This thesis explores how economic performance, measured as real GDP-growth per capita, affects the vote share of parties which relies on radical ideological platforms. Using a fixed effect model with panel data, based on real electoral outcomes of 18 western European democracies, the result reveals an ambiguous reality. The overall conclusion implies that low growth rates benefit the electoral success of radical-right parties and holds for robustness checks. No solid evidence of the relationship is found on the radical-left side.The result further reveals that the individuals decision to vote radical is relative more affected by the ongoing business cycle trend between the elections rather than sudden changes close to the election day. The relationship also appears to be stronger among nations of southern Europe.

In 2018, the Sweden Democrats party has gained 17.5 per cent of the votes during the Swedish general elections. Consequently, with this success, they became the third largest party in the riksdag. However, the party’s rapid growth has created several questions in the political arena and the Swedish society about the party’s ideological affiliations and evolutions. The political scientists, Mudde (2010) and Widfeldt (2008) argue that in order to understand a party’s improvements, it is important to explore a party’s ideological evolution. Scholars have argued that Sweden Democrats have normalized their ideas and values; adopted liberal values in some policy areas in order to attract a large number of voters, succeed and survive in the political system. The aim of this study is to explore the party’s idea/ideology changes since its creation in 1988 until present 2019. Hence, the main purpose is to find out if the core ideologies of the Sweden Democrats - that is nativism, authoritarianism and populism- as expressed in their party programs respectively electoral manifestos, are characterized by continuity or by normalization, and adaptation to liberal values. Using Marie Demker’s (1993) concept of ideology, ideal types for radical right populism and liberalism have been constructed as analytical tool. The study shows that throughout the years, the party’s nativist world view and strategy have been changed and normalized, the authoritarian world view has mainly been constant but the strategy has had major changes; shifted to liberal values, and finally regarding populism; both world view and strategy are characterized by continuity.

This diploma thesis examines the suitability of generalization of the populist radical right parties (PRRP). In recent years, these parties have succeeded on the political scene of many European countries. Using the example of "new" Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD) political party and the established Danish People's Party (DF) it shows the differences in the party pre-election rhetoric and program, which are brought about by parties' age as well as by different historical developments in the respective countries. The historical context has affected contemporary political environment and, therefore, there are reasonable doubts about the generalization of the PRRPs. This is especially the case of post-communist countries, which, after years of oppression, had to go through a process of transformation that involved not only economic issues. This thesis is based on the Lipset's and Rokkan's cleavages theory, while it tries to confirm its existence in the given states, namely the economical, the religious, the center - periphery and the urban - rural cleavage. The inclusion of six tested factors in the analysis helps to do this. The multiple linear regression analysis tested which factors (the factors are socio-cultural, socio-economic, and demographic factors) have a statistically significant...

In the last decade, we have witnessed a new stage in the mainstreaming and normalization pro­cess of populist radical right policies and ideas in the Western world. This has resulted in in­creasing politicization of issues related to immigration. In Sweden, this politicization took off when the radical right-wing populist (RRP) party the Sweden Democrats (SD) was voted into the parliament in 2010. Even though the party was isolated by the mainstream parties, its presence in the parliament still contributed to the politi­cization for a long time. Additionally, increased “gang”-related shootings have pushed the po­liticization even further since the shootings in the public and political discourse have often been connected to immigration. Apart from this, certain mainstream right-wing parties, especially the Moderates (M) and the Christian Democrats (KD), have questioned the isolation of SD lately, which led to the presentation of a collaboration between the three parties in the fall of 2021. With this collaboration as a background, the aim of this study is to show the particular roles M and KD play in the process of mainstreaming and normalization of the RRP discourse, espe­cially related to immigration and its alleged connection to criminality. The study draws on crit­ical discourse analysis of political and public discourse in the context of RRP to analyze how M, KD, and SD construct themes and arguments around immigration, immigrants, and crimi­nality on their official Facebook pages. The study argues that there is an ongoing process of normalization of RRP policy and ideas in Swedish public and political discourse. Largely, SD is the strategical enacting actor in this pro­cess. How­ever, both M and KD take part in the process by contributing to gradually changing the existing discourse on immigration towards new forms and new norms. This is conducted by employing strategies, concepts, and rhetoric well-known from RRP discourse.

Do Populist Radical Right Parties have an impact on the attitudes of other parties? Despite drawing much attention from the general public as well as academics, there is no clear answer to this conundrum. In this paper I examine how mainstream political parties change their positions in parliamentary debates on immigration and refugees after Populist Radical Right Parties enter parliament. In order to do this, I use theoretical concepts such as discourse coalitions and storylines in combination with network methodology to map out how parties in the Swedish parliament relate to one another through their attitudes towards key themes in the debate on immigration and refugees. This paper focuses on the relations between parties through language by applying Discourse Network Analysis on parliamentary debates. Thus, it contributes with a new relational aspect and methodological tool on a relatively underutilised material. The findings indicate that there is a change in other parties’ attitudes towards immigration and refugees, with two mainstream right parties moving closer to the Populist Radical Right Party. However, the datatype does not support causal language and the findings are limited due to small amounts of data.

The rise of right-wing populism has been identified as a major threat to multilateralism, and its negative consequences for climate policy have already materialised. However, its impacts on environmental policy have been less studied, especially so regarding policy outcomes. In this paper, I strive to narrow this research gap by investigating the impacts of right-wing populism on environmental protection expenditure. I employ a panel regression analysis to examine populist government participation in all European Union member states, and I also separate countries that have experienced a right-wing populist government to explore differences across the party family. The results show no profound effects, which is anticipated. Environmental concerns are more easily conveyed within the right-wing populist logic than climate change mitigation measures, and many European PRRPs express pro-environmental policy stances - they are so-called green patriotists. Based on previous studies, I expand on this concept. Finally, the results indicate green patriotism might be influential for policy outcomes, which is another contribution of this paper to the research field.

Literature on climate policy of political parties’ points to an emerging congruence between populist radical right parties and scepticism toward climate change and climate policy. This thesis explores this nexus via a case study of the Sweden Democrats (SD) climate policy over a period of twelve years (2010-2022). It examines if the Sweden Democrats have expressed variations of climate scepticism and whether this has varied over time. Idea analysis and a taxonomy of three categories of climate scepticism are used for analysing official policy material of the Sweden Democrats. This thesis finds that the Sweden Democrats have outcomes on all three categories of climate scepticism: evidence (i.e., whether human caused climate change is happening), process (related to bureaucratic and scientific processes, e.g., scepticism against dominant research paradigms and bureaucratic decision making), and response scepticism (related to policy choices dealing with climate change). Over time there has been a gradual migration of scepticism from evidence and process related scepticism toward more policy-oriented forms of scepticism that concerns type of policy and attitudinal responses to climate change. Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is primarily anchored in arguments related to desired levels of national response and issues of trade/offs, with climate scepticism frequently constructed through frameworks of the potential harm that climate mitigation may do to national sovereignty, national economy, and industries. Another finding is that the Sweden Democrats overall have a lower salience and prioritization of climate issues compared to other parties represented in parliament whose climate policy they criticize, presenting their climate policy as alternative to these parties. This thesis concludes that the Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is closer to an unconvinced stance toward climate change rather than strictly denialistic, with evidentiary sceptic arguments over time becoming less frequent and decreasing in the degree of scepticism.

This thesis deals with differences in the level of satisfaction with democracy between populists and non-populists in eleven Western European countries the past twenty years, with the common denominator that they all have experienced the electoral success of a populist radical-right party and a population increasingly expressing distrust and dissatisfaction with democracy. The thesis is based on a definition of populism in which it is regarded as a threat to democracy, and moreover, the thesis explores whether there are any significant differences in the level of satisfaction with democracy and whether these differences changes as time passes between these two voter groups.  The results of the analysis, which is carried out quantitively, strengthens the theoretical expectations, proving that there is a significant negative correlation between being populist and level of satisfaction with democracy, and that the effect becomes stronger as time passes. The results also align with the perception that societal changes such as modernization and globalization has contributed to the growth of new voter groups who express their dissatisfaction with democracy by opposing the establishment, thus turning to the political alternatives.

Populism is a phenomenon that impacts not only nation-states and their institutions but also the institutions of international-supranational organizations. This is the case of the European Union, where populist radical right parties (PRRPs) – the most predominant type of populism in Europe – reached the Parliament in 1984, consolidated in 2014, and have since then participated in the debates about the European legislation. Such participation has been mainly framed by the current functioning of the European Parliament (EP), which grants greater importance to alliances instead of individual Members of the Parliament, thereby, PRRPs cooperated among themselves in three groups: the European Conservatives and Reformists, the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, and the Europe of Nations and Freedom.  Particularly in migration, a key area of interest of these parties because of their nativist and authoritarian characteristics, these alliances have specific positions and therefore, have promoted different strategies aimed at increasing the powers of member states by diminishing European integration, strengthening the EU external borders, and preventing the arrival of new immigrants, especially the illegal ones. This was particularly reinforced in the 8th parliamentary period that lasted from 2014 to 2019, which also coincided with the 2015 refugee crisis. In this context, the EP adopted and implanted various legislation to cope with the crisis, including the European Border and Coast Guard, the European travel document for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals, the Entry/Exit System, the European Travel Information and Authorization System, and the reinforcement of the mandate of the EU-LISA agency.  In 30.905 words, this research aims at understanding whether PRRPs’ characteristics and positions have influenced the EU immigration legislation, measured by how successful have been the two common strategies they undertake to do so: influencing the voters’ attitudes and opinions and obstructing parliamentary proceedings. Data shows that these groups still have a minority in the Parliament, do not vote together as a bloc, some of them do not actively participate in parliamentary work, and therefore, have limited power to impact the legislation as they can only do it indirectly by shaping the behavior of their electoral force.

The Nordic countries are geographically, culturally and politically close, and have all witnessed an upsurge in support for radical right-wing parties over the past decades. Although the five parties: the Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party, the Icelandic Progressive Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Sweden Democrats, are different when it comes to party history and how accepted they have been by other parties, they are today similar in their anti-immigration rhetoric, their critique of the established elites and to some extent their welfare chauvinism. According to theories on radical right-wing parties and environmental attitudes, caring for nature and the environment would make a person less probable to vote for a radical right-wing party. Using data from the European Social Survey, the relationship between environmental attitudes and radical right-wing support is examined. The initial results support this thesis, but when adding control variables the relationship is no longer significant. However, when looking at the countries separately, it shows that the relationship between environmental values and radical right-wing voting varies across the Nordic countries. Here, Norway stands out as the country with the strongest negative relationship between environmental values and support for radical right-wing parties.