This project delves into the role of American churches, notably the United Methodist Church (UMC), in perpetuating a segregation mindset and normalizing whiteness. The UMC's efforts toward a beloved community, exemplified by the Cross-Racial/Cross-Cultural (CR/CC) appointment, are scrutinized, emphasizing the need to confront racial and cultural challenges to prevent erasure, silencing, and assimilation by underscoring the importance of recognizing and addressing these issues for collective well-being, encapsulated in the principles of honoring, communication, and integration. Introducing the concept of re(de)fined and rethought Christian Conferencing, the project emphasizes the integration and honoring of diverse narratives, particularly through the Transformative Community Conferencing framework. Based on a narrative mediation approach, this framework seeks to challenge the pervasiveness of white cultural norms within the UMC, promoting collaboration between predominantly white congregations and clergy from non-white backgrounds. The project explores the transformative potential of this framework, stressing the importance of active engagement and concrete actions for genuine transformation in local UMC congregations, with a case study at Pound Ridge Community Church.

Ce mémoire traite du problème de la spécificité méthodologique de la phénoménologie critique. Cette dernière, depuis que Guenther en a forgé l’expression, a connu une effervescence remarquable qui est marquée par l’unité de sa visée : extirper la phénoménologie de sa posture contemplative pour en faire un instrument de critique sociale. Or en dépit du caractère distinctif de ce but, déterminer précisément ce qui distingue la phénoménologie critique de sa contrepartie classique demeure un problème d’envergure. En effet, la réponse d’abord formulée par Guenther, selon laquelle la phénoménologie critique procèderait à une subversion radicale de la méthode classique, s’est attirée plusieurs critiques. Contre une telle solution qui considère la méthode comme le critère fondamental de la distinction entre les approches phénoménologiques classique et critique, nous défendons dans le présent mémoire la thèse de l’unité méthodologique des deux approches par-delà leurs visées respectives. Plus précisément, nous reprenons à notre propre compte la position d’Oksala selon laquelle c’est le rejet de la réduction eidétique – soit la visée d’identification de structures universelles au sein de l’expérience consciente – qui constitue le critère fondamental de distinction de la phénoménologie critique vis-à-vis de l’approche classique. Cependant, contrairement à Oksala, nous soutenons que l’abandon d’une telle visée au sein de l’approche critique ne constitue pas une subversion de la méthode classique. Nous argumentons, d’une part, que la réduction eidétique demeure effectivement possible au sein de la phénoménologie classique et, d’autre part, que la poursuite d’une telle fin ne mine pas sa complémentarité avec la phénoménologie critique. Pour ce faire, nous déployons deux stratégies argumentatives. La première, plus succincte, consiste à répondre directement aux objections formulées par Oksala en ce qui a trait à l’insuffisance de la variation imaginative comme mode d’accomplissement de la réduction eidétique. La seconde, plus extensive, consiste à appliquer une analyse, en phénoménologie critique, d’un champ émergent de la phénoménologie contemporaine, soit la phénoménologie des normes perceptuelles. L’argument permet de démontrer qu’une analyse critique du rôle transcendantal des structures sociales relativement à l’expérience vécue des normes perceptuelles est parfaitement compatible avec l’identification de la forme eidétique de ces normes. / This master’s thesis addresses the problem of the methodological specificity of critical phenomenology. Since Guenther coined the term, critical phenomenology has experienced a remarkable effervescence marked by the unity of its aim: to extricate phenomenology from its contemplative posture and turn it into an instrument of social critique. But despite the distinctiveness of this aim, determining precisely what distinguishes critical phenomenology from its classical counterpart remains a major problem. Indeed, the answer formulated by Guenther, according to which critical phenomenology proceeds to a radical subversion of classical method, has attracted several criticisms. Against such a solution, which regards method as the fundamental criterion for distinguishing between classical and critical phenomenological approaches, this thesis recognizes a methodological unity between the two approaches which supercedes their respective aims. Specifically, I adopt Oksala's position: it is the rejection of eidetic reduction - the aim of identifying universal structures within conscious experience - that constitutes the fundamental criterion for distinguishing critical phenomenology from the classical approach. However, unlike Oksala, I argue that the rejection of such an aim within the critical approach does not constitute a subversion of the classical method. On the one hand, eidetic reduction remains effectively possible within classical phenomenology. On the other hand, the pursuit of such a goal does not undermine its complementarity with critical phenomenology. To demonstrate this, I employ two argumentative strategies. First, I respond directly to Oksala's objections regarding the inadequacy of imaginative variation as a mode of accomplishing the eidetic reduction. Secondly, I apply a critical-phenomenological analysis to an emerging field of contemporary phenomenology, namely the phenomenology of perceptual norms. The aim of this approach is to show that a critical analysis of the transcendental role of social structures in shaping the lived experience of perceptual norms is perfectly compatible with the identification of the eidetic form of these norms.

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.

Le déroulement du commerce électronique sur un marché global suscite de nombreux questionnements juridiques. D'une part, le droit est conçu à l'échelle nationale en fonction d'un milieu social tributaire de son histoire et de sa culture et d'autre part, le commerce électronique global présente des caractéristiques très singulières : dématérialisation, ubiquité et dimension transfrontalière. Or, une telle confrontation est susceptible de menacer la sécurité juridique des parties dans leurs transactions commerciales en ligne mais aussi la confiance nécessaire à leur développement. Les territoires nationaux, en limitant le pouvoir d’action effectif des États, pose un problème d’échelle : réglementer un phénomène global confronté à des souverainetés territoriales multiples. L’encadrement normatif du commerce électronique global se développe désormais, en partie, à un niveau extra étatique, confirmant l’érosion du monopole des États dans la régulation des rapports juridiques globalisés. La normativité devient le résultat d’un jeu normatif ouvert non seulement quant aux acteurs de la régulation, mais également quant à la qualification des normes impliquées dans cette régulation. Prenant la mesure de la complexité croissante de la normativité, les États interviennent pour tenter de concilier les pratiques nouvelles avec la règle de droit dans une logique de définition des règles du jeu et d’harmonisation du comportement des acteurs économiques. Les systèmes de droit nationaux apprennent à interagir avec des normes multiples de sources différentes. Cette évolution reflète l’articulation des dynamiques de mutation de la normativité avec le phénomène de globalisation du commerce électronique. / The roll out of e-commerce on a global market gives rise to a number of legal questions. On one hand, the law is conceived on a national scale based on the social context, which itself is dependent on its history and culture, and on the other hand, global e-commerce has very unique characteristics: dematerialization, ubiquity and a cross-border dimension. Such a confrontation is likely to jeopardize the legal security of parties in their online commercial transactions, in addition to the trust necessary for their development. National territories, by limiting the effective State power, present a scale issue: regulating a global phenomenon confronted by multiple territorial sovereignties. The normative framework of global e-commerce is now starting to develop, partly, at the non-state level confirming the erosion of States monopoly in the regulation of the global legal relations. Normativity becomes the result of a normative game, open not only as for regulation actors, but even as for the qualification of the norms involved in this regulation. With regard to the growing complexity of normativity, States intervene in order to attempt to reconcile new practices with the rule of law, while aiming to define the playing fields and to harmonize the behaviour of the economic players. National law systems are learning to interact with multiple norms from different sources. This evolution reflects the articulation of changes in normativity dynamic with the phenomenon of e-commerce globalization.

Ce texte a pour but de monter que l’efficience telle qu’utilisée par les économistes dans le cadre de recommandations de politiques publiques suppose toujours l’adoption de certains critères moraux. Je voudrai d’abord montrer que les recommandations des économistes en matière de politiques publiques ont déjà été identifiées aux recommandations de l’utilitarisme. Plusieurs économistes ont voulu abstraire leur science de toute discussion morale au XXe siècle. Cette séparation entre faits et valeur s’est soldée par l’apparition de l’efficience de Pareto, grandement utilisée dans le cadre de l’économie du bien-être. Cependant, cette utilisation de l’efficience suppose à la fois qu’il est moralement désirable d’améliorer le bien-être des individus et que ce bien-être peut être évalué en termes de satisfaction des préférences, ce qui constitue un jugement de nature éthique et morale qui ne peut être fait seulement à partir de faits scientifiques. L’efficience ne peut plutôt être utilisée de manière non moralement discutable seulement si l’on examine au préalable les objectifs sociaux que l’utilisation de cette mesure présuppose. D’un point de vue scientifique, l’économiste qui veut utiliser une mesure d’efficience doit donc toujours prendre pour acquis les éléments normatifs qui sont intégrés aux calculs d’efficience. La discussion concernant la pertinence de ces objectifs sociaux ainsi que l’importance relative de chacun des objectifs sociaux est une discussion portant avant tout sur des questions morales qui ne sont pas du domaine des sciences économiques. / This text aims to show that efficiency, as used by economists in the context of public policy recommendations, always implies the acceptance of certain moral criterions. I will aim to show that economical recommendations concerning public policy have been identified to utilitarianism in the past. Many economists have then tried to separate their science from debates concerning morals in the XXth century. This separation has had as one of its results the creation of the concept of Pareto efficiency, which has seen wide usage in welfare economics. However, this particular use of efficiency supposes that it is both morally desirable to seek to improve welfare of individuals and that this welfare can be evaluated in terms of preference satisfaction. Both of these affirmations constitute ethical and moral judgements that cannot be made within the sole scope of scientific claims. Efficiency can rather be used in a non-morally controversial way only if the underlying moral considerations are properly identified. A purely scientific use of efficiency needs to take for granted the normative elements implied in measures of efficiency. The determination of the relevance of various social objectives and the relative importance of each of these objectives remains moral questions that cannot be addressed by economics as such.

In this thesis I discuss one way in which evolutionary theory has been brought to bear on the evaluation of competing meta-normative views in epistemology. More specifically, I investigate whether normative realism in epistemology (epistemic realism) is compatible with the view that we are justified in holding many of the epistemic beliefs we hold, on the assumption that those beliefs can be explained in evolutionary terms. In Part I I discuss normativity in epistemology and meta-epistemology. I begin by drawing attention to the fact that there are very different ways of understanding which concepts in epistemology are normative and what their normativity consists in. I focus on the concept of an epistemic reason to illustrate this point. I then discuss, in some detail, how different interpretations of epistemic-normativity will affect the form which normative-realist views in epistemology can take. I conclude by drawing a taxonomy of epistemic-realist views which is mindful of the different interpretations of epistemic normativity which I distinguished. In Part II I turn to discuss the topic of Darwinian arguments against normative-realist views in epistemology. I begin by considering the form which Darwinian arguments have taken in recent metaethical literature. I argue that Darwinian arguments of a kind which is meant to raise a distinctively epistemological challenge for normative-realist views – I call those 'Darwinian-epistemological' arguments – represent a more interesting object of philosophical investigation than Darwinian arguments of a different 'metaphysical' kind. I then formulate a Darwinian-epistemological argument which targets normative-realist views in epistemology (DEA), explain how it works, and spend some time discussing its key premises. In Part III I engage with the Darwinian-epistemological challenge against realism about epistemic normativity that Sharon Street presents in her paper 'Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons' (2009). I argue that Street’s epistemological challenge is best viewed as an instance of a Darwinian-epistemological argument of the kind I formulated (DEA). I then go on to reply to Street’s argument on behalf of the epistemic realist. I conclude that arguments with the form of DEA do not represent a serious threat for normative realist views in epistemology.

The thesis Otherness and Identity deals with the discourse of Gilles Deleuze (Différence et répétition, 1968) and Deleuze in cooperation with Félix Guattari (Capitalisme et schizophrénie: L'Anti-Oedipe, 1972, Mille plateaux, 1980, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, 1991). On the basis of their discourse the process of individuation is constructed, and is at first situated into deleuzean space-time. The process of individuation is based on the principle of inner difference that is understood as a generative principle which "makes the difference". In this sense, the concept of individuation represents a concept of otherness unlike the concept of identity. The first and the second part of the thesis present basic principles of thinking of Deleuze and Guattari. In the third part of the thesis the principle of identity is localized in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. This concept is understood as a consequence of illegitimate uses of the synthesis of unconsciousness. On this ground their critique of psychoanalytic reproduction of repressive Oedipal structures is presented. And the Oedipal structure in it's reproductive function is also presented as a construct of sexual identity. The fourth part of the thesis is devoted to confrontation of opinion motivations, views and strategies of Deleuze and Guattari...

A partir d’une problématique suscitée par l’élaboration de l’Observatoire des Conditions de Travail de l’Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi (ANPE) auquel nous avons participé en Convention Industrielle de Formation par la Recherche (CIFRE), la thèse retrace les généalogies conceptuelles qui ont amené aux visions actuelles du concept de « conditions de travail », qui s’est institutionnalisé en France vers 1970 en restant sans définition. Marqué au niveau de sa structure par une conception factorielle issue de la division du travail, et par une conception séquentielle issue du taylorisme qui s’y est superposée, il se constitue progressivement au niveau de son sens dans les débats du XIXe siècle dans une dialectique entre droit-liberté et pouvoir-domination qui s’apparente à une conception politique des conditions pour le travail, subsumée à partir du mouvement de rationalisation du début du XXe siècle par une conception organisationnelle de conditions entièrement normées ou normables. Ces conditions tendent alors à être traitées dans des négociations institutionnelles, en désadhérence de la dialectique permanente et sans cesse renouvelée du normatif et du normé dans l’activité. Cette distance entre le concept et la vie est une usurpation épistémologique dont nous proposons le dépassement par une modélisation ergologique du concept mettant en visibilité les multiples entités de débats de normes, et donc de valeurs, du micro au macro dans l’espace social. Ce mode de traitement renouvelé du concept au profit de ceux qui travaillent, favoriserait l’émergence d’alternatives laissées en pénombre dans l’activité, sources potentielles de performance pour les entités productives. / Stemming from an issue concerning the creation of the observatory of the working conditions within the French National Employment Agency (ANPE) that we participated in as beneficiary of an industrial research grant (CIFRE), the thesis retraces the conceptual genealogies that led to the current views on the concept of « working conditions », which was institutionalized in France around 1970 but remain undefined. Initially structured according to a factorial understanding based on the division of labour, then extended using sequential design derived from taylorism, its meaning is progressively built during the nineteenth century through dialectics between rights-freedom and authority-domination which refers to a political understanding of the working conditions, subsumed from the early twentieth century’s rationalization movement by an organizational design of fully standardized or standardizable conditions. These conditions then tend to be exploited within institutional negotiations, being disconnected from continuously renewed dialectics between normative and normed in activity. This gap between the concept and real life is an epistemological usurpation which we propose to surpass using an ergological way of modeling the concept that brings visibility to multiple groups of debates regarding standards, and therefore values, from micro to macro in the social space. This renewed way of addressing the concept which benefits to those who work, could promote the emergence of alternatives left in the semi-darkness of the activity, potential sources of performance for productive groups.

L’objet de cette étude est de mettre en évidence les traits distinctifs de l’institution que désigne le terme « entrée en vigueur de la loi ». Il s’agit d’un ensemble de règles et de pratiques correspondantes qui permettent aux acteurs du système juridique de déterminer avec précision le moment à compter duquel devient obligatoire toute nouvelle loi. Pour qu’une telle détermination soit possible, le système juridique doit consacrer au moins une règle de droit commun, à savoir une règle qui permet de déterminer, à défaut de disposition contraire, la date d’entrée en vigueur de toute nouvelle loi. La consécration d’une telle règle présuppose l’existence d’un critère qui permet de déterminer avec précision le moment où la procédure d’édiction chaque nouvelle loi est achevée. En droit positif français, ce critère est la promulgation. Pour rendre compte de cette fonction de la promulgation, il importe de distinguer entre deux séries de conditions d’entrée en vigueur : les conditions particulières, dont dépend l’entrée en vigueur des lois d’après les règles du droit positif, et les conditions générales, dont la réunion est nécessaire pour qu’il soit en premier lieu possible de consacrer des règles d’entrée en vigueur. Concernant les conditions particulières, l’étude des règles de droit commun montre que, contrairement à une idée communément admise, la publication n’est pas une condition nécessaire de l’entrée en vigueur des lois. S’agissant des conditions générales, il s’avère que l’institution de l’entrée en vigueur présuppose une conception volontariste de la loi et un haut degré de formalisation de la procédure de son édiction. / This study aims at identifying the distinctive features of what is commonly referred to as “entry into force of statutes”. This term refers to a nexus of rules and practices that enable the agents of a legal system to determine in a precise manner the moment every statute becomes legally binding. For that to be possible, there must be at least one general rule that applies to any statute lacking a commencement clause. The existence of such a rule depends on the presence of a criterion that allows establishing the precise moment every bill becomes an enacted statute. In France, the relevant criterion is the formal act, known as promulgation, by which the Head of State signs a bill into law. In order to fully grasp the function thus performed by the act of promulgation, a distinction must be made between two kinds of conditions that can be said to be necessary for a statute’s entry into force. On the one hand, there are the specific conditions set out by the relevant rules of a legal system. On the other hand, there are some more fundamental conditions that a legal system must necessarily meet in order to provide for a general rule governing the entry into force of its statutes. As regards the conditions set out by the relevant rules of the French legal system, it turns out that, contrary to a commonly held idea, the rules in question do not make prior publication a necessary condition for the entry into force of statutes. As regards the aforementioned necessary conditions, it appears that the relevant rules and practices presuppose a voluntarist conception of law and, subsequently, a high level of formalism in the procedure followed for the enactment of statutes.

O debate sobre redistribuição e reconhecimento tem como principais referências os trabalhos de Nancy Fraser e Axel Honneth, bem como o livro Redistribuição ou Reconhecimento? Uma controvérsia político-filosófica, obra que reúne contribuições de ambos. Cada um destes autores atribui, contudo, um diferente significado a esses dois conceitos que são também mobilizados por eles de modos distintos. Com o objetivo de explorar esse debate no interior e a partir da controvérsia Fraser-Honneth, abordaremos a compreensão que os dois possuem sobre as relações entre redistribuição e reconhecimento, em seus diferentes níveis de análise. Tomando como fio condutor a pergunta acerca da possibilidade de que o conjunto de injustiças existentes seja compreendido a partir do conceito de reconhecimento, ou acerca da necessidade de recorrer para isso ao par conceitual redistribuição e reconhecimento, pretendemos mostrar que por mais importantes que sejam as questões relativas à base normativa de suas teorias, à importância e ao caráter que atribuem aos conflitos sociais a disputa entre o monismo proposto por Honneth e o dualismo defendido por Fraser tem em seu centro questões sobre teoria social, por meio das quais procuram compreender as relações entre a economia e a cultura e apresentar teorias do poder aptas a diagnosticar as injustiças ou patologias sociais existentes. Injustiças que, segundo eles, precisam ser analisadas também no interior das interações sociais, que estariam perpassadas por relações de poder. / The debate about redistribution and recognition has as its central theoretical references, Nancy Frasers and Axel Honneths work and, mainly, the book Redistribution or Recognition? A political-philosophical exchange, a work that gathers contributions from both of them. Each of these authors ascribes, though, a different meaning to those two concepts that are, besides, mobilised by them in distinguished ways. With the aim to explore this debate within and from Fraser-Honneth controversy, we seek to discuss the comprehension that both authors sustain regarding the relations between redistribution and recognition, in its different levels of analysis. Establishing as our guiding line the question concerning the possibility that the set of existing injustices be comprehended only through the concept of recognition, or if to do so is necessary to call upon the conceptual par redistribution and recognition, we aim to pinpoint that although questions regarding the normative basis of their theories and the importance or character they assign to the social conflicts might be of fundamental importance the dispute between the monism endorsed by Honneth and the dualism advocated by Fraser has its center the different social theories developed by those authors, through which they seek to understand the relations between culture and economy and to bring foreword theories of power that can diagnose the existent social pathologies or injustices. Injustices that, according to them, need to be properly analysed within social interactions, also pervaded by power relations.