The thesis aims to analyze and explain nature of Euroscepticism of political parties. The objects of the research are two players of the Czech party system - the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The thesis starts with a theoretical part, which summarizes the current debate in political science and Euroscepticism in the context of political parties. The aim of the empirical analysis is based on the verified KSČM and ODS in relation to the party Euroscepticism due to theory of Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak. The thesis tries to answer the research questions whether KSČM and ODS are truly Eurosceptic and which aspects of Euroscepticism are typical for that parties, as well as how Euroscepticism manifests. Key words: euroscepticism, european integration, ODS, KSČM, European Union

Yes

This thesis discusses how Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party usesrhetorical tools to foster Euroscepticism domestically and to create distance between Hungaryand the EU. By analyzing the extensive and ever-growing collection of anti-EU rhetoricconducted by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban and other official Fidesz party sources,the thesis explores the narrative strategies that frame the EU as an oppressive enemy actor thatis infringing on Hungarian values and sovereignty. By uncovering the manner in which thesestatements have been made and what national sentiments they aim to conjure in the listeners’minds, the thesis provides a deeper understanding of why Hungary’s Euroscepticism is soprevalent among similar post-soviet east-central European states. This thesis uses a method ofrhetorical political analysis (RPA) which is based on a constructivist theoretical frameworkthat assumes Hungarian Christian national identity and shared history informs the Fideszparty’s political and rhetorical strategies.

This dissertation seeks to test the proposition that public opinion is a driving force in integration, and thus examines the effect of euroscepticism on EU integration. Utilizing an understanding of integration as the process of European states achieving similar legal, social, cultural, political and economic policy outcomes while ceding greater policy power to European institutions, the relationship between aggregate level euroscepticism in EU member states (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden) and speed of compliance with EU policies is examined. More specifically, this dissertation examines the relationship between aggregate level euroscepticism in an EU member state, and the speed at which that state transposes EU directives. In testing this relationship a number of contextual conditions are examined, including the role of issue salience, domestic party systems, and electoral conditions. The findings of this dissertation suggest that the widely held belief that public opinion is driving European integration may be false.

Norway is the only country which has turned down EU membership in two popular referenda. It occupies a unique place in the study of Euroscepticism due to its population's stable and persistent misgivings about European integration. The thesis seeks to find out what Norwegian Euroscepticism really is and how it can be explained. Adopting a theoretical framework drawn from the Norwegian and comparative literature on EU support and a sequential exploratory mixed methods research design, the thesis first examines how the Norwegian Eurosceptic discourse has played out in a major national newspaper and the party political arena in the last fifty years, through the three periods of heightened Euroscepticism (1961-62; 1970-72; 1989-1994) and one period of latent Euroscepticism (1995-2010). Subsequently, the results of the qualitative analysis are tested on the 1994 Referendum Study to ascertain whether the issues mobilized in the public debate do indeed resonate on the popular level. The thesis finds that there are essentially two broad types of Norwegian Euroscepticism, mainstream (centre/left) and right-wing Euroscepticism. It argues that concerns about postmaterialist Values, political Culture and Rural society (VCR) are at the heart of mainstream Norwegian Euroscepticism, that values (the desire to make Norway and the world a better place), political culture (selfdetermination) and rural attachment are much more potent explanations for the phenomenon than economic interest (wanting to make Norway a richer place) or national identity concerns. Right-wing Euroscepticism, however, has an altogether different structure. Although it shares the political culture element with its mainstream counterpart, it does not exhibit postmaterialist or rural society sentiments. Conversely, it is driven by economic utilitarianism and the view that the EU is not sufficiently neo-liberalist. The findings also suggest that perceived cultural threat might be relevant to right-wing Euroscepticism, but this is an issue which must be investigated further by future research.

With the rise of the right- and left-wing populism growing in Europe, it is important for political scientists to look into this trend and what might be causing it. Studying the rise of Populism throughout Europe is important because of its potential threats to democracy. In this research, I examine one trend that may attribute to this growth of these political parties. In my research, I examine whether Eurosceptic ideas on social media are correlated to electoral success in European Parliament elections. Many populist party leaders have turned to social media to reach out and to gain followers. Social media has been a great platform for misperception and false news. Social media is also relatively easy to use and is used by many to obtain political information. For this research, I analyze the Twitter accounts of right-winged populist political actors in Germany, Italy, and Hungary during the two years before the 2019 EU Parliament elections. The four leaders looked into were Alice Weidel for the Alternative for Germany, Matteo Salvini for Lega in Italy, Gabor Vona, and Tamas Sneider for Jobbik in Hungary. There are two leaders from Hungary due to the switch in power during the two years. By doing content analysis in this analytical paper and looking into the reactions of followers on these actor’s social media pages, there will be a better understanding of how social media can help spread the growth of Eurosceptic attitudes in citizens in the EU. The anticipated results from this research are that as time progresses towards EP elections, populist actors will increase their social media usage with a stronger emphasis on Eurosceptic ideologies in their posts. With an increase in postings and rhetoric, it is expected that citizens in the EU will be adopting similar views with these leaders and will then vote for these populist parties into the European Parliament. This research is important in helping the EU and its leaders obtain a better understanding of the growth and progression of populism in relation to Euroscepticism and its role in social media. Having a better understanding of the concept, it can aid in slowing the progression of populism and Euroscepticism, the one thing that is undermining its institutions.

This master's thesis examines public euroscepticism in three case studies: Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It argues that relevant literature lacks consistency and continuity because of the narrow scope in which the phenomenon has been observed in terms of the factors related to euroscepticism. The aim of this thesis is to solve this problem by performing a more holistic examination; by marrying previously accumulated knowledge on euroscepticism, public opinion data provided by the Eurobarometer and European Union Parliamentary Election results all in an effort to demonstrate the variability both in the factors related to euroscepticism and relevant attitudes over time This thesis examines euroscepticism from a multidimensional perspective. It does this by performing a cross-national longitudinal trend study, observing factors related to euroscepticism: political parties, economics, migration, national identity and national sovereignty from 1994 to 2014. Compiling and observing this body of data, it is expected, will confirm or reject the argument that the causes and degrees of euroscepticism fluctuate over time and amongst member states. Having confirmed this fact may spur further investigation of the phenomenon and encourage the European Union to identify policy areas which could nurture closer relations with its European citizens in an effort to gain further legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy also means a Europe which listens to the expectations of its citizens and addresses their concerns through adequate policies. For any of its policies, including enlargement, the EU has to win the support of its citizens.European Commission, Enlargement report (2006: 23) / Master of Arts

The purpose of this thesis is to describe the hard euroscepticism in two Swedish parties: The Swedish democrats and the Left party, by describing and comparing their arguments. I will mainly do this by examining if they have traditional features in their arguments and if they have an alternative system to the EU. I’m using a study by Van Bohemen et al and the Benchmark theory by De Vries to analyze the results. The arguments are found in their official party documents. By describing, comparing and analyzing the arguments I’ve found that both parties arguments have anti-institutional and protectionist features. The Left party also argues against economic inequality and the Swedish democrats arguments have ethnocentric features. Besides the traditional ‘arguments’ The Left party also argue that the union is unequal, neoliberal and disregarding the climate changes. Both parties also have an alternative system to the EU. The Left party wants to replace it with international organizations which works against for instance inequality and climate changes. The Swedish democrats wants a deepened Nordic collaboration, which would help the economy as well as protect the Nordic identity. My conclusion is that both parties have traditional Eurosceptic features and an alternative system. There are some similarities as well as differences in their arguments and the differences are mainly ideological.

The purpose of this thesis is to describe the hard euroscepticism in two Swedish parties: The Swedish democrats and the Left party, by describing and comparing their arguments. I will mainly do this by examining if they have traditional features in their arguments and if they have an alternative system to the EU. I’m using a study by Van Bohemen et al and the Benchmark theory by De Vries to analyze the results. The arguments are found in their official party documents. By describing, comparing and analyzing the arguments I’ve found that both parties arguments have anti-institutional and protectionist features. The Left party also argues against economic inequality and the Swedish democrats arguments have ethnocentric features. Besides the traditional ‘arguments’ The Left party also argue that the union is unequal, neoliberal and disregarding the climate changes. Both parties also have an alternative system to the EU. The Left party wants to replace it with international organizations which works against for instance inequality and climate changes. The Swedish democrats wants a deepened Nordic collaboration, which would help the economy as well as protect the Nordic identity. My conclusion is that both parties have traditional Eurosceptic features and an alternative system. There are some similarities as well as differences in their arguments and the differences are mainly ideological.

This thesis aims at analyzing the EU policy of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma partisi - Justice and Development Party) based on the concepts of Euroscepticism and Europragmatism. Related to that aim initially the Euroscepticism and conjoint concepts are considered. Furthermore, Euroscepticism in Turkey is discussed at public and political party levels. To what extent the EU policy of AKP has undergone a change since it came to power in 2002 is discussed. Moreover the EU policy of MGH (Milli G&ouml / r&uuml / s Hareketi - National Outlook Movement), a political movement from which AKP emanated is discussed. Looking at their EU policy, it is discussed to what extent AKP differs from the National Outlook Movement. Literature review and discourses of the party officials showed that the Political Islam in Turkey has been in a transformation process since 28 February Process and in this process EU has formed an anchor for the Political Islamists. AKP that separated from the Political Islam movement has also been affected by this transformation process. AKP has given support for the EU process if it serves to domestic goals of the party. However since 2005 due to the internal and external factors AKP&rsquo / s commitment to the EU process has declined.