This study introduces industry competition factors to fraud models to examine how competition associates with fraud risk. I argue that industry competition eclipses many firm-level determinants in their association with fraud risk, and that the cost of poor information elevates fraud risk as competition increases. I find that fraud risk is higher for firms in industries with 1) more substitutable products and services, 2) greater threats of new entry, and 3) larger incumbent pools of competitors, and that substitution exceeds every firm-level variable except size in its relevance with fraud risk. Cross-sectionally, I provide evidence that industry-wide non-adoption of advanced cost analytics (i.e. using obsolete, distortionary standard costing practices) may exacerbate the fraud-risk effects of competition, especially product substitution: a one standard deviation increase in substitution associates with over double the fraud risk for firms in industries typified by obsolete costing practices. I also find that different strategies vary in their fraud-offsetting associations dependent on the type of competition most prevalent in an industry. Together, these findings shed light on how the effects of industry competition may subsume or surpass most firm-level fraud determinants and provide evidence of previously unidentified drawbacks of obsolete cost accounting systems. / Doctor of Philosophy / Elements of industry competition help explain a firm's fraud risk. I find that bringing competition variables into firm-level fraud models helps explain a large portion of the firm's fraud risk, and that the effects of competition more strongly associate with fraud risk than most firm-level attributes. The results also indicate that the effects of competition on fraud risk may be even worse in industries where obsolete cost accounting practices remain widespread: the effects of price competition in such industries associates with significantly greater fraud risk than in other industries. Additional findings include the implied fraud-risk-reducing effects of different business strategies, depending on which type of competition is most intensive around a firm. Altogether, this study sheds light on the importance of including industry competition effects when assessing fraud risk, especially when a firm's or its peers' cost accounting system quality is poor and price competition is high.

First Essay: Using a sample of 15,835 completed M&A transactions in U.S. from 1985 to 2015, we document three main empirical results. First, consistent with the notion that the disciplinary effect of competition on corporate management, acquiring firms in competitive industries experience significantly positive announcement returns, while the abnormal returns of acquiring firms in non-competitive industries are insignificant. Second, market competition is correlated to the shareholder value in different types of M&A transaction. Horizontal and vertical integrations have positive announcement returns, while conglomerate integrations have negative announcement returns, irrespective of the condition of market competition. Third, the return of small acquiring firms is higher than the return of large acquiring firms, and this size effect is more profound in non-competitive industries. Second Essay: This paper examines the long-term performance of the reverse merger (RM) transactions in Taiwan stock market. Shell companies tend to conduct private placements to raise equity capital in the year following RM transactions. Based on the intended use of capital, issuers of private placements are classified into three categories: investment, recapitalization, and general corporate purposes. We find that shell companies in the investment category experience better long-term performance in the subsequent three years, which is consistent with the view that RM firms with strategic plans to increase in investments in capital expenditures are signaling profitable investment opportunity. However, shell companies in the recapitalization or general corporate purposes categories experience no or poor subsequent underperformance, suggesting that RM deals in these two categories are speculative in nature and short-sightedness that destroy the long-term shareholder wealth.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T19:14:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 30 / Nenhuma / Um extenso corpo de pesquisa tem identificado diversos fatores sobre os determinantes da estrutura de capital. Várias características das empresas, tais como tamanho, oportunidades de crescimento, lucratividade, escudos fiscais, proporção de ativos fixos, por exemplo, têm sido relacionados como fatores que influenciam a estrutura de capital. No entanto, há poucas evidências empíricas sobre o efeito das condições de mercado sobre a estrutura de capital. (HARRIS; RAVIV, 1991). Brander and Lewis (1986, 1988) e Maksimovic (1988) foram pioneiros ao analisar o uso da estrutura financeira como uma variável estratégica em mercado de produtos competitivos. O propósito desta investigação foi justamente verificar a interação entre a estrutura de capital e a estratégia competitiva em mercado de produtos e insumos. Para isso, foi realizada uma análise dos determinantes da estrutura de capital e da estratégia por meio de um modelo de dados em painel. Além disso, foi estimado um modelo de equação simultânea com uma amostra / An extensive body of research has identified several factors on the determinants of capital structure. Several firm characteristics such as size, growth opportunities, profitability, tax shields, or the proportion of fixed assets, have been shown to affect capital structure. Nevertheless, there is little empirical evidence on the effect of market conditions on the capital structure. (HARRIS; RAVIV, 1991) Brander and Lewis (1986, 1988) and Maksimovic (1988) pioneered the analysis of the use of financial structure as a strategic variable in product market competition. The purpose of this research was to precisely determine the interaction between the capital structure and the strategy in factor-product market. An analysis of the strategy and capital structure determinants using a panel data model was conducted. Moreover, a model of simultaneous equation was estimated with a sample of 207 Brazilian firms. The Least Square (LS), Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) have been used

In Chapter 1, the staggered nature of the adoption of interstate bank branching deregulation in the United States is utilized as an exogeneous shock to investigate the managerial incentives involved in corporate socially responsible (CSR) activities. Using Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Research & Analytics, Inc. for our CSR measures, we find a significant negative relation between the extent of deregulation and CSR practices, which implies that deregulation-led rising competition in product market makes the non-financial firms more concerned about protecting interests of shareholders than other stakeholders. Specifically, firms with low pricing power tend to significantly reduce their CSR activities. Our results are robust using alternative empirical specifications and CSR measures. Chapter 2 investigates the interaction between price stability and financial stability for “Fragile Five” countries. In the first step, we investigate the causation linkage between price stability and financial stability indicators. In the second step, we analyze the effect of financial stability instruments, lending rate and required reserve ratio, on price stability. We then test the price stability instrument policy rate on financial stability. Empirical findings, in the first step, indicate that there is no meaningful relationship between policy objectives in the short run, while the relation between financial stability and price stability occurs in the longer time frequencies. However, the situation is not valid for all economies. In the second step, we measure the effects of monetary policy tools employed by the central bank of each of the Fragile Five countries. The findings from the analysis that investigates the effects of each policy instrument imply that the policy rate instrument implemented to achieve the inflation target does not affect the financial stability goal. Similarly, the reserve requirement ratio instrument to achieve the financial stability goal does not affect the price stability goal. On the other hand, results give some implication about the negative effects of the lending rate instrument on the inflation targeting objective.

This thesis deals with different aspects of the Spanish Labor Market. The first chapter explores the impact of product market competition on job instability. Empirical results show that job instability rises with competition. The second chapter addresses the existence of network effects on immigrants' remitting behavior. Using a unique data base, I find positive network effects on the probability of remitting as well as on quantity remitted. The final chapter studies the role of the recent construction boom in explaining decisions to drop out of high-school. The construction boom is shown to increase the likelihood of dropping out of high-school. / Esta tesis trata diferentes aspectos del mercado laboral español. El primer capítulo explora el impacto de la competencia en el mercado de productos sobre la inestabilidad del empleo. Los resultados empíricos muestran que la inestabilidad en el empleo crece con el nivel de competencia. El segundo capítulo plantea la existencia de efectos de las redes sociales de inmigrantes sobre el envío de remesas. Mediante el uso de una base de datos exclusiva, he encontrado efectos positivos de las redes sociales sobre la probabilidad de enviar remesas así como sobre la cantidad enviada. El último capítulo estudia el papel del reciente boom de la construcción en el abandono escolar durante la educación secundaria. Se demuestra que el boom de la construcción ha incrementado la probabilidad de abandono escolar durante la educación secundaria.

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This dissertation consists of two empirical essays. The first chapter titled: “Hedge Fund Activism and Dual Ownership of U.S. Multinationals”. Harford, Wang & Zhang (2017) conclude that holding high cash balances abroad to avoid US taxes causes internal capital markets and investments distortions. We posit that hedge funds target MNCs with more severe internal capital and agency problems. We demonstrate that upon acquiring dual ownership in these firms, hedge funds reduce internal capital problems and improve investment, especially innovation, efficiencies. To further reduce agency costs of foreign cash holdings, hedge funds engage dual firms in focused acquisitions. These improvements are reflected in superior performances of dual firms relative to non-dual firms. Chapter 2 titled as “Innovation Strategies & IPO Underpricing”. In this chapter, we investigate how a firms’ choice of pre-IPO innovation strategies affect IPO pricing. We differentiate the orientation of the issuing firm’s innovation portfolio in terms of exploitative orientation versus explorative orientation based on citations of patents across technology classes. We introduce a measure of innovation power to generate breakthrough innovations. We show that the issuing firms with greater innovation power, especially firms with exploratory orientation of a patent, significantly decrease underpricing and have the power to bargain a higher offer price. Our results suggest that a higher exploration strategy requires more time to negotiate a higher offer price while more valuable innovation requires less time to bargain at the higher offer price.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T13:42:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Furieri Batianello.pdf: 1553909 bytes, checksum: 307230d5431d6833c34cb63af8c84ab9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-11 / Esta dissertação analisa a qualidade da informação contábil (QIC) na interação entre a governança corporativa e a competição, visando responder lacunas ainda não preenchidas pela literatura, principalmente na comparação entre os quatro ambientes resultantes da interação entre competição e governança das firmas. No que tange relação competição/governança, estudos como o de Karuna (2010), por exemplo, apontaram existir uma relação entre a intensidade da competição e uma governança mais forte. Em relação à contabilidade/competição, Dhaliwal et al. (2008), descobriram haver associação positiva entre a intensidade da competição e o conservadorismo condicional, que é considerada uma das propriedades da informação contábil. Por conseguinte, no que diz respeito à relação governança/contabilidade, achados de Bushman et al. (2000), por exemplo, confirmam que a contabilidade influencia a governança corporativa. Ball et al. (2000) contradizem-nos afirmando que a governança corporativa impacta a contabilidade, ou seja, os mecanismos de governança presentes em um ambiente teriam papel fundamental na qualidade da informação contábil. A competição do mercado de produtos foi calculada mediante o Índice de Herfindahl. A divisão entre firmas com mecanismos de governança fortes e fracos foi feita com base na listagem da BM&FBovespa, onde considerou-se empresas listadas nos níveis Novo Mercado e Nível 2 como empresas com governança forte, e o restante como empresas com governança fraca. Foram utilizados dados entre os anos de 2000 e 2011, das firmas listadas da Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo. A técnica de análise estatística utilizada foi a regressão múltipla com dados em painel desbalanceado. Os resultados, no geral, corroboraram com estudos anteriores, de que tanto a presença de uma governança forte quanto um ambiente altamente competitivo podem incrementar os números contábeis de forma a torná-los mais qualitativos. Curiosamente, os resultados sugeriram que em ambientes classificados como não competitivos e com mecanismos de governança fracos, a qualidade da informação contábil divulgada mostrou-se relativamente alta, segundo duas das três propriedades da qualidade da informação contábil analisadas / This dissertation analyzes the quality of accounting information (QAI) on the interaction between corporate governance and competition, aiming to tackle questions that have not been addressed by the literature available so far, especially when it comes to comparing the four possible environments resulting of the combination between different competition and governance environments. When it comes to the relationship between competition and governance, studies such as Karuna s (2010) point out to the existence of a cause/effect relationship between the intensity of the competition and stronger governance. When discussing accounting and competition, Dhaliwal et al. (2008) evidenced a positive relation between the amount of competition and the conditional conservatism, which is considered one of the main priorities of accounting information. Thus, in what concerns the relationship between governance and accounting, findings made by Bushman et al (2000) confirm that accountancy has an influence on corporate governance. Ball et al (2000) are contrary to that opinion, claiming that it is corporate governance that impacts on accountancy, which means that the governance mechanisms present at a certain environment would play a fundamental role in the quality of accounting information. The product market competition was calculated using the Herfindahl Index and the identification of firms with strong or weak governance was based on BM&FBovespa listings, where firms listed in New Market or Level 2 were considered with strong governance, and the others were considered with weak governance. The data used was collected between 2000 and 2011, from the firms listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange. The type of statistical analysis used to process data was the multiple regression with unbalanced panel data. In general, the results point to the same direction as previous ones, showing that both the presence of a strong governance and a highly competitive environment can enhance the accounting numbers in order to make them more qualitative. Interestingly, results suggest that in environments classified as uncompetitive and weak governance mechanisms, the quality of accounting information disclosed was relatively high, according to two of the three properties of the quality of accounting information analyzed

本論文包含二篇與公司財務相關之文章，第一篇文章嘗試在考量總體經濟條件和公司生產力衝擊下，建構一個簡單結構式模型以探討公司之資本結構決策。特別的是，由該模型可得到公司最適負債比率與總體經濟條件衝擊之報酬波動性呈反向關係，惟公司最適負債比率與公司生產力衝擊之報酬波動性呈正向關係。第二篇文章係利用對稱寡占產業均衡模型，以探討產業內經理人薪酬決策之異質性。即使產業內所有公司皆為同質，在模型均衡下存在有些公司會採取激勵性薪酬，而其他公司則不採取激勵性薪酬。該模型預期當市場競爭性增加時，產業內公司經理人薪酬決策會更具異質性。此外，上述二篇文章皆分別以美國製造業資料進行實證，並且實證結果均符合其模型之預期。 / This dissertation proposes two essays about corporate finance. Essay one develops a simple structural model to investigate a firm’s capital structure choices in consideration of macroeconomic conditions and firm-level productivity shocks. The model particularly generates the implication that the optimal debt ratio is negatively correlated to the return volatility of macroeconomic conditions, but positively correlated to that of firm-level productivity. Essay two is contributed to explore the heterogeneity of the compensation decision within the industry by employing a symmetric oligopoly industry equilibrium model. Within the equilibrium some firms will adopt incentive pay while others will not, even though all firms are ex ante identical. The model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the compensation decision as the intensity of market competition increases. Both of the two essays further provide empirical evidence of the US manufacturing industry to support the model implications.

本研究旨在探討公司治理與動態資本結構之間的關係，以及產品市場競爭對此關係的影響。 第一篇文章探討公司治理品質如何影響動態資本結構。本篇文章同時考慮負債的「接管防禦」與「懲罰」效果，對最適資本結構調整速度的影響。我們的實證結果發現，雖然低負債(underlevered)和高負債(overlevered)公司，皆呈現公司治理品質愈差，調整速度愈慢的結果，但原因並不相同。以低負債且弱治理的公司來說，因負債所扮演的懲罰角色帶來的成本，高於使用負債作為接管防禦工具所帶來的利益，因此公司傾向減少負債的使用，並以較緩慢的速度朝向目標資本結構調整。但就高負債弱治理的公司而言，因面臨較嚴重的接管威脅，為了驅逐潛在的掠奪者，公司選擇增加負債的使用，而不願調降其負債水準至目標值，因此也降低了資本結構的調整速度。 第二篇文章主要探討產品市場競爭在公司治理品質與動態資本結構關係中所扮演的角色。文獻中已有許多研究探討市場競爭對經理人的怠惰行為的影響。然而，到目前為止，仍然沒有文獻研究產品市場競爭程度的高低如何影響公司治理與資本結構調整速度之間的關係。我們的文章因此補足目前研究文獻不足之處。實證結果顯示，公司在競爭的狀態下，更願意以追求股東財富極大化為其目標，此舉也因此提升公司資本結構朝向最適目標值調整的速度。除此之外，我們的實證結果亦發現在一個高度市場競爭的環境下，弱治理與強治理公司之間調整速度的差距會縮小。 / This study contains two essays on the relationship between corporate governance on capital structure dynamics, and how production market competition affects this relation. Essay 1: Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidences The effects of corporate governance on optimal capital structure choices have been well documented, though without offering empirical evidence about the impact of corporate governance quality on the adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. This study simultaneously considers two effects of debt originating from agency theory—the takeover defense and the disciplinary effects of debt—on the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure. Corporate governance has a distinct effect on the speed of capital structure adjustment: weak governance firms that are underlevered tend to adjust slowly to the optimal capital structure, because the costs of the disciplinary role of debt outweigh the benefits of using debt as a takeover defense tool. Although, overlevered weak governance firms also adjust slowly, they do so because they are reluctant to decrease their leverage toward the target level to deter potential raiders, especially if they face a serious takeover threat. Therefore, this study finds that both overlevered and underlevered firms with weak governance adjust slowly toward their target debt levels, though with different motivations. Essay 2: Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Dynamic Capital Structure The importance of product market competition for analyzing managerial slack or the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decision has been widely discussed. However, prior studies pay little attention to center on the impact of market competition on the relationship between corporate governance quality and capital structure dynamics. This paper thus fills this gap in the literature. Our study finds that competition makes firms with weak governance have stronger incentive to maximize shareholders’ wealth and thus increase their adjustment speed toward their target leverage. Moreover, the difference in the adjustment speeds between weak and strong governance firms become smaller when firms operate in highly competitive industries.