The period of the seventies was characterized by occurence of oil crises that defined the entire decade of economic development across the U.S. The theoretical section of the work is devoted to macroeconomic consequences of the increased oil prices and brings the idea of economic theory, which considers the oil shocks as a part of wider economic problems in the mentioned period. Analytical part examines the impact of increased oil prices on the concrete industry. It describes performance indicators of automobile producers in the U.S., sketch the entry of new competitors in the U.S. auto market and following gradual loss of dominance of domestic brands. Work further analyzes the consumer behaviour in terms of preferences of new model products and the usage of personal vehicles. In conclusion, the given legislative measures its impact on the development of car culture in the U.S. Synthesis of statistics on industry, regulatory and economic papers provides opinion, that even though the opportunity for change in the automotive industry due to the oil shocks of the seventies occurred, in the long term remain unused which lost the chance to eliminate the potential risk of future oil crisis in the american automotive sector.

Στην παρούσα εργασία παρουσιάζονται οι επιπτώσεις των δυο πετρελαϊκών κρίσεων, του 1973 και του 1979, στην δημιουργία των προβληματικών επιχειρήσεων, στην Ελληνική Οικονομία. Επίσης, αναλύονται και οι πολιτικές που ακολούθησαν οι κυβερνήσεις, την περίοδο 1974-1990, με στόχο την λύση του προβλήματος. Για να γίνουν σαφείς, οι επιδράσεις των δυο ενεργειακών σοκ, αρχικά, γίνεται αναφορά στην διεθνή και ελληνική οικονομία, την περίοδο 1950-1970, με εστίαση στην ελληνική βιομηχανία που αποτελεί την ραχοκοκαλιά της οικονομίας. Από την ανάλυση προκύπτει ότι κατά την μεταπολεμική περίοδο παρουσίασε αλματώδη οικονομική μεγέθυνση. Ωστόσο γίνεται ξεκάθαρο από την μελέτη, ότι η ελληνική οικονομία, μετά τις δυο πετρελαϊκές κρίσεις, ανακόπτει την τροχιά ανάπτυξης, στην οποία είχε περιέλθει. Τα δυο ενεργειακά σοκ, είναι ο σημαντικός προσδιοριστικός παράγοντας της ελληνικής κρίσης, την περίοδο μετά το 1974, και της δημιουργίας των προβληματικών επιχειρήσεων. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί, ωστόσο, ότι δεν ήταν ο μοναδικός συντελεστής, αλλά ότι το πρόβλημα ήταν περισσότερο ένας συνδυασμός αρνητικών συγκυριών που συνέτρεχαν εκείνη την περίοδο, στην Ελληνική οικονομία, αναφορικά κυρίως με την δομή της. Από την ανάλυση προκύπτει, επίσης, ότι εφαρμόστηκαν ποικίλες πολιτικές αντιμετώπισης του προβλήματος, χωρίς όμως κάποιο αισθητό αποτέλεσμα. Οι πολιτικές αυτές αφορούσαν - είτε άμεσο, είτε έμμεσο - έντονο κρατικό παρεμβατισμό. Ένα βασικό σημείο της κριτικής του κρατικού παρεμβατισμού, στην εξυγίανση των προβληματικών επιχειρήσεων, είναι ότι η έλλειψη σαφούς προσανατολισμού και η υποχώρηση σε πιέσεις των εμπλεκομένων μερών, οδήγησαν σε αποτυχία και διόγκωση του προβλήματος. / -

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2007-02-23Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:48:16Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 traumann_ap_me_assis.pdf: 579521 bytes, checksum: 2282f70cc7a1b74a74ef6e21ae9c408a (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Este trabalho trata das relações entre o Brasil e o Mundo Árabe, especialmente depois da primeira crise do petróleo, em 1973. Diante da disparada do preço do petróleo, o Brasil passou a intensificar o seu intercambio diplomático e comercial com os países árabes no intuito de suavizar os efeitos da crise. De forma inédita e adotando uma política externa pragmática baseada no interesse comercial do país, o governo Geisel incrementou as relações do Brasil com o Oriente Médio e norte da África. Nesta busca por novos aliados, destacou-se o Iraque. A amizade Brasil-Iraque começou com a prospecção de petróleo e a descoberta pela Petrobrás do poço iraquiano de Majnoon, um dos maiores do mundo, e também pela construção de estradas e ferrovias. / This work deals with the relations between Brazil and the Arab World, especially after the First Oil Crisis of 1973. To face the fast rise of the oil prices, Brazil started to intensify diplomatic and commercial affairs with the Arab countries in intention to reduce the effects of the crisis. Adopting a new and more pragmatic foreign politics, based in the commercial interest of the country, the Geisel government developed the relations of Brazil with the Middle East and North of Africa. In this search for new allies, Iraq was distinguished. The Brazil-Iraq friendship started with the prospection of oil and the discovery by Petrobras, of the Iraqi well of Majnoon, one of the greatest of the world, and also the building of roads and railroads in that country.

Orientador: Clodoaldo Bueno / Banca: Estêvão Chaves de Rezende Martins / Banca: José Luis Bendicho Beired / Resumo: Este trabalho trata das relações entre o Brasil e o Mundo Árabe, especialmente depois da primeira crise do petróleo, em 1973. Diante da disparada do preço do petróleo, o Brasil passou a intensificar o seu intercambio diplomático e comercial com os países árabes no intuito de suavizar os efeitos da crise. De forma inédita e adotando uma política externa pragmática baseada no interesse comercial do país, o governo Geisel incrementou as relações do Brasil com o Oriente Médio e norte da África. Nesta busca por novos aliados, destacou-se o Iraque. A amizade Brasil-Iraque começou com a prospecção de petróleo e a descoberta pela Petrobrás do poço iraquiano de Majnoon, um dos maiores do mundo, e também pela construção de estradas e ferrovias. / Abstract: This work deals with the relations between Brazil and the Arab World, especially after the First Oil Crisis of 1973. To face the fast rise of the oil prices, Brazil started to intensify diplomatic and commercial affairs with the Arab countries in intention to reduce the effects of the crisis. Adopting a new and more pragmatic foreign politics, based in the commercial interest of the country, the Geisel government developed the relations of Brazil with the Middle East and North of Africa. In this search for new allies, Iraq was distinguished. The Brazil-Iraq friendship started with the prospection of oil and the discovery by Petrobras, of the Iraqi well of Majnoon, one of the greatest of the world, and also the building of roads and railroads in that country. / Mestre

Since the oil crisis of 1973-74, the problem faced by the typical oil-producing country has been that of developing a production structure with which the excess supplies of financial capital available to it could be transformed into human and physical capital over time. Because the inflows of oil funds were unanticipated, the initial attempt at the utilization of such funds resulted in the haphazard piling up of imports at rates which did not correspond to the absorptive capacity of a non-industrial oil-producing economy, thereby limiting the contribution of these oil revenues to development. This study suggests a framework within which the inflow of oil-funds can be reasonably anticipated and .the rate of oil production in each OPEC member-country geared towards its absorptive capacity. The model is applied within the context of dynamic multi-sectoral planning for Nigeria over the period 1974 to 2001. This study has a distinct two-tier approach to the optimal determination of oil-production and oil-revenue utilization for OPEC as a whole and for Nigeria in particular. First, a dynamic programming model of the world oil market with OPEC as a monopolistic organization trying to maximize the discounted stream of net revenues accruing to its members is developed and solved. Then, the optimal rate of oil extraction determined is allocated to individual OPEC members on the-basis of historical market shares. In the second part of the study, the results of the oil sub-model were integrated with a dynamic multi-sectoral planning model with the anticipated revenues as maximum levels of uncompensated transfers of funds from the oil sector for financing the plan. In this way, Nigeria's capacity to absorb oil revenues can be determined in an optimal way. This procedure was applied to long term planning for Nigeria over nine planning periods from 1974 to 2001 by use of large-scale linear programming techniques. Simulation experiments were also conducted with the planning model in order to determine the effects of changes in the model's basic parameters on the economy's absorptive capacity and the major macroeconomic variables. Our results indicate that Nigeria's capacity to absorb oil revenues far exceeds the revenue-inflows that could derive from current allocations to it by OPEC. Thus, Nigeria can be expected to agitate for increases in the market share allocated to it by OPEC or to seek further increases in oil price while keeping within OPEC production norms. This would be particularly profitable for Nigeria up to 1986 after which it would probably reach the limit ·of its absorption capacity. Our computational experience with the planning model also indicates that Nigeria's future prospects will depend on several goals embodied in the model as contraints, the most important of which are -the rate of growth of imports that is permitted by explicit government policy, the savings rate that is set as a target, and the manner in which the export earnings from the oil sector are made available to the domestic economy. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Depuis la stagflation observée consécutivement à la forte hausse du prix du pétrole en 1973 et 1979, les chocs pétroliers sont considérés comme l’une des sources de fluctuations potentiellement les plus importantes aux États-Unis comme dans de nombreux pays industrialisés. De nombreux articles ont étudié le rôle des chocs pétroliers dans la fluctuation des principales variables macroéconomiques à savoir, la croissance, le chômage, l’inflation et les salaires. Cependant, ces travaux n’ont pas encore permis d’aboutir à un consensus. Le débat s’est même intensifié au cours de cette dernière décennie, en raison d’une absence de réaction forte de l’économie réelle pendant la période d’augmentation du prix du pétrole entre 2002 et 2007. En effet, la récession qu’aurait dû engendrer une telle hausse des prix ne fut observée qu’au moment de la crise des subprimes en 2008. Plusieurs hypothèses furent avancées pour expliquer la différence entre les crises des années 1970 et 2000. Blanchard & Gali (2009) et Blanchard & Riggi (2013) évoquent, par exemple, la réduction de la quantité de pétrole utilisée dans la production, la plus grande flexibilité des salaires réels et une meilleure crédibilité de la politique monétaire. Hamilton (2009) et Kilian (2008) suggèrent quant à eux de l’expliquer par l’origine différente des deux chocs pétroliers : un choc d’offre pendant les années 70 et un choc de demande pendant les années 2000. L’objectif original de la thèse était de réexaminer l’impact des chocs pétroliers sur l’économie réelle par le canal de la dette. [...]Le développement de ces travaux entamés dans la thèse pourra aboutir à un cadre alternatif de modélisation décisif pour l’intelligence de la macroéconomie. Il devrait permettre une meilleure compréhension de l’évaluation des relations réciproques entre la sphère financière, la réalité des cycles macroéconomiques réels, l’énergie et le climat dans ce qui est sans aucun doute l’enjeu de notre génération : la transition écologique. / Ever since the stagflation that followed the oil price run-ups of 1973 and 1979, oil price shocks have been considered one of the most influential sources of economic fluctuation in the United States and other developed countries. A large body of literature has analyzed oil price shocks as sources of variation for leading macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, unemployment rate, inflation, and wages. However, scholars have yet to reach a consensus as to the true impact of oil shocks on the macroeconomic environment. Furthermore, the last decade has seen the debate intensify as the results of the relatively (in comparison with the 1970s) muted reaction of the real economy during the 2002-6 oil price run-up. Indeed, the recessionary effect was only observed during the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008-9. Numerous hypotheses have been put forward to explain the difference in impact during the 1970s versus the 2000s. For instance, Blanchard & Gali (2009) and Blanchard & Riggi (2013) evoked the reduction of the quantity of oil used of a unit of production, more flexible real wages, and a better credibility of the monetary policy. Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2008) pinpointed a difference in the nature of the shock: whereas the oil shocks of the 1970s were driven by supply, that of the 2000s was led by demand. The original aim of this thesis was to reevaluate the impact of the oil shock in the 2000s through the debt channel. First, based on the work of Banchard & Gali, we proposed a new dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE), which includes oil as an input of production as well as a consumption good. By relaxing some of the hypotheses of Blanchard & Gali, especially the decoupling of the output elasticity of oil with the cost-share in the production, our work demonstrated that oil is still a fundamental variable of the GDP in the United States. Furthermore, we found that energy efficiency is a key factor that explains the muted macroeconomic impact of an increase in oil prices. A third line of inquiry that may explain the difference between the shocks of the 1970s and the 2000s considers the extra costs implied by a higher price of oil that were absorbed by private debt (which was itself exacerbated by low interest rates set by the Federal Reserve in the 2000s). However, we found that DSGE modeling is unable to replicate the macroeconomic environment that led to the subprime mortgage crisis. In light of these considerations, I reoriented my thesis along the lines of a new angle of research that seeks to represent economic mechanisms differently. Under this new frame-work, private debt is at the core of macroeconomic analysis. It provides an alternative view of the financial crisis that occurred in the 2000s.[...]The conclusions of this thesis demonstrate great potential for providing foundations for new perspectives in macroeconomic modeling. The papers included in the thesis allow, in particular, for a better understanding of situations that most macroeconomic models are not able to cope with, including the over indebtedness crisis. As a result, the framework introduced here may provide an alternative and improved perspective for public policy. Further development of the research presented in this thesis may lead to the improvement of other frameworks in the field of macroeconomics. This would allow for a better understanding of complex interactions between the financial sphere, real business cycles, energy, and climate in what is certainly the biggest challenge of our generation : the ecological shift.

Detta är en jämförande studie om medierepresentationen av oljekrisen i Stavanger i Norge och Aberdeen i Skottland. I uppsatsens första del undersöker och jämför vi tre nyhetsartiklar från norska lokala tidningar i Stavanger med tre skotska lokala tidningar i Aberdeen genom en kvalitativ textanalys. I uppsatsens andra del lägger vi tyngd på journalisternas uppfattning om krissituationen och använder oss av semistrukturerade intervjuer. Genom kvalitativa intervjuer med norska och skotska journalister jämför vi hur de resonerar kring val av vinklar, nyheter, källor och hur de upplever sitt yrke och sin arbetsroll i relation till rapporteringen av oljekrisen. I arbetet lyfter vi fram skillnader i framställningen av situationen i Stavanger respektive Aberdeen. Vi använder oss av en etnografisk intervju i vårt tillvägagångssätt när vi träffar journalisterna, för att kunna använda detta som en ingång till historisk bakgrund för effekterna av oljekrisen och påverkan på städerna. En utgångspunkt för uppsatsen är att undvika att bedöma huruvida det rör sig om en kris eller inte och istället fokusera på gestaltningen i de valda medierna och journalisternas upplevelser av sitt arbete. Resultatet av vår studie visar att det finns nationella samband med hur journalisterna uppfattar oljekrisen. De norska journalisterna mörkar i högre utsträckning att det pågått en omfattande oljekris i Stavanger, medan de skotska journalisterna talar mer öppet om en kris. Vi kan genom denna studie konstatera att det återfinns skillnader i hur den lokala rapporteringen för oljekris sker, samt hur gestaltningen av oljekrisens konsekvenser ser ut i artiklarna som vi har valt att analysera.

C’est avec le lancement de la Coopération Politique Européenne (CPE) en 1969/70 que les six États membres de la Communaute européenne (CE) ont tourné une page dans l’histoire de l’intégration européenne. À partir de cette date les membres de la CE se sont consultés sur des questions de politique étrangère afin d’harmoniser leurs vues et d’élaborer des positions communes. Dès le début la France avait le plus grand intérêt à mettre le Proche-Orient sur l’agenda des Six. Comme les deux chocs pétroliers de 1973/74 et de 1979 risquaient de peser lourd sur les relations euro-arabes, les autres États membres de la Communauté ont consenti en principe à développer une position commune envers le Proche-Orient. Ainsi une politique proche-orientale des Six, et àpartir de 1973 des Neuf, s’est institutionnalisée au cours des années 1970 qui était basée d’une part sur des déclarations communes sur la situation au Proche-Orient et d’autre part sur une coopération économique interrégionale plus étroite, notamment dans le cadre du dialogue euro-arabe. Sous la présidence de Georges Pompidou tout comme sous la présidence de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing la France a été le moteur dans le développement des relations euro-arabes des années 1970. Même si l’action française qui visait à faire adopter sa propre politique proche-orientale par ses partenaires européens n’était pas toujours couronnée de succès la déclaration commune du 6 novembre 1973 et surtout la déclaration commune de Venise du 13 juin 1980reflètent nettement position pro-palestinienne de la France. / By launching European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1969/70 the six member states of the European Community (EC) openend a new chapter in the history of European Integration. Henceforward the six member states consulted each other in foreign policy issues in order to develop commun positions where possible. From the beginning France showed the greatest interest in putting the Middle East on the European agenda. As the two oil price shocks of 1973/74 and 1979 put a strain on the euro-arab relations the other member states of the EC supported the French request to develop a commun European Near-Eastern policy. Consequently, the 1970ies were marked by a process of institutionalisation of commun policy towards that region that was, on theone side, based on common European declarations, and, on the other side, on a more intense euro-arab cooperation in the field of economics, and this especially within the framework of the euro-arab dialogue. Both under the presidency of Georges Pompidou and under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing France can be described as motor of the development and the extension of euro-arab relations. Even if the French diplomacy that tried to make her Near-Eastern policy a common European policy has not always been crowned with succes the common Brussels declaration of November 1973 and especially the common Venicedeclaration of June 1980 reflect clearly the pro-Palestinian stance of France.

RésuméCette thèse a pour but de contribuer à l'histoire des communautés européennes et à la compréhension du processus de prise de décision au sein de cette coopération. Elle a pour objectif de clarifier l'importance du choc pétrolier pour la coopération européenne. Plus particulièrement, elle vise à comprendre quels effets immédiats et à court terme cette crise eut sur le développement d'une politique énergétique commune : La crise pétrolière fut-elle un levier ou une barrière au développement d'une politique énergétique commune? D'un côté, il se peut que le choc pétrolier ait accéléré le processus de prise de décision parce qu'il créa une urgence à traiter les problèmes d'approvisionnement du moment et à changer la dépendance européenne envers le pétrole du Moyen-Orient sur le long terme. D'un autre côté, il se peut que le choc pétrolier ait ralenti l'évolution d'une politique énergétique commune en intensifiant une confrontation entre les perspectives divergentes des Neuf, bloquant ainsi tout compromis. Dans ce contexte, des questions se posent quant aux raisons pour lesquelles les états membres recherchaient une coopération dans le domaine énergétique sans chercher de compromis au niveau de leurs intérêts divergents.Cette thèse a donné un aperçu sur différents aspects du processus de prise de décision dans les communautés européennes. La Commission européenne apparait dans cette recherche comme intervenant activement dans le développement d'une politique énergétique commune après la fusion de l'exécutif des communautés en 1967. L'échec de consensus en mai 1973 prouve toutefois que le besoin d'une coopération énergétique commune des gouvernements nationaux ait été moins fort que les différences d'intérêt mutuelles. En outre, on peut en conclure que les Neuf jugèrent l'OCDE comme un organisme plus approprié pour faire face aux tensions du moment du marché pétrolier.Après le début du choc pétrolier la coopération au niveau supranational fut considérablement minimisée. Il est certain que la Commission ne resta pas apathique face aux problèmes pétroliers lors du choc pétrolier. L'institution réagit vivement aux déclarations des pays producteurs de pétrole par des propositions de juridiction sur une politique pétrolière à court terme et des lettres insistant sur une position commune face aux problèmes d'approvisionnement en pétrole. Au sein de la Commission plusieurs comités et groupes furent créés, ou se rencontrèrent plus fréquemment, et se concentrèrent sur différents aspects du choc pétrolier.Le choc pétrolier ne fut pas un accélérateur du traitement des juridictions au niveau commun. Toutefois, il y a quelques remarques à faire. Il convient de mentionner que le Groupe de l'énergie du Conseil permit, curieusement, un forum pour la discussion d'actions communes possibles pour traiter les problèmes pétroliers du moment. En outre, la création du Comité de l'énergie signifiait un changement important dans le processus européen de prise décision. Troisièmement, l'OCDE a eu un rôle plus important que constaté avant en tant qu'acteur important du processus de prise de décision européen au niveau de l'énergie.Lors du choc pétrolier il ne fut pas donné à la Commission européenne de rôle d'élaboration de politique concernant les problèmes pétroliers du moment. Dans une première phase, le Conseil refusa ce rôle à la Commission à cause des mesures arabes sur les réductions de production et par crainte d'aggraver la situation. Mais même si cet argument n'était plus valable, les propositions pour des politiques à court termes de la Commission ne furent pas acceptées. Par contre, à cette époque, il fut confié à la Commission la tâche d'élaborer un programme à moyen et long terme pour une politique énergétique commune jusqu'en 1985. À cet égard, le choc pétrolier semble avoir été le catalyseur d'une politique énergétique commune. / This thesis aims to contribute to the history of the European communities and to the understanding of the decision-making process within this cooperation. More specifically, it seeks an answer to the question of what immediate and short-term effects he oil shock had on the development of a common energy policy: Was the oil crisis a lever or a barrier for the development of a common European energy policy? On the one hand, the oil shock may have possibly accelerated the decision-making process because it created an urgency to deal with the current supply problems and to change the European dependency on Middle Eastern oil on the longer term. On the other hand, the oil shock may have slowed down the development of a common energy policy by escalating a confrontation between the diverging perspectives of the Nine, blocking, in this way, a compromise. In this context, questions arise about the reasons why member states were searching for cooperation in the field of energy without searching for a compromise for their diverging interests.This thesis gives insight into different aspects of the decision-making process at the European communities. The European Commission emerges from the research as an active actor in the development towards a common energy policy after the merger of the communities' executives in 1967. The failure to reach consensus in May 1973 shows, however, that the need from national governments for a joint energy cooperation was less significant than the mutual differences of interest. Moreover, it might be concluded that the Nine deemed the OECD a more appropriate body to face the current tensions in the oil market. Two weeks after the Energy Council, they had committed themselves to the consumer cooperation at the OECD, just like the other member countries of this organisation. The idea for such a closer cooperation had been pushed by the United States since 1972. Within the OECD's Oil Committee, the theme of a worldwide apportionment scheme was being discussed as well as the danger of outbidding prices. The most important questions of the time were thus already discussed within this forum which maintained the large advantage of including the United States.After the start of the oil shock, cooperation at supranational level was significantly minimised, although the Commission did certainly not remain apathetic towards the oil problems. The institution swiftly reacted to the oil producer countries' announcements with new proposals for jurisdiction on short-term oil policy and letters insisting on a joint position faced with the oil supply problems. Within the Commission several committees and groups were created, and existing committees met more regularly, and focused on different aspects of the oil shock. The oil shock was not an accelerator for the processing of jurisdiction at common level. Noteworthy is the fact, however, that the Energy Group of the Council surprisingly provided a forum for the discussion of possible common actions to counter the current oil problems. Moreover, the creation of this Energy Committee signified an important change within the European decision-making process. Thirdly, the OECD had a more important role than assumed in other studies in this field, as an actor in the European decision-making process on energy.During the oil shock the European Commission was not attributed a role in the policy making concerning the current oil problems. In a first phase, the Council refused to such a role for the Commission because of the Arab measures on production cuts and a fear to aggravate the situation. But even when this argument no longer applied the proposals for jurisdiction of the Commission were not accepted. By contrast, at that time the Commission was given the assignment of elaborating a mid- and long-term programme for a common energy policy until 1985. In that respect, the oil shock seems to have been a catalyst for a common energy policy.

La crise pétrolière de 1974 frappe de plein fouet la consommation énergétique. Cette crise bouleverse d’abord la consommation quotidienne, les entreprises qui consomment beaucoup d’énergie (acier, automobile, … etc.), puis l’État qui voit se réduire les taxes pétrolières pour régulariser le marché public. Ainsi les citadins, surtout les parisiens, qui ont peu de ressources énergétiques doivent changer leurs habitudes de consommation. Réduire la consommation énergétique dans la construction devient une nécessité et l’État doit montrer l’exemple. Les bâtiments publics, neufs, rénovés ou restaurés servent d’exemple et illustrent les prises de position de l’État. S’occuper des économies d’énergie dans des bâtiments publics, c’est montrer l’intérêt que l’État manifeste vis-à-vis du domaine public. Le but de ce projet est de reconstituer les manières de repartir les traditions et les décisions dans la gestion énergétique et les nouveaux moyens techniques appliqués à la construction des édifices. Les résultats mettent en évidence cette problématique à travers l’étude de quelques bâtiments publics réalisés/édifiés en Île-de-France rapidement après la crise pétrolière de 1974. / The oil crisis of 1974 strikes quite hard the energy consumption. First of all, this crisis has disturbed the daily consumption, the companies which consume a lot of energy (steel, automobile, etc.) Then the State which reduced the oil taxes to settle the public market. The citizens, especially the Parisians who have a little reserve of energy resources may need to change their consumption habits. Reducing the energy consumption in the buildings becomes a necessity and the government has to show the example. The public, new, renewed or restored buildings, display the examples that the government wants to give of its new position. Dealing with the question of energy savings in public buildings, is also showing the governmental interest towards its public sector. See how the traditions and the decisions in the energy management and the new technical means applied to the construction of buildings are the purposes of this research, which highlights this problem and applies it to some of the public buildings realized recently after the oil crisis of 1974 in Ile-de-France .