The aim of this study is to quantify the extent to which political correctness, understood as an implicit social convention of restraint on public expression, operates within a community. Due to a scarcity of prior experimental research in the area, a new method was developed for the purpose of the study. Using random selection, the treatment consists of exposing groups averaging 10 individuals to a survey on diversity and immigration matters. The effect is measured as the discrepancy in attitudes that is revealed between anonymous and non-anonymous responses to the treatment survey. Control groups are similarly exposed to a survey on traditional left-right matters. The discrepancies are then compared. The results are controlled for possible influence by factors including group size, sex ratio, and length of study. The general effect of the treatment is not statistically significant, possibly as a result of small sample size. Further analysis shows a significant positive correlation between the proportion of women and the extent of attitude discrepancy. On one interpretation, this means that women in the population are on average more responsive to political correctness than men. Due to the population’s skewed characteristics, the results are not generalised. Future researchers in the area are advised to draw their sample from a more representative population, to investigate additional subject matters and to collect more sophisticated data, in particular on the level of the individual.

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-04-06T17:17:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Gustavo André Olsson.pdf: 1799854 bytes, checksum: 0a833923268b119a275b33522e2bfaa7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-06T17:17:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gustavo André Olsson.pdf: 1799854 bytes, checksum: 0a833923268b119a275b33522e2bfaa7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-25 / CNPQ – Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Este trabalho investiga a pretensão da Análise Econômica do Direito Penal em contribuir na maneira pela qual o Direito se relaciona com a sociedade contemporânea. Aquela se sustenta na utilização de instrumentos de análise da Ciência Econômica a respeito do comportamento dos seres humanos em sociedade. Investiga o efeito dos incentivos (em um sentido amplo), mensurando as respostas dos "agentes racionais" (mesmo com racionalidade limitada). Nesse contexto, a intenção das análises econômicas consiste em complexificar a perspectiva jurídica a respeito do comportamento humano, no sentido de encontrar melhor responsividade social em relação ao ordenamento jurídico, sobretudo fazendo uso de pesquisas empíricas. Assim, partindo de uma reconstrução da Análise Econômica do Direito Penal, desde o texto seminal de Gary Becker (1968), a pesquisa discute os avanços internos daquela perspectiva, assim como os aportes provenientes da Economia Comportamental. Esse enfoque é assumido em razão de, por si só, a Economia Comportamental (da mesma maneira que as análises empíricas) ser capaz de auxiliar na construção/evolução da dogmática do Direito. Por fim, investiga-se, com fundamentação da Teoria dos Sistemas, a possibilidade de acomplamentos entre os aportes da Ciência Econômica (como comunicação do Sistema da Ciência ou da Economia) em relação ao Sistema do Direito, especialmente considerando as dificuldades de racionalidades consequencialistas, como as propostas ligadas ao agente racional (que reage aos incentivos - ainda que limitadamente, com viéses e com heurísticas de decisão). O resultado considera a possibilidade de ganhos para o Direito, especialmente na maneira de como as normas jurídicas podem ser planejadas e terem sua eficiência e efetividade mensuradas; de outro lado, sugere-se atenção às pesquisas (e a realização de novas) a respeito da percepção e da responsividade dos destinatários das normas jurídicas. Da mesma forma, verificou-se dificuldades para que o Direito alcance objetivos sociais diante da contingência e dos riscos nas sociedades contemporâneas, segundo a perspectiva da Teoria dos Sistemas Sociais. / This research studies the role of the Economic Analysis of Criminal Law in order to verify how it might contributes with the Law in contemporary society. Economic analysis is based on the use of analytical tools of Economic Science with the aim to investigate the way in which humans beings behave in society. Actually, it investigates the effect of incentives (in a broad sense) in human behavior. In this context, the intention of the Law and Economics analysis is to complexify the legal perspective regarding human behavior to find better social responsiveness, in relation to changes in the legal system. Thus, based on a reconstruction of the Economic Analysis of Criminal Law, from the Gary Becker’s seminal text (1968), this research discusses the internal progress of that perspective, and especially the criticism added on it from Behavioral Economics. This approach was chosen because Behavioral Economics, by itself, could be able to assist in the construction of the dogmatic view of Law. Finally, it was investigate, based on System Theory, the theoretical relationship between the contributions of Economic Science (as communications of System Science or Economics) in relation to the System of Law, especially considering the difficulties of “consequentialist rationalities”, as related to the “rational agent” (that reacts to incentives, even with bounded rationality, biases and heuristics of decision). The result suggests the possibility of gains for the Law, especially in the way of how legal rules can be planned and might have measured their efficiency and effectiveness, considering the way of how recipients perceive (and react) to rules changing. In the same perspective, it might be difficult to Law reach social goals in a social contingent and risky society, from the perspective of the Theory of Social Systems.

Les logiques multivalentes sont définies comme une famille de logiques non classiques dont la caractéristique commune est de ne pas restreindre les valeurs de vérité aux seuls « vrai » et « faux ». À cet égard, Kleene (1938) a offert une logique se fondant sur l’intuition que tout énoncé est soit vrai, soit faux ; mais qu’il existe néanmoins des énoncés dont la valeur de vérité n’est pas connue. La formalisation d’une telle intuition amena Kleene à introduire une troisième attribution de valeur de vérité pour les énoncés : « inconnu ». Pour autant, une telle formalisation reste ambiguë : elle échoue à résoudre la dichotomie entre le fait que tout énoncé est soit vrai, soit faux et le fait qu’il existe des énoncés dont l’attribution de valeur de vérité n’est ni « vrai », ni « faux ». L’enjeu de la présente thèse sera l’introduction d’une nouvelle logique multivalente intitulée logique de l’agent rationnel se fondant sur les idées de Kleene tout en en éliminant l’ambiguïté décrite plus haut.La logique de l’agent rationnel permet de modéliser le raisonnement d’un agent en considérant la connaissance (ou l’ignorance) qu’il peut avoir de la valeur de vérité classique des énoncés. D’un point de vue technique, nous introduisons plusieurs définitions de la notion de conséquence logique dans ce cadre, et construisons sur cette base, des sémantiques complètes de notre logique. Nous montrons ensuite l’intérêt d’une telle formalisation en l’appliquant à l’étude d’un problème épistémologique connu sous le nom de « paradoxe de la connaissabilité ». D’un point de vue épistémologique, l’introduction de la logique de l’agent rationnel permet d’analyser la notion d’ignorance comme indépendante de celle de connaissance. Une telle formalisation ouvre ainsi la voie à une position inédite, selon laquelle la notion d’ignorance est primitive et non analysable. / Many-valued logics is a family of non-classical logics, which is characterized by the fundamental fact that they do not restrict the truth values to only truth and falsity. According to this line of inquiry, Kleene (1938) constructed a logic that is based on the idea that every proposition is either true, or false, but there exist propositions for which the truth value is unknown. The formalisation of this idea leads to the introduction of a third assignment of truth value to propositions, interpreted as “unknown”. However, this formalisation contains an ambiguity, because it does not permit the resolution of a contradiction between the fact that every proposition is either true or false, and the fact that there exist propositions for which the assignment of truth value is neither “true” nor “false”. The initial aim of the present thesis is to explore Kleene’s idea in order to introduce and analyse a new many-valued logic, to be called the logic of a rational agent, that is founded on Kleene’s ideas, but that eliminates the above-mentioned ambiguity.The logic of a rational agent models the reasoning of an agent, taking into account the knowledge (or ignorance) of the classical truth value of a proposition that the agent can have. On the technical level, we introduce diverse definitions of entailment relations and construct consistent and complete semantics on this base. We then show the interest inherent in such a formalisation, by proposing an application of this logic to a famous epistemological problem, known as the “knowability paradox”. On the epistemological level, the logic of a rational agent permits us to offer an analysis of the notion of ignorance, as understood independently from the notion of knowledge. Such a formalization.

Notre étude cherche à démontrer pourquoi les agents économiques sont incités à enfreindre le droit de la concurrence. Le choix de l’infraction dépend de l’avantage retiré du manquement comparé au coût subi. La notion de « faute lucrative » illustre parfaitement l’espoir d’un lucre tiré du manquement à la loi. L’économie comportementale nous enseigne cependant que les déterminants de la conformité au droit sont autres que la recherche du profit. Selon cette discipline, l’incitation – c’est-à-dire la motivation principale de l’agent qui fait le choix d’enfreindre la loi – est détachée d’un calcul coût-avantage. L’agent économique est sujet à des « biais cognitifs » : le défaut d’information disponible ne lui permet pas de faire toujours le choix susceptible de maximiser son intérêt. Appliquée au droit de la concurrence, la théorie de l’agent rationnel, fût-elle critiquable, reste néanmoins la plus pertinente pour examiner la dissuasion car elle permet de comparer la règle de droit à un « prix » qui pèse sur le choix d’enfreindre la loi. L’influence des règles juridiques comme un ensemble de normes incitatives ou dissuasives qui influencent le comportement des agents sur le marché est moins pris en compte par l’économie comportementale qui se concentre davantage sur les biais cognitifs des agents.L'agent économique rationnel qui entend retirer un profit de son manquement peut spéculer sur les multiples failles propres au droit de la concurrence, lesquelles affaiblissent le risque juridique de l’infraction. Deux limites fondamentales affectent la dissuasion : d’une part, celles relatives à l’effectivité des règles de concurrence. La probabilité, pour le fautif, d’échapper à l’application du droit génère des infractions « rentables ». D’autre part, celles relatives à l’efficacité des règles de concurrence favorisent aussi la conservation des gains illicites retirés du manquement, car la sanction imposée par le déclenchement de l’action publique et/ou privée n’est pas adaptée à la dissuasion du comportement déviant.Ces limites concernent aussi bien l’application de l’action publique que l’application de l’action privée en réparation. La fonction dissuasive du « private enforcement » est limitée en l’absence de dommages-intérêts confiscatoires. De même, les vices congénitaux à la loi Hamon paralysent la portée dissuasive de l’action de groupe. S’agissant de l’action publique, le développement des ententes algorithmiques et la spécificité des marchés numériques compliquent le travail de détection des autorités de concurrence. Même en cas de détection, la sanction appliquée à l’agent économique semble sous-dissuasive car, comme le démontre notre étude empirique, l’amende et/ou les dommages-intérêts imposés sont souvent inférieurs aux gains retirés des infractions de concurrence.Par ailleurs, le faible risque pénal pesant sur les dirigeants responsables de pratiques illicites affaiblit la dissuasion, car ceux-ci forment aussi des calculs sur l’avantage qu’ils ont personnellement à tirer du manquement à la loi. Il ressort de nos travaux que la création d’un test de légitimité de l’emprisonnement permet de répondre à la question de savoir, pour chaque type d’infraction de concurrence, si la prison est ou non une peine légitime.En somme, l’étude propose la construction d’un régime dissuasif par étapes, visant à renforcer à la fois l’effectivité et l’efficacité des règles de concurrence. Considérant que l’agent économique opère des prédictions sur le droit applicable, il faut non seulement faire en sorte que le droit de la concurrence s’applique effectivement, c’est-à-dire que le contrevenant soit confronté aux coûts de sa violation, mais efficacement, ce qui signifie que le coût du manquement doit être supérieur à son éventuel bénéfice. / This study explores the reasons why economic agents are likely to break the rules of competition law. This paper demonstrates that main reasons are related to a cost-benefit calculation, also known as the concept of “lucrative infringement”. Our results are conflicting with the findings of behavioural economics, which reject the theory of cost-benefit calculations incentives and argues that economic agents are subject to “cognitive biases”. However, the theory of the rational agent, despite its limitations, remains the most relevant for assessing the competition law ability to deter anticompetitive practices because it compares the rule of law to a "price" that weighs on the choice to break the law. The influence of legal rules as a set of incentive or deterrent norms that influences agents' behaviour on the market is less considered by behavioural economics that focuses more on agents' cognitive biases.Economic agents are rational and look for a “lucrative infringement”. They speculate on the multiple loopholes of competition law, which weakens the legal risk of the infringement. In this regard, two fundamental limits affect deterrence: on the one hand, the low probability of getting caught which generates “lucrative faults,” and on the other hand, the retention of all unlawful gains derived from the infringement.These limits concern both the application of public and private enforcement. First, the dissuasive function of "private enforcement" is limited by the absence of confiscatory damages. Similarly, the restrictive standard of proof to admit a collective class action hinders its dissuasive nature. When it comes to enforcement, the development of algorithmic cartels and the specificity of digital markets reduce competition authorities’ ability to detect illegal practices. Even when they manage to detect such practices, the sanction applied to the economic agent seems under-dissuasive. As our empirical study shows, fines and/or compensatory damages imposed are often lower than the benefit derived from the infringement.In addition, deterrence is weakened by the absence of criminal punishments for business leaders who have coordinated anticompetitive practices. This study demonstrates that they also make calculations about the benefit they may derive from violating the law. Our study develops a “legitimacy test of imprisonment” to provide an answer to the question of when imprisonment is a legitimate penalty.This study builds a step-by-step deterrent legal regime to daunt anticompetitive practices. Deterrence requires a twofold analysis on the application of competition law and the adequacy of sanctions to deter anticompetitive conducts. It is necessary not only to make competition law effective, i.e. that no infringer can escape with the costs of its violation, but also – to achieve an adequate level of deterrence – that fines and/or compensatory damages exceed any potential gains that may be expected from the infringement.