<p>The Swedish Code for Corporate Governance was introduced on July 1, 2005. All companies then listed at OM Stockholmsbörsen A-list and those on the O-list with a market value of more than three billion SKr must implement the rules in the Code. The Code includes rules for corporate governance as a complement to the legislation. The Code is based on the principle comply or explain. This means that the companies are aloud to diverge from the rules if they explain why. The reason for this principle is that it enables a much higher level of ambition in the Code than if it would be legislated.</p><p>The Swedish Code for Corporate Governance has introduced much tougher rules on internal control than the existing legislation demands. The Code demands a good internal control without defining what it means. The idea is that the companies themselves are responsible for developing a standard for good internal control. It also includes that the board should sign an annual report about the companies internal control and establish a special internal audit function for evaluating the internal control system.</p><p>The main purpose with this paper is to study the implementation of the Code in Swedish companies concerning the rules on internal control of the financial reporting.</p><p>The paper is limited to the companies listed at OM Stockholmsbörsen former A-list which apply with the Code. Five companies are being interviewed on their work with internal control. All companies at the former A-list are included in the study of the existence of an internal audit function.</p><p>The paper is based on both secondary and primary data, mainly focused on the latter. The secondary data is collected from literature, journals, internet and annual reports from the companies included in the study. Primary data has been collected via e-mail and telephone contacts. One of the interviews was done via telephone and the others through meetings at the companies head offices.</p><p>The study shows that exactly half of the companies have an internal audit function and the existence of the function is strongly related to the ownership structure. Only companies with a wide spread in ownership and nationalized companies has the function.</p><p>There is a great uncertainty about what good internal control means. A suitable solution to apply with the rules in the Code is therefore to use COSO’s definition and recommendations on internal control. The framework also includes guidelines on how to evaluate and improve internal control.</p>

The Swedish Code for Corporate Governance was introduced on July 1, 2005. All companies then listed at OM Stockholmsbörsen A-list and those on the O-list with a market value of more than three billion SKr must implement the rules in the Code. The Code includes rules for corporate governance as a complement to the legislation. The Code is based on the principle comply or explain. This means that the companies are aloud to diverge from the rules if they explain why. The reason for this principle is that it enables a much higher level of ambition in the Code than if it would be legislated. The Swedish Code for Corporate Governance has introduced much tougher rules on internal control than the existing legislation demands. The Code demands a good internal control without defining what it means. The idea is that the companies themselves are responsible for developing a standard for good internal control. It also includes that the board should sign an annual report about the companies internal control and establish a special internal audit function for evaluating the internal control system. The main purpose with this paper is to study the implementation of the Code in Swedish companies concerning the rules on internal control of the financial reporting. The paper is limited to the companies listed at OM Stockholmsbörsen former A-list which apply with the Code. Five companies are being interviewed on their work with internal control. All companies at the former A-list are included in the study of the existence of an internal audit function. The paper is based on both secondary and primary data, mainly focused on the latter. The secondary data is collected from literature, journals, internet and annual reports from the companies included in the study. Primary data has been collected via e-mail and telephone contacts. One of the interviews was done via telephone and the others through meetings at the companies head offices. The study shows that exactly half of the companies have an internal audit function and the existence of the function is strongly related to the ownership structure. Only companies with a wide spread in ownership and nationalized companies has the function. There is a great uncertainty about what good internal control means. A suitable solution to apply with the rules in the Code is therefore to use COSO’s definition and recommendations on internal control. The framework also includes guidelines on how to evaluate and improve internal control.

In the media today, remuneration programs to CEO’s are frequently discussed. Media are usually focusing on the large amounts paid out rather than why the companies use the programs. The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the conflict of interest presented by the Principal Agent Theory is affected by a CEO remuneration program. To reach the purpose, an inductive method has been used. Questionnaires have been send out by e-mail and phone interviews have been carried out with two sample groups, one with remuneration programs, and one that do not use remuneration programs. The main theoretical framework used is Principal Agent Theory. With the help of other supporting and complementing theories the authors have been able to analyze the empirical findings gathered, and come to a conclusion. The authors were able to come to the conclusion that an effective remuneration program can to some extent steer a CEO’s behavior in the short term, and thereby affect the conflict of interest going on between principals and agents according to Principal Agent Theory. At the same time the authors have come to the conclusion that it is more difficult to make any clear connections between remuneration programs and being able to steer CEO’s behavior in the long run. However the long run reason for a remuneration program is to create a loyalty between the owners and managers. It has also been seen that companies without a remuneration plan tend to apply a Stewardship relationship rather than a principal agent relationship, and are thereby managing to decrease the conflict of interest between the two parties. / Bonusprogram är ofta diskuterade i media idag. Fokus ligger oftare på storleken på beloppen som betalas ut snarare än varför företagen väljer att använda sig av programmen. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka huruvida intressekonflikten presenterad i Principal Agent Teori påverkas av ett bonusprogram till VD. För att uppnå syftet har en induktiv metod används. Frågeformulär har skickats ut via e-post och telefonintervjuer har genomförts med två olika urvalsgrupper, en där företagen använder sig av bonusprogram till sin VD och en där företagen inte använder sig av bonusprogram till sin VD. Den huvudsakliga teorin som använts är Principal Agent Teori. Med hjälp av andra stödjande samt kompletterande teorier har författarna kunnat analysera det empiriska materialet som samlats in och på så sätt lyckats komma fram till en slutsats. Författarna kom fram till slutsatsen att ett effektivt bonusprogram kan till viss del styra en VD:s beteende på kortsikt, och på så sätt påverka den intressekonflikt som pågår mellan principal och agent enligt Principal Agent Teorin. Samtidigt har författarna kommit fram till slutsatsen att det är svårare att se något klart samband mellan bonusprogram och möjligheten att styra en VD:s beteende på långsikt. En annan anledning för att använda ett bonusprogram är att skapa en lojalitet mellan ägare och chefer på långsikt. Det har även framkommit att företag som inte använder sig av ett bonussystem tenderar att ha en Stewardship relation snarare än en principal agent relation mellan ägaren och VD. På så sätt lyckas dessa företag minska intressekonflikten mellan de två parterna.

<p>In the media today, remuneration programs to CEO’s are frequently discussed. Media are usually focusing on the large amounts paid out rather than why the companies use the programs. The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the conflict of interest presented by the Principal Agent Theory is affected by a CEO remuneration program.</p><p>To reach the purpose, an inductive method has been used. Questionnaires have been send out by e-mail and phone interviews have been carried out with two sample groups, one with remuneration programs, and one that do not use remuneration programs.</p><p>The main theoretical framework used is Principal Agent Theory. With the help of other supporting and complementing theories the authors have been able to analyze the empirical findings gathered, and come to a conclusion. The authors were able to come to the conclusion that an effective remuneration program can to some extent steer a CEO’s behavior in the short term, and thereby affect the conflict of interest going on between principals and agents according to Principal Agent Theory. At the same time the authors have come to the conclusion that it is more difficult to make any clear connections between remuneration programs and being able to steer CEO’s behavior in the long run. However the long run reason for a remuneration program is to create a loyalty between the owners and managers. It has also been seen that companies without a remuneration plan tend to apply a Stewardship relationship rather than a principal agent relationship, and are thereby managing to decrease the conflict of interest between the two parties.</p> / <p>Bonusprogram är ofta diskuterade i media idag. Fokus ligger oftare på storleken på beloppen som betalas ut snarare än varför företagen väljer att använda sig av programmen. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka huruvida intressekonflikten presenterad i Principal Agent Teori påverkas av ett bonusprogram till VD.</p><p>För att uppnå syftet har en induktiv metod används. Frågeformulär har skickats ut via e-post och telefonintervjuer har genomförts med två olika urvalsgrupper, en där företagen använder sig av bonusprogram till sin VD och en där företagen inte använder sig av bonusprogram till sin VD.</p><p>Den huvudsakliga teorin som använts är Principal Agent Teori. Med hjälp av andra stödjande samt kompletterande teorier har författarna kunnat analysera det empiriska materialet som samlats in och på så sätt lyckats komma fram till en slutsats.</p><p>Författarna kom fram till slutsatsen att ett effektivt bonusprogram kan till viss del styra en VD:s beteende på kortsikt, och på så sätt påverka den intressekonflikt som pågår mellan principal och agent enligt Principal Agent Teorin. Samtidigt har författarna kommit fram till slutsatsen att det är svårare att se något klart samband mellan bonusprogram och möjligheten att styra en VD:s beteende på långsikt. En annan anledning för att använda ett bonusprogram är att skapa en lojalitet mellan ägare och chefer på långsikt. Det har även framkommit att företag som inte använder sig av ett bonussystem tenderar att ha en Stewardship relation snarare än en principal agent relation mellan ägaren och VD. På så sätt lyckas dessa företag minska intressekonflikten mellan de två parterna.</p>

På grund av alla redovisningsskandaler efter det senaste millennieskiftet diskuteras detmycket kring hur förtroendet för revisorer har påverkats. Enronskandalen som inträffade iUSA, var en av de största skandalerna som påverkade hela världens ekonomi. Även i Sverigeförekommer det redovisningsskandaler. Skandiaskandalen är en utav dessa under modern tid.Allmänheten har till följd av dessa skandaler ifrågasatt trovärdigheten i den granskningrevisorer gör i bolags finansiella rapporter. Det finns ett antal olika faktorer som ligger tillgrund för dessa skandaler. Bland de faktorer som låg till grund för skandalerna fannsintressekonflikter, exempelvis att revisorn hade hand om andra tjänster utöver revision, samtatt revisorn inte var oberoende i sin granskning. Som en naturlig effekt avredovisningsskandalerna efterfrågade allmänheten lagstiftningar och åtgärder för att repareradet skadade förtroendet. Koden var en av de åtgärder som infördes som en respons på dennasituation. Syftet med Koden är att vinna tillbaka allmänhetens förtroende för de svenskabörsnoterade bolagen och förbättra styrningen av bolagen. Det är dock inte säkert att Kodenverkligen åtgärdar problemet. Syftet med uppsatsen är att fördjupa diskussionen kringförtroendet för revisorer. Detta genom att undersöka dels huruvida Koden verkligen harpåverkat förtroendet för revisorer och dels genom att försöka identifiera de faktorer sompåverkar förtroendet för revisorer. För att kunna studera det identifierade fenomenet,förtroende för revisorer, och därmed svara på forskningsfrågorna har en kvalitativ ansatsanvänds. Resultatet av denna studie tyder på att Koden inte har haft avsevärd påverkan påförtroendet för revisorer. Dessutom identifierar studien de faktorer som faktiskt påverkarförtroendet för revisorer. En del av dessa faktorer beror på intressekonflikter och att alla parterär nyttomaximerade och andra beror på revisorns egenskaper. Dessa faktorer bör regleras merkring och förtydligas, visar vår studie, för att stärka och återupprätta det skadade förtroendetför revisorer. / As a result of a series of accounting scandals during the last turn of the millennium the debatehas revolved a great deal around how the trust for accountants has been affected. The ”EnronScandal” that occurred in the US, was one of the most immense scandals that affected theworld economy. Accounting scandals do occur in Sweden as well, the ”Skandia Scandal” isone of those scandals that have occurred in modern time. The public has questioned thecredibility in the type of review accountants do in a corporations financial reports. There are anumbers of factors that can be the cause for these scandals. Among the factors that were thecause behind these scandals, were conflicts of interest. Mainly that the accountant hadresponsibility of additional services alongside with audit, but also the independence of theaccountant. As a natural impact the public demanded legislation and legal actions to repair thedamaged trust. Swedish code for corporate governance was one of a couple of actions thatwere implemented as a response to the situation. The purpose to the code was to win back thepublics trust for the Swedish quoted companies and to improve the governance of thecorporations. It is however not quite certain that the code really is able to repair the problem.The aim of this essay is to deepen the discussion round the trust of accountants. By partlyexamining if the Swedish code for corporate governance really has impacted the trust foraccountants, and partly by trying to identify the factors that influences the trust foraccountants. To be able to study the identified phenomenon, the trust for accountants, and toaccordingly answer the questions in the research, a qualitative approach has been applied. Theresult of this study indicates that the code has not impacted the trust of accountantssignificantly. The study also identifies the factors that actually affect the trust for accountants.Some of the factors depend on conflicts of interest and that all parties are cost-benefitmaximized, others lie in the accountant’s qualities. The conclusion in our essay is that thesefactors should be increasingly regulated and explicated in order to reestablish the damagedtrust for accountants.

Diploma thesis tests the existence of luck premium on U.S. CEOs' compensations. Luck premium means that in case of high principal-agent costs, CEOs are rewarded for random luck and not only for their productivity. Thesis uses financial crisis in 2008 as a breaking event after which attention and control of CEOs' remuneration by owners, public, and media intensified. Using regression with fixed effects on panel data between years 2004 and 2012 thesis proved impact of luck premium before 2008 while the influence was not significant after 2008. Results were not robust for other model specifications, which might be caused by selectivity of the dataset. Thesis then presents overview of theoretical approaches to CEOs' compensation analysis and recommendations for optimal compensation set-up.

In international corruption indexes, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Sweden often ranks as one of the least corrupt countries in the World. Despite this, the country still experiences corruption scandals, particularly in local government. In the wake of a scandal, municipalities tend to react swiftly and initiate anti- corruption reforms. However, despite such actions, new scandals re-emerge. The purpose of the study is to analyze why the undertaken reforms are not always successful in preventing new scandals from happening. In order to do so, I focus on anti-corruption measures in two large Swedish municipalities that have repeatedly experienced corruption scandals, despite having taken action and putting anti-corruption measures in place: the cities of Norrkoping and Gothenburg. Interviews on the scandals and the anti-corruption reforms were conducted with officials and politicians, and empirical evidence has also been gathered from public documents and audit reports. The principal-agent theory and the ideal types of “value based” and “compliance based” approaches are the theoretical tools which are used to analyze the undertaken anti-corruption reforms. The results show that the reforms undertaken indeed have improved the integrity systems of the cities. However, the reoccurring scandals can best be explained by the fact that the reforms have not been properly incorporated properly in the administrations, which in some cases have resulted in an ignorance of the rules. Some scandals can also be explained by conscious criminal acts from the agents, acts that are difficult to guard oneself against no matter how well-designed the anti-corruption institutions are. The results hence show that it is hard to design institutions that obliterate the corruption that are undertaken on purpose by agents.

The study is based on a hypothetical deductive approach. The study applies a quantitative method. The material covers 3926 firm years between 2007–2019. The data studied is obtained from the ASSET4 database. Analysis of data has taken place in the statistics program IBM SPSS. The study is based in corporate governance where the balance between shareholders and stakeholders forms the basis together with the countries' legal origins, i.e. how the legal traditions of different countries affect firms' reporting. To analyze this, two parts are used, a period of voluntary reporting of ESG(2007-2016) and a period covering the regulatory framework implemented in the European Union where mandatory reporting (2017-2019) of non-financial information such as environment and social aspects were introduced for larger firms in 2017. Based on this, a comparison is made whether higher ESG reporting is achieved in the voluntary or mandatory environment.  The study finds evidence that higher ESG reporting is achieved in the mandatory reporting and that the countries' legal differences decrease during the mandatory reporting period. The results show that firms of Scandinavian legal origin have lower ESG reporting and that a concentrated ownership structure leads to a lower ESG reporting.

This dissertation contains three essays on the impact of other-regarding behavior on human decision-making. Chapter II uses experimental methods to analyze the relative performance of a variety of compensation contracts. This study creates an environment in which individuals are paid via common payment mechanisms employed in the dual-principal agent relationships (Piece Rate, Flat Rate, Salary, Bonus and Socialization) and examines the effect that different incentive structures have on agent behavior. In Chapter III I explore the potential outcomes of blended payment structures in a dual-principal agent environment. I draw from the previously conducted experimental study in Chapter II and simulate agent behavior induced by blended payment mechanisms. In Chapter IV, I move away from studying payment mechanisms to investigate the impact of intentionality and responsibility on an individual's decision-making process. I explore the effects of direct and indirect responsibility as well as selfish and kind intentions using experimental methodology. Each of these essays provides further evidence that other-regarding behavior has a significant impact on the outcome of an economic situation; therefore, emphasizing the need to address such behavior in theoretical designs. / Ph. D.

Under den senare delen av 1900-talet inträffade ett antal företagsskandaler, såsom Enron och Worldcom, vilket föranledde ett bristande förtroendet för såväl styrelsers som revisorers arbete. För att återfå förtroende på den svenska marknaden introducerades Koden och en uppdatering av Aktiebolagslagen gjordes. En av de förtroendehöjande åtgärderna innebar att revisionsutskotten introducerades. Revisionsutskottens införande innebar ett tydliggörande av styrelseledamöternas arbetsuppgifter, men medförde samtidigt att huvudmannaskapsproblematiken i styrelsen aktualiserades. Vilket leder till vår problemformulering: Hur har revisionsutskottens införande påverkat ansvarsfördelning i styrelsen?För att kunna besvara vår frågeställning har vi genomfört kvalitativa intervjuer utifrån ett expertperspektiv. Expertperspektivet har företrätts av institutionella ägare, revisorer och en advokat. Respondenternas olika relationer till fenomenet har bidragit till ett brett perspektiv.Empiriinsamlingen påvisar tydligt att införandet av revisionsutskott har aktualiserat huvudmannaskapsproblematiken. Empirin påvisar att en dualism, i styrelsen, kan ha uppstått utifrån vem som agerar i vems uppdrag. Dock åberopar respondenterna likt lagrum och rekommendationer att styrelsens huvudansvar i helhet kvarstår.Vår slutsats är att styrelsen inte har skapat sig ett alibi genom införandet av revisionsutskott, och att styrelsens ansvar i helhet kvarstår. Därmed kan vi konstatera att införandet av revisionsutskott har belyst ansvarsfrågan, men att ansvaret kvarstår hos styrelsen i sin helhet. Vi har även konstaterat att forskning om huvudmannaskapsproblematiken inom styrelsen är bristfällig och att mer forskning skulle berika området. / Program: Civilekonomprogrammet