This thesis examines the microeconomic consequences of the arrival of open source in the software market. Specifically, it analyzes three features of open source software by using specific models of industrial organization. Open source software is free, and may be modified or duplicated by anyone. The first paper studies the entry of an open source software in a closed source software market. Using a model of horizontal differentiation, the analysis considers a closed source firm's investment in the quality of its software. The introduction of open source on the market reduces the firm's investment in quality and increases the price of its software. Moreover, the entry of open source software may reduce consumer welfare. Post-entry by an open source software, the reduction in market share lowers the firm's incentive to invest in quality. The second paper features vertical differentiation to study a monopolist selling supporting product to its software. The study begins by contrasting the supply of support by an open source provider and a closed source vendor. The model shows that in both cases the levels of support offered are the same. In addition, consumer welfare is higher and profit lower under an open source software. Then, the paper considers the competition in the provision of support. Here, the supply of high level support is greater than under a monopolist. Finally, the monopolist adopts a dual licensing strategy to extract more surplus from developers interested in modifying open source software and redistributing the resulting product. This technique, when the developers place high value on the source code, generates more profit if the monopolist chooses to publish as open source rather than closed source. The last paper studies how a closed source firm is affected by the introduction of an open source benefiting from contributions by users. A vertical differentiation model is used, and reveals that, when contribution of users is present, the closed source vendor may lower its price to a level where it forces the open source out of the market. The firm's lower price not only increases demand for its software, but also induces consumers into switching from open to closed source software therefore reducing the contribution of users. / Les logiciels libres sont uniques en leur genre\ : non seulement sont-ils distribués gra-tuitement, mais on peut aussi les modifier et les copier. Cette thèse étudie l'impact de ces propriétés du logiciel libre sur la compétition et sur les entreprises de logiciel propriétaire. Des modèles propres à l'organisation industrielle sont utilisés. Le première étude examine l'arrivée d'un logiciel libre sur un marché occupé par un logiciel propriétaire. En utilisant un modèle de différenciation horizontale, le papier consi-dère une firme propriétaire qui investit dans la qualité de son logiciel. L'arrivée d'un logiciel libre cause l'entreprise du logiciel propriétaire à réduire le niveau de son investissement et à augmenter le prix de son produit. Il s'avère alors que l'introduction du logiciel libre sur le marché réduit l'investissement de l'entreprise et engendre même l'augmentation du prix du produit. De plus, l'arrivée du logiciel libre peut réduire le niveau de bien-être des consommateurs. Comme le logiciel libre ne réagit pas aux décisions stratégique de l'entreprise, cette dernière voit son marché réduit peu importe sa stratégie. La firme décide conséquemment de vendre un produit de moindre qualité à un prix plus élevé à une clientèle réduite. Le deuxième papier propose un modèle qui utilise la différenciation verticale afin d'exa-miner un monopoleur offrant un produit complémentaire à son logiciel. L'étude compare d'abord les cas d'un logiciel libre et d'un logiciel propriétaire, toujours dans le contexte d'un monopoleur offrant du support professionnel pour son logiciel. Il est établi que le bien-être des consommateurs est plus élevé, et le profit inférieur dans le cas d'un distributeur de logiciel libre. Ensuite, le modèle initial est modifié avec l'ajout d'une seconde entreprise offrant du support professionnel. Dans ce cas, l'offre de support de haut niveau est plus élevée. Finalement, le monopoleur adopte une stratégie de licences doubles. Ce concept permet au monopoleur de proposer la vente d'une licence même si son logiciel est libre. Cette technique génère plus de profits, certaines conditions étant présentes, que si l'entreprise optait pour un logiciel propriétaire. Un logiciel libre profite des contributions de ses usagers pour améliorer son produit. Le troisième papier examine l'arrivée d'un tel produit sur un marché dominé par un logiciel propriétaire. Le modèle de différenciation verticale utilisé contraste les deux logiciels dans un marché donné et révèle que la contribution des utilisateurs peut diminuer la part de marché du logiciel libre au profit de son conccurrent. De fait, en diminuant ses prix le licenceur du logiciel propriétaire incite le consommateur à délaisser le logiciel libre pour le produit de son concurrent.

O presente trabalho estuda a vedação da discriminação de preço nas redes contratuais de distribuição, tanto pelo aspecto concorrencial, quanto pelo aspecto civil. A abordagem concorrencial decorre da existência de um ilícito assim tipificado na Lei Antitruste brasileira. É preciso identificar os requisitos de aplicação próprios do direito concorrencial, que tem como bem jurídico tutelado a defesa da concorrência. Fez-se um estudo de direito comparado com o direito concorrencial norte-americano, em que vigente o Robison-Patman Act. A abordagem de direito civil-contratual depende da identificação dogmática da existência de uma rede contratual, a partir da verificação da finalidade econômica global em um dos elementos essenciais dos contratos individuais que formam a rede. Necessário, ainda, proceder à qualificação jurídica dos contratos de distribuição, partindo da sua causa e dos demais elementos estruturais que informam se tratar de um contrato atípico. A vedação à discriminação decorre da incidência da cláusula geral do art. 187 do CC/02, que proíbe o abuso do direito em razão de um exercício que exceda manifestamente os limites impostos pelos dois critérios trabalhados: a finalidade econômica ou social do direito e a boa-fé. Distingue-se a boa-fé enquanto criadora de deveres laterais de conduta da confiança enquanto protetora de uma situação de confiança. A vedação à discriminação de preço decorre do standard de boa-fé na função de criadora de deveres de conduta para o organizador da rede diante dos distribuidores que lhe estejam vinculados nessa rede contratual. O referencial valorativo é a lealdade que se espera do organizador da rede nesse contexto negocial. Estuda-se os diversos critérios econômicos justificativos do que seja uma justa e leal diferenciação de preço sob o influxo do conceito operativo de igualdade elaborado no âmbito do direito público. / This paper studies the prohibition of price discrimination in contractual networks of distribution, both by the competitive aspect, as the civil aspect. The competitive approach stems from the existence of an unlawful this way typified in Brazilian Antitrust Law. One need to identify the requirements for application of competition law, which legal interest is to protect competition, not competitors. There is a comparative study with the U.S. competition law, because of the current rules of Robinson-Patman Act. The approach of civil-contract law depends on the identification of a network contract from the scanning of the global economic interest in one of the essential elements of individual contracts that compose the network. Also necessary to proceed with the legal classification of the distribution contracts, from his structural and functional (“consideration”) elements that informs it as an atypical contract. The prohibition of discrimination price arises from the general clause of art. 187 of the Civil Code of 2002, which prohibits the abuse of rights in respect of an exercise that clearly exceed the limits imposed by the two criteria worked: the economic or social purpose of the right and good faith. It is distinguished the good faith in its function of create duties of the confidence of a trust situation. The prohibition of price discrimination stems from the standard of good faith in its function of create duties of conduct to the organizer of the network of distributors. The reference value is the loyalty expected of the organizaer of the network in this negotiating context. We study the different economic criteria to be evidence of an equitable and fair price differentiation under the influence of the operating concept of equality established under public law.

O presente trabalho estuda a vedação da discriminação de preço nas redes contratuais de distribuição, tanto pelo aspecto concorrencial, quanto pelo aspecto civil. A abordagem concorrencial decorre da existência de um ilícito assim tipificado na Lei Antitruste brasileira. É preciso identificar os requisitos de aplicação próprios do direito concorrencial, que tem como bem jurídico tutelado a defesa da concorrência. Fez-se um estudo de direito comparado com o direito concorrencial norte-americano, em que vigente o Robison-Patman Act. A abordagem de direito civil-contratual depende da identificação dogmática da existência de uma rede contratual, a partir da verificação da finalidade econômica global em um dos elementos essenciais dos contratos individuais que formam a rede. Necessário, ainda, proceder à qualificação jurídica dos contratos de distribuição, partindo da sua causa e dos demais elementos estruturais que informam se tratar de um contrato atípico. A vedação à discriminação decorre da incidência da cláusula geral do art. 187 do CC/02, que proíbe o abuso do direito em razão de um exercício que exceda manifestamente os limites impostos pelos dois critérios trabalhados: a finalidade econômica ou social do direito e a boa-fé. Distingue-se a boa-fé enquanto criadora de deveres laterais de conduta da confiança enquanto protetora de uma situação de confiança. A vedação à discriminação de preço decorre do standard de boa-fé na função de criadora de deveres de conduta para o organizador da rede diante dos distribuidores que lhe estejam vinculados nessa rede contratual. O referencial valorativo é a lealdade que se espera do organizador da rede nesse contexto negocial. Estuda-se os diversos critérios econômicos justificativos do que seja uma justa e leal diferenciação de preço sob o influxo do conceito operativo de igualdade elaborado no âmbito do direito público. / This paper studies the prohibition of price discrimination in contractual networks of distribution, both by the competitive aspect, as the civil aspect. The competitive approach stems from the existence of an unlawful this way typified in Brazilian Antitrust Law. One need to identify the requirements for application of competition law, which legal interest is to protect competition, not competitors. There is a comparative study with the U.S. competition law, because of the current rules of Robinson-Patman Act. The approach of civil-contract law depends on the identification of a network contract from the scanning of the global economic interest in one of the essential elements of individual contracts that compose the network. Also necessary to proceed with the legal classification of the distribution contracts, from his structural and functional (“consideration”) elements that informs it as an atypical contract. The prohibition of discrimination price arises from the general clause of art. 187 of the Civil Code of 2002, which prohibits the abuse of rights in respect of an exercise that clearly exceed the limits imposed by the two criteria worked: the economic or social purpose of the right and good faith. It is distinguished the good faith in its function of create duties of the confidence of a trust situation. The prohibition of price discrimination stems from the standard of good faith in its function of create duties of conduct to the organizer of the network of distributors. The reference value is the loyalty expected of the organizaer of the network in this negotiating context. We study the different economic criteria to be evidence of an equitable and fair price differentiation under the influence of the operating concept of equality established under public law.

L’objet de cette thèse est de définir et d’identifier les effets des politiques de différenciation tarifaire sur l’usage et l’organisation d’un réseau de transport de voyageur urbain ou interurbain. Par différenciation tarifaire, on entend la capacité à faire payer à l’utilisateur un service à des prix différents, en tenant compte de plusieurs critères que nous définirons : l’usage, la distance parcourue…. La tarification différenciée est également appelée discrimination tarifaire de deuxième niveau dans les pays anglo-saxons. La politique tarifaire d’un réseau de transport public répond à trois objectifs qui sont souvent contradictoires. Le premier est la collecte de la recette et la couverture des coûts, le second est l’orientation des usages sans détériorer la fréquentation. Enfin le troisième présente la politique tarifaire comme un instrument possible de politique urbaine. Quels sont les éléments d’une politique tarifaire qui peuvent avoir une influence sur le comportement des utilisateurs en termes de déplacement sur un territoire ? Est-ce qu’un tarif multimodal va générer plus de déplacements combinés, un meilleur taux de fréquentation ? Peut-on observer des changements de comportements suite à l’introduction de tarifications spécifiques comme les tarifs heures de pointe/heure creuses ? Les moyens de paiement comme les facilités d’accès au service font également partie de la stratégie tarifaire : les cartes prépayées, le post paiement, les cartes à valeur permettant de débiter le prix des trajets en fonction des pratiques sont autant de supports permettant l’accès à des bouquets de services. Des tarifications parfois extrêmement sophistiquées ne sont pas perçues comme telles par les utilisateurs. La première partie a pour objectif de définir les enjeux autour de l’élaboration du tarif et de la différenciation tarifaire. Les mécanismes et les composantes de la différenciation tarifaire seront définis et les travaux déjà réalisés sur les relations entre tarification et usage d’un service seront passés en revue de manière à dégager un état des lieux des pratiques tarifaires existantes et hiérarchiser celles pouvant avoir un impact direct sur l’usage spatial du réseau. Dans une deuxième partie, l’étude portera sur la dimension spatiale du tarif à travers l’étude des relations entre les différentes tarifications à la distance et la morphologie spatiale des territoires considérés. L’efficacité des pratiques tarifaires eu égard aux politiques de planification urbaine sera évaluée à partir d’exemples de villes ayant des formes urbaines de type mono-centrique, polycentrique ou composite. La relation entre tarification et morphologie urbaine sera confirmée. L’objet de la troisième partie est de simuler le comportement des utilisateurs lors de modifications tarifaires à partir des données de fréquentation disponibles grâce aux validations billettiques. Dans un premier temps à partir des données de validations des réseaux urbains et interurbains de Belfort ainsi que du département de l’Oise et de la Drôme, nous montrerons qu’il est possible de faire des analyses ciblées. Puis, à partir des données réelles collectées sur le réseau d’Ile de France, et en se projetant à l’introduction d’une ligne structurante nouvelle comme la ligne 15 du Grand Paris, nous chercherons à simuler l’impact d’une tarification différenciée sur la fréquentation globale des deux réseaux. En utilisant un algorithme de répartition des flux selon un modèle de répartition entre deux itinéraires concurrents, Il s’agira d’explorer une méthode de construction d’une grille tarifaire qui fixerait des niveaux de recette globale tout en orientant les usages sur des objectifs définis : niveau d’utilisation de la nouvelle ligne, tranche horaire, courts et long trajets.... / The purpose of this thesis is to define and identify the effects of price discrimination policies on the use and organization of urban public transports. Price discrimination is the possibility to price a service with different level of tariff. At first, we will define the issues around public transport fares, whose complexity is now mitigated by existing smart cards and other payment tools. Then, the spatial dimension of the fare will be given special attention through the study of the relationships between fee structure and spatial morphology of 10 cities around the world. The relationships between urban morphology and pricing will be confirmed. Knowing that usage of public transport are diverse, it is essential to have a good knowledge of users habits. Smard Card data reconstruction provides geographical and statistical information that can be re used for urban planning and for pricing policy. How ?Grand Paris orbital line 15, will be launched in 2020. It is an example of introducing a new metro line inducing significant time savings for commuters. Passengers will be given a real alternative between their usual route and the new one. The new route can offer several advantages: gain of time spent during the trip, gain in terms of number of transfers, comfort gain, security gain, price advantages. This could be an opportunity for an agency to review its fare policy. Our model is based on existing travel flows derived from the itinerary reconstruction from Navigo Smart Card pass. It establishes the principles of a fare grid based on travelers’ preferences and current travel patterns. For this research, we used data from public transport pass users in the Paris’ Metropolitan area, for one month. Finally, we show that price discrimination is related to "mobility" and not to “public transport”. If we consider the mobility needs of the user, pricing is no longer that of “transportation” but a package of services enabling access to different forms of mobility. Therefore it is transport governance that can be a problem. How to federate all mobility stakeholders in France? This dimension is essential for public transport authorities. It is a key success factor for achieving ambitious and sustainable urban planning policies.

<div> <p>First Essay: We study the effect of entry of ethanol plants on the spatial pattern of corn prices. We use pre- and post-entry data from corn elevators to implement a clean identification strategy that allows us to quantify how price effects vary with the size of the entrant (relative to local corn production) and with distance from the elevator to the entrant. We estimate Difference-In-Difference (DID) and DID-matching models with linear and non-linear distance specifications. We find that the average-sized entrant causes an increase in corn price that ranges from 10 to 15 cents per bushel at the plant’s location, depending on the model specification. We also find that, on average, the price effect dissipates 60 miles away from the plant. Our results indicate that the magnitude of the price effect as well as its spatial pattern vary substantially with the size of the entrant relative to local corn supply. Under our preferred model, the largest entrant in our sample causes an estimated price increase of 15 cents per bushel at the plant’s site and the price effect propagates over 100 miles away. In contrast, the smallest entrant causes a price increase of only 2 cents per bushel at the plant’s site and the price effect dissipates within 15 miles of the plant. Our results are qualitatively robust to the pre-treatment matching strategy, to whether spatial effects are assumed to be linear or nonlinear, and to placebo tests that falsify alternative explanations.</p><p><br></p></div> <p>Second Essay: We estimate the cost of transporting corn and the resulting degree of spatial differentiation among downstream firms that buy corn from upstream farmers and examine whether such differentiation softens competition enabling buyers to exert market power (defined as the ability to pay a price for corn that is below its marginal value product net of processing cost). We estimate a structural model of spatial competition using corn procurement data from the US state of Indiana from 2004 to 2014. We adopt a strategy that allows us to estimate firm-level structural parameters while using aggregate data. Our results return a transportation cost of 0.12 cents per bushel per mile (3% of the corn price under average conditions), which provides evidence of spatial differentiation among buyers. The estimated average markdown is $0.80 per bushel (16% of the average corn price in the sample), of which $0.34 is explained by spatial differentiation and the rest by the fact that firms operated under binding capacity constraints. We also find that corn prices paid to farmers at the mill gate are independent of distance between the plant and the farm, providing evidence that firms do not engage in spatial price discrimination. Finally, we evaluate the effect of hypothetical mergers on input markets and farm surplus. A merger between nearby ethanol producers eases competition, increases markdowns by 20%, and triggers a sizable reduction in farm surplus. In contrast, a merger between distant buyers has little effect on competition and markdowns.</p><p><br></p> Third Essay: We study the dynamic response of local corn prices to entry of ethanol plants. We use spatially explicit panel data on elevator-level corn prices and ethanol plant entry and capacity to estimate an autoregressive distributed lag model with instrumental variables. We find that the average-sized entrant has no impact on local corn prices the year of entry. However, the price subsequently rises and stabilizes after two years at a level that is about 10 cents per bushel higher than the pre-entry level. This price effect dissipates as the distance between elevators and plants increase. Our results imply that long-run (2 years) supply elasticity is smaller than short-run (year of entry) supply elasticity. This may be due to rotation benefits that induce farmers to revert back to soybeans, after switching to corn due to price signals the year the plant enters. Furthermore, our results, in combination with findings in essay 2 of this dissertation, indicate that ethanol plants are likely to use pricing strategies consistent with a static rather than dynamic oligopsony competition.

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Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en économie de l'information. Le premier chapitre sert d'introduction et les Chapitres 2 à 4 constituent le coeur de l'ouvrage. Le Chapitre 2 porte sur l’acquisition d’information sur l’Internet par le biais d'avis de consommateurs. En particulier, je détermine si les avis laissés par les acheteurs peuvent tout de même transmettre de l’information à d’autres consommateurs, lorsqu’il est connu que les vendeurs peuvent publier de faux avis à propos de leurs produits. Afin de comprendre si cette manipulation des avis est problématique, je démontre que la plateforme sur laquelle les avis sont publiés (e.g. TripAdvisor, Yelp) est un tiers important à considérer, autant que les vendeurs tentant de falsifier les avis. En effet, le design adopté par la plateforme a un effet indirect sur le niveau de manipulation des vendeurs. En particulier, je démontre que la plateforme, en cachant une partie du contenu qu'elle détient sur les avis, peut parfois améliorer la qualité de l'information obtenue par les consommateurs. Finalement, le design qui est choisi par la plateforme peut être lié à la façon dont elle génère ses revenus. Je montre qu'une plateforme générant des revenus par le biais de commissions sur les ventes peut être plus tolérante à la manipulation qu'une plateforme qui génère des revenus par le biais de publicité. Le Chapitre 3 est écrit en collaboration avec Marc Santugini. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions les effets de la discrimination par les prix au troisième degré en présence de consommateurs non informés qui apprennent sur la qualité d'un produit par le biais de son prix. Dans un environnement stochastique avec deux segments de marché, nous démontrons que la discrimination par les prix peut nuire à la firme et être bénéfique pour les consommateurs. D'un côté, la discrimination par les prix diminue l'incertitude à laquelle font face les consommateurs, c.-à-d., la variance des croyances postérieures est plus faible avec discrimination qu'avec un prix uniforme. En effet, le fait d'observer deux prix (avec discrimination) procure plus d'information aux consommateurs, et ce, même si individuellement chacun de ces prix est moins informatif que le prix uniforme. De l'autre côté, il n'est pas toujours optimal pour la firme de faire de la discrimination par les prix puisque la présence de consommateurs non informés lui donne une incitation à s'engager dans du signaling. Si l'avantage procuré par la flexibilité de fixer deux prix différents est contrebalancé par le coût du signaling avec deux prix différents, alors il est optimal pour la firme de fixer un prix uniforme sur le marché. Finalement, le Chapitre 4 est écrit en collaboration avec Sidartha Gordon. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions une classe de jeux où les joueurs sont contraints dans le nombre de sources d'information qu'ils peuvent choisir pour apprendre sur un paramètre du jeu, mais où ils ont une certaine liberté quant au degré de dépendance de leurs signaux, avant de prendre une action. En introduisant un nouvel ordre de dépendance entre signaux, nous démontrons qu'un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la plus dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, compléments stratégiques et isotoniques, soit substituts stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. De même, un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la moins dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, substituts stratégiques et isotoniques, soit compléments stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. Nous établissons également des conditions suffisantes pour qu'une structure d'information donnée, information publique ou privée par exemple, soit possible à l'équilibre. / This thesis is a collection of three essays in economics of information. Chapter 1 is a general introduction and Chapters 2 to 4 form the core of the thesis. Chapter 2 analyzes information dissemination on the Internet. Online platforms such as Amazon, TripAdvisor or Yelp are now key sources of information for modern consumers. The proportion of consumers consulting online reviews prior to purchasing a good or a service has grown persistently. Yet, sellers have been accused of hiring shills to post fake reviews about their products. This raises the question: Does the presence of shills make reviews less informative? I show that the answers to this question depend on the way the platform presents and summarizes reviews on its website. In particular, I find that withholding information by garbling the reviews benefits information dissemination by inducing the seller to destroy less information with manipulation. Next, I show that the platform's choice regarding how to present reviews hinges on its revenue source. Indeed, a platform that receives sales commissions optimally commits to publishing information differently from a platform that receives revenues from advertisements or from subscription fees. Incidentally, such platforms have contrasting impacts on the amount of information that is transmitted by reviews. Chapter 3 is co-authored with Marc Santugini. In this chapter, we study the impact of third-degree price discrimination in the presence of uninformed buyers who extract noisy information from observing prices. In a noisy learning environment, it is shown that price discrimination can be detrimental to the firm and beneficial to the consumers. On the one hand, discriminatory pricing reduces consumers’ uncertainty, i.e., the variance of posterior beliefs upon observing prices is reduced. Specifically, observing two prices under discriminatory pricing provides more information than one price under uniform pricing even when discriminatory pricing reduces the amount of information contained in each price. On the other hand, it is not always optimal for the firm to use discriminatory pricing since the presence of uninformed buyers provides the firm with the incentive to engage in noisy price signaling. Indeed, if the benefit from price flexibility (through discriminatory pricing) is offset by the cost of signaling quality through two distinct prices, then it is optimal to integrate markets and to use uniform pricing. Finally, Chapter 4 is co-authored with Sidartha Gordon. In this chapter, we study a class of games where players face restrictions on how much information they can obtain on a common payoff relevant state, but have some leeway in covertly choosing the dependence between their signals, before simultaneously choosing actions. Using a new stochastic dependence ordering between signals, we show that each player chooses information that is more dependent on the information of other players whose actions are either isotonic and complements with his actions or antitonic and substitutes with his actions. Similarly, each player chooses information that is less dependent on the information of other players whose actions are antitonic and complements with his actions or isotonic and substitutes with his actions. We then provide sufficient conditions for information structures such as public or private information to arise in equilibrium.

Le droit de l’Union européenne appréhende les comportements d’entreprises en matière de prix par des règles antitrust et par une législation contre le dumping. Ces deux réglementations diffèrent à de nombreux égards. Elles poursuivent des objectifs différents : défense des intérêts de certains concurrents européens versus promotion de la libre concurrence au bénéfice des consommateurs. Cependant, toutes deux contribuent à protéger la loyauté de la concurrence (i.e. promotion d’une certaine homogéniété des conditions de concurrence). Elles appréhendent des pratiques tarifaires différentes : les marchés concernés sont définis différemment (produit concerné exporté depuis un pays tiers et produit similaire fabriqué par l’industrie de l’Union versus marché de produit et marché géographique en cause) et les caractéristiques des entreprises concernées sont également différentes (aucune forme d’accord entre entreprises ou de pouvoir de marché minimum requis par la législation antidumping) ; le dumping discriminatoire n’équivaut à aucun prix discriminatoire anticoncurrentiel, et le dumping à perte n’est pas l’équivalent du prix prédateur ni de tout autre prix bas anticoncurrentiel. Nonobstant leurs différences, les deux réglementations doivent coexister paisiblement. Pourtant, les opportunités de biais protectionnistes dans la détermination du dumping préjudiciable sont toujours nombreuses dans la législation antidumping et la pratique de la Commission. En outre, la mise en oeuvre de la législation antidumping peut être néfaste pour la concurrence dans le marché intérieur via l’incidence des procédures et des mesures antidumping et les effets anticoncurrentiels de certains comportements d’entreprises dans le cadre des procédures antidumping ou environnant ces dernières. De telles incidences nocives pour la concurrence sont déjà réduites par des dispositions telles que la règle du droit moindre et la clause d’intérêt public (intérêt de l’Union), mais pourraient et devraient l’être davantage. / European Union law addresses pricing practices of undertakings through antitrust provisions and an anti-dumping legislation. These two sets of regulations differ in many respects. They pursue different aims: protection of the interest of some European competitors versus promotion of free competition for the benefit o f consumers. However, they both hept to ensure fair competition (i.e. promotion of alevel playing field). They address different pricing practices: the markets concerned are differently defined (concerned product exported from one third country andsimilar product produced by the Union industry versus relevant product and geographic markets) and the characteristics of the undertakings concerned are also different (no sort of agreement between undertakings and no minimum market power required in anti-dumping law); price discrimination dumping in not equivalent to any anti-competitive price discrimination and below cost dumping is not equivalent to predatory pricing or to any other low anti-competitive price. Not with standing their differences, both sets of regulations have to coexist peacefully. Yet, opportunities of protectionist biases in the determination of injurious dumping are still numerous in the anti-dumping legislation and Commission’s practice. Moreover, the enforcementof the anti-dumping legislation may negatively affect competition in the internal market through the impact of the anti-dumping proceedings and measures and the anti-competitive effects of some undertakings’ behaviors within the ambit of, or surrounding the anti-dumping proceedings. Such harmful effects on competition of the anti-dumping action are already reduced by provisions such as the lesser duty rule and the public interest clause (Union interest), but could and should be further reduced.

Made available in DSpace on 2009-11-18T19:01:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ACF164.pdf: 430647 bytes, checksum: 50ce0289098209cf31ef0a474324a655 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / This case study investigates, empirically, cost methods and criteria of price discrimination made from hospital organizations when they set up their prices of hospital services to private patients and push down their prices to patients affiliated to health insurance and/or health maintenance organizations (HMO). The theory sought to show the Brazilian health systems either public or private, the aspects about corporate culture, the relationship among three players of the private health system ¿ health insurance companies (or HMO), hospitals and the patients, the importance of the cost systems, and the criteria of price discrimination. With these theories, it was developed a qualitative exploratory research, through open interviews, with hospital¿s managers and co-workers from invoicing department from two hospitals located at the Rio de Janeiro City. Based on results we didn¿t identify appropriate cost systems to help the managers to make a correct decision about price discrimination, but was identified corporate culture factors that could influence the price discrimination. Among the results, we can see unprepared hospital managers. Finally, we discussed some contributions and weakness of this case study, and there are presented suggestions for future researches. / O presente estudo de caso investiga, de forma empírica, os métodos de custeio e os critérios de discriminação de preços realizados pelas organizações hospitalares quando da definição de preços para os atendimentos a pacientes particulares e àqueles oriundos de planos de saúde e/ou seguro saúde. Para isso, o referencial teórico utilizado procurou abranger os sistemas de saúde público e privado, os aspectos relativos à cultura organizacional, a relação existente entre os três atores do processo ¿ planos de saúde, prestadores de serviços médicohospitalares e consumidores, a importância dos sistemas de apuração e análise de custos, os critérios de discriminação de preços. Com essa base teórica foi desenvolvida uma pesquisa qualitativa exploratória em duas unidades hospitalares sediadas no município do Rio de Janeiro, através de entrevistas em profundidade, junto a seus gestores hospitalares e a funcionários dos setores de faturamento daquelas entidades. O desenvolvimento da pesquisa não identificou sistemas de gerenciamento de custos adequados para auxiliar os gestores na definição dos preços, mas foram identificados fatores culturais que pudessem influenciar a discriminação desses preços. Dentre os resultados obtidos, destaque para o aparente despreparo na área administrativa e de controladoria dos gestores hospitalares. Ao final, são discutidas as contribuições da pesquisa, suas limitações e as sugestões para o desenvolvimento de futuros estudos.

Thesis ?Value generation and management in retail/whole chains? was started with intention to offer enhanced theoretical basis for research in this area, that is still represented insufficiently in comparison to importance of retail/whole chains in whole economy. Additionally the practical inconsistency between trading rules demostrated to customers and trading partners of chains (including visible behaviour of chains) and value driving variables bears interest. The thesis targets following: search and indication of potential value drivers (value affecting variables) of retail/wholesale chains description of such value affecting variables, testing of relevance of such value affecting variables synthesis of description and relevance (importance) gives recommendations and measures for value creation in these chains Based on analysis of external conditions and internal sources were identified following value generating areas: strategy of retail/wholesale chain growing from internal source of competitive advantage ? strategical differentiation, issue of expansion (understood both as strategical variable - potential competitive advantage, and external threat of concentration value creating variables of core business of retail/wholesale chain: price strategy managing of liquidity stabilization of operating profit in condition of fluctuation sales