Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study concerns the state and violence in the Western Cape. This study was undertaken because the Western Cape has since 1996 been plagued by violence, including bombings, assassinations and violent protests. In particular these violent incidents have been labeled as terrorism or urban terrorism. The South African government does however not have a definition or a policy promulgated into law regarding terrorism. Very little progress has been in apprehending the person(s) and or group(s) responsible for these incidents of violence. The study therefore looked at violence in the Western Cape in an exploratory way. The aim of the paper was to (1) find credible appropriate definitions of terrorism, (2) to identify possible role players in violence, (3) to establish a chronology of violent events, (4) to identify the frequency, distribution and patterns of violence, (5) analyse the communication of events. An underlying theme throughout the paper is the weak state in which violence is a cause, consequence, and indicator of the weak state. The violence-plagued Western Cape is the geographical focus of the study. The paper looks at three incidents of violence, representative of the types of violence that have taken place in the Western Cape. The bombing of the Planet Hollywood restaurant, the killing of policeman Bennie Lategan and the killing of gangster Neville Herold are the cases discussed by in paper. For the purpose of the paper, the period of interest is the transitional period of the 1980's to 1994. The period under study is August 1998 to December 1999. After careful consideration of all the information the following conclusions where reached. The killing of Bennie Lategan is a terrorist act while the killing of Neville Herold and the Planet Hollywood bomb blast are not terrorist acts according to the definition used by this paper. PAGAD emerged as the major role player involved in violence. The organization is also complex and multidimensional with various groupings within the organization. The weak policing and justice systems are among the factors contributing to violence. The propositions and theories suggested by this study are based on current information and therefore speculative. Should more information become available these propositions may need to be revisited. Continual research on this topic is therefore important. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie gaan oor geweld in the Wes Kaap. Die studie was nodig omdat die Wes Kaap sedert 1996 geteister word deur geweld, insluitende bomplanting, sluipmoorde en geweldadige protesaksie. Hierdie geweldige insidente is bestempel as terrorisme of stedelike geweld. Die Suid Afrikaanse regeering het egter nie 'n definisie of beleid oor terrorisme nie. Baie min persone of groepe verantwoordelik vir geweld is voorgekeer. Hierdie studie gaan dus oor geweld in die Wes Kaap. Die doel van hierdie studie was (1) om 'n definisie van terrorisme, georganiseerde misdaad, geweld, vigilantisme en Islamietiese Fundamentalisme te vind, (2) om moontlike deelneemers van geweld te identifiseer, (3) om 'n kronologie van geweld op te stel, (4) Sekere patrone van geweld te identifiseer, en om te studeer wat hierdie insidente aan ander kommunikeer? 'n Onderligende tema, in die studie is die swak staat waarin geweld 'n oorsaak, gevolg en aanduiding is van die swak staat is. Die Wes-Kaap is die geografiese fokus van die studie. Die studie kyk na drie insidente van geweld wat alle tipe geweld in die Wes Kaap verteenwoordig. Die bomontploffing van die Planet Hollywood restaurant, die moord van polisieman Bennie Lategan en bende leier Neville Herold is die gevalle wat bespreek word in die studie. Vir die doel van die studie is die tydperk van die 1980' s tot 1994 van belang. Die tydperk onder bestudering is Agustus 1998 to January 1999. Na oorweging van al die informasie is die volgende gevolgtrekkings gemaak. Die Planet Hollywood ontploffing en die moord op Neville Herold is nie terroriste dade nie, maar die moord op Bennie Lategan is 'n terroriste daad. PAGAD kom te voorskyn as die grootse deelnemer in geweld. Die organisasie is kompleks en het veelvuldige dimensies met verskeie groepe binne die organisasie. Swak polisieering en die regstelsel is onder die faktore wat bydra tot geweld. Die voorstellings en teorië wat voorgestel in die studie, is gebaseer op huidige informasie en daarom is dit spekulatief. Indien meer inligting beskikbaar gemaak word sal die afleidings en voorstelle hersien moet word. Voordurende navorsing oor hierdie onderwerp is daarom nootsaaklik.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Somalia has experienced constant instability and conflict for nearly two decades. With a collapsed state, widespread violence and criminal activity, as well as continued disagreement between warring factions, the prospect of peace seems bleak. The purpose and rationale of this research has been to critically examine root causes and perpetuating factors of the protracted war in Somalia in order to arrive at a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the intractability of this conflict. This study aims to fill a gap in the literature by pointing to some elements which have previously been overlooked in existing research on the topic, especially the impact of the war economy on the fuelling of the conflict. While the thesis first and foremost set out to identify factors which contribute to the intractability of conflict in Somalia, a thorough conceptualisation of relevant theory and a historical overview of the case study were provided as a point of departure. An analysis then followed which tied theory to empirical data. According to my analysis, the most significant internal factors contributing to intractability of conflict in Somalia were the long absence of a central governing authority, the low level of economic development, the role of Islam, as well as particular choices made by the parties to the conflict. Relational factors which are crucial are the similar military strength of the opposing sides, their lack of cooperation, and their different views regarding the country’s law and governance. Finally, external factors were deemed to have had a particularly strong effect on the long war. Ethiopia’s constant meddling; Eritrea’s support of al-Shabaab; the UN’s and the AU’s various missions; as well as the presence of a plethora of humanitarian aid agencies have shaped the conflict throughout its course. The conclusion was drawn that the war economy had the greatest impact on conflict in the first rounds of the civil war, but with the transformation, re-escalation and re-intensification of the conflict that has occurred over the last couple of years, the opportunities for benefiting from war and instability may again have increased. Piracy stands out as a new, prominent pillar of the contemporary war economy. The war economy of today continues to have an influence on the Somali conflict; it adds to its intractability, makes it increasingly difficult to establish a legitimate and stable non-corrupt government, and generally sustains violence in the country. I suggest that further research be undertaken on the topic of state collapse in Somalia, as it is clear that the long absence of a central government is a factor which has had a significant impact on the prolongation of conflict. In addition, as accurate data on the current war economy is rare, I recommend that field research should be conducted in Somalia to gain a more precise understanding of shadowy economic activities and their linkages to conflict. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Somalië beleef vir byna twee dekades konstante onstabiliteit en konflik. Met wydverspreide geweld, kriminele aktiwiteite, voortgesette verskille tussen strydende faksies en die verbrokkeling van die Somaliese staat, lyk die vooruitsig vir vrede in die land onwaarskynlik. Die doel en rasionaal van hierdie navorsing is om krities te ondersoek wat die grondoorsake en verewigings faktore is, van die uitgerekte oorlog in Somalië. Die navoring meen dus, om 'n omvattende ontleding te gee van die redes vir die hardnekkigheid van konflik in die land. Die studie poog ook om 'n gaping in die literatuur te vul deur te wysig op kritiese elemente wat nalatig was in bestaande navorsing en meer fokus te gee aan die impak van die oorlogsekonomie wat konflik in Somalië aanspoor. Alhoewel die proefskrif hoofsaaklik poog om die faktore wat bydra tot die hardnekkigheid van konflik in Somalië te bestudeer, word 'n deeglike begrip van die toepaslike teorie en 'n historiese oorsig van die studie voorsien as die vertrekpunt van die navorsing. Dit word dan opgevolg deur ‘n analise, wat die teorie bind aan empiriese data. Volgens my analise is die belangrikste interne faktore wat bydra tot die hardnekkigheid van konflik in Somalië; die lang afwesigheid van 'n sentrale beherende gesag, die lae vlak van ekonomiese ontwikkeling, die invloed van Islam, sowel as unieke keuse van partye tot die konflik. Relevante faktore wat noodsaaklik is, is die soortgelyke militêre krag van die opponerende kante, die gebrek aan samewerking, en hul teenstrydige standpunte oor die land se wet en bestuur. Laastens is daar gevind dat eksterne faktore 'n besonder sterk invloed gehad het op die langdurigheid van die oorlog. Ethiopië se konstante inmenging, Eritrea se ondersteuning van al-Shabaab, die VN en AU se verskeie misies, asook die teenwoordigheid van 'n oorvloed van humanitêre hulpagentskappe het deel gehad in die formulering van konflik oor tyd. Die gevolgtrekking was dat die oorlogsekonomie die grootste impak gehad het op die konflik in die eerste rondtes van die burgeroorlog, maar met die transformasie-, her-eskalasie en reintensivering van die konflik oor die afgelope paar jaar, is daar weereens ‘n styging in die geleenthede vir individue om te baat uit die onstabiliteit en oorlog. Seerowery staan uit as 'n nuwe, prominente pilaar van die huidige oorlogsekonomie. Die huidige oorlogsekonomie het nog steeds 'n invloed op die Somaliese konflik, dit dra by tot sy hardnekkigheid, maak dit toenemend moeilik om ‘n wettige en stabiele onkorrupte regering te stig en dit fasiliteer die voortduur van geweld in die land. Ek stel voor dat verdere navorsing onderneem word oor die onderwerp van die ineenstorting van die staat in Somalië. Dit is duidelik dat die lang afwesigheid van 'n sentrale regering 'n beduidende faktor is, wat ‘n impak op die verlenging van konflik het. Verder, omdat akkurate data oor die huidige oorlogsekonomie so skaars is, beveel ek aan dat verdere navorsing gedoen moet word om ‘n meer akkurate begrip van donker ekonomiese aktiwiteite in Somalië te kry en hul impak op konflik.

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the role of social norms and social networks on the organization of political violence. Challenging traditional accounts of collective action, this dissertation presents an alternative theoretical framework of recruitment by organizations that aim to engage in political violence. The framework hypothesizes that the use of social norms and social networks can help overcome the collective action problem for such organizations by minimizing the need for selective incentive provision. The theoretical framework is applied to two in-depth historical case studies of the conflicts in Chechnya (1994–1996 and 1999–2009) and Sierra Leone (1991–2002). Each case study is composed of two analyses of the organization of political violence. In the case of Chechnya, the organization of Chechen resistance in the First Russo-Chechen War (1994–1996) and the organization of Chechen resistance in the Second Russo-Chechen War (1999–2009) are treated as separate units of analysis. In the case of Sierra Leone, the units of analysis are the Revolutionary United Front that initiated the Sierra Leonean Civil War in 1991, and the Civil Defense Forces that were organized in opposition to the Revolutionary United Front in the mid-1990s. The analysis of the results from the case studies supports the hypotheses of the theoretical framework. Both case studies exhibit significant within-case variation. In both cases, it is shown that use of the norms and networks of the sociopolitical environment within which the organizations of political violence operate has a favorable effect on successful recruitment, and that non-use of these mechanisms has a detrimental effect. In addition, the results have implications for current theoretical debates in the literature on domestic conflict, as well as policy-related implications for the potential for conflict mediation. / text

Although there has been a wealth of academic literature which has examined counter-terrorism, both in the general sense and in case study focused approaches, there has seldom been an engagement in terrorism studies literature on the nature of the state itself and how this impacts upon the particular response to terrorism. Existing literature has a tendency to either examine one branch of the state or to treat (explicitly or implicitly) the state as a unitary actor. This thesis challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor, looking beneath the surface of the state, investigating intra-state dynamics and the consequences for counter-terrorism. I highlight that the state by its nature is ‘peopled', demonstrating through comparative analysis of case studies from Spain, France, and the United Kingdom, how the individual identities and dispositions of state personnel at all levels from elites to entry level positions determine the nature and characteristics of particular states. I show that if we accept that the state is peopled, we must pay attention to a series of traits that I argue all states exhibit to understand why campaigns of counter-terrorism take the shape and form that they do. I posit that we must understand the role that emotional and visceral action by state personnel in response to terrorism plays, how the character of particular state organisations can impact upon the trajectory of conflicts, and how issues of intra-state competition and coordination can frustrate even the best laid counter-terrorism strategies. Furthermore, I show how the propensity for sub- state political violence to ‘terrorise' populations makes the response to terrorism a powerful political tool, and how it has been deployed in the past for political gain rather than purely as an instrument to improve security. I conclude that future academic analyses of counter-terrorism must take this into consideration, and likewise, state personnel must be mindful of the nature and character of their state should they wish to effectively prevent terrorism and protect human rights and the rule of law.

D.Litt. et Phil. / Non-violent mass-based protest and resistance by liberation groups have a long history in the South African context. Prior to the 1980s, they had achieved only minor and isolated successes. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 and its successful mass protest action against the state to 1990, changed the equation, however. The UDF's origin could indirectly be traced back to attempts from the 1950s to launch mass-based protest and resistance against the apartheid state. Calls for the formation of a united front against the South African State were made by various persons and organisations since the 1950s, but it was only by the 1980s that circumstances allowed the formation of a united front. Demographic realities, urbanisation, the legalisation of black trade unions, an educated leadership, the growth of a grassroots-based civil society among blacks, all contributed to make the formation of the UDF a reality. Protest against the government's tricameral system, initially provided the direct stimulus for the formation of the UDF during 1983 to 1984. By the end of 1984, the UDF had built up a wide support base to directly threaten the government's position. The result was several states of emergency through which the state endeavoured to crush the UDF-led opposition. The UDF's unique structure, which consisted of affiliates from all sectors of civil society, including black trade unions as an alliance partner, managed to survive the state's repressive measures, continued to pressurise the state so that by 1989, under a new head-of-state, the National Party "capitulated" and opened the door to real elections for a democratic South Africa. The UDF's strategies were aimed to mobilise the masses and through its mass-based action, bring maximum pressure to bear on the government. This strategic approach was executed by employing various tactics, which related to the classic methods of mass-based non-violent action. In the end, the state's security apparatus proved unable to cope with the UDF's relentless actions, offset by its inability to act effectively against the UDF as an entity, mainly because of its amorphous structure. Although other factors, such as economic recession, foreign sanctions, the ANC campaign to isolate South Africa, among other played a role, the UDF provided the crucial domestic impetus to illustrate to the South African government, that black resistance couldn't be suppressed and that the situation would continue to worsen. Seen against this background, it is unlikely that CODESA would have occurred as soon as it did without the activities of the UDF throughout the 1980s.

Diese Dissertation vereint Theorien ethnischer Gruppen und Grenzen (M. Weber, F. Barth, A.D. Smith, A. Wimmer, R. Brubaker, M. Lamont, V. Molnár, C. Tilly) mit den Macht- und Konflikttheorien von H. Popitz und R.V. Gould sowie der cultural sociology J.C. Alexanders in einer Performanztheorie gewalttätiger ethnischer Gruppenkonflikte. Mit Hilfe dieser theoretischen Konzeption gelingt es, anhand einer empirischen Verlaufsanalyse des Nordirlandkonflikts (1966–2013) eine Erklärung für dessen lange Dauer und spätere Transformation in einen gewaltfreien Konflikt zu geben. Der Verlauf der Gewalthandlungen (soziale Grenzen) wird in Beziehung gesetzt zu den zeitlichen Wandlungen der zentralen visuellen Propagandamedien der Akteure (symbolische Grenzen), den Murals in den Hochburgen der Republikaner und Loyalisten. Die Bilder (als nachträgliche Bühnenbilder) entzogen ab den frühen 1980ern auf Seiten der Republikaner (PIRA) die Anwendung von Gewalt der Logik eines Kampfes um "bindende Aktionsmacht" (Popitz). Die Gewalttätigkeiten konnten daher trotz der sich damals abzeichnenden Pattsituation fortgesetzt werden. Paradoxer Weise legten diese frühen Murals zugleich den Grundstein für die spätere Transformation des Konflikts gerade dadurch, dass sie Gewalt nicht mehr als Mittel zum Zweck legitimierten, sondern zu etwas relativ 'Beliebigem' stilisierten. Auf loyalistischer Seite (UDA, UVF) kam es zeitgleich zu vergleichsweise größeren Brüchen auf visuell-symbolischer Ebene. In Vergleich zu den republikanischen Murals zeichneten sich die der Loyalisten nicht durch eine relativ geradlinige und einheitliche Entwicklung aus, sondern durch eine Diversifikation der Motive und die Suche nach (neuen) Symbolen, die die eigene Gruppe neu begründen und einen konnten. Die Möglichkeit zur Konfliktfortsetzung und -transformation wurzelte hier nicht in einem systematischen symbolischen Wandel, sondern in einem patchwork divergierender (alter und neuer) Selbstverständnisse. / This doctoral thesis develops a performance theory of violent ethnic group conflicts by combining theories of ethnicity and boundaries (M. Weber, F. Barth, A.D. Smith, A. Wimmer, R. Brubaker, M. Lamont, V. Molnár, C. Tilly) with theories of power and violent conflicts (H. Popitz, R.V. Gould) and the cultural sociology of J.C. Alexander. This theoretical framework is applied on the Northern Ireland conflict (1966–2013). The result is an explanation for its long duration and later transformation into a non-violent one (peace process). The empirical analysis traces the relations between social and symbolic boundaries throughout the conflict. The development of social boundaries is reconstructed through an analysis of violent events during the conflict, the development of symbolic boundaries is reconstructed based on the central visual means of political communication used by the protagonists of the conflict, i.e. the murals painted in republican and loyalist strongholds. The development of murals (understood as belated stage settings) is interpreted in the context of the course of the violent conflict. In the early 1980s – a stalemate had developed on the level of social boundaries – the murals on the republican side (PIRA) transformed the meaning of violence: It was disconnected from an instrumental logic. Paradoxically, this transformation enabled at the same time the continuation of the violent conflict as well as its later transformation into a non-violent one. The loyalist murals (UDA, UVF) – compared to the republican ones – were characterized by ruptures and a lack of a coherent development. They exhibited a diversification of themes and a search for new (re-)uniting collective symbols. They did not enable the continuation and transformation of the conflict through systematic symbolic changes, but through the emergence of a patchwork of diverse (old and new) collective symbols and 'identities'.

Tendo como fio condutor o uso da violência política em sua relação com o poder soberano, a Tese decifra um percurso que leva da crítica ao terror ao esvaziamento da política. O temor da transformação de questões sociais em questões políticas inaugura a desqualificação da ação política que busque instaurar outra hierarquia de valores e outros lugares às categorias e grupos sociais vítimas de uma ordem instituída. Como se essa decisão de exclui-los fosse expressão da vontade da maioria, a abstração que permite excluir grupos humanos inteiros no pós-Primeira Guerra Mundial, ao transformar direito em privilégio de alguns como no caso em que apátridas e desnacionalizados foram vítimas, é encontrada também no movimento que transforma a política em gestão e administração, e criminaliza as tentativas de ruptura da ordem vigente. No termo desse percurso, os limites à liberdade prático-política são pensados tanto sob o registro da luta emancipatória radical quanto sob o da criminalização da ação violenta como terrorismo a ser neutralizado ou exterminado. / This Thesis main focus is the analysis of the ways in which political violence can be used and its relations with the Sovereign Power. I argue that there is a link build by the years between the Terrors critics and the emptying of politics, alloying the creation of the idea that one must fear the transformation of social questions into political questions. Because of this situation, all political actions seeking another values hierarchy and another place to the status quos victims tend to be disqualified. Also, since the post-I Great War, the mass exclusion of entire social groups not only became possible but could be shared as a decision of the majority of the people, through the transformation of common wrights into privileges of some, as can be observed in the homelandless and stateless cases. I aim to demonstrate the functioning of the abstraction working in that process, and to sustain that is the same abstraction that gives basis to transform politics into management and administration, and to criminalize the ones who fight to disrupt the established order. Thus, the limits of the practical political freedom will be examined under the clash of two registers: one belonging to radical emancipatory fights and the other one to the movement that enforces violent political actions criminalization as terrorism needed to be neutralized or terminated.

Denna studie presenterar en empiriskt välgrundad bild av inställningar till våld i radikalnationalistiska rörelser samt av hur dessa (re)konstrueras och upprätthålls inom organisationer. Studien utgörs av en hermeneutisk inramningsanalys av texter, artiklar, podcasts, radioprogram och dokumentärer av och om radikalnationalistiska aktörer. Studiens resultat visar en inom radikalnationalismen gemensam världsbild av att ”det egna folket” (den vita rasen / den västerländska identiteten) är hotat av en flyktinginvasion och att staten är ovillig eller inkapabel att skydda detta folk. I detta upplevda katastrofala läge anser sig radikalnationalisterna skyldiga att skydda folket i statens ställe. Våld ses inte som ett självändamål, men däremot som ett naturligt medel i kampen för folkets överlevnad, vilket man inte tar avstånd från om det anses nödvändigt. Den radikalnationalistiska rörelsen anser sig vara utsatta såväl fysiskt som politiskt av systemet och av meningsmotståndare, vilket enligt deras resonemang gör det nödvändigt att ibland använda sig av nödvärnsvåld. Organisationernas officiella riktlinjer uppmuntrar nödvärnsvåld i syfte att skydda sig själv, sina kamrater och sin organisations heder. Internt uttalas radikaliserade varianter av detta resonemang där det beskrivs att våld alltid kan motiveras med självförsvar i och med att vårt folk är under attack och därmed behöver försvaras. / This study presents an empirically founded description of attitudes towards violence in radical nationalist social movements and of how these are (re)constructed within organisations. The analysis has been made through a hermeneutical frame analysis of texts, podcasts, documentaries and radio programmes about and issued by radical nationalist actors. The result shows that the radical nationalist movement has a collective world view of “their own people” as threatened by a refugee invasion from which the state is unwilling to protect said people. Nationalist actors see it as their responsibility to protect the people where the state fails to do so. Violence is not seen as an end, but as a natural means in the fight for survival, which will not be disregarded if perceived as advantageous. The movement sees itself as victim to physical and political injustice from the system and from political opponents, which in their view justifies use violence in self protecting purposes. Official guidelines encourage violence to protect oneself, one’s comrades and the honour of the organisation. A radicalized version is that violence always can be motivated with self-defence because “our people” is seen as under attack and needs to be defended. / Populärvetenskaplig sammanfattning Denna studie syftar till att undersöka och presentera en bild av inställningar till våld i radikalnationalistiska miljöer samt hur dessa kommer till och förändras inom organisationer. Radikalnationalism är detsamma som vad som i vardagligt tal kallas ”högerextremism”, men då man vid en närmre titt kan se att rörelsen inte går att placera på en klassisk höger-vänster-skala så har jag valt att istället använda begreppet radikalnationalism. För att nå mitt syfte har jag använt mig av inramningsteori (framing theory), vilket är en vetenskaplig metod i syfte att fånga hur organisationer konstruerar och upprätthåller en gemensam verklighet och identitet. Metoden har här använts för att se om det finns en kollektiv syn på våld inom den radikalnationalistiska rörelsen och hur denna i så fall ser ut. Studiens resultat visar att den radikalnationalistiska rörelsen har en gemensam världsbild där samhället befinner sig i fullständigt kaos, där ”det egna folket” (den vita rasen / det västerländska folket) är hotat av en flyktinginvasion och där staten är ovillig eller inkapabel att skydda detta folk. I detta upplevda katastrofala läge anser sig radikalnationalisterna skyldiga att skydda folket i statens ställe, vilket skall göras genom en framtida revolution. Våld ses inte som ett självändamål, men däremot som ett naturligt och nödvändigt medel i kampen för folkets överlevnad, vilket man inte tar avstånd från om det anses hjälpa kampen framåt. Utöver detta instrumentella våld anser sig den radikalnationalistiska rörelsen vara utsatta såväl fysiskt som politiskt av systemet och av meningsmotståndare, vilket gör det nödvändigt att ibland använda sig av nödvärnsvåld. Organisationernas officiella riktlinjer uppmuntrar nödvärnsvåld i syfte att skydda sig själv, sina kamrater och sin organisations heder. Internt uttalas radikaliserade varianter av detta resonemang där det beskrivs att våld alltid kan motiveras med självförsvar i och med att vårt folk är under attack och därmed behöver försvaras.

Review Essay of Y. Aboul-Enein, Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2013; J. Deol and Z. Kazmi, eds. Contextualising Jihadi Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; M. H. Hassan, The Father of Jihad:’Abd Allāh ‘Azzām’s Jihad ideas and Implications to National Security. London: Imperial College Press, 2014; J. Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012; A. Moghadam and B. Fishman, eds., Fault lines in global jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures, New York and London: Routledge, 2013.

L’Irish Republican Army (IRA), le principal groupe paramilitaire républicain, fut fondé en 1969. Dès lors, il lutta contre la présence britannique en Irlande du Nord et pour la réunification de l’île d’Irlande. Le désarmement de l’IRA, considéré comme irréalisable jusqu’en 2001, s’accomplit pourtant bel et bien entre 2001 et 2005 dans le cadre du processus de paix. Le 26 septembre 2005, l’IRA avait officiellement déposé les armes. Quels mécanismes avaient alors permis, au sein du processus de paix nord-irlandais, d’aboutir à la "mise hors d’état de nuire" de l’arsenal de l’IRA qui déclarait pourtant encore en 1998 qu’il n’accepterait pas de rendre les armes ? Comme l’annonce le titre de cette thèse, trois questions sous-tendent notre analyse : quels étaient les enjeux de l’abandon de la violence et du désarmement pour l’IRA et le Sinn Féin durant tout le processus de paix ? Quelle était la portée symbolique du désarmement pour le groupe armé clandestin et pour le mouvement républicain dans son ensemble ? Enfin, quels mécanismes, tant diplomatiques que psychologiques, avaient pu convaincre l’IRA d’abandonner la violence puis de désarmer ? À la demande du groupe clandestin, la nature du dispositif de désarmement et le nombre d’armes détruites demeurent confidentiels. Cette étude ne prétend donc pas révéler des secrets d’État, mais bien de mettre en évidence la dynamique du processus qui a mené l’IRA de la violence armée à l’abandon des armes. / The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the main Republican paramilitary group in Northern Ireland was founded in 1969. From then on it fought to put an end to the British presence in Northern Ireland and to achieve the unification of Ireland. The decommissioning of the IRA, which seemed unrealizable until 2001, was indeed accomplished between 2001 and 2005, as part of the Peace Process. On 26 September 2005, the IRA officially laid down its weapons. What mechanisms played a role in the IRA putting its arsenal beyond use during the Northern Ireland Peace Process, despite the armed group’s declaration in 1998 that there would be no disarmament? As mentioned in the title of this thesis, three questions underlie our analysis: What was at stake in the giving up of violence and in decommissioning for the IRA and Sinn Féin during the Peace Process? What was the symbolic significance of decommissioning for the IRA and for the whole Republican movement? Finally, what diplomatic and psychological mechanisms managed to convince the IRA to give up violence and then to disarm? At the clandestine group’s own request, the technical aspects of decommissioning and the number of arms which were destroyed still remain confidential. Therefore, this study does not reveal any State secrets, but rather underlines the dynamics of the process which led the IRA from armed violence to the giving up of arms.