » de la délinquance juvénile.
Suivant un regard sociohistorique, cette thèse retrace les oppositions et les alliances entre scientifiques, fondations philanthropiques, sociétés savantes, agences gouvernementales, élus politiques et acteurs juridiques qui ont façonné la trajectoire du champ de la justice des mineurs états-unienne. Cette recherche s’intéresse particulièrement au « travail de manipulation symbolique » (Bourdieu, 2001) des « nouveaux réformateurs », une alliance hétérogène d’agents appartenant à la classe dominante, qui au tournant du 21e siècle ont construit et diffusé un nouveau discours social situant les causes de la délinquance juvénile dans le cerveau des adolescents. Elle formule une critique des fondements épistémologiques et des usages politiques de ce discours, et rend compte des rapports de pouvoir, notamment d’âge, de classe et de race, qu’il participe à renforcer, malgré les ambitions progressistes de ses promoteurs.
Les analyses présentées dans cette recherche s’appuient sur un matériau hétéroclite combinant des archives judiciaires, des articles scientifiques, de la littérature grise et 37 entretiens semi-directifs réalisés auprès de chercheurs, de juges, de membres de fondations philanthropiques, d’associations militantes et d’agences gouvernementales. L’hétérogénéité de ce matériau offre un moyen de suivre les déplacements du discours de l’immaturité du laboratoire vers le tribunal ou du Congrès des États-Unis vers les institutions correctionnelles. Elle permet de rendre raison des logiques spécifiques de champ qui génèrent l’action de ces agents, ainsi que des logiques transversales qui les conduisent à s’allier pour agir politiquement afin de « sauver » les jeunes délinquants. / This dissertation investigates the role of neuroscientific knowledge about the adolescent brain in the contemporary mutations of the field of juvenile justice in the United States. More specifically, it analyzes the socio-historical dynamics whereby the theory of adolescent brain immaturity came to play a key role in three Supreme Court rulings which, between 2005 and 2012, made the death penalty and life imprisonment unconstitutional for juvenile offenders. Located at the intersection of the sociology of science and the sociology of the penal field, this dissertation examines this “legal triptych” in light of the history of the juvenile justice system in the United States. I argue that the contemporary debates surrounding the age of criminal responsibility are the latest manifestation of the symbolic struggles that various fractions of the dominant class have historically waged around the definition of the “problem” of juvenile delinquency.
Following a socio-historical perspective, this dissertation traces the oppositions and alliances between scientists, philanthropic foundations, learned societies, government agencies, elected politicians, and legal actors who have shaped the trajectory of the field of juvenile justice in the U. S. One key focus of the dissertation is to examine the “work of symbolic manipulation” (Bourdieu, 2001) of the “new reformers”, an heterogenous alliance of agents from the dominant class who, at the turn of the 21st century, constructed and disseminated a new social discourse locating the causes of juvenile delinquency in the brain of adolescents. To address this focus, I formulate a critique of the epistemological foundations and political uses of this discourse. I give an account of the power relations, notably of age, class and race, that this discourse of immaturity helps to reinforce, despite the progressive ambitions of its promoters.
The analyses presented in this dissertation are based on a diversified material combining judicial archives, scientific articles, grey literature and 37 semi-structured interviews conducted with scholars, judges, members of philanthropic foundations, of activist groups and of government agencies. The heterogeneity of this material provides the means to track how the discourse of immaturity shifts from the laboratory to the courtroom or from the U.S. Congress to correctional institutions. It allows me to account for the specific field logics that generate the action of these agents, as well as the cross-cutting logics that lead them to ally themselves to act politically in order to “save” juvenile offenders.
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La responsabilité criminelle a-t-elle un avenir? : enquête sur les fondements philosophiques, juridiques et psychologiques de l’imputabilité pénale à l’ère des neurosciencesGilbert Tremblay, Ugo 04 1900 (has links)
La présente thèse a une vocation à la fois descriptive et prospective. Descriptive, d’une part, en ce qu’elle entend mettre au jour les fondements juridiques actuels de la responsabilité criminelle tout en déterminant l’étendue des rapports qu’ils entretiennent avec la notion philosophique de libre arbitre. Prospective, d’autre part, en ce qu’elle entend évaluer les chances de survie de ces fondements à la lumière de la nouvelle vision de l’homme qui se dégage des avancées récentes en neurosciences. Nous aurons pour ce faire à soupeser la vraisemblance de deux grandes prophéties concernant l’avenir de la responsabilité criminelle : l’une, que nous qualifierons de « scientiste », prétend que le concept juridique actuel de responsabilité criminelle est voué à tomber en désuétude en raison de son incompatibilité avec notre connaissance du cerveau. L’autre, que nous qualifierons de « légitimiste », prétend que c’est plutôt en modifiant les intuitions populaires en matière de responsabilité que les neurosciences bouleverseront l’édifice pénal. Dans les deux cas, nous découvrirons qu’une erreur de diagnostic quant au fonctionnement juridique et psychologique des jugements de responsabilité conduit à une erreur de pronostic. / This doctoral dissertation is both descriptive and prospective. Descriptive, on the one hand, by seeking to identify the current legal foundations of criminal responsibility and by trying to determinate the extent of their relationship with the philosophical notion of free will. Prospective, on the other hand, by seeking to evaluate the chances of survival of these foundations in the light of the new vision of man that emanates from advances in neuroscience. To this end, two great prophecies concerning the future of criminal responsibility will have to be weighed: one, which we will call ‘‘scientist’’, claims that the current legal concept of criminal responsibility is incompatible with what neuroscience teaches us and is, therefore, destined to fall into disuse. The other, which we will call ‘‘legitimist’’, claims that it is rather by altering the popular intuitions about responsibility that neuroscience will threat the penal edifice. In both cases, we will discover that a misdiagnosis concerning the legal and psychological functioning of the judgments of responsibility leads to an error of prognosis.
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