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It is argued that physical (and not inherently psychical) properties are insufficient to constitute all else. Specifically they cannot constitute an instance (K1) of our knowledge that the number of existing things is at least one. This employs a new version of entry by entailment: Every fact as to the presence of a constituted trope is entailed by facts about the presence of the ontologically basic, where a property is ontologically basic if and only if the fact of its presence is not entailed (even allowing exhaustive definitions of all tropes in terms of their ultimate constituents) by facts about the presence of things non-identical to it. Existence is a mind-independent presence. Things can be present (to mind) as opposed to existing but must be accompanied by the presence of all of their parts and of anything else that their presence might entail. This includes some existing thing in the case that knowledge that something exists is present, since it is analytic that knowledge cannot be of what is not the case. Purely dynamical properties cannot exist apart from instances of some other property kind (on pain of regress as to what moves). Material properties can make a difference to cognitive states only in virtue of differences they can make to dynamical properties. Thus, any cognitive state present in some dynamical and material scenario must be present in an equivalent purely dynamical scenario, which cannot exist. Hence: 1) There can be no knowledge of existence, or thus trope K1, in a purely dynamical scenario. 2) There can thus neither be a trope K1 if only dynamical and material properties (and what they constitute) are present. So because there is a trope K1, there are one or more ontologically basic properties which are not dynamical or material. It is further argued that nothing ontologically basic is per se (directly and non-obscurely) conceivable except as psychicality or a categorical basis of a disposition to change or constancy (respectively, dynamism and materiality). Thus at least one ontologically basic property is either psychical or not per se conceivable. The latter proposition has less merit.

The following thesis is concerned with the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind surrounding the nature of phenomenal consciousness (viz. subjective experience, or qualia). My primary aim is to adjudicate the ongoing dialectic between dualists and physicalists regarding the ontological status of phenomenal consciousness — physical or nonphysical — by examining the two major arguments most commonly deployed against physicalism: namely, the zombie argument (Chalmers), and the knowledge argument (Jackson). I conclude by showing that once physicalism has been shorn of the various doctrines that it need not and ought not accept — that is, once we are clear about what, precisely, the fundamental doctrine of physicalism actually is — it becomes clear that these arguments do not go through, and that the case for dualism has not been made. I also argue that the task of actually disarming these arguments (in the right way) is potentially critically instructive to contemporary physicalists, as this helps to nourish a clearer overall understanding of what physicalism (properly understood) is, and is not, committed to. In Chapter One I lay the groundwork for the aforementioned anti-physicalist arguments by explaining precisely what is meant by the phrase “phenomenal consciousness” and its various synonyms. I then briefly summarize the mind-body problem and articulate the so-called “explanatory gap” therein. Chapter Two looks at the zombie argument (as articulated by David Chalmers, 1996) and finds that the argument itself, as stated, actually has very little to do with defending dualism against physicalism, but rather is ultimately an argument for epiphenomenalism — which, I argue, is untenable. Chapter Three examines Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism (1982). Here I show why the argument itself fails to support property dualism, but also why the standard physicalist objections to it fail. I argue that Mary does indeed learn facts about the world upon her release, and that physicalists must face up to this squarely. I then suggest that physicalism (properly understood) is entirely compatible with this admission. Chapter Four examines a kind of rehabilitated version of the zombie argument in the context of a larger discussion about the relation between conceivability and possibility. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-18 13:18:41.928

Structuralist theories of properties state that properties are individuated by their nomological or causal roles. It has previously been suggested that structuralism is incompatible with robust conceptions of qualia. In this paper, I argue that structuralism should be taken as a theory of de re representation, and under this formulation it is able to accommodate qualia as intrinsic, introspectable properties of experiences. I then turn to various thought experiments used by qualia theorists to expand the notion of qualia, and find the majority of these compatible with structuralism as well. I conclude that the structuralists and qualia theorists need not be at odds with each other.

It is argued that physical (and not inherently psychical) properties are insufficient to constitute all else. Specifically they cannot constitute an instance (K1) of our knowledge that the number of existing things is at least one. This employs a new version of entry by entailment: Every fact as to the presence of a constituted trope is entailed by facts about the presence of the ontologically basic, where a property is ontologically basic if and only if the fact of its presence is not entailed (even allowing exhaustive definitions of all tropes in terms of their ultimate constituents) by facts about the presence of things non-identical to it. Existence is a mind-independent presence. Things can be present (to mind) as opposed to existing but must be accompanied by the presence of all of their parts and of anything else that their presence might entail. This includes some existing thing in the case that knowledge that something exists is present, since it is analytic that knowledge cannot be of what is not the case. Purely dynamical properties cannot exist apart from instances of some other property kind (on pain of regress as to what moves). Material properties can make a difference to cognitive states only in virtue of differences they can make to dynamical properties. Thus, any cognitive state present in some dynamical and material scenario must be present in an equivalent purely dynamical scenario, which cannot exist. Hence: 1) There can be no knowledge of existence, or thus trope K1, in a purely dynamical scenario. 2) There can thus neither be a trope K1 if only dynamical and material properties (and what they constitute) are present. So because there is a trope K1, there are one or more ontologically basic properties which are not dynamical or material. It is further argued that nothing ontologically basic is per se (directly and non-obscurely) conceivable except as psychicality or a categorical basis of a disposition to change or constancy (respectively, dynamism and materiality). Thus at least one ontologically basic property is either psychical or not per se conceivable. The latter proposition has less merit.

Submitted by Juciane Terezinha do Prado null (jucianepradowb@hotmail.com) on 2018-03-30T14:01:35Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Juciane.pdf: 769073 bytes, checksum: 13717d8c6b064a72684c453f7046260d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Satie Tagara (satie@marilia.unesp.br) on 2018-04-02T14:34:46Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 prado_jt_me_mar.pdf: 769073 bytes, checksum: 13717d8c6b064a72684c453f7046260d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-02T14:34:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 prado_jt_me_mar.pdf: 769073 bytes, checksum: 13717d8c6b064a72684c453f7046260d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-03 / Não recebi financiamento / Nesta Dissertação, abordamos a proposta do monismo dual (ou de duplo aspecto), sugerida por Thomas Nagel, para analisar os aspectos do mental como a consciência e os qualia. O estudo propõe analisar em que medida essas características mentais podem ser descritas de forma física, ou se, ao efetuar uma análise minunciosa dessas características, podemos concluir que elas não podem ser descritas da mesma forma que descrevemos eventos físicos. Para que possamos, então, as analisar, descrevemos, inicialmente, a abordagem dualista e em que medida ela contribui para nossa compreensão das características mentais como eventos não físicos. Analisamos, também seus problemas e dificuldades em se explicar a interação de processos mentais não físicos com o corpo físico. Em seguida, abordamos a concepção fisicalista, na qual, propomos descrever seus problemas e as razões pelas quais as características mentais não podem ser, simplesmente, explicadas ou mesmo descritas como processos físicos ordinários. No capítulo seguinte, descrevemos a perspectiva de Nagel, sobre a proposta do monismo de duplo aspecto, no qual o autor propõe duas perspectivas epistemológicas sobre a mente consciente, as perspectivas de primeira pessoa, restrita ao próprio ser consciente, e a perspectiva de terceira pessoa, correspondendo ao modo de abordagem típico das ciências empíricas. Nesta abordagem, as qualidades subjetivas (qualia) se restringem à perspectiva de primeira pessoa. Portanto, o monismo de duplo aspecto em Nagel pode ser caracterizado como sendo ontologicamente monista (trata-se de um só ser consciente) e epistemologicamente dualista (este ser é apreendido por si mesmo na perspectiva de primeira pessoa, e abordado cientificamente na perspectiva da terceira pessoa). / We approach the proposal of dual-aspect monism by Thomas Nagel to analyze the conscious mind and related concepts as qualia. To what extent these mental characteristics can be described in a physical way, or, by performing a thorough analysis of these characteristics, should we conclude that they cannot be described in the same way that we describe physical events? We first describe the dualistic approach and to what extent it contributes to our understanding of the mental characteristics as non-physical events. We also analyze the problems and difficulties in explaining the interaction of non-physical mental processes with the physical body. Then we approach the physicalist conception and propose to describe its problems and the reasons why the mental characteristics cannot be simply explained or even described as ordinary physical processes. In the following chapter, we describe Nagel's perspective on the proposition of dual-aspect monism, in which the author proposes two epistemological perspectives on the conscious mind, the first person perspective, restricted to the conscious being itself, and the third person perspective, corresponding to the typical approach of the empirical sciences. In his view, subjective qualities (qualia) are restricted to the first-person perspective. Therefore, dual-aspect monism in Nagel can be characterized as being ontologically monistic (we are one being, body and mind) and epistemologically dualistic (this being is apprehended by herself in the first-person perspective, and approached scientifically from the third person perspective).

Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very influential piece of reasoning that seeks to show that colour experiences constitute an insoluble problem for science. This argument is based on a thought experiment concerning Mary. She is a vision scientist who has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision but has never had colour experiences. According to Jackson, upon seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires new knowledge that escapes her complete scientific knowledge. He concludes that there are facts concerning colour experiences that scientific knowledge can neither describe nor explain. Specifically, these facts involve the occurrence of certain non-physical properties of experiences that he calls qualia. The present research considers whether a plausible formulation of the hypothesis that science can accommodate colour experiences is threatened by a version of the knowledge argument. The specific formulation of this problem has two motivations. Firstly, before investigating whether the knowledge argument raises a problem for the claim that science can account for colour experiences, we need a plausible formulation of this claim. I argue that the idea that science can accommodate colour experiences can be formulated as the modest reductionism hypothesis. Roughly speaking, this is the hypothesis that a science that can be explanatory interfaced with current physics of ordinary matter can account for conscious experiences. Secondly, an unintelligible premise figures in Jackson’s version the knowledge argument. Namely, it is assumed that Mary possesses a complete (future or possible) scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, the type of strategy involved in Jackson’s argument can be used to target modest reductionism. By considering contemporary psychophysics and neuroscience, I characterise Mary’s scientific knowledge. First, this characterisation is intelligible. In fact, it is elaborated on the basis of descriptions and explanations of colour experiences involved in current physics and neuroscience. Second, a supporter of modest reductionism can assume that the scientific knowledge ascribed to Mary might account for colour experiences. The main conclusion of the present research is that our version of the knowledge argument fails to threaten the modest reductionism hypothesis. In fact, I endorse what can be called the “two ways of thinking” reply to the knowledge argument. According to this response, the knowledge argument shows that there are different ways of thinking about colour experiences. One way of thinking is provided by scientific knowledge. The other way of thinking is provided by our ordinary conception of colour experiences. However, the existence of these two ways of thinking does not imply the existence of facts and properties that escape scientific knowledge. It might be the case that the ordinary way of thinking about colour experience concerns facts and properties described and explained by science. The principal conclusion of the research results from two investigations. The first line of research aims to reveal and evaluate the implicit assumptions that figure in the knowledge argument. The main body of the research is dedicated to this task. The principal result of this investigation is that the knowledge argument must rely on an account of introspective knowledge of colour experiences. I argue that an inferential model of introspection provides such account. On this model, Mary’s capacity to hold beliefs about her colour experiences when she sees coloured objects requires her mastery of colour concepts. The second main investigation seeks to justify the two ways of thinking strategy. As many opponents and supporters have recently started to realise, this strategy might be charged with being ad hoc. I offer a distinctive justification of this reply to the knowledge argument. Assuming the account of introspection mentioned above, the existence of visual recognitional colour concepts might justify this strategy. A person possesses these concepts when she is able to determine the colours of objects simply by having visual experiences.

Réduit à sa plus simple expression, ce travail de recherche met face à face deux acteurs s’affrontant dans un duel philosophique : le physicalisme et l’argument de la connaissance de Franck Jackson. La question clé autour de laquelle s’agencera notre discussion ici est (1) Est-il vrai que « Tout est physique » ? Le coeur de la thèse que nous défendons peut être résumé ainsi : (T) Le clivage post-platonicien (tacite) entre les formes objectivées et les formes subjectivées de la pensée, provoque des fossés explicatifs (explicites), qui sont franchis (très souvent) via des sauts conceptuels (mystérieux), intercalés entre les étapes d’une argumentation. Il sera argumenté ici que la distribution actuelle des débats sur l’axe états physiques (objectifs) / états qualitatifs (subjectifs) subit une pression souterraine post-platonicienne. Conséquemment, une bonne partie de l’énergie des penseurs actuels est dépensée à la recherche du « bon saut » ou « crochet » conceptuel permettant d’attacher les rives du mental à celui du physique. Nous soutiendrons que le coeur du problème ne consiste pas à résoudre le différend entre les physicalistes et les avocats des qualia, mais plutôt à trouver la réponse à la question : pourquoi en sommes-nous arrivés là, i.e., à ce clivage sur l’axe phénoménal/physique ? / “Everything is physical” physicalists claim. “Everything except qualia” reply the defenders of the Knowledge Argument. This thesis argues that both parties to this debate are committed to a traditional picture according to which one can tacitly adopt the standpoint of an off-stage narrator, capable of distinguishing ab initio between the different items in this conceptual scenario. The main claim here is that every time we artificially introduce a sharp conceptual distinction separating these two items or levels (mental and physical), we must automatically make a sophisticated conceptual leap in order to link the first-person qualitative perspective with the external physical world. Thus the physicalism/qualia dispute is only a by-product of an extended theoretical conception of the mind/world link which entails two distinct kinds of problems: (i) structural problems (to define and determine conceptually dual items like thought/matter, reason/senses, subject/object, etc.). Such problems require us to question “how are these items supposed to work together?” and this leads us to the second group of problems: (ii) mediation problems. The first group of problems inevitably leads to explanatory gaps; the second ends up needing to appeal to conceptual leaps in order to ensure the necessary link between two separate items. This exerts a powerful influence over the cast of our thoughts: seen from this angle, all philosophical enterprise comes down to the question of where to place the three following parameters: the world as it is, the conceptual picture which aims to represent the world as it is and the theorist-painter gifted with the ability to capture the world picture as it is. We also face the problem of finding the right mediators to assure coherence among the members of this trio, and the problem of setting the valid criteria guaranteeing the theorist-painter that what is captured on his conceptual canvas does indeed correspond to the world as it is, i.e. that he is not laboring under the delusions of an evil genie. In this thesis I argue against this way of putting things.

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-23T19:17:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-daniel-borgoni-goncalves.pdf: 697101 bytes, checksum: 026a5001500a1058e5d33f955936424a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-23T19:18:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-daniel-borgoni-goncalves.pdf: 697101 bytes, checksum: 026a5001500a1058e5d33f955936424a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-23T19:18:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-daniel-borgoni-goncalves.pdf: 697101 bytes, checksum: 026a5001500a1058e5d33f955936424a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A experiência consciente é uma das coisas das quais estamos mais certos no mundo, mas ela é um grande mistério. Não temos uma teoria amplamente aceita que justifique racionalmente de que modo um sistema físico como o cérebro pode experienciar (um sabor, a felicidade, a dor, etc), e que esclareça qual a natureza das experiências conscientes. De forma mais clara, experiências conscientes têm uma fenomenologia, isto é, características qualitativas distintas que são apreendidas subjetivamente. Tais propriedades são os qualia e foram associados à consciência fenomênica, pois estes são acessíveis pela consciência do organismo que experiencia. Entretanto, não sabemos como conciliar a experiência consciente com o que sabemos, na medida em que suas propriedades parecem ser essencialmente subjetivas e, portanto, inescrutáveis e indescritíveis sob um ponto de vista de terceira pessoa. Como então conciliar a objetividade de nossas explicações com a subjetividade da consciência? Inúmeros filósofos e filósofas da mente defendem que os qualia são propriedades nãofísicas, adotando um dualismo entre corpo e mente. Neste intricando e complexo debate entre materialistas e antimaterialistas, os últimos costumam elaborar argumentos que desafiam os primeiros. Assim, o capítulo 1 é dedicado ao amplamente debatido argumento do conhecimento de Frank Jackson. Após a apresentação deste argumento, o submeteremos a uma série de objeções que tentam derrubar a sua conclusão antimaterialista. Então, trataremos das respostas que foram oferecidas às objeções. Por fim, ponderaremos as objeções e as respostas fazendo um balanço deste debate. O capítulo 2 é dedicado ao controverso argumento dos zumbis de David Chalmers. Trataremos inicialmente de algumas noções teóricas necessárias para o compreendermos e, então, o apresentaremos. Após isso, o submeteremos a várias objeções que tentam bloquear a sua conclusão antimaterialista e trataremos das respostas às objeções. Então, faremos um balanço das objeções que lhe foram opostas. Em nossas considerações finais sobre a discussão envolvida nos capítulos 1 e 2, será feita uma avaliação global deste debate entre materialistas e antimaterialistas indicando qual o lado tem melhores argumentos. / Conscious experience is one of things that we are more certain in the world, but it is a great mystery. We do not have a broadly accepted theory that rationality justifies how a physical system like a brain can experience (a taste, happiness, pain, etc) and clarify what is the nature of conscious experiences. More clearly, conscious experiences have a phenomenology, that is, distinct qualitative features that are subjectively apprehended. These properties are qualia and they were associated to phenomenal consciousness, because qualia are accessible for the consciousness of the organism that has the experience. However we do not know how to reconcile the conscious experience with our knowledge, insofar as their properties seem to be essentially subjective and inscrutable and indescribable under a third person point of view thus. How reconcile the objectivity of our explanations with the consciousness subjectivity? Several philosophers of mind defend which qualia are non-physical properties, adopting a mind-body dualism. In this puzzling and complex debate among materialists and anti-materialists, it is common the latter make arguments that challenge the formers. Thereby the chapter 1 is dedicated to broadly debated Frank Jackson´s knowledge argument. After the presentation of knowledge argument, I will submit it to several objections that try overthrow its antimaterialist conclusion. Then I will deal with the responses that were provided to these objections. Finally I will ponder objections and responses making a balance of this debate. The chapter 2 is dedicated to controversial David Chalmer´s zombie argument. Initially I will deal with some necessary theoretical notions to we grasp it and then I will present the zombie argument. Thereafter I will submit it to several objections which try overthrow its anti-materialist conclusion and I will deal with the responses to these objections. Then I will make a balance about the objections against zombie argument. In our final considerations about the discussion engaged on chapters 1 and 2, will be make a global evaluation about this debate among materialists and anti-materialists indicating what side have better arguments.

<p>Svest je u poslednje tri decenije postala predmetom multidisciplinarnih studija svesti (consciousness studies), &scaron;to je aktualizovalo značaj konceptualne analize pojma svesti i problema koji se javljaju u različitim istraţivačkim pristupima svesti. Da li različite discipline (pa čak i različiti pristupi u okviru iste discipline) govore uop&scaron;te o istom predmetu? Na &scaron;ta se, na primer, odnose savremene neurolo&scaron;ke teorije svesti, kakav teorijski status ima koncept svesti u okviru funkcionalnih dijagrama kognitivne psihologije, o čemu govore psihoterapeuti kada nagla&scaron;avaju značaj svesnosti u psihoterapijskom procesu ili značaj osve&scaron;ćivanja nesvesnog, &scaron;ta imaju u vidu fenomenolozi ili praktičari kontemplativnih tradicija kada se bave neposrednim iskustvom i na kraju, &scaron;ta pod sve&scaron;ću podrazumevaju različite ontolo&scaron;ke pozicije o odnosu duha i tela? Konceptualna analiza koja je sprovedena u ovom radu ima za cilj pobolj&scaron;anje komunikacije izmeĎu disciplina i lokalizaciju te&scaron;koća koje stoje na putu interdisciplinarnim istraţivačkim projektima.<br />Analitička filozofija duha (philosophy of mind) je u poslednje četiri decenije izo&scaron;trila i locirala problematiku svesti, te razvila novi konceptualni aparat i misaone eksperimente koji omogućavaju preciznije razumevanje ograničenja u poku&scaron;aju prirodnonaučne rekonstukcije pojma duha (mind), kakvu su poslednjih decenija, inače sa velikim uspehom, preduzele tzv. mind sciences (poput kognitivne psihologije, ve&scaron;tačke inteligencije, lingvistike, neuronauke) . U radu autorka pokazuje kako različiti savremeni filozofi ukazuju na distinkcije dva lica svesti i duha &ndash; Dţekendofovo razlikovanje računarskog duha (computational mind) i fenomenolo&scaron;kog duha (phenomenological mind), Blokovo razlikovanje A-svesti (access consciousness) i P-svesti (phenomenal consciousness) i Čalmersovo razlikovanje &bdquo;lakog&ldquo; i &bdquo;te&scaron;kog&ldquo; problema svesti. Dok se, na primer, A-svest, odnosi na svest u smislu pristupačnosti, odnosno dostupnosti odreĎenog sadrţaja (mentalne reprezentacije) u kontroli govora, rezonovanja i akcije, P-svest (fenomenalna svest) odnosi se na činjenicu da svesna mentalna stanja poseduju doţivljajne, kvalitativne odlike, koje su dostupne direktno jedino iz subjektivne perspektive prvog lica. Za ovaj aspekat svesti je filozofija duha uvela tehnički termin qualia (lat. sing. quale) i on čini svest drugačijom od ostalih predmeta istraţivanja u dominantnoj objektivističkoj naučnoj paradigmi.<br />U radu autorka diskutuje problem ontolo&scaron;kog statusa qualia, kao problem u formulaciji materijalističkih teorija duha (teza o identitetu, funkcionalističke i reprezentacionalističke teorije), kao i epistemolo&scaron;ke probleme qualia &ndash; problem spoznajno privilegovanog poloţaja, argument nepotpunog znanja (Dţekson) i problem eksplanatornog jaza (Levajn) i njihove reperkusije za filozofiju nauke &ndash; problem odnosa metodologije prvog i trećeg lica, razumevanja i obja&scaron;njenja, duhovnonaučnog i prirodnonaučnog pristupa čoveku. Iz ovog ugla je u novom svetlu sagledano istorijsko smenjivanje paradigmi u glavnim tokovima akademske psihologije.<br />Sve dosada&scaron;nje strategije eliminacije fenomenalne svesti iz psiholo&scaron;kog i filozofskog diskursa vode produbljavanju jaza izmeĎu sveta iskustva (Lebenswelt, Huserl) i prirodnonaučne slike sveta izgraĎene primenom objektivne metodologije. Psihoterapija je, naprotiv, disciplina koja predstavlja jednu od najvaţnijih spona izmeĎu disciplinovanog pristupa subjektivnom iskustvu i objektivnih naučnih činjenica. Zato je paţnja posvećena savremenom konstitusanju psihoterapije kao naučne discipline, kao i njenom pozicioniranju u odnosu na prirodnonaučnu i duhovnonaučnu paradigmu od osnivanja (Frojdovog osciliranja izmeĎu naklonosti prirodnonaučnom modelu i hermeneutičke prakse), preko niza novina i &bdquo;dekonstrukcija&ldquo; prvobitnog modela kroz njenu istoriju, do savremenog trenda &ndash; neuropsihoterapije, koja poslednjih deset godina uvodi nova saznanja neuronauke u sagledavanje psihoterapijskog procesa i unapreĎenje postupaka. Analizirani su značaj i uloga koju različiti psihoterapijski pravci (klasična psihoanaliza, BT, KBT, uključujući i nove mindfulness pristupe, egzistencijalistički, humanistički i konstruktivistički pravci) pridaju svesti, svesnosti i osve&scaron;ćivanju, te koje značenje ovi pojmovi imaju u svetlu distinkcija na koje je ukazala analiza filozofije duha &ndash; reprezentaciono tj. funkcionalno-kauzalno i fenomenalno. Pokazano je i kako se epistemolo&scaron;ki problemi svesti koji su ranije opisani pojavljuju i re&scaron;avaju u psihoterapiji kao praktičnoj disciplini.<br />Integracija fenomenalne svesti u sliku duha, te povezivanje prirodnonaučnih disciplina i disciplina koje se bave iskustvom i subjektivno&scaron;ču mora da poĎe dalje od konceptualno-logičke analize na kojoj ostaje filozofija duha. Prvi korak na tom putu je razvoj metodologije prvog lica, koja omogućava opis mentalnih procesa i sadrţaja onako kako se oni manifestuju iz ugla svesnog subjekta. Stoga je najpre prikazano &scaron;est metoda prvog lica poreklom iz introspektivne psihologije, fenomenolo&scaron;ke filozofije i budističke kontemplativne tradicije, a zatim sprovedena tematska kvalitativna analiza ovih metoda. Postupkom otvorenog kodiranja izdvojeno je deset dimenzija po kojima su uporeĎivane metode. Ovo eksplorativno istraţivanje omogućilo je precizniji uvid u meĎusobne srodnosti i razlike analiziranih metoda, u njihove moći i slabosti, te strategije unapreĎenja, kao i u mogućnosti saradnje sa metodama trećeg lica. Pokazali smo takoĎe da &bdquo;pogled iznutra&ldquo; moţe da otkrije vaţne odlike svesti i duha koji ostaju netransparentni objektivnim metodama.</p> / <p>Consciousness has become the subject of multidisciplinary consciousness studies in last three decades which revived the importance of conceptual analysis of the concept of consciousness and problems that occur in a variety of research approaches to consciousness. Do different disciplines (and even different approaches within the same discipline) speak about the same subject at all? What are modern neurological theories of consciousness related to, for example, what is the theoretical status of the concept of consciousness within functional diagrams of cognitive psychology, what do psychotherapists talk about when they highlight importance of awareness in a psychotherapeutic process and importance of becoming aware of the unconscious, what do phenomenologists or practitioners of contemplative traditions have in mind when dealing with direct experience and, in the end, what do different ontological positions imply with the notion of consciousness in the relationship between mind and body? Conceptual analysis conducted in this paper aims to improve communication between disciplines and localize difficulties that stand in the way of interdisciplinary research projects.<br />Analytic philosophy of mind has sharpened and located the problem of consciousness in last four decades, and has also developed a new conceptual apparatus and thought experiments that enable more accurate understanding of limits in an attempt of a natural science reconstruction of the concept of mind, which in recent decades, usually with large success, have been undertaken by so-called mind sciences (such as cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience). In this thesis, the author shows how different contemporary philosophers suggest distinctions of two faces of consciousness and mind &ndash; Jackendoff&rsquo;s distinction between computational mind and phenomenological mind, Block&rsquo;s differentiation of A-consciousness (access consciousness) and P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) and Chalmers&rsquo; distinction between &quot;easy&quot; and &quot;hard&quot; problems of consciousness. While, for example, A-consciousness, refers to consciousness in terms of accessibility and availability of specific content (mental representations) in the control of speech, reasoning and actions, P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) refers to the fact that conscious mental states possess experiential, qualitative characteristics, which are directly available only from the subjective perspective of the first person. Philosophy of mind introduced a technical term qualia (lat. sing. quale) for this aspect of consciousness, and it makes consciousness different from other subjects of research in the dominant objectivist scientific paradigm.<br />In this thesis, the author discusses the problem of the ontological status of qualia, as a problem in the formulation of the materialistic mind theories (the thesis of identity, functionalist and representational theories), as well as epistemological problems of qualia - the problem of privileged access, the argument of incomplete knowledge (Jackson) and the problem of the explanatory gap (Levine) and their repercussions on philosophy of science - the problem of the relationship between first and third-person methodologies, understanding and explanation, a human science and a natural science approach to man. The historical succession of paradigms in the mainstream academic psychology has been viewed from this angle.<br />All previous strategies of eliminating phenomenal consciousness from psychological and philosophical discourse lead to deepening of the gap between the world of experience (Lebenswelt, Husserl) and the natural science picture of the world constructed by using an objective methodology. Psychotherapy, on the contrary, is a discipline that is one of the most important links between a disciplined approach to subjective experience and objective scientific facts. That is why attention has been paid to the contemporary constitution of psychotherapy as a scientific discipline, as well as its positioning in relation to a natural science and a human science paradigm since its establishment (Freudian oscillating between the affection to natural scientific model and hermeneutical practice), through a number of novelties and &quot;deconstructions&quot; of the original model through its history, to the modern trend &ndash; neuropsychotherapy which has introduced new findings of neuroscience in understanding psychotherapeutic processes and improvement of procedures in last ten years. We analyzed the importance and the role that different psychotherapeutic views (classical psychoanalysis, BT, CBT, including new mindfulness approaches, existentialist, humanistic and constructivist views) attach to consciousness, awareness, and raising awareness, as well as the meanings of these terms in the light of distinctions identified by the analysis of philosophy of mind - that is, representational, functional-causal, and phenomenal. It was shown how the epistemological problems of consciousness described above occur and get resolved in psychotherapy as a practical discipline.<br />Integration of phenomenal consciousness into an image of the mind, and connection of natural science disciplines and disciplines which deal with experience and subjectivity has to go beyond a conceptual and logical analysis on which philosophy of mind remains. The first step on this road is development of a first-person methodology, which allows a description of mental processes and content as they are manifested from a perspective of a conscious subject. Therefore, the first things presented were six first-person methods originating from introspective psychology, phenomenological philosophy and Buddhist contemplative tradition, and then, a qualitative thematic analysis of the six methods was conducted. The process of open coding singled out ten dimensions by which methods were compared. This exploratory research has allowed for a more precise insight into mutual similarities and differences of the analyzed methods, into their powers and weaknesses, improvement strategies, as well as opportunities for cooperation with third-person methods. It has shown also that &ldquo;a view from within&quot; can reveal important features of consciousness and mind that remain non-transparent to objective methods.</p>