Le solipsisme a été thématisé comme un préalable pour fonder la connaissance au dix-septième siècle. Cette doctrine suggérait, qu’en vue de la certitude, il fallait admettre transitoirement la concevabilité d'un doute portant sur l'existence du monde extérieur en totalité et des autres esprits. L'existence du monde extérieur a pu ainsi être tenue pour établie à l'occasion de preuves de l'existence d'un créateur unique ou tenue pour assurée à l’aide d'une déduction transcendantale. En comparaison, rien ne semble pouvoir prouver l'existence des autres. D'une part, rien ne semble compter comme une preuve a posteriori de l'existence d’autrui, puisque ce doute ne peut s'appuyer sur l'expérience. D'autre part, une preuve permettant de lever ce doute ne peut être produite a priori, puisque l'absence empirique généralisée des autres est concevable a posteriori. Ainsi, rien ne semble exclure la possibilité d'une découverte a priori de son unicité. Cette thèse entreprend de mettre au jour le traitement de cette difficulté par Sartre et Wittgenstein. Les deux philosophes se sont confrontés à l'illusion de confinement qui est le corollaire de l’admission, à titre de possibilité pertinente, de l'absence généralisée des autres esprits. Sartre propose dans L'être et le néant une preuve conceptuelle de l'existence d'autrui pour montrer que ledit problème théorique de l'existence d'autrui est un faux-problème, tandis que Wittgenstein propose dans le Tractatus de dissoudre les problèmes philosophiques de l'existence du monde extérieur et des autres esprits par le biais d'une réflexion sur les conditions d'intelligibilité de l'expression. Dans les deux cas, il s'agit de dissiper l’apparence d’un doute portant sur le monde en totalité et du même coup sur les autres esprits. Non seulement une preuve de l'existence d'autrui est impossible, mais elle est en plus superflue. Ainsi, requérir une telle preuve ne peut que conduire à manquer l’obviété de nos engagements envers les autres, et par là au déni de leurs existences. / Solipsism was conceived as a preliminary to grounding knowledge in the seventeenth century. This doctrine suggested that, in order to achieve certainty, one had to temporarily admit the conceivability of doubt about the existence of other minds and the external world as a whole. The existence of the external world was then taken to be established by means of proofs of the existence of a unique creator, or assured by means of transcendental deduction. By comparison, nothing seems to prove the existence of others. On the one hand, nothing seems to count as proof a posteriori of the existence of others, for the doubt it would dispel cannot be grounded in experience. On the other hand, nor can a proof which would dispel such doubt be produced a priori, for the empirical and generalized absence of others is conceivable a posteriori. Thus, nothing seems to exclude the possibility of an a priori discovery of one’s unicity. This thesis endeavours to bring out the similarity of the treatment of this difficulty by Sartre and Wittgenstein. Each of these philosophers confronted the illusion of confinement that presupposes admitting the generalized absence of others. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre proposes a conceptual means to establish that the theoretical problem of the existence of other minds is a pseudo-problem. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein proposes to dissolve the philosophical problems of the existence of the external world and the existence of other minds via reflexion on the intelligibility conditions of expression. Both cases involve dispelling the appearance that doubt about the world and other minds is possible and required. Not only that proof of the existence of other minds is impossible, it is also superfluous. To require such a proof therefore can lead to nothing but missing the obviousness of our commitments to others, and thereby to denying their existence.

The United Nation’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft is correlated with the promotion of universal human rights. Universal human rights are held to apply consistently to everyone everywhere without conceivable exception. There is some debate as to whether universal human rights possibly exist. This debate centers around two difficulties: 1) the task of identifying a single trait or capability that all human beings necessarily share, and 2) the task of relating human rights to this trait or capability. Conventional epistemic justifications defending the existence of universal human rights attempt to address both difficulties. However, they have become the focus of numerous criticisms. By conducting systematizing and critically reviewing text analyses, I will conclude that conventional epistemic justifications are unable to refute standard criticisms satisfactorily. In their place, I will introduce an epistemic justification from the philosophy of mind. I will attempt to demonstrate that this justification is capable of 1) identifying a single trait that all human beings necessarily share, 2) relating human rights to this trait, and 3) satisfactorily refuting the standard criticisms raised against conventional epistemic theories. I have produced this paper in the hope of further legitimizing the UN’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft by providing a more philosophically optimal justification of claims affirming the existence of universal human rights.

Ce mémoire se penche sur la possibilité de la conscience artificielle. Plus spécifiquement, je me demande s’il est possible qu’un robot, un ordinateur ou toute autre machine ait une conscience phénoménale, i.e. qu’il y ait un effet que cela fait que d’être ces systèmes. Après avoir brièvement caractérisé la conscience phénoménale, j’investiguerai quelques problèmes qui sont propres à la conscience, soit le problème difficile de la conscience ainsi que le problème des autres esprits, dans le but d’établir le cadre conceptuel qui nous permettra de réfléchir quant à la possibilité de la conscience artificielle. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je défendrai la thèse selon laquelle la conscience artificielle est possible en m’appuyant notamment sur le principe d’invariance organisationnelle défendu, entre autres, par David Chalmers, ainsi que sur la théorie computationnelle de l’esprit. Finalement, dans le troisième et dernier chapitre, j’évaluerai diverses objections contre la possibilité de la conscience artificielle que je tenterai tour à tour de réfuter dans le but maintenir ma thèse initiale aussi intacte que possible. / This thesis examines the possibility of artificial consciousness. More specifically, I consider the possibility for a robot, computer or any other machine to have phenomenal consciousness, i.e. that there is something it is like to be those systems. After having briefly characterized phenomenal consciousness, I will investigate some problems that are specific to consciousness, namely the hard problem of consciousness as well as the problem of other minds, in order to establish the conceptual framework that will allow us to reflect upon the possibility of artificial consciousness. In the second chapter, I will defend the thesis that artificial consciousness is possible by relying on the principle of organizational invariance which is defended by David Chalmers, among others, as well as on the computational theory of the mind. Finally, in the third and last chapter, I will assess various objections against the possibility of artificial consciousness which I will try to refute in turn in order to keep my initial thesis as intact as possible.

This thesis is an investigation into the phenomenon which Shozo Ohmori (1921-1997) considered “a peculiar manner of awareness”, and to which he attributed the term ‘fancy’. The objective is to achieve an approximate understanding of Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’, as it relates to awareness of entities in three-dimensional space, and the extensions mentioned in his only publication in English: “Beyond Hume’s Fancy” (1974). This objective will be realized by asking three questions. The first question is how we are to understand the demarcation of the different phenomena of awareness which Ohmori identifies. The second question that this thesis asks is what applications that the phenomenon ‘fancy’ mentioned in Ohmori’s account have, as Ohmori saw it. Having answered these questions, I will then make an assessment of another salient consideration: how does Ohmori’s employment of the term ‘fancy’ relate to Hume’s employment of the same term (seeing as the name of Ohmori’s article makes such a reference). As we shall see, Ohmori is attempting to identify a more specific phenomenon than the widely discussed issue of thinking about something that is not currently perceivable in our perceptual field. The third and final question that this thesis asks is whether there are any salient issues with Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’ and, if so, whether those issues can be resolved. When we are aware of entities in three-dimensional space, we are subject to various mental processes. Our awareness, seemingly, uses different modes of interpretation and orientation. In other words, our ‘point of view’ (which is something that not only pertains to the use of our visual sensory organs) determines both our place and relation towards other entities. One salient issue when considering the notion of awareness is how and by which order awareness emerges. Impressions, as David Hume would call them, seemingly precede our ideas. Sense-data, as Shozo Ohmori phrased it, is unquestionably inseparable from conceptions. Our conceptions, in turn, seem to inform our perceptions with expectations and predictions of how things are. When we perceive an entity, we are ready to make judgements about its being at this moment. When we see the front of a desk, we are ready to claim awareness of said desk-front as part of a desk (which entails the ontology of a desk, namely, being a three-dimensional construction of a particular variety). In everyday situations we simply speak of such an awareness as ‘perception’ when in actuality, all we see (which constitutes the sense-data or content of a perception) is the front of a desk. It seems we cannot regard our awareness of a desk (a three-dimensional entity) as a perception simpliciter. Of course, by having a notion of what a desk is, our awareness is pregnant with a ‘conception’ in the form of an idea that is informing our awareness of said desk. But our conceptual understanding of the notion of something being a desk is not enough to explain what our awareness of a desk-at-this-moment is. At least, that is what Ohmori thought.

Recherche sur l'existence d'une culture stratégique typiquement occidentale, européenne et américaine, culture qui trouverait l'un de ses fondements dans les représentations des combattants dans la pensée stratégique depuis la Renaissance / Doctorat en sciences politiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished