Normal human limitations mean that when people decide how to act, they often have to base their decisions on flawed information or reasoning. Even when agents reason to the best of their ability, and form intentions consistent with that reasoning, they sometimes get things wrong. Dominant theories about reasons for action argue that all good, or ‘normative’, reasons for acting are objective normative reasons. But objective normative reasons for action are derived from facts about the world that ignore certain facts about human agents. On these accounts of reasons, real human agents can be unable to learn what they have normative reason to do. A common response to this problem is to say that in such situations people act in a praiseworthy way, but their actions are based on false beliefs, and false beliefs cannot be good reasons. I argue that when agents reason to the best of their ability and form intentions consistent with that reasoning, agents act appropriately in response to states of the world that are normative reasons for action. To support my claim, I develop an account of what I call ‘justifiable reasons’, normative reasons for action that human agents can always use as a basis for action, and the form of reason that underpins rationality. I discuss the similarities and differences between my account of justifiable reasons and several approaches to reasons that resemble my account. I show that, in spite of objections, justifiable reasons are normative reasons, not motivating reasons. Accounts of subjective normative reasons are based on examples that look similar to mine. So, I explain why justifiable reasons are not subjective normative reasons. Some features of internal reasons also resemble features of justifiable reasons. But, I show that there is nothing about justifiable reasons that entails that they must be internal or external reasons. I take it that justifiable and objective normative reasons serve different purposes, so I explain these different purposes. Finally, I argue in support of my claim that to be rational, agents must act appropriately in response to justifiable reasons.

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<p dir="ltr">This dissertation explores intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts that result from differing axiological stances. A stance is one’s orientation towards a subject and one’s axiological stance is one’s orientation towards what they take to be valuable. An axiological stance also influences how one responds to practical reasons. Stances currently enjoy some attention in epistemology and the philosophy of science, but I provide a novel treatment of stances in the practical domain. Comprised of three chapters, this dissertation explores the psychological and normative contributions of one’s stances in normative ethics, then extends this work to the philosophy of religion. In chapter one, I unpack the psychological contribution of axiological stances. I introduce the concept of an axiological stance in the context of the debate surrounding “hard choices,” arguing that an intrapersonal conflict of axiological stances explains the characteristic difficulty of hard choices. In chapter two, I explore the normative side of axiological stances, drawing from Peter Winch. While Winch has been associated with various forms of relativism, I suggest that he is better understood as defending a moral analog to epistemic permissivism. In this chapter, I suggest that a plausible version of his view is an axiological stance permissivism where an axiological stance can modify the weights of one’s normative reasons. Lastly, in chapter three, I address aspects of God’s practical life that may comprise an axiological stance. The normative import of these aspects, I argue, provide a model of God’s practical life that is not objectionably robotic. On such a model, God has some control over what his weightiest reasons are.</p>

This thesis discusses how to enhance the public discussion of moral and political questions. Enhancing public ‘deliberation’ is desirable since it provides citizens with influence, it enables coming to an understanding, and it ensures legitimacy. The concept of ethico-political judgment, with its two conditions, is elaborated on as an ideal that suggests how we should deliberate. In order to understand how we actually deliberate, an empirical inquiry into the public discourse on prenatal diagnosis and screening in the Netherlands and Sweden is conducted. On the basis of Kant’s ethics and his theory of the faculty of judgment, the two conditions for public deliberation are developed. These conditions are the giving of and asking for normative reasons as well as aiming at impartiality of judgment. Normative reasons are prescriptive, universal, and internal and these are related to Kant’s ethics. Impartiality is related to Kant’s ‘enlarged thought’, to think from the standpoint of others, as well as Kant’s practical philosophy. We need to think from the standpoints of others in order to consider whether or not the principle of our action applies to all. Four thematic foci in the public discourse on prenatal diagnosis are investigated – the unborn life, attitudes toward the disabled, implications of new choices, and the limits of medicine. The conclusion is that – if we wish to enhance public deliberation on the basis of the two conditions of ethico-political judgment – we should deal with both interpretive differences over universal principles (such as respect for autonomy and human dignity) and varying representations of ‘the other’ (such as the fetus, disabled persons, mothers-to-be, and future parents). / I denna avhandling diskuteras hur offentlig diskussion kring moraliska och politiska frågor kan intensifieras. Att intensifiera offentlig diskussion är önskvärt för att ge medborgare inflytande, för att främja förståelse och för att skapa legitimitet. Begreppet etisk-politisk bedömning utvecklas som ett ideal för hur vi bör diskutera. För att undersöka hur vi faktiskt diskuterar görs en empirisk undersökning av det offentliga samtalet om fosterdiagnostik i Nederländerna och Sverige. Med utgångspunkt i Kants etik och hans teori om omdömesförmågan utvecklas två villkor för offentlig diskussion. Dessa villkor är att ge och efterfråga normativa skäl och att sträva efter opartiskhet av omdömesförmågan. Normativa skäl är preskriptiva, universella och interna. Begreppet utvecklas utifrån Kants etik. Opartiskhet baseras på Kants ’utvidgade tänkande’: att tänka utifrån andras perspektiv. Denna idé relateras till Kants praktiska filosofi. Det ’utvidgade tänkandet’ innebär att vi tar ställning till om principen som vi väljer för en handling gäller alla. Fyra teman i det offentliga samtalet om fosterdiagnostik analyseras – det ofödda livet, attityder gentemot handikappade, implikationer av nya val och den medicinska praktikens gränser. Slutsatsen är att om vi önskar intensifiera offentlig diskussion med utgångspunkt i de två villkor som utvecklas, bör vi ta itu med tolkningsskillnader när det gäller universella principer (som respekt för autonomi och människovärde) samt olika representationer av ’den andra’ (som fostret, handikappade, gravida kvinnor och blivande föräldrar).