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The false official statement a comparative study of 18 U.S.C. 1001 and Article 107, Uniform Code of Military Justice /Abagis, Kenneth M. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, 1961. / "April 1961." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in microfiche.
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Trestný čin křivé výpovědi a nepravdivého znaleckého posudku dle § 346 tr. zák. / The Crime of Perjury and False Expert Report according to Section No. 346 of the Criminal CodeVernerová, Monika January 2019 (has links)
The Crime of Perjury and False Expert Report according to Section No. 346 of the Criminal Code Abstract A great deal of media attention has been dedicated recently to cases of experts facing the charge of perjury and false expert report pursuant to Section No. 346 of Act No. 40/2009 Coll. of the Criminal Code (hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Code). These cases reduce the experts' credibility in the eyes of the public, cast doubts on their practice as a whole and are therefore commonly used as an argument for adopting a new Law on the experts' conduit. In accordance with the aforementioned facts, the goal of this thesis is to provide a further insight into the crime of perjury and false expert report under Section No. 346 of the Criminal Code. The thesis consists of an introduction, five chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter gives a historical overview concerning perjury and false expert report followed by the definition of Section No. 346 of the Criminal Code, including its specific elements, and finally an analysis of several disputed cases that call into question the conclusion of criminal liability under Section No. 346 of the Criminal Code, such as the expert's consultant, the processor of the expertise or the formal and the material witnesses. The following chapter is divided into two...
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The Influence of Population on Wrongful ConvictionsWhittington, Kari 12 1900 (has links)
With criminal cases continuing to be exonerated across the United States, research must be done on the subject to advance current practices to reduce its occurrence in the future. This study combines county population data with the National Registry of Exonerations to analyze the contributing factors to wrongful convictions and the possible effect of population on their frequency. The objective of this study was to identify specific policy changes based on the five contributing factors to wrongful convictions that could be applied to population specific areas. The results yielded multiple patterns that are discussed thoroughly. These findings allowed the introduction of policy changes and proposals for future research.
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Comment les juges détectent-ils les mensonges lors de procès? Étude des mécanismes communicationnels sous-jacents aux déclarations de culpabilité pour parjureDenault, Vincent 04 1900 (has links)
Tant lors de procès en droit criminel que lors de procès en droit administratif, civil ou familial, le mensonge peut contribuer à la mise en place de trames narratives qui embrouillent les faits que les juges devraient connaitre afin d’appliquer adéquatement le droit. De plus, si les juges ne sont pas capables de distinguer le vrai du faux lors des témoignages, la confiance du public indispensable au bon fonctionnement du système de justice pourrait être compromise. Par ailleurs, même si des chercheurs s’intéressent, depuis les années 1960, à la détection du mensonge, en particulier lors d’interrogatoires policiers reproduits en laboratoires, ces expérimentations ignorent plusieurs attributs des systèmes de justice accusatoires (p. ex., les procédures judiciaires, les éléments de preuve incriminante, les déclarations assermentées, les interrogatoires, les contre-interrogatoires et les plaidoiries). Par conséquent, puisque la détection des témoignages mensongers par les juges lors de procès est rarement explorée, les juges des tribunaux municipaux, provinciaux et fédéraux sont pratiquement laissés à eux-mêmes. Dans le cadre de ma thèse, je présente un travail de type descriptif, analytique et explicatif pour observer et mieux comprendre le raisonnement ou, du moins, une partie du raisonnement par lequel des juges, en contexte naturel, en sont venus à déterminer, selon leur point de vue, que des témoins ont menti alors qu’ils témoignaient. Cette recherche vise, entre autres, à bonifier la validité écologique des expérimentations en laboratoire et à s’attaquer plus adéquatement à la problématique des mensonges lors de procès. D’une part, afin d’étudier la détection du mensonge dans le contexte concret où elle a lieu plutôt que dans le cadre d’une représentation expérimentale de cette activité, j’ai fait le choix de me tourner vers des jugements écrits de tribunaux canadiens comme données de recherche, plus spécifiquement, quatre jugements canadiens portant sur une accusation criminelle de parjure résultant d’une déclaration incriminante où les accusés ont été déclarés coupables. D’autre part, afin de décrire, analyser et expliquer de façon minutieuse et approfondie les mécanismes communicationnels sous-jacents aux déclarations de culpabilité pour parjure, j’ai fait le choix de mobiliser une approche contemporaine d’analyse du discours s’inscrivant dans les travaux de l’École de Montréal—l’approche ventriloque de la communication (Cooren, 2013)—dans la mesure où celle-ci permet d’identifier les éléments qui apparaissent comme faisant la différence dans la constitution d’un jugement. Hormis la rareté alarmante des jugements rendus à la suite de procès sur une accusation criminelle de parjure résultant d’un témoignage, les résultats de mes analyses permettent d’observer le rôle substantiel des idées reçues et l’apport considérable des précédents dans le processus décisionnel des juges lors de procès. Comme je le montre dans ma thèse, ces idées reçues peuvent exposer des croyances sur le comportement humain véhiculées ou exprimées, explicitement ou non, par les juges dans leur jugement. Quant aux précédents, ils peuvent avoir l’effet de voiler le rôle substantiel de ces mêmes idées reçues dans le processus décisionnel des juges. De plus, les résultats de mes analyses suggèrent que la détection des témoignages mensongers par les juges lors de procès dépend, entre autres, de nombreux éléments du contexte tels que mis en scène dans le raisonnement des juges et n’a pas grand-chose à voir avec le scénario expérimental typique mis en place pour étudier la détection du mensonge. Finalement, bien qu’ils n’offrent pas de « nouvelle technique » pour distinguer l’honnête justiciable du menteur, les résultats de mes analyses s’inscrivent en continuité avec d’autres travaux de recherche qui démontrent l’utilité a priori limitée des indicateurs comportementaux de mensonge et qui suggèrent que les praticiens du droit, en particulier les juges, devraient être systématiquement formés sur la nature faillible du processus décisionnel lors de procès. / Both in criminal law trials and in administrative, civil or family law trials, deception can lead to the development of narrative patterns that obscure facts that judges should know in order to properly apply the law. In addition, if judges are unable to distinguish truth from falsehood in testimonies, the public trust essential to the proper functioning of the justice system may be compromised. Furthermore, even if researchers have, since the 1960s, been interested in detecting deception, especially during police interrogations conducted in laboratories, these experiments ignore several attributes of adversarial justice systems (e.g., court proceedings, incriminating evidences, sworn statements, examinations, cross-examinations and pleadings). As a result, since the detection of deceptive testimony by judges during trials is hardly ever addressed, judges in municipal, provincial and federal courts are practically left on their own. In my thesis, I present a descriptive, analytical and explanatory work to observe and better understand the reasoning, or at least part of the reasoning, by which judges, in a natural setting, have come to determine, from their perspective, that witnesses have lied while testifying. This research aims, among other things, to improve the ecological validity of laboratory experiments and to address more adequately the problem of deception during trials. On the one hand, in order to study the detection of deception in the actual context in which it takes place rather than in the context of an experimental representation of this activity, I have chosen to turn to written judgments of Canadian courts as research data, more specifically, four Canadian judgments pertaining to a criminal charge of perjury resulting from an incriminating statement in which the accused was found guilty. On the other hand, in order to describe, analyze and explain in a thorough and in-depth manner the underlying communicative mechanisms of perjury convictions, I have chosen to use a contemporary approach to discourse analysis that is part of the work of the Montreal School—the ventriloquist approach to communication (Cooren, 2013)—to the extent that this approach allows to identify the elements that appear to make a difference in the constitution of a judgment. Aside from the alarming scarcity of judgments rendered following trials on a criminal charge of perjury resulting from a testimony, the results of my analyses make it possible to observe the substantial role of popular beliefs and the considerable contribution of precedents in the judges’ decision-making process during trials. As demonstrated in my thesis, these popular beliefs may expose assumptions about human behaviour conveyed or expressed, explicitly or not, by judges in their judgments. As for precedents, they may have the effect of veiling the substantial role of these very beliefs in the judges’ decision-making process. Furthermore, the results of my analyses suggest that the detection of deceptive testimony by judges during trials depends, among other things, on several contextual elements as staged in the judges’ reasoning and has little to do with the typical experimental design set up for studying deception detection. Finally, although they do not offer a “new technique” for distinguishing the honest litigant from the liar, the results of my analyses are consistent with other research that demonstrates the a priori limited usefulness of behavioural indicators of deception and suggests that legal practitioners, particularly judges, should be systematically trained on the fallible nature of the decision-making process during trials.
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As God as my witness: a contemporary analysis of theology's presence in the courtroom as it relates to the "oath or affirmation" requirement within the Florida rules of evidenceGurney, Nicholas Scott 01 January 2011 (has links) (PDF)
The existence of the oath in the courtroom can be traced back thousands of years throughout history, but the use, meaning, and effect of the oath in law has changed dramatically. The oath as we know it was once a powerful truth-telling instrument that our ancestors used to call upon a higher power. It was the belief of many that the oath itself was not sworn to man or state, but rather directly to a deity. The oath has since then evolved as a result of ever changing beliefs, fueled by increasing tolerance, shaping the oath into more of a tradition, and less of an edict. For centuries, theorists have attempted to determine whether an oath in court is actually effective at accomplishing its goal. The intent of this thesis is to examine the origin of the oath all the way up to the present day. It will be through a comprehensive study of federal law, state law, case law, articles, and publications that we will better understand the oath as a truth-telling instrument that in recent times has lost its effect. From there, it will be possible to better form a solution to a problem that plagues our courtrooms: perjury, or the act of lying under oath. This thesis will seek to establish the best way for our community to actively work towards ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of our judicial system.
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FauxtopiaKampf, Raymond William 01 January 2004 (has links)
To all who come to this fictitious place:Welcome.Fauxtopia is your land. Here, age relives distorted memories of the past, and here, youth may savor the challenge of trying to understand the present. Fauxtopia is made up of the ideals, the dreams and the fuzzy facts which have re-created reality... with the hope that it will be a source of edutainment for all the world.Ray KampfFauxtopia DedicationApril 1st, 2004
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