UK's exit from the EU presented the European project with a new situation. However, fears that more member states would follow UK’s example were overcome by increased support for EU membership in Sweden. The Left Party and the Sweden Democrats have moved from wanting to leave the EU to accepting Swedish EU-membership. Previous research in this area has focused on how parties position themselves for or against European integration as an idea on the one hand and the EU as an institutionalization process of these ideas on the other hand. Little research has been done on how Eurosceptic counterparts in Europe react to exit, as the UK is the first country to leave the EU. The aim of this thesis is to analyze how the Swedish Left Party and the Sweden Democrats have changed their position on the EU issue in connection with Brexit and consider an ideological dimension. The qualitative research of election platforms results in three conclusions. First, both parties remain in their fundamental criticism of the EU but see Brexit as a new opportunity to reform the EU fundamentally. Secondly, the pause on demands for a Swedish withdrawal from the EU may be based on an ideological dividing line. Thirdly, the parties problematize the EU in a similar way but from different angles, which further strengthens an assumption about the importance of ideology in the study of Euroscepticism.

This dissertation seeks to test the proposition that public opinion is a driving force in integration, and thus examines the effect of euroscepticism on EU integration. Utilizing an understanding of integration as the process of European states achieving similar legal, social, cultural, political and economic policy outcomes while ceding greater policy power to European institutions, the relationship between aggregate level euroscepticism in EU member states (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden) and speed of compliance with EU policies is examined. More specifically, this dissertation examines the relationship between aggregate level euroscepticism in an EU member state, and the speed at which that state transposes EU directives. In testing this relationship a number of contextual conditions are examined, including the role of issue salience, domestic party systems, and electoral conditions. The findings of this dissertation suggest that the widely held belief that public opinion is driving European integration may be false.

This thesis seeks to explain Euroskeptic attitudes by examining the relationship between information and Euroskepticism and the role of Euroskepticism in the post-enlargement integration debate. Drawing upon data from the Eurobarometer survey series and the European Election Studies, this thesis tests the relationship between information and attitudes towards membership, the direction of integration, and voting. This analysis concludes the roles of knowledge and awareness have divergent influences on hard and soft Euroskepticism. While increased knowledge increases support for membership in the EU, increased awareness decreases support for the direction of integration. This conclusion suggests that knowledge initially informs individuals of the benefits of being a member in the EU but greater awareness increases the likelihood they will be a harsher critic of the way in which it is developing, necessitating further examination of the role of the Euroskeptic movement in public opinion.

The purpose of this study is to describe and compare eurosceptic elements of the Swedish Left-Party and the Sweden Democrats leading up to the European Parliament elecetions of 2014 and 2019. Previous research has focused on many different aspects of eurocepticism; the definition and meaning of euroscepticism, eurosceptic voting among citizens and euroscepticism in democratic party-systems. Hence, this case-study aims at explaining euroscepticism in a Swedish context among the two clearly eurosceptic parties in the Swedish party-system. The two parties both have eurosceptic sentiments, although they have different ideological starting points and values. The Sweden Democrats consider themselves social conservatives with a nationalistic basic view. On the other hand, the Swedish Left-Party consider themselves as socialists and feminists with an ecological basic view. In order to find and compare these eurosceptic sentiments, a text analysis is combined with an analysis of arguments used in the two party’s election platforms leading up to the European Parliament elections. The empirical evidence is consequently interconnected with Taggart and Szczerbiak theory of soft and hard euroscepticism. This theory, or model of analysis, is used the catogorize parties based on their ”resistance” against different aspects of the European Union or the European process of integration as a whole. The study finds that the euroscepticism of the Swedish Left-Party and the Sweden Democrats have somewhat changed from the elections of 2014 and 2019. The resistance has mitigated to some degree leading up to the 2019 elections, in comparison to the elections of 2014. Although netither party could be categorized as soft or hard eurosceptics, they both lean more towards the features of soft euroscepticism.

<p><p><p> </p><p><p>Euro barometer surveys show quite an astonishing change in Turkish opinion towards European Union. In 2004, 73 % of the population considered EU as a good thing. In 2008, only 49 % were of the same opinion. At the same time, skepticism towards European integration is explained differently in earlier research. Some scholars claim that partisanship may explain attitudes of citizens better than “cost and benefit” approaches. The first aim of this study is to distinguish whether young Turkish citizens show a similar level of skepticism to the EU compared to the rest of the population. The second aim is to show how earlier research-identified factors can explain the EU attitudes of younger Turkish citizens. To map this out, a questionnaire based on Euro barometer survey questions has been used. The Turkish “youths” have been selected based on three conditions: age, profession and gender. To identify these individuals, the author has used what is sometimes referred to as the “snowball” technique. This basically means that the first identified individuals further contact people who fit the sample criterion. The result indicates that level of education; partisanship and strong nationalism all have an impact on EU membership attitudes. The result also showed that people who visited worship and other religious meetings on a regular basis, had a tendency to be more skeptical to a Turkish EU membership.</p></p></p></p>

Euro barometer surveys show quite an astonishing change in Turkish opinion towards European Union. In 2004, 73 % of the population considered EU as a good thing. In 2008, only 49 % were of the same opinion. At the same time, skepticism towards European integration is explained differently in earlier research. Some scholars claim that partisanship may explain attitudes of citizens better than “cost and benefit” approaches. The first aim of this study is to distinguish whether young Turkish citizens show a similar level of skepticism to the EU compared to the rest of the population. The second aim is to show how earlier research-identified factors can explain the EU attitudes of younger Turkish citizens. To map this out, a questionnaire based on Euro barometer survey questions has been used. The Turkish “youths” have been selected based on three conditions: age, profession and gender. To identify these individuals, the author has used what is sometimes referred to as the “snowball” technique. This basically means that the first identified individuals further contact people who fit the sample criterion. The result indicates that level of education; partisanship and strong nationalism all have an impact on EU membership attitudes. The result also showed that people who visited worship and other religious meetings on a regular basis, had a tendency to be more skeptical to a Turkish EU membership.

Syftet med denna studie är att urskilja likheter och skillnader mellan de verklighetsbilder som de brittiska tidningarna The Sun och The Daily Telegraph skapade åt sina läsare veckan innan Storbritanniens folkomröstning om medlemskapet i EU. Uppsatsen har sin utgångspunkt i teorierna om gestaltning, medielogik och kunskapsklyftan. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys grundad i massmedieretoriken undersöks om tidningarna uppfyllde det demokratiska uppdraget att informera medborgarna inför valet och i vilken grad de drogs mot populistiska tendenser i sin rapportering.   Resultatet av analysen visar att det finns markanta skillnader mellan de typer av information som de olika tidningarna erbjuder sina läsare. The Sun gav en förenklad och polariserad världsbild som närmast bidrog till att befästa fördomar. The Daily Telegraphs världsbild var mer komplex, men också mer högtravande och därmed exkluderande. Detta är knappast förvånande och stämmer väl överens med den bild som tidigare forskning ger av den nyhetsvärdering som styr kvalitetstidningar respektive tabloider världen över. Genom en jämförelse mellan de två tidningarna görs de skilda verklighetsbilder läsarna tar till sig tydliga, vilket kan öppna upp för en diskussion om tidningarnas demokratiska roll i samhället.

Den Europeiska Unionen är i ständig politisk utveckling och så är även den svenska opinionens förhållningssätt till det europeiska samarbetet. Denna studie syftar till att undersöka vilka attityder till EU som finns representerade i ledarsidor i tidningarna Proletären, Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet och Samtiden, under det första kvartalet av 2019. Dessa fem tidningar representerar olika sidor av det politiska landskapet i Sverige. Uppsatsen visar också vilka sakpolitiska frågor och pågående politiska processer som ledarsidornas diskussioner om EU anknyter till. För att besvara studiens frågeställningar har en kvalitativ innehållsanalys tillämpats. När det gäller sakpolitiska frågor kretsar den svenska EU-debatten framför allt kring migration, medan andra frågor som rör EU behandlas mer sporadiskt i enskilda tidningar. Ledarsidornas debatt var däremot mer riktad åt större politiska processer som kretsade kring Brexit, EU:s demokratiska utveckling och EU-valet. I samtliga diskussioner har de identifierade attityderna analyserats med stöd utav en multidimensionell teori av Boomgaarden et al. (2011) som förklarar hur attityder formas. Studien kommer fram till slutsatsen att det finns en förhållandevis utbredd euroskepticism mot unionens funktionssätt, men att skepticismen sällan är av principiellt slag. EU:s demokratiska underskott identifieras som en framträdande orsak till det kritiska förhållningssättet. Trots kritiken har de politiska mittentidningarna Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter och Svenska Dagbladet en positiv framtidsvision för Sverige i EU. De mest negativa attityderna finns på den politiska ytterkanten både till höger och vänster, där den vänsterradikala tidningen Proletären utmärker sig i att vilja förkasta hela unionen, medan Samtiden snarare intar en mer kritisk hållning än mittentidningarna.

The EU has widened and deepened the single market over time according to a transactionalist discourse of common-interests in integration. This rationale holds that as amounts of cross-border movement increase, Member State populations should perceive the single market as beneficial, thus leading to the creation of an affective European identity. Instead, as consequences of integration have become more visible, resistance to the EU has become more pronounced, especially with relation to the Union's right of free movement of persons. This thesis argues that interest-based theories of integration ignore prospects for resilient national identities to influence the accordance of solidarity ties, so as to color interest perceptions within national public spheres. Combining the literature on European identity, moral panic and communication studies on news framing, it maintains that the popular news media provide a conduit through which these interest perceptions can be taken up through the tendency of news outlets to report events that deviantly threaten underlying identity conceptions. Through content analysis of 'popular' press in the UK, Spain and Poland, it seeks to show how the inane tendency of news to report events in terms of an identity-based narrative can serve to foment moral panic within national publics. Contrary to interest based theories of integration, the EU's discourse clashes with national identity. Disintegration may be posited as the 'proper stance' to be supported on the part of the public in news narrative, if threatening deviance caused by EU migration is to be resolved. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This diploma thesis examines the suitability of generalization of the populist radical right parties (PRRP). In recent years, these parties have succeeded on the political scene of many European countries. Using the example of "new" Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD) political party and the established Danish People's Party (DF) it shows the differences in the party pre-election rhetoric and program, which are brought about by parties' age as well as by different historical developments in the respective countries. The historical context has affected contemporary political environment and, therefore, there are reasonable doubts about the generalization of the PRRPs. This is especially the case of post-communist countries, which, after years of oppression, had to go through a process of transformation that involved not only economic issues. This thesis is based on the Lipset's and Rokkan's cleavages theory, while it tries to confirm its existence in the given states, namely the economical, the religious, the center - periphery and the urban - rural cleavage. The inclusion of six tested factors in the analysis helps to do this. The multiple linear regression analysis tested which factors (the factors are socio-cultural, socio-economic, and demographic factors) have a statistically significant...