This dissertation investigates rhetoric and prudence in Sophocles through close readings of Antigone, Ajax, Philoctetes, and Oedipus at Colonus. Central to the project is a reconstruc-tion of a uniquely Sophoclean conception of prudence as “good sense”; good sense is distinguished from traditional conceptions of prudence as an inter-subjective capacity for good judgment that is born of experience and chance. The study finds that while good sense and persuasive rhetoric are occasionally paired, they are frequently divorced from one another. Thus, in place of heroic conflicts and tragic failings, these readings present an alternative tragic tension between the persuasive yet often solipsistic speech of heroes and protagonists and the good sense of marginalized characters. This project is situated within the “turn to rhetoric” in contemporary democratic theory; in this context, it presents Sophocles as a novel and under-theorized resource in three overarching ways. First, his dramas were performed in a democratic context and gave voice to perspectives otherwise marginalized within the polis; in this respect he offers more inclusive democratic resources than his Athenian contemporaries. Second, these plays offer sobering insight into the impact of contingency in shaping rhetorical contexts. They reveal that overconfidence in rhetorical technē underestimates the extent to which successful persuasion is often aligned with chance and social advantage. Third, he draws attention to pervasive structural inequalities that work against and silence good sense. In this final respect the plays themselves are considered as didactic resources that cultivate reflective judgments and good sense in the spectator and reader.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Philosophy, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

Esta pesquisa visa analisar a teoria dos golpes de Estado de Gabriel Naudé, um dos principais tratadistas da razão de Estado do século XVII. Através da leitura de Considérations politiques sur les coups dÉtat (1639), obra magna do autor, busca-se encontrar não apenas a base conceitual desse texto, mas inclusive identificar os percursos teóricos que deságuam nos escritos de Naudé. Por meio desta investigação é possível notar a noção de prudência como grande sustentáculo da referida teoria dos golpes de Estado, essencialmente influenciada pelas obras de Justo Lípsio e Pierre Charron. A partir daí, busca-se desconstruir a prudência naudeana para nela apontar o peso das idéias dos escritores mencionados, o que também permite demonstrar a existência de outras referências à razão de Estado da época, que não Nicolau Maquiavel. / This research aims to analyze Gabriel Naudés theory of the coups détat , one of the main authors of reason of State on the 17th Century. Interpreting Naudés magnum opus, Considérations politiques sur les coups dÉtat (1639), I intend to explore not only his conceptual basis but the theoretical tendencies leading to his writings. Through this investigation it is possible to deem prudence as the major supporting notion of the theory of the coups détat, which was essentially influenced by the works of Justus Lipsius and Pierre Charron. Thence, I intend to deconstruct Naudés notion of prudence in order to point out the weigh of Lipsius and Charrons ideas on his work, showing the existence of other references in the formulation of the reason of State on this epoch, besides Niccolo Machiavelli.

A idéia central da dissertação é explicitar a filosofia da educação subjacente às práticas do Opus Dei e discutir criticamente estas práticas. A contribuição principal do trabalho será a demonstração de que a concepção de educação do Opus Dei tem como objetivo a formação de indivíduos submissos em grau universal e irrestrito. Serão também explicitados os meios utilizados pela instituição para obter este objetivo. A natureza do trabalho é a de uma pesquisa teórica que além da bibliografia usual inclui o exame de diversos casos e testemunhos. O objeto a ser pesquisado se subdivide nos textos produzidos pelo Opus Dei (de autoria de seu fundador, o espanhol Josemaría Escrivá, e de seus seguidores) e no que podemos chamar de educação informal do Opus Dei, que são as atividades levadas a cabo nas casas da instituição. O objetivo visado, portanto, é trazer à luz uma análise científica sobre as práticas educacionais do Opus Dei e seus reflexos no indivíduo. O referencial teórico remete à obra de autores que se debruçaram sobre as temáticas da virtude da prudentia, linguagem e psico-sociologia: Tomás de Aquino, Karl Popper e Erich Fromm. Os procedimentos metodológicos consistem na pesquisa teórica e no exame de relatos. O procedimento técnico-operacional consiste em analisar os escritos do Opus Dei, sempre confrontados com os depoimentos de quem vivenciou as práticas da instituição, à luz dos referenciais teóricos apontados. / The central idea of this work is to present the educational philosophy of Opus Dei´s practices and critically analyze those practices. The main contribution of this work shall be the demonstration that the Opus Deis concept of education has as primary goal the production of fully submitted individuals. The methods used by the institution to achieve this goal will also be presented. The works nature is theoretical, but also includes the analysis of many testimonies of real cases. The object of research is composed by Opus Deis texts (written by its founder, the spanish Josemaría Escrivá, and by some of his followers) and by the so called informal education of Opus Dei, witch are activities that usually take place inside the institutions houses. The objective, therefore, is to present a scientific analysis of the Opus Deis educational practices and its consequences on the individual. The theoretic references are authors who have studied the fields of prudentia, language and psycho-sociology: Tomas de Aquino, Karl Popper and Erich Fromm. The methodological procedures consist on the theoretical research and on the analysis of testimonies. The technical-operational procedure consist on the analysis of Opus Deis texts and testimonies of ex-members.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-20T13:17:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando Rodrigues Montes Doca_Dissertacao.pdf: 1158926 bytes, checksum: 64106b444d209715694d39cf9eee1adb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-07-16 / The objective of this work is to explain how practical reasoning takes place in Aristotle. This is a delicate and controversial issue of the Aristotelian practical philosophy, since he did not dedicate any moment of his work the Stagirite to closely analyze the practical reasoning. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle deals with deliberation, prudence, and practical syllogism, but we do not see him coordinate these themes as a concluded whole in a theory of the practical reasoning. This research aims to do so in order to precisely determine how the practical reasoning of a moral agent works, since its beginning, in the apprehension of a conception of the good, until its conclusion, in the imminence of an action. To do so this work undertakes an analysis of important conceptions about the theory of practical reasoning. Initially, two preliminary themes are dealt with: happiness and moral virtue, and right in sequence it goes deeper in the theme of practical reasoning analyzing the concepts of deliberate choice, of deliberation, and, most of all, of prudential reason, seeing that its operation covers a considerable part of the practical reasoning of the moral agent. But practical reasoning is not completely explained only by understanding such themes neither can it be limited to the operation of prudential reason. The theory of practical syllogism also appears as an important element in the explanation of how practical reasoning works. As a result of this, a large part of this research is dedicated to discussing the role of practical syllogism in the corpus aristotelicum, as well as to understanding the relationship it establishes with deliberation. Given its role and identified the kind of relationship it has with deliberation a complete map of practical reasoning is finally presented and the question about how practical reasoning in Aristotle works is then answered. / O objetivo deste trabalho é explicar de que modo se dá o raciocínio prático em Aristóteles. Esta é uma delicada e controvertida questão da filosofia prática aristotélica, visto que em nenhum momento de sua obra o Estagirita se dedica a analisar detidamente o raciocínio prático. Em sua Ethica Nicomachea, Aristóteles trata da deliberação, da prudência e do silogismo prático, mas não o vemos coordenar estes temas em um todo acabado, em uma teoria do raciocínio prático. A presente pesquisa propõe-se a fazê-lo a fim de determinar precisamente como se dá o raciocínio prático de um agente moral, desde seu início, quando da apreensão de uma concepção de bem, até o seu término, quando da iminência de uma ação. Para tanto, procede-se a análise de conceitos importantes em torno da teoria do raciocínio prático. Inicialmente tratam-se dois temas preliminares: a felicidade e a virtude moral, e já na sequência se adentra ao tema do raciocínio prático ao se analisar os conceitos de escolha deliberada, de deliberação e, sobretudo, de razão prudencial, visto sua operação cobrir uma parte considerável do raciocínio prático do agente moral. Mas o raciocínio prático não se explica por completo apenas com a compreensão de tais temas e nem ele se resume à operação da razão prudencial. Também a teoria do silogismo prático figura como um elemento importante na explicação sobre como se dá o raciocínio prático. Em decorrência disto é dedicado neste trabalho um amplo espaço à discussão do papel do silogismo prático no corpus aristotelicum, bem como à compreensão de que relação ele estabelece com a deliberação. Determinado seu papel e identificada a espécie de relação que ele mantém com a deliberação, é, finalmente, apresentado o mapa completo do raciocínio prático e é respondida a questão sobre como se dá este raciocínio em Aristóteles.

Orientador: Carlos Arthur Ribeiro do Nascimento / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T03:22:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Albertuni_CarlosAlberto_D.pdf: 1073887 bytes, checksum: 855e7c4c220904aa0e980ccfb0ff0de5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Trata-se de uma investigação sobre a teoria dos primeiros princípios da razão prática na obra de Tomás de Aquino. No centro desta teoria está o termo 'sindérese¿, cujo conteúdo foi elaborado nas discussões da filosofia e da teologia medievais, a partir de sua menção na Glosa de Jerônimo a Ezequiel. Tal termo designa um conceito que apresenta um caráter inovador dentro da teoria da ação moral em comparação com a ética aristotélica, pois Tomás de Aquino o entende como o hábito dos primeiros princípios da moral, equivalente ao hábito dos primeiros princípios teóricos (intellectus principiorum) de Aristóteles. Dessa forma, o interesse é compreender como o conceito de sindérese é desenvolvido dentro da filosofia moral de Tomás de Aquino, visando detectar a estrutura conceitual na qual se localiza e se relaciona com outros conceitos importantes de sua filosofia moral, tais como, consciência, lei natural e prudência / Abstract: This work is an investigation of the theory concerning first principles of practical reason in the work of Thomas Aquinas. In the heart of this theory is the term 'synderesis¿, which content was built in the discussions of medieval philosophy and theology, from its mention in the Gloss of Jerome on Ezekiel. This term indicates a concept that presents a new character in the moral action theory in comparison with aristotelian ethics, since Thomas Aquinas understands it as the habit of moral first principles, equivalent to Aristotle¿s habit of theoretical first principles (intellectus principiorum). Thus, the purpose is to understand how the concept of synderesis is developed within moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, aiming to individuate the conceptual structure in which it is found and is related with other important terms of his moral philosophy as conscience, natural law and prudence / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: João Carlos Kfouri Quartim de Moraes / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-25T16:34:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Felicio_ThiagoHarrison_M.pdf: 1180811 bytes, checksum: 8ebcdcb1646c78cb4e7c018c801cc8fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: Investigamos o tema da primazia da phrónesis sobre a philosophía na Carta a Meneceu, em algumas Máximas e Sentenças de Epicuro e em alguns testemunhos tardios. No passo 132, de Carta a Meneceu, lemos que a phrónesis é mais preciosa do que a philosophía, sendo que a primeira é tida como uma sabedoria prática e contínua, indispensável à vida do sábio, e a segunda como um saber teórico e igualmente como um exercício, cujo principal objetivo é livrar o homem dos temores oriundos de vãs opiniões, atuando de maneira terapêutica, à semelhança de um remédio. Comparando as noções que a Carta nos revela com outras passagens que fazem referência a tais termos, podemos constatar que em nenhum momento Epicuro demonstra desprezo pela philosophía. Então, como podemos localizar e compreender os motivos que o levam a declarar a primazia de uma sabedoria sobre a outra? Para responder a essa pergunta, buscamos tanto os comentários de intérpretes já consagrados da tradição quanto os de intérpretes mais recentes. Além disso, traduzimos a Carta a Meneceu e algumas passagens do corpus epicurista / Abstract: We did an investigation of the theme of the primacy of the phrónesis over the philosophía in the Letter to Menoeceus, in some of the Maxims and Sentences of Epicurus and in some late testimonies. In the line 132 of the Letter to Menoeceus we read that the phrónesis is more precious than the philosophía. The phrónesis is taken as a practical and continuous wisdom, essential to the life of the sage, whereas the philosophía is taken as a theoretical wisdom and also as an "exercise", whose main goal is to free the man from the fears of vain opinions, acting in a therapeutic way, as a medicine. Comparing the notions which the Letter reveals with other passages that make reference to such terms, we note that Epicurus doesn't show contempt for the philosophía. So how can we locate and understand the reasons why the philosopher declares the primacy of the phrónesis over the philosophía? To answer this question we researched both comments of interpreters already enshrined in the tradition as the comments of the latest interpreters. In addition we translated the Letter to Menoeceus and some passages of the Epicurean corpus. / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

The diploma thesis deals with problems of provisions. Its substantial part is devoted to obvious provisions. First of all, there is metioned a general determination of provisions and some of Generally accepted accounting principles, which have the largest influence on formation of provisions. The thesis describes provisions according to International Financial Reporting Standards and according to the Czech legislation. Consequently, the thesis compares czech approach to provisions with IFRS's approach. With regard to upcoming amendments of provision in IFRS the part of thesis reports essential proposed changes. The end of the thesis is devoted to buried reserves. There is mentioned life cycle, meaning and examples of buried reserves.

The diploma thesis focuses on deferred tax. It characterizes this accounting category and describes various theoretical approaches to its calculation. It deals with its historical development and the current regulation of its recognition and presentation in financial statements. The thesis contains rules set by IFRS as well as Czech accounting legislation. It explains the most common situations where deferred tax liability and deferred tax asset arises. The practical part compares chosen theoretical knowledge with its practical application. It assesses correctness of presentation of deferred tax in practice. The thesis deals with the question whether accounting units make mistakes when presenting deferred tax and whether they provide sufficient additional information to users of financial statements. Significance of deferred tax in balance sheet and income statement is subject to interest too.

Dans l’exercice de son office, le juge est en permanence aux prises avec la loi et sa conscience. Cette réalité n’est pas propre à notre temps. Elle est une donnée constante de l’histoire judiciaire. Et selon les époques, la conscience du juge n’a pas toujours occupé la même place. Cette oscillation de la place de la conscience dans l’acte de juger témoigne à la fois d’un souci de justice et d’un souci éthique. Malgré les tentatives des doctrines positivistes et légicentristes d’atténuer, voire d’évacuer la question de la conscience du juge de la sphère judiciaire, elle demeure entière, et bien plus encore aujourd’hui avec la complexité de plus en plus grande de certaines affaires judiciaires. Le droit et la conscience sont un couple viscéralement lié mais malheureusement un couple en « difficulté », où le droit ne triomphe pas toujours et où la conscience n’a pas toujours bonne presse au regard de la dimension subjective qui la caractérise et à laquelle elle est très souvent réduite. Si cette question a fait l’objet jusqu’ici d’une abondante littérature tant en droit français qu’en droit canonique, il nous semble qu’elle a été essentiellement abordée soit sous l’angle du droit séculier soit sous l’angle exclusivement du droit canonique. A notre connaissance aucune étude comparative n’a été faite sur ce sujet. D’où l’intérêt de notre étude. Nous proposons donc dans cette investigation une étude comparée de la conscience du juge en droit pénal français et en droit canonique à travers respectivement les concepts d’intime conviction et de certitude morale. En droit pénal français, les juges et les jurés conformément à l’art. 353 CPP, doivent juger en se référant à leur intime conviction tandis que dans la législation canonique le juge ne peut, quel que soit le litige, prononcer sa sentence qu’après avoir acquis conformément au c. 1608, CIC/83 la certitude morale sur la vérité des faits. L’« intime conviction » en droit français et la certitude morale en droit canonique sont deux formes de la manifestation de la conscience du juge. Nous nous interrogeons donc de savoir si la certitude morale est en droit canonique ce que l’intime conviction en droit pénal français. À travers cette étude comparée nous voulons soustraire le jugement selon la conscience des caricatures dont il fait l’objet et mettre en évidence la complexité de l’office du juge. Au cœur du débat sur la conscience du juge c’est l’office tout entier du juge qui est en jeu. Juger est un art qui mobilise toute la personne du juge et met en évidence son autorité à travers une perspicacité et une prudence ritualisées. La conscience du juge – dont la manifestation se décline sous les vocables d’intime conviction et de certitude morale respectivement dans les systèmes juridiques français et canonique et dont le risque d’arbitraire est si communément appréhendé par l’opinion – est un gage de justice et de vérité pour autant qu’elle soit soumise à l’épreuve du rituel judiciaire. Si notre société contemporaine se rebiffe à l’idée de conscience – renvoyée d’emblée à la sphère exclusivement morale et subjective – notre investigation a pour finalité de démontrer que la conscience du juge telle que comprise dans les législations canonique et française revêt un sens technique précis qui ne saurait être enfermé dans une quelconque normativité. / In the exercise of his office, the judge is constantly struggling with the law and his conscience. This reality is not peculiar to our time. It is a constant in judicial history. According to the times in history, the judge's conscience has not always occupied the same place. This oscillation of the place of consciousness in the act of judging shows both a concern for justice and an ethical concern. Despite the attempts of positivist and law-centrist doctrines to mitigate or even dispel the question of the judge's consciousness of the judicial sphere; it remains intact, even more so today with the increasing complexity of certain cases. The ‘righteous’ and the ‘conscientious’ are a viscerally linked couple but unfortunately it is a couple in "difficulty", where the law does not always triumph and where the conscience does not always have good press with regard to the subjective dimension which characterizes it and to which it is very often reduced. If this question has so far been the subject of an abundant literature in both French and Canon law, I believe that it has been essentially approached either from the angle of secular law or exclusively Canon law. To our knowledge, no comparative study has been made on this subject. Hence the interest of our study. We therefore propose in this investigation a comparative study of the judge's conscience in both French criminal law and Canon law through respectively the concepts of ‘intimate conviction’ and ‘moral certainty’. In French criminal law, judges and jurors, in accordance with art. 353 CPP must judge by referring to their intimate conviction whereas in the Canon law the judge cannot; whatever the litigation pronounce in his sentence that after having acquired according to c. 1608, CIC/83 "moral certainty" about the truth of the facts. "Intimate conviction" in French law and "moral certainty" in Canon law are two forms of manifestation of the judge's conscience. We therefore wonder whether "moral certainty" is in canon law what the "conviction" is in French criminal law. Through this comparative study we wish to subtract the judgment according to the consciousness of the caricatures of which it is the object, and to highlight the complexity of the office of the judge. At the heart of the debate about the conscience of the judge is the entire office of the judge that is at stake. Judging is an art that mobilizes the whole person of the judge and highlights his authority through a ritualized perspicacity and prudence. The conscience of the judge - whose manifestation is expressed under the terms of intimate conviction and moral certainty respectively in the French and canonical legal systems and whose risk of arbitrariness is so commonly apprehended by the public - is a pledge of justice and truth as much as it is subject to the test of judicial ritual. If our contemporary society rebels to the idea of consciousness – seen as an outset to the exclusively moral and subjective sphere -, our investigation aims to demonstrate that the conscience of the judge as understood in the canonical and French legislation has a precise technical meaning, which cannot be locked in any normativity.