This study sought to further build on previous empirical findings regarding Johnsons theory that the gender symmetry debate can at least be partially resolved by acknowledging that two distinct subgroups of physical violence exist within intimate partner violence: Intimate Terrorism (IT) and Situational Couple Violence (SCV). According to Johnsons predictions these separate groups can be distinguished by the use of non-violent control tactics. This study focused on testing the ability of non-violent control tactics to predict the frequency and severity of violence within the sub-group intimate terrorism. It further explored Johnsons assertion that intimate terrorism is gender asymmetric with females experiencing a greater amount of victimization. Previous studies demonstrated moderate support that two subgroups do exist within intimate partner violence and that intimate terrorism may be asymmetrical. However, only one of the previous studies included a male sample that was not reflective of the general population. This study will test the gender asymmetry of intimate terrorism by using both a male and female sub-sample form the National Violence Against Women Survey. This studies sample consisted of males and females reporting at least on incident of physical violence by either their current spouse or cohabitating heterosexual partner. The statistical analysis showed moderate support that there are two subgroups within intimate partner violence that can be distinguished by the use of non-violent control tactics. It also demonstrated that for the subgroup intimate terrorism there are some differences across gender when examining severity and frequency of violence. However, only a small amount of the variance in intimate terrorism can be explained by non-violent control tactics.

The differences in the international responses to the violent conflicts in East Timor (1998–1999), Maluku (1999–2003) and Aceh (1998–2005) are examined in this research. Given the growing acceptance of the significance of the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh might prima facie have justified humanitarian intervention similar to that in East Timor. By analysing the differences from the Indonesia’s domestic political point of view it is clear that the conscience-shocking situation caused by the violent conflicts was not the compelling factor for the international community to militarily intervene. The deployment of a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) was decided only after the UN and foreign major countries believed that such military intervention would not jeopardize the ongoing process of democratization in Indonesia. This suggested that Indonesia’s domestic circumstance was central to whether a similar measure in Maluku and Aceh would take place or not. Due to the reformasi (political reform) in Indonesia within which the independence of East Timor took place, two main changes within Indonesian politics, namely the growing sentiment of anti-international intervention and the continuing democratization process, helped to ensure that humanitarian intervention in the two other regions did not happen. / These two conditions were fortified by the increasingly consolidated democratic politics which brought the communal conflict in Maluku to the Malino Peace Agreement. The emergence of a stronger and democratic government in Indonesia, furthermore, made cooperation with the international community possible in seeking a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict in Aceh. By involving the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) agreed to the Helsinki peace agreement and accepted the role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to secure its implementation. Thus, a strong democratic government made an international military intervention for humanitarian purposes unnecessary.

Interpersonal violence and abuse in New Zealand is so widespread it is considered a normative experience. Mental health nurses witnessing the inscribed effects of abuse on service users are lead to consider whether we are dealing with a breakdown of the mind or a breakdown in social or cultural connection (Stuhlmiller, 2003). The purpose of this research is to examine the cultural context which makes violence and abuse against women and children possible. In 2003, the public debate on prostitution law reform promised to open a space in which discourses on sexuality and violence, practices usually private or hidden, would publicly emerge. Everyday discourses relating to prostitution law reform reported in the New Zealand Herald newspaper in the year 2003 were analysed using Foucauldian and feminist post-structural methodological approaches. Foucauldian discourse analysis emphasises the ways in which power is enmeshed in discourse, enabling power relations and hegemonic practices to be made visible. The research aims were to develop a complex, comprehensive analysis of the media discourses, to examine the construction of harm in the media debate, to examine the ways in which the cultural hegemony of dominant groups was secured and contested and to consider the role of mental health nurses as agents of emancipatory political change. Mental health promotion is mainly a socio-political practice and the findings suggest that mental health nurses could reconsider their professional role, to participate politically as social activists, challenging the social order thereby reducing the human suffering which interpersonal violence and abuse carries in its wake.

The purpose of the present study is to design and investigate the effect of Violence Management Training on violent behaviors and anger control of secondary school students. An experimental design with one training and notreatment control group and two measurements (pre and post) was used in the present study. The subjects were selected from 95 ninth and tenth grade secondary students from a multi-programmed lycee in &Ccedil / amlidere region of Ankara. The Violent Behaviors Checklist (VBC) and Anger Control Subscale of STAS (State Trait Anger Scale) were used as the data collection instruments. Violence Management Training, consists of 16 sessions, was implemented to the training subjects. The sessions were held twice a week and each session lasted 50 minutes. On the other hand, no-treatment control group subjects did not receive any training. Mixed Design (one between factor and one within factor) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was applied to the pretest and posttest VBC scores of v subjects to examine the effect of the Violence Management Training on the violent behaviors of subjects. Additionally, in order to investigate the effect of the Violence Management Training on anger control of subjects, Mixed Design (one between factor and one within factor) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was employed to the pretest and posttest Anger Control Subscale scores of STAS. The results indicated that Violence Management Training was not an effective treatment procedure in reducing violent behaviors and increasing anger control of secondary school students.

Thesis (M.W.S.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2000. / Bibliography: p. 232-245.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina at Wilmington, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves : [97]-99).

Culture plays a part in the construction of legal understandings in the Supreme Court contrary to much legal scholarship. The oral argument of the Supreme Court is a unique way for Justices to gather information beyond the formalized briefs and prior written opinions. In the oral argument the Supreme Court Justices utilize cultural codes as tools to probe, shape, negotiate and challenge the legal meanings and boundaries of the case before them. Using the oral argument transcript in a 2010 Supreme Court case on the issue of whether California has the right to censor the sale of violent video games to minors, this study attempts to understand the sociological processes behind constructing law. Findings show cultural codes being used by the Justices, in this legal context of an oral argument, to address the border disputes and help to establish the specific legal parameters of a case.

Both elite deviance, committed by the upper echelons of society, and organized crime threaten development and the rights and security of people across and within nations; however empirical research on these topics is limited, especially in the field of criminology. This study addresses this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses derived from Simon’s symbiotic theory of elite deviance, which posits that direct and indirect relationships exist between elite deviance, organized crime, and conventional crimes exist (2008). The intervening effects of national culture and political economic ideology are also considered. To test the research hypotheses, this study uses homicide rates, corruption and organized crime measures, and indicators of national culture from 114 nations. Findings suggest that empirical linkages exist between elite deviance, organized crime and conventional deviance at the cross-national level. These data suggest the level of corruption and organized crime within a nation are better predictors of homicide than conventional explanations of violent crime (e.g., modernization/development, opportunity/routine activities). Furthermore, organized crime partially mediated the relationship between corruption and homicide rates in the same (positive) direction. This implies that the criminogenic effect of elite deviance on non-elite deviance operates indirectly through organized crime. The corruption-homicide relationship was also partially mediated by a national culture of moral cynicism and capitalist economic conditions. Although not definitive given methodological concerns and alternate theoretical explanations, this study provides avenues for future research into the underlying social processes that influence the crime rate within nations.

In Britain, there have been growing concerns over the increasing female prison population and treatment of girls and women by the criminal justice system (see Carlen and Worrall, 2004; Hedderman, 2004; Batchelor, 2005; Hutson and Myers, 2006; Sharpe, 2009). In particular, there has been a rising female prison population in Scotland which has been associated with greater punitive controls over the behaviour of women (McIvor and Burman, 2011). The British press have depicted a social problem of certain young women becoming more violent and have attributed this to women’s liberation, particularly in the night time economy (MacAskill and Goodwin, 2004; Gray, 2006; Evening News, 2008). These concerns have attracted widespread media and political attention leading to a steady growth in academic research exploring the apparent rise of violent young women (Burman et al., 2003; Burman, 2004b; Batchelor, 2005). Despite this, there are relatively few studies that examine responses to young women with an emphasis on violent offences. Furthermore, there is a lack of research that has examined the role police officers have played in the control and depiction of young women’s violence. This research investigates the perceptions of and responses to young women depicted as violent from police officers in Scotland. Thirty three qualitative interviews were carried out with front line police officers in 2008 to investigate social control mechanisms employed to regulate the behaviour of young women. The research utilised feminist perspectives to develop an understanding of how young women deemed as violent face formal and informal mechanisms of social control from police officers. The study challenges the apparent increase in violence among young women and instead argues that institutional controls have contributed to young women being labelled as violent. Changes in police practices and zero tolerance approaches towards violence have resulted in a net widening effect that has impacted on the number of young women (and men) being brought to the attention of the police for violent offences. It is argued that this mechanism of institutional control could be a contributing factor towards the rise in the number of young women being charged for violent offences. Police discretion on the basis of gender did have an influence on arrest practices for some of the officers, but there was insufficient evidence to suggest the police officers responded any harsher or more lenient towards women. However, what was apparent was that police officers believed women needed to be ‘controlled’; they perceived them as more unmanageable than men and this defiance towards authority resulted in women being arrested. Women depicted as violent remain to be categorised on the basis of socially constructed gender norms and it is argued that this mechanism of discursive control continues to locate violence within the realm of masculinity. In conclusion, women who are depicted as violent are portrayed as unfeminine and in need of greater social control which is exercised through both formal and informal measures by police officers.

While the Europeans were discussing integration, other nations experienced long conflicts over borders. In some of the latter contexts, the significance of borders was underscored by escalated border policing through the erection of barriers. Although barrier construction is not a new phenomenon, an increasing number of nation-states are launching barrier projects along their borders. While in all cases the concerned nation-states claimed these barriers were provided security, scant attention was given to the actual security outcomes of these constructions. This research provides answers to the questions: what accounts for the different security outcomes of border barriers? How can barriers differ? And why? How does variation in barriers affect the nature and number of non-state actors' attacks? When do violent groups have tactical shifts and tactical innovations in the context of a barrier? This work moves beyond the conventional perspective on barriers that see them as successful defensive security measures. Instead, it develops the Fortification-Cooperation model that explains why the level of cross-border militant attacks change, when violent groups shift their tactics and when they innovate. I argue that security cooperation on both sides the border limits violent activities locally, which in turn restricts their access to militant resources. Presence of these resources is central for launching more attacks and for introducing tactical innovations. In turn, barriers impose restrictions to movement and increase the cost of certain attack. In this context, motivated violent groups substitute their commonly employed attack tactics for other types of attacks that can be sustained despite the presence of the barrier. Using a newly constructed qualitative and quantitative datasets on Palestinian attacks against Israel and barrier construction between 1990 and 2010, this study finds that the empirical record does not provide support the existing common explanations about the outcomes of barriers and that the interaction of cross-border cooperation and fortification is a key determinant of the number and nature of cross-border militant attacks. This work has significant implications for many states that built, are building, or are considering the construction of barriers on their borders since according to this research, a barrier without cross-border security cooperation would not be efficient at diminishing or decreasing cross-border violence. Additionally, violent groups' access to military resources is an important factor that should be taken into consideration when a barrier is built. Again, cross-border cooperation plays an essential role in restricting these resources, which would lead to less violence. In fact, in some cases, cooperation alone may result in similar outcomes to the combination of fortification and cooperation, which raises questions about the utility of barriers to begin with. / text