In this study an attempt is made to trace and analyse the changing nature of African youth in urban areas, with particular reference to the East London locations. The period covered is the period from the 1940s to the end of 1992. In common wisdom, an impression is often created that African youth is a homogeneous grouping. This has been particularly the case in the 1980s, when the youth of this country took to the streets and challenged the status quo in a manner unknown in South Africa's recorded history. However, the main conclusion of this study is that the African youth is not homogeneous, and has never been during the period under review. It is argued in the study that the youth divides into various categories which at times interact with one another, but are at times antagonistic to each other. It has been stressed though, that the various categories have not remained the same. Almost all underwent various changes and transformations. Some of the changes and transformations were radical, leading to the disappearance of some categories, for example, the old distinction of 'school' and 'red' youth. Where such took place, new categories have emerged, even in instances where the intentions were to bring the various categories under the roof of a single category, for example, bringing various categories under the wing of the political youth, or comrade (qabane), as was the case in the 1980s. In tracing the changing nature of African youth in urban areas, the underlying argument has been that there is no evidence of a single youth culture ever prevailing for long. This study attempts to explain why such a culture was not possible. Only a grasp of historical process will, moreover, help to explain the changing youth scene. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1993.

The political violence and vigilante activities that characterised Natal and Zululand between 1985 and 1996 had numerous causes. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 contributed to the rise of vigilantism and political violence. The formation of the Congress of the South African Trade Union (COSATU) in 1985 compounded this situation. Both these movements were known to be sympathetic to the African National Congress (ANC), which was still banned at the time of their formation; hence they had similar objectives to the ANC. During this time, Inkatha was the only strong Black political movement in the country, and particularly in Natal and Zululand. The Inkatha movement and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi regarded the formation of the UDF and COSATU in 1985 as a challenge to the hegemony of Inkatha in the region, following his fall-out with the ANC leadership in exile. Local leadership of political movements, namely, UDF and COSATU on one hand and Inkatha on the other, mobilised their support-base and took arms against each other. The lifting of the State of Emergency in 1986 intensified political violence and vigilante activities in the region. The Natal Midlands’ violence saw a high number of deaths and causalities. Local communities as well such as Vulindlela suffered a great deal. Clan faction fights were characteristic of KwaShange in the period 1940s-1970s, but from the late 1980s onwards (especially 1987) political unrest and struggle against the Nationalist apartheid regime changed into conflict between Inkatha and the UDF, which gradually worsened into civil war. In the course of my previous studies in KwaShange I discovered that the violence had impacted upon families and inter-generational relationships. According to some senior residents’ thinking, a number of youths were ill disciplined. Issues of disciplining of youths had obscured the political struggle and violence, making it hard to disentangle them. When researching memories of the violence, I found that persons spoke of different incidents within this struggle period and described their violent nature and how it had impacted on families’ survival, both psychologically and physically. The interviewees kept saying that it was hard to forget the memories engendered by their horrific experiences. The South African Government was accused of secretly provoking acts of violence in Natal and Zululand and was furthermore accused of having sent IFP troops to the Caprivi in Namibia for training in guerrilla combat. The Government later acknowledged this, explaining that the Natal Legislature needed specially trained forces for its officials. The unbanning of political parties and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 saw KwaZulu- Natal entering a new phase of random vigilante activities and violence. The security forces (the South African Police and the South African Defence Force) were accused of supporting IFP vigilantes. All this led to the “Seven Days War” in 1990 in the Midlands, particularly in KwaVulindlela. In KwaShange this violence, from 1986 until 1996, created divisions in families and the community. Many people lost their lives. All efforts to put an end to the violence and vigilantism failed. The announcement that the first democratic election in South Africa was to be held in 1994 triggered more violence in Vulindlela. Exhaustion in the area, and a national climate which promoted peace were elements which eventually brought the conflict to an end. Socially and economically, the area is still experiencing problems. Survivors and generations born during and after the turmoil talk about endless psychological and emotional suffering born during this turmoil. My contention is that trauma experienced as a result of this violence and its consequences influenced the lives of all persons affected by it, and that this was transmitted across generations, through whole families and communities. It must be realized that these people and their families were affected for a long time, and many are still traumatised. The social structure of the community has been affected by it and by implication that of successive generations will also be affected. This study describes and analyses political violence in KwaShange and investigates how it is remembered by the survivors. It also attempts to answer the question of how communities, families and individuals survived these traumatic experiences, how they coped (or failed to cope) with their experiences, both then and fifteen years after the end of violence. By focusing on KwaShange as a case study of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, I hope to determine what was in play in the province, and find a common pattern underlying the dynamics of the conflicts. Pre-civil war divisions have not, up to the present, been confronted, and these fuelled the political affiliations that were a response to the struggle against the apartheid regime. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Sociology, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 212-230).

La place de la violence dans l'histoire du XX° siècle est l'objet de nombreuses études depuis la publication des ouvrages de l'historien américain George L. Mosse. Si cet intérêt s'est longtemps concentré sur l'étude des mouvements d'extrême-droite, depuis une décennie la recherche historique se penche sur l'étude des relations qu'entretient le communisme, avec la violence. C'est dans cet environnement historiographique que notre étude vise à éclairer la place tenue par la violence dans la vie du PCF de sa naissance, en 1920, à son interdiction en septembre 1939. Dans un premier temps, après avoir analysé la place de la violence dans le mouvement socialiste et ouvrier avant 1914, il s'agit de percevoir la nouveauté introduite par l'idéologie bolchevique dans cette relation au moment où la société française est confrontée à la Grande Guerre et ses séquelles et de déterminer le rôle de la violence dans la naissance du PCF et dans son développement jusqu'à la fin des années 1920. Nous analysons ensuite la période « classe contre classe » où le PC développe pleinement les potentialités contenues dans la culture de guerre civile qu'il cultive depuis sa naissance. Il essaye alors d'inscrire cette guerre civile dans la réalité française. Le discours qui s'appuie sur la simplification de la perception des réalités politiques, économiques et sociales, décryptée au prisme de la culture de la guerre civile se durcit pour marquer l'imminence de la parousie révolutionnaire. Le PCF prône alors la confrontation directe avec les forces de l'ordre dans le but de conquérir la rue tout en essayant de mettre sur pied une force paramilitaire. L'abandon de l'activisme violent à la fin de 1931 entraîne une période d'hésitation sur la place de la violence dans la stratégie communiste, hésitation qui prend fin à partir de 1934 avec le tournant vers le Front populaire qui fait l'objet de notre troisième et dernière partie. La culture de guerre civile, que porte en lui le communisme, s'intègre alors à la culture républicaine sous le signe de l'antifascisme. Ce processus, qui participe aux succès que connaissent alors les communistes, entraîne une atténuation de la place de la violence dans la politique du PCF, mais non sa disparition. Sa trace se retrouve dans la politique interne de vigilance révolutionnaire, l'usage de la force contre les fascistes et les renégats et le rôle des communistes français sur le front espagnol durant la guerre civile. / The place of violence in history of XX ° century is the object of many studies since the studies of the American historian George L. Mosse. If this interest has concentrated for a long time on the study of the far-right movements, for decade historical research leans over the study of relations communism, with violence. It's in this historiographic environment that our study aims at lighting the place held by violence in the life of PCF since its birth, in 1920 to its ban in September, 1939. At first, having analysed the place of violence in socialist and working movement before 1914 and the novelty introduced by the bolchevik ideology in this relation at the time when the French society is confronted with First World War and its consequences to determine the role of violence in the birth of PCF and in its development during 1920s. We analyse the period «class against class» where the PC develops entirely potentialities contained in the culture of civil war which it cultivates since its birth. He tries to register this civil war in French reality. The speech which leans on the simplification of the perception of political, economic and social realities, having read in prism of the culture of civil war to mark the imminence of the revolutionary parousie. PCF search direct confrontation with police force in the intention of winning the street, while trying to set up a paramilitary force. The end of violent activism at the end of 1931 draws away a period of hesitancy on the place of violence in communist strategy, hesitancy which comes to end from 1934 with turn towards the Popular Front which makes the object of our third and last part. The culture of civil war, that hits in him communism, integrates then with republican culture under the sign of antifascism. This process, which participates in the successes which know then the communists, draws away an alleviation of the place of violence in the policy of PCF, but not its disappearance. Its trace is in the internal policy of revolutionary alertness, the usage of force against the fascists and the renegades and the role of the French communists on the Spanish front during civil war.

The quality of peace at the end of civil war has emerged as an important concept for understanding persistent security threats. This study seeks to bridge two well established fields by asking: Does the failure to implement a peace agreement encourage terrorism? I argue that the psychological effect of a failing peace agreement shapes the individual’s propensity to terrorism by enhancing the appeal of a frame which favors “radical” action to advance the group’s struggle for recognition. Terrorism can be simultaneously an emotionally driven response at the individual level, and a rational choice at the group level. This paper employs mixed methods. A cross-case study measures the spatial/temporal variation in peace settlement implementation and the intensity of terrorism between/within 34 post-accord settings. A within-case study leverages temporal variation to illustrate how four violent non-state actors responded to perceptions of salient loss at various points in the Mindanao peace process. While each organization used terrorism strategically, the strategies were not always linked to peace settlement implementation. This study advances understanding of the event-driven relationship between implementation failure and terrorism, the process by which “radical” frames convert an individual’s emotional reaction into political violence, and the dynamic integration of quantitative and qualitative research.

Este artículo sostiene que hay espacios sociales en Perú donde seproducen memorias alternativas sobre la violencia política que tuvo lugar entre 1980 y 2000.En Andahuaylas, Apurímac, las narrativas recurrentes hablan acerca de la servidumbre en la hacienda, de la movilización campesina por la restitución de sus tierras, la ocupación de tierras y sobre su violenta represión. Existe esta memoria victoriosa respecto de la ocupación de la tierra, al lado de una memoria de victimización respecto de la guerra interna. Sin embargo, esas representaciones han sido silenciadas a través de estudios oficiales sobre la memoria, que están tan de moda.En Ongoy, Andahuaylas, bajo la apariencia de un conflicto entre las comunidades y hacienda, se encuentran prácticas políticas campe- sinas en relación con el Estado. Los campesinos desarrollan redes con las instituciones del Estado, sindicatos, estudiantes, inmigrantes, partidos políticos y otros en busca de la restitución de sus tierras. Reúnen documentos que utilizan como apoyo de su memoria y de su precedencia en el territorio. Ellos muestran que la lucha por la tierra que relativamente termina en 1963 con la ocupación de la tierra, la masacre de los campesinos y la represión, tiene orígenes coloniales. Son historias y recuerdos que reconstruyen la lucha por la tierra como un acto heroico y se superponen con otras represen-taciones más recientes de la violencia política. / This article argues that there are social spaces in Peru where alternative memories about the political violence that took place between 1980 and 2000 are produced. In Andahuaylas, Apurímac, recurrent narratives tell about servitude in the hacienda, peasant mobilization for the restitution of their land, land occupation and its violent repression. A victorious memory of the land occupation exists alongside of an oppressive memory of internal war. Yet these representations have been silenced by official studies on memory, which are now so fashionable.In Ongoy, Andahuaylas, in the guise of a conflict between communities and hacienda, there are peasant’s political practices in relation with respect to the state. Peasants developed association networks with state institutions, trade unions, students, migrants, political parties and others to seek the restitution of their land. They gathered documents which they use in support of their memory and seniority in the territory. These show that the struggle for land that culminated in 1963 with the occupation of land, the slaughter of peasants and repression, has colonial origins. These are stories and memories that reconstruct the land struggle as a heroic act and overlap with other more recent representations of political violence. To analyze the process, events in Ongoy between 1960 and 1969 are reconstructed in dialog with the peasants gathered documents and testimonies of the actors on how events are reinterpreted after political violence.

The aim and purpose of this study is to explore how the Western media, more precisely six British newspapers, portrays the Kurdish female fighters of the Women’s Protection Units and the Peshmerga, who today are fighting against Deash in Northern Iraq and Syria. There have been a growing media interest in the Kurdish female fighters since the rise of Daesh, and they were an often recurring subject in newspapers and other media platforms during 2014 and 2015. I have collected 32 articles from six different newspapers, and applied a framework consisting of six different frames developed by Brigitte L. Nacos together with theories of media framing and social constructivism. The methodology is conducted as a critical discourse analysis, inspired by Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model.     In the articles, the Kurdish female fighters are portrayed as a different phenomenon, however, the articles still describes them as brave and dignified fighters who are rational in their understanding of what they are fighting for and what they are sacrificing. They are portrayed as being motivated by issues such as equality and female liberation in contrast to Deash anti-female values. The previous research conducted by feminist scholars often focuses on that the media portray women, who conduct acts of political violence, in a negative ways, such as deviants who are lacking traditionally stereotypical feminine characteristics or that their looks are in focus instead of their motivations. However, I have drawn the conclusion that there is more to how the Kurdish female fighters are portrayed then what one would think.

There were no "Rebellions" in 1896-7. The concept of "risings" which is to be found in the European perspective of the escalated violence has distorted an understanding of the complex nature of the events. The events of 1896-7 must rather be explained through an examination of the details of the conflict. European pressure on the African people prior to 1896 was minimal and cannot be assumed to be the "cause" of the first "Chimurenga". There was no planned, organised or coordinated "rebellion" in Matabeleland in March 1896. Further, no distinction can be made between a "March" rebellion in Matabeleland and a June "rebellion" in Mashonaland. A European war of conquest in 1896-7 evoked the responce known now as the first "Chimurenga". It was the war of conquest of 1896-7 which saw the ascendancy of the European perspective over the African and thereby established the psychological foundations of the Rhodesian colonial state. The complex nature of the events of 1896-7 is to be understood through an appreciation of the different perspectives of those who became embroiled in the conflict.

The purpose of this thesis was to get an idea of how tourism in Ukraine and specifically in the capital, Kiev, changed since the major events in recent years. In 2012 Ukraine and Poland welcomed the big football event Euro 2012 where Kiev was one of the hosting cities. After that the tourist flow increased until the terrible riot that took place at the end of 2013. Among other consequences, it led to Kiev receiving a bad image internationally via mass media, which in turn led to the reduction of the tourist flow. This thesis is a qualitative study, based on interviews with two government officials who had given us an overview of how tourism is today and what government does to improve the city’s image of having poor security and threats to potential tourists in Kiev today. Interviews with both representatives took place on location in Kiev. In addition to that, we conducted an email-survey with 13 Swedish tourists who had not previously visited Kiev to get a picture of their knowledge of Ukraine’s capital. Based on the answers from our respondents, we had worked to obtain the relevant theories and previous research for further analysis. The results of this thesis show that nowadays tourism in Kiev is not a profitable industry and there is too little focus dedicated to this topic as well as the city's marketing, because of the ongoing war in parts of the country. Furthermore, there is no ministry responsible for tourism in Kiev, but only departments that are being constantly moved between different ministries. / Syftet med denna uppsats var att få en uppfattning över hur turism i Ukraina och specifikt i huvudstaden Kiev ser ut, då den ändrades i och med stora händelser under de senaste åren. År 2012 hade Ukraina och Polen välkomnat det stora fotbollsevenemanget EM 2012 och Kiev var en av städerna som evenemanget arrangerades i. Efter detta hade turistflödet ökat tills det förfärliga upploppet som skedde i slutet av år 2013. Det ledde till att Kiev fick en dålig image internationellt via massmedia som i sin tur ledde till turismflödets minskning. Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ studie, byggt på intervjuer med två myndighetsrepresentanter som har gett oss en överblick om hur turismen ser ut idag och vad staten gör för att avlägsna denna image om dålig säkerhet och hot mot potentiella turister som Kiev har idag. Med potentiell turist menas en person som hittar något intresse för att besöka ett turistställe. Intervju med både representanter skedde på plats i Kiev. Samtidigt hade vi genomfört en undersökning då vi via e-post intervjuade 13 svenska turister som inte tidigare hade besökt Kiev. Syftet med e-post intervjuerna var att få deltagarnas bild av vad de har för kunskap om Kiev. Utifrån svar från våra respondenter hade vi arbetat för att få fram de relevanta teorier samt tidigare forskning för vidare analys. Resultatet av denna uppsats visar att dagens turism i Kiev inte är den lönsamma näringen och det fokus som läggs på detta område samt stadens marknadsföring är obetydlig, då det pågår krig i delar av landet. Samtidigt som förvärvsarbetet av turismen brister på grund av saknad av ett departement som ska vara ansvarig för turismen i Kiev. Det finns endast inaktiva avdelningar som ständigt flyttas till olika departement.