This study seeks to create a systematic overview of the five biggest Greek-Cypriot political parties in terms of votes. The topic which is being examined is the political positions held by these parties towards the solution of the Cypriot Problem. The Cypriot problem is a very controversial topic in Cyprus given the fact that forty percent of the island is under Turkish occupation to this day. The attitudes towards finding a solution and the attitude towards a solution has been historically a topic of polarization, whereas certain groups in Cyprus have more values of Philhellenism and others believe in Cypriocentricism. The study seeks to identify the correlation of the aforementioned values in terms of certain types of nationalism, thus creating a systematic overview with the party positions from a G/C perspective.

This thesis consists of an introduction and four self-contained papers, designated I-IV, which extend previous research on national political parties and voters in Western Europe. More specifically, the issues addressed are parties’ positions and voters’ opinions on European integration and their dynamic interactions, i.e. the extent to which parties’ influence voters’ opinions, voters influence parties, and the conditions under which they influence each other. All four papers make contributions to both the content of the research field and methodology (statistical techniques) applied. Paper I re-examines and evaluates several hypotheses regarding the way national political parties position themselves with respect to European integration. Based on analysis of panel data on references to Europe in the election manifestos of political parties in 16 West European countries between 1970 and 2003, I present evidence that their stances on European integration have been largely determined by their ideology, here measured by the locations of the parties within party families and their general orientation along the left/right ideological continuum. The results indicate that the influence of ideology has diminished over time and parties have adopted more favourable positions towards the European project, but it is too early to ignore the connection between left/right and pro/anti integration, since many marginal parties are still taking oppositional stances that are strongly related to their ideological commitments. In Paper II, I discuss how configurational comparative methods (i.e. Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA) and statistical methods can be combined to provide tests for the sufficiency of any given set of combination of causal conditions. The potential utility of the mixed-method approach for analyzing political phenomena is demonstrated by applying it to cross-national data regarding party-based Euroscepti¬cism in Western Europe. The findings show that oppositional stances to European integration are mainly restricted to non-governmental ideological fringe parties on both the left and right. Further, radical left parties with Eurosceptical positions are largely restricted to countries with social democratic (i.e. Nordic) welfare state regimes. The empirical example presented in this paper demonstrates that configurational methods can be successfully combined with related statistical methods. Paper III examines and evaluates the link between electorates’ opinions and national political parties’ positions on European integration, i.e. the extent to which political parties lead and/or follow public opinion on this issue. Applying a method for causal modelling to panel data concerning political parties’ positions and voters’ opinions in 15 countries from 1973 to 2003, I find (contrary to previous investigations of this relationship) that there is little empirical support for an electoral connection or reciprocal causation between party positions and electorates’ opinion regarding European integration. Parties have an influence on voter opinions, but they are largely unresponsive to changes in voter opinion. In Paper IV, I examine when parties do (and do not) influence voters’ opinions about EU policy issues. According to previous research, whether parties are able to persuade their constituents to adopt their standpoints depends on several conditions: characteristics and preferences of individual voters, intra-party factors, inter-party factors and several factors that affect the salience of EU issues at the domestic level. Applying hierarchical linear models to data concerning voters’ opinions and political parties’ positions in 14 West European countries, I present findings regarding the conditions under which parties are actually able to influence voters’ opinions concerning European integration.

Den breda mitten, eller bara mitten, är ett centralt begrepp i Centerpartiets identitet. Trots detta är Centerpartiets sakpolitik inte särskilt positionerad i ”mitten”. Partiet är snarare det mest högerlutande partiet av samtliga riksdagspartier vad gäller ekonomiska frågor. Samtidigt är själva idén med den breda mitten att etablera ett bredare samarbete över blockgränser men exkludera Vänsterpartiet och Sverigedemokraterna på grund av deras respektive ytterkantsposition. Rent sakpolitiskt är den breda mitten en gåta. Medan fenomenet inte tillåter sig att begripas speciellt väl ur ett sakpolitiskt perspektiv, argumenterar föreliggande uppsats för att det bättre kan förstås utifrån dess symboliska betydelse. Den breda mitten undersöks således som en instans av sekulär religion. Genom intervjuer med Centerpartister kartläggs ett religiöst meningssystem som grundas på; (1) ett heligt ideal om en icke-extrem politisk karaktär i form av mitten; (2) en moralisk gemenskap som sluter upp kring idealet och försvarar det från all form av upplevd extremism, men som är mer intresserad av sitt förakt för Sverigedemokraterna och (3) upplevelser av hur ritualer kring motståndet mot Sverigedemokraterna och självuppoffring för idealet erbjuder frälsning från synden att kunna associeras med Sverigedemokraterna via högeridentiteten. Religionens funktion tolkas vara att reglera diskrepansen mellan partiets identitet och praktik genom ritualer och moraliska argument som triumferar över sakliga problem med motstånd mot Sverigedemokraterna som den övertygande mekanismen. Mitten identifieras vidare som den perfekta täckmanteln för en förlorad högeridentitet och för de framgångar som motståndet mot Sverigedemokraterna bringar partiet, då motstånd mot båda ytterkantspartierna gör att Centerpartiet kan hävda sig som mitten och därigenom attrahera den större grupp väljare som finns där. Motståndet mot Sverigedemokraterna tolkas i sin tur som den grundläggande drivkraften bakom fenomenet den breda mitten, en drivkraft som inte bara bygger på framgångar i termer av en ökad väljarbas utan också på en upplevd välvilja, en dold förhoppning om en alternativ och självständig högergemenskap men även på en möjlighet för Centerpartiet att göra upp med sin egen historia av främlingsfientlighet. / The broad middle, or just the middle, is a central concept in the identity of The Centre Party in Sweden. Despite this, the politics of The Centre Party is not particularly positioned in “the middle”. Rather, The Centre Party is the most right-leaning party of all the parliamentary parties when it comes to economic issues. Simultaneously, the very idea behind the broad middle is to establish wider cooperation across block boundaries but exclude the parliamentary parties The Left Party and The Sweden Democrats due to their respective outer edge position. As a matter of concrete policy, the broad middle is an enigma. While the phenomenon does not allow itself to be understood particularly well from a concrete political perspective, the present thesis argues that it can be better understood based on its symbolic meaning. The broad middle is thus analysed as an instance of secular religion. Through interviews with members of The Centre Party, a religious meaning system is mapped which is based on; (1) a sacred ideal of a non-extreme political character in the form of the middle; (2) a moral community that defends the ideal by protecting it from all sorts of experienced extremism, but whose interest lies more in its contempt for The Sweden Democrats and (3) experiences of how rituals surrounding the antagonism towards The Sweden Democrats and self-sacrifice for the ideal offers salvation from the sin of being associated with The Sweden Democrats trough a Right-wing identity. The function of the religion is interpreted as regulating the discrepancy between The Centre Party’s identity and practise through rituals and moral arguments that triumphs over factual problems with the antagonism towards The Sweden Democrats as the convincing mechanism. The middle is further identified as the perfect cover for a lost Right-wing identity and for the successes that the antagonism towards The Sweden Democrats brings the party, since opposition to both the outer-edge parties allows The Centre Party to assert itself as the middle and thus attract the larger group of voters who are located there. The antagonism towards The Sweden Democrats is in turn identified as the primal driving force behind the phenomenon the broad middle, a driving force that is not only based on successes in term of increased voters but also on an experienced benevolence, a hidden hope for an alternative and independent Right-wing community as well as on an opportunity for redemption with The Centre Party’s own history of xenophobia.