Electoral violence can have dire consequences for a society, but remains a strategy employed by incumbents to secure electoral victory. This thesis search to explore if electoral violence instigated by progovernment side actually do increase the incumbent’s probability of electoral victory. The novelty of the question derives from taking into account a differentiation between the instigating side as progovernment or anti-government, which previous studies have not done. The argument is that as the opposition is likely to have other motives and resources available than the incumbent, anti-government violence should target other spectrums of the population and thus have a different effect on the electoral outcome than progovernment violence.  The findings give consistent statistical significance to a positive relationship between progovernment instigated violence and probability of incumbent electoral victory when controlling for electoral fraud and anti-government violence. This supports the hypothesis and suggests that incumbents do benefit, at least in the short term, from applying electoral violence. However, long-term backlash may still occur and the consequences for the society is dire. The relationship between anti-government violence and electoral outcome did not achieve statistical significance. Further research are needed to improve the nuance of the findings in this thesis and better understand electoral violence from different actors perspective.

No / This article aims to understand how emotions are integral elements in relations of power and government, with particular reference to the `War on Terror' declared by many Western governments after the events of 11 September 2001. In particular, I analyse two incidents within this: the peace demonstration against the Iraq war in London, 2003, and the aftermath of the Madrid train bombings in Spain, 2004. Using newspaper reports of these two incidents, I analyse how emotions were used by governments to try to direct the conduct of the population along with the uncertain reaction to this. Using Foucault's insights on power along with the theoretical work of Durkheim, Arendt and Nussbaum, I argue the evidence indicates that the emotions which run through relations of power are complex and ambivalent, motivating resistance and opposition to government as much as compliance.

À rebours des lectures fonctionnalistes et du rôle de « façade démocratique » souvent prêté aux partis d’opposition en contexte autoritaire, cette thèse étudie les logiques endogènes et exogènes des processus d’institutionnalisation de la contestation en Algérie. À partir d’une enquête menée entre 2009 et 2013 auprès de militants et dirigeants du FFS à Alger, Béjaïa et Tizi-Ouzou, ce travail éclaire à la fois les luttes et les conflits qui fragilisent l’organisation et les processus de (re)production du lien partisan qui favorisent sa perpétuation. Fondé au lendemain de l’indépendance de l’Algérie et communément qualifié de « plus vieux parti d’opposition », le Front des forces socialistes (FFS) se maintient depuis plus de cinquante ans. Contraint d’opérer dans la clandestinité sous le régime de parti unique (1962-1989), ce parti a été légalisé après l’adoption du pluralisme partisan en 1989. Depuis lors, il participe – bien que de manière variable – à la compétition politique. En explorant les pratiques partisanes oppositionnelles au concret avec une approche relationnelle, la thèse analyse comment la trajectoire du FFS s’inscrit à la fois dans l’espace protestataire et dans l’espace politique institutionnel. Elle questionne les tensions et les mises à l’épreuve que génère cette double inscription et montre ainsi comment une organisation partisane se perpétue en restant dans l’opposition dans des configurations de pouvoir ne permettant pas l’alternance / Established in the aftermath of Algeria's independence and commonly referred to as the "oldest opposition party", the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) has existed for more than fifty years. Forced to operate clandestinely throughout the single-party regime (1962-1989), this party was legalized after the adoption of party pluralism in 1989. Since then, it has participated - albeit in variable ways - to the political competition. How does a party perpetuates itself by remaining in the opposition within power configurations that prevent political change? Contrarily to functionalist approaches and the role of "democratic façade" often attributed to opposition parties in authoritarian contexts, this dissertation examines the endogenous and exogenous logics of protest institutionalization. By exploring partisan opposition practices with a relational approach, this work analyzes how the FFS trajectory incorporates the protest space as well as the institutional political space. It questions the tensions and the challenges generated by this double inscription. Based on fieldwork carried out between 2009 and 2013 with FFS activists and leaders in Algiers, Béjaïa and Tizi-Ouzou, the dissertation sheds light on both the struggles and conflicts that weaken the organization and processes of (re)production of the partisan link that favour its perpetuation

Inhalt: Mit Linz und Loewenstein – Zum Begriff des autoritären Regimes Von Wellen und blinden Flecken in der Komparatistik Autoritäre Regime im 21. Jahrhundert – Ein Überblick Schleichender Autoritarismus im Westen Autoritäre Wende des Kapitalismus?

Inhalt: 1. Fragestellungen und State of the Art 1.1 Forschungsfragen 1.2 Über den Stand der Forschung 1.3 Opposition in autoritären Regimen – klassisch und aktuell 2. Analyseschritte 2.1 Opposition in politischen Systemen 2.2 Handlungsdimensionen der Opposition 2.3 Idealtypen der Opposition in autoritären Regimen 2.4 Fünf forschungsleitende Hypothesen 3. Literaturverzeichnis

Welche Rolle hat die politische Opposition in autoritären Regimen? Das vorliegende Arbeitspapier formuliert generelle Überlegungen zum Phänomen des Autoritarismus im 21. Jahrhundert und entwickelt ein Konzept, mit dem regionenübergreifend das politische Agieren der Opposition in autoritären Regimen analysiert werden kann.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Purdue University, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 280-293).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-96).

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral--Univeristé de Genève, 1988). / Includes bibliographical references (p. [477]-480).

In January 1979, Stuart Hall claimed to have identified a new ‘radical Right’ ideology he termed ‘Thatcherism’, which was attempting to ‘command the space’ occupied by the social democracy of the then Labour government and the ‘moderate wing’ of the Conservative Party. In short, the Thatcher Conservative Opposition was detaching itself from ‘traditional’ Conservatism. This thesis examines the validity of the claim at the time it was made, through a detailed scrutiny of the positions taken up between 1974 and 1979 by those identified as being on the ‘radical Right’ of the Party and those designated as ‘moderates’. In particular, it analyses the programme proposed by Sir Keith Joseph, the leading advocate of New Conservatism, within the context of the policy-making processes adopted by the Party in those years and the outcome of those processes. It concentrates on efforts to formulate policies in the key economic and industrial relations fields and examines how what emerged was shaped by the opposing views of those involved and by outside events. It considers how Margaret Thatcher, in order to keep the Party intact, contrived to avoid entering into potentially unsustainable policy commitments and, at the same time, impressed herself sufficiently on the electorate that when the opportunity arose, it was prepared to vote her and her Party into office. It became possible, once the first Thatcher government started its work, to regard much of what it did as ideological and radical. However, so inchoate was the programme developed in opposition that one can only conclude that there was no body of doctrine at the time of the 1979 election which warranted the name of ‘Thatcherism’ and that victory was achieved by acting in accordance with ‘traditional’ Conservatism – by doing what was necessary in the circumstances to attain power.