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<p> We study two objects: an ideal of a Hecke algebra, and a pairing in Galois cohomology.</p> <p> Let h be the Hecke algebra of cusp forms of weight 2, level n, and a fixed Dirichlet character modulo n generated by all Hecke operators, where n is an odd prime p or a product of two distinct odd primes N and p. We study the Eisenstein I ideal of h. We wrote a computer program to test whether Up - 1 generates this ideal, where Up is the pth Hecke operator in h. We found many cases of n and the character so that Up - 1 alone generates I. On the other hand, we found one example with N = 3 and p = 331 where Up - 1 does not generate I.</p> <p> Let K = Q(μn) be the nth cyclotomic field. Let S be the set of primes above p in K, and let G_K,S be the Galois group of the maximal extension of K unramified outside S. We study a pairing on cyclotomic p-units that arises from the cup product on H1(G_K,S, μp). This pairing takes values in a Gal(K/Q)-eigenspace of the p-part of the class group of K. Sharifi has conjectured that this pairing is surjective. We studied this pairing in detail by imposing linear relations on the possible pairing values. We discovered many values of n and the character such that these relations single out a unique nontrivial possibility for the pairing, up to a possibly zero scalar.</p> <p> Sharifi showed in [S2] that, under an assumption on Bernoulli numbers, the element Up - 1 generates the Eisenstein ideal I if and only if pairing with the single element p is surjective. In particular, in the instances for which we found a unique nontrivial possibility for the pairing, then if Up - 1 generates I, we know that the scalar up to which it is determined cannot be zero.</p> / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc)

This study explored how a teacher-training course helped secondary art student teachers in Taiwan to develop their perceptions and practice of creativity and creative pedagogy [CPed]. A series of CPed workshop sessions, based on the Western theoretical framework of possibility thinking [PT] and its pedagogy [PTCPed], were designed to introduce to the twelve secondary art teacher training students in an arts university in Taiwan. Through adopting an action-based case study approach, qualitative data were collected from the participants’ interviews together with the reflective documents of the participants and the researcher, and any possible visual materials. Observations were also video-recorded. The analytical methods focused on both inductive and deductive approaches to explore how student teachers developed their perceptions of creativity and CPed and the possible influences in practice. Adopting the idea of “contextualising” one set of cultural values in another, a new landmark of PTCPed emerged. This study confirmed most features of PT, but found question-posing and question-responding to be intriguingly absent in the participants’ definitions of creativity (PT) and their practice of CPed; and it also, significantly, identified several emerging PT characteristics and attitudes: originality, confidence, no limitations, and problem-solving. These features were fostered by teacher’s creative teaching [CT] and learners’ creative learning [CL] in an enabling and effective context in which teachers offered the learners’ opportunities (including time, space and challenges) to develop ideas and confidence to play with the materials, prioritised learners’ agency (including individual and group activities), and stood back to offer freedom, and at the same time moved step forward to observe the learners’ engagement and check when to offer help. Finally, this study also highlighted the implications for the practice in the Taiwanese initial art teacher education [IATE], in which teacher educators are suggested to appreciate this complexity, and to understand and allow student teachers to interact with different perspectives or approaches when interpreting their pedagogy through reflective practice.

Ce mémoire a pour tâche de déterminer le statut ontologique de la puissance chez Aristote. Pour ce faire, il est d’abord question, dans le premier chapitre, de bien définir les deux sens de la puissance, soit la puissance motrice et l’état potentiel. Nous expliquons aussi alors les multiples sens de la puissance motrice et les multiples types de la puissance que sont la nature, l’âme et l’art. Ensuite, le second chapitre étudie les liens entre l’état potentiel et la matière, d’une part, et les liens entre le non-être, la puissance et la possibilité, d’autre part. Enfin, le troisième chapitre explicite la hiérarchie ontologique aristotélicienne pour en dégager le statut ontologique de la puissance par rapport à l’acte. Cela est fait de trois manières : selon l’antériorité de l’acte sur la puissance au sein d’une substance unique ; selon l’antériorité des êtres éternels, notamment celle du premier moteur, sur les êtres générables et corruptibles ; l’antériorité du bien en acte sur le bien puissance. / This master thesis seeks to determine the ontological value of potency in Arstotle’s philosophy. To do so, the first chapter defines the two meanings of potency, which are the power to change something else and the potential state of a being. We then explain the multiple meanings of power and its multiple types, namely nature, soul and art. The second chapter, in addition to analysing the links between potentiality and non-being, also studies how non-being, potency and possibility are connected. Finally, the third chapter explains the aristotelian ontological hierarchy to highlight the ontological value of potency in connection to act. This is done in accordance with three kinds of priority, which are the priority of act over potency in a single substance, the priority of eternal beings, especially the one of the prime mover, over generated and corruptible beings, and the priority of good in actuality over potential good.

[pt] A Lógica é hoje em dia vista como uma ciência matemática fundamentalmente ligada à faculdade do entendimento, e pouco relacionada com nossa capacidade de imaginar ou conceber. Desta forma, sob a alcunha de psicologismo, costuma-se descartar qualquer associação da lógica à conceptividade ou à imaginação como espúria e mal colocada. Esta tese de doutorado tem como objetivo mostrar que, contrariamente ao que se costuma crer, há na lógica, tomada como uma ciência, um inegável emprego metodológico da faculdade da conceptividade ou da imaginação. Para mostrar isto, primeiramente examinamos sobre bases autônomas o princípio da conceptividade, segundo o qual a proposição p é concebível se e semente se p é possível. Investigamos as principais posições contemporâneas contra e a favor deste princípio e chegamos a uma versão qualificada do princípio, que defendemos ser livre de contraexemplos. Terá sido mostrado, portanto, que, sob certas condições, há uma relação essencial entre conceitos modais aléticos (possibilidade, necessidade, contingência, impossibilidade) e nossa faculdade de conceber ou imaginar: o que é concebível é possível - ainda que nem sempre o que é inconcebível seja impossível. Em seguida, mostramos como o princípio da conceptividade foi um instrumento insubstituível, nas mãos dos grandes pioneiros da lógica, em uma tarefa muito bem delimitada: a codificação de novas linguagens lógicas. Defendemos, por conseguinte, que Aristóteles, quando primeiramente codificou a lógica de proposições categóricas, e Frege, quando elaborou a lógica funcional e quantificada, foram obrigados a recorrer à conceptividade como parâmetro básico para examinar a correção expressiva da linguagem que estavam codificando e para aferir a validade lógica de diversas proposições e argumentos. Com vistas a tornar claro o lugar da noção de conceptividade dentro da lógica, examinamos a lógica e a epistemologia de Aristóteles e, sobretudo, de Frege, nas quais encontramos elementos concretos que apontam para o emprego desta noção dentro do contexto primitivo de codificação lógica a que nos reportamos. Enfatizamos que, no contexto em que estes autores se encontravam, não havia opções epistemológicas para examinar e avaliar sua lógica a não ser o recurso princípio da conceptividade. / [en] Logic is seen today as a mathematical science fundamentally linked to the faculty of understanding, unrelated to our capacity of imagining or conceiving. Under the label psychologism, one usually considers any association between logic and conceivability (or imagination) as spurious and misled. This doctoral thesis has as its goal showing that, contrarily to what is ordinarily thought, there is in logic, understood as a science, an undeniable methodological employment of the faculty of conceivability or imagination. In order to show this, we firstly examine the conceivability principle (the proposition p is conceivable if and only if p is possible) on autonomous basis. We examine the main contemporary positions against and in favor of this principle and come to a qualified version of the principle, which we purport to be free of counterexamples; it will have been shown, therefore, that, under certain circumstances, there is an essential relation between modal concepts (possibility, necessity, contingency, impossibility) and our faculty of conceiving or imagining: whatever is conceivable is possible - even though it is not always true that whatever is inconceivable is impossible. Secondly, we show how the conceivability principle was an irreplaceable tool in the hands of the great pioneers of logic, in a very well delimited task: codifying new logical languages. Therefore, we hold that Aristotle, as he firstly codified the logic of categorical propositions, and Frege, as he elaborated quantified functional logic, were bound to employ conceivability as a basic parameter so as to examine the expressive correctness of the language they were codifying and determine the validity of various propositions and arguments. In order to make clear the place of conceivability in logic, we examine Aristotle´s Frege´s logic and epistemology and find concrete elements indicating the employment of this notion in the primitive context of logical codification we have mentioned. We emphasize that, in the context in which these authors were working, there were no epistemological options other than the resource to the conceivability principle.

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La présente thèse s'intéresse à coder la politique de sécurité SELinux en OrBAC et à proposer une extension de ce modèle. Nous avons commencé par présenter l'état de l'art des différents modèles de contrôles d'accès présents dans la littérature en mettant en exergue les limites de chacun de ces modèles. Ensuite nous avons présenté le modèle OrBAC comme étant une extension du modèle RBAC, car d'une part il a apporté la notion de contexte et d'organisation et d'autre part il permet d'exprimer, en plus des permissions, des interdictions et des obligations. Ensuite, nous avons présenté la solution de sécurité SELinux qui utilise un ensemble de modèles de contrôle d'accès comme DAC, RBAC et MAC. Nous avons recensé plusieurs centaines, voire des milliers, de règles dans la politique de sécurité SELinux, ces règles peuvent concerner des décisions d'accès ou des décisions de transition. Nous avons ensuite pu coder lesdites règles en modèle OrBAC, et ce en passant par le remplissage ses tables d'entité, pour ensuite les transformer en relations OrBAC. Notre thèse a aussi rappelé les fondements de la logique possibiliste, et a ensuite apportée une amélioration importante du modèle OrBAC, il s'agit de l'introduction de l'entité priorité au niveau de chaque relation du modèle OrBAC. L'entité priorité quantifie la certitude pour qu'une entité concrète soit injectée dans l'entité abstraite correspondante, ou en cas général, le degré de certitude pour qu'une relation soit réalisée. Nous avons proposé trois modes de combinaison (pessimiste, optimiste et avancé) qui peuvent être adoptés pour déterminer la valeur de la priorité de chaque relation concrète à partir des priorités des relations abstraites correspondantes. Enfin, nous avons implémenté, via une application développé par DELPHI, le codage des règles concernant les décisions d'accès de la politique de sécurité SELinux, en modèle OrBAC tout en introduisant la notion de priorité. / This thesis focuses on encoding default-based SELinux security policy in OrBAC and propose an extension of this model. We presented the state of the art of different models of access controls present in the literature underlining the limitations of each of these models. Then we presented the model OrBAC as an extension of the RBAC model, firstly because he brought the notion of context and organization and secondly it allows expressing, in addition to permissions, prohibitions and obligation. Then we presented the SELinux security solution that uses a set of access control models such as DAC, RBAC and MAC. We identified several hundreds or even thousands of rules in SELinux security policy, these rules may be access decisions or decisions of transition. We could then encode these rules in OrBAC model, and via filling its tables of entities, then transform relations OrBAC. Our thesis also reviewed the foundations of possibilistic logic, and then made an important enlargement in OrBAC model; it's to introduce an entity called "priority" in each relationship model OrBAC. The entity "priority" quantifies the certainty for concrete entity injection into the corresponding abstract entity, in general, it's meaning the degree of certainty that a relationship is performed. We proposed three modes of combination (pessimistic, optimistic and advanced) that can be adopted to determine the concrete relations priority value from priorities values of each corresponding abstract relationship. Finally, we implement, via an application developed by DELPHI, coding access decisions rules of the SELinux policy in OrBAC model introducing the priority entity.

Broader social issues that affect students’ lives manifest in the classroom and the current neo-liberal reform structures in education (e.g., the accountability movement combined with punitive discipline measures and structural classism/racism) fail to acknowledge the impact of these issues on student identity within school and community. While this era of standardized testing has brought about anti-democratic realities in schools of all sorts, it is also the case that schools that pass tests often enjoy a more liberatory climate while schools struggling to meet testing requirements are more likely to possess oppressive qualities. Not coincidentally, the more oppressive schools are often populated by poor kids, kids of color, and very often in urban schools, poor kids of color. Deficit thinking runs rampant in urban schools and marginalized communities – student experiences perpetuate oppressive social hierarchies and students are pushed to think that they can’t, won’t, and aren’t capable. Critical service learning, and more specifically photovoice as a form of critical service learning, has promise to provide a different kind of educational experience. This project is an exploratory qualitative study using photovoice, photo elicitation, and critical thematic analysis to determine what narratives students construct while participating in photovoice as a form of critical service learning. This study posits a way to move from deficits to possibilities by providing a space for traditionally marginalized youth to legitimize their sense of place, identity, and connection to their community while empowering them to be advocates for social change. Students served as action researchers, constructing counter narratives through an adaptation of photovoice documentation, addressing social inequities by highlighting strengths and assets in their own schools and community. In addition to using photovoice as a methodology, this study also addressed how photovoice as critical service learning pedagogy can serve to create discursive spaces for those counter-narratives to circulate and to be heard. This project addressed the need for a critical service learning approach in education that empowers students to become agents of change, using their own stories and cultural/social capital to disrupt deficit perspectives while promoting possibility perspectives – moving us closer to a more democratic public education.

Hur har vi kunskap om vad som är möjligt? Enligt vad som kan betraktas som det traditionella svaret till den frågan, har vi kunskap om modalitet via föreställningsbarhet. Vi föreställer oss ting och tar sedan detta som bevis för möjlighet. Denna uppsats kommer att undersöka tre invändningar till detta svar angående hur vi har kunskap om möjlighet. Vi kommer sedan att överväga Williamsons förmodan: att vår kognitiva kapacitet för att hantera kontrafaktiska konditionaler bär med sig den kognitiva kapaciteten för oss att även hantera metafysisk modalitet (2007, 136), och undersöka om denna förmodan undviker dessa invändningar. Det kommer här att argumenteras att Williamson’s förmodan undviker två av invändningarna och att den inte tycks kunna svara på den sista invändningen. Det kommer även att argumenteras att en invändning mot Williamson’s förmodan ser ut att vara särskilt problematisk, och att det inte är klart att Williamson’s förmodan är i någon bättre position än den negativa föreställningsbarhets vyn. / How do we have knowledge of what is possible? On what could be considered as the traditional response to this question, we have knowledge of modality by conceivability. We conceive of things and on the basis take this as evidence for possibility. This thesis will consider three objections to this response of how we have knowledge of possibility. We will then consider Williamson’s conjecture: that our cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals carries the cognitive capacity for us to also handle metaphysical modality (2007, 136), and see if this conjecture avoids these objections. It will be argued that Williamson’s conjecture avoids two of the objections and that it does not seem to have a response to the last objection. It will also be argued that one objection to Williamson’s conjecture seems particularly problematic, and that it is not so clear that Williamson’s conjecture is any better off than the negative conceivability view.

This thesis presents and evaluates David Chalmers argument that the existence of phenomenal conscious experience constitutes a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of a purely materialistic neuroscience. My aim is to defend the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness, and argue that continued research in neuroscience and neurophysiology can result in a successful materialistic or reductive solution to the hard problem of consciousness. My argument against Chalmers is two-fold. First, I challenge Chalmers claim that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical. And second, I argue that his conceivability argument is implausible.