This study first examines whether equity-based compensation (i.e., stocks and options) is associated with audit committees’ oversight failures. I then examine whether this association between equity-based compensation and oversight failures is affected when firms initiate the clawback provisions in their compensation contracts. I use the likelihood of restatements, the incidence of internal control weaknesses (ICW), and earnings management measures to proxy for audit committees’ oversight failures. Based on a sample of 129 firms that voluntarily adopt the clawback provisions during 2003-09 and a matched sample created from the propensity score matching technique, I find several important results. First, larger amounts and portions of stocks and options are associated with higher restatement and ICW likelihood and greater earnings management. Second, equity-based compensation appears to harm audit committees' oversight effectiveness. However, the adoption of the clawback provisions significantly mitigates such negative effect. Finally, the clawback provisions are effective in reducing restatements, ICW, and earnings management only when these provisions are triggered by "bad faith" rather than restatements. Overall, my empirical results bear policy implications on audit committees’ compensation practice and the mandatory adoption of the clawback provisions.

The following thesis deals with the development of the accounting of corrections of the accounting errors of previous years and changes in accounting methods from the beginning of financial accounting in the Czech Republic through the processing of many interpretations by the National Accounting Board, up to the current modification, which was an amendment to the Decree No. 500/2002 Coll., which transposed certain provisions of Act No. 563/1991 Coll., which came into force on January 1, 2013. Thanks to this decree, the account Restatements of retained earnings results, in the case of a correction of an error and a change in the accounting method, in a better understanding of the financial statements than it did before the issue was addressed through extraordinary costs or revenues in the current accounting period. In addition as practical part, this thesis composes also of a research from the financial statements of large Czech companies focusing on the frequency of use of the new item in the balance sheet for 2015, the reason of the using and explanation in supplement to the financial statements, including the method of settling the final balance of the account from previous years. The research also dealt with the auditor's response to the found deficiencies. The last part of the thesis is a comparative analysis of research conducted during the years of 2013, 2014 and 2015.

本研究主要探討盈餘重編宣告如何影響重編公司之供應商的股價評價與實質投資決策。首先，本研究假設並發現，盈餘重編宣告除了導致重編公司的股價顯著下跌外，亦誘發其上游供應商的股價顯著下跌。實證進一步發現，供應商的股價依盈餘重編之資訊內涵而調整，促使投資人關注重編事件對上游供應商的預期盈餘之影響，也提醒投資人去關心上游供應商的財務報表品質。其次，本研究假設，盈餘重編宣告傳遞有關重編公司未來前景不佳及財務報表不實的資訊，將影響其供應商對投入特定關係資產所能獲得收益之預期，進而影響其對重編公司所投入的特定關係資產投資決策。實證結果支持前述假說，重編公司之供應商於重編宣告年度後將減少其研究發展支出，且此研究發展支出之變動與重編宣告所引起的股價變動具顯著關聯性。最後本文假設，重編公司扭曲其實際盈餘數字將影響供應商的投資決策，進而影響供應商的投資效率性。研究發現，供應商在重編公司財務報表誤述期間有顯著超額投資之現象。然而，此供應商之超額投資現象在盈餘重編宣告年度後不再顯著。 / This dissertation extends prior research on earnings restatements by examining the effects of earnings restatements on valuation and investment decisions of restating firms’ suppliers. First, this paper hypothesizes and finds that earnings restatements that adversely affect stock price of the restating firms also induce their suppliers’ stock price declines. These stock price declines are related to changes in analysts’ earnings forecasts and seem to reflect investors’ financial reporting quality concerns. Second, I hypothesize that earnings restatements contain information about the value of relationship-specific investments by suppliers. This information causes suppliers to revise their belief about the value of relationship-specific investments, and therefore affects their subsequent relationship-specific investment decisions. Consistent with my prediction, I find that changes in suppliers’ relationship-specific investments after restatement announcements are related to information in the restatements. Finally, I predict and find that a restating firm misreporting financial results induces its suppliers to make excess investments during the misreporting period, while excess investment is no longer positive after the restatement announcement.

本研究以財報重編為財報品質之代理變數，探討自由現金流量是否對內部股權結構與財報品質的關係具有調節效果，期望藉助對於自由現金流量調節效果之了解，以利報表閱讀者更適當地解讀財報訊息，瞭解財報之品質。 實證結果顯示，自由現金流量對內部股權結構與財報品質間確實具有顯著的調節效果，尤其是董、監持股率與董事兼任經理人這兩項因素對於財報品質之關係，很受到自由現金流量之影響。自由現金流量本身與財報重編呈顯著負相關，自由現金流量愈高，財報重編的可能性愈低。但自由現金流量所引發的代理問題，反而可能對董、監持股率、董事兼任經理人與財報品質間的關係產生負面的調節效果，即財報重編的可能性顯著提高。但自由現金流量對於經理人持股率與財報品質間的關係不具有顯著的調節效果。 / This study examines whether free cash flow has the moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and financial reporting quality, using financial restatements as a proxy for financial reporting quality. This study tries to interpret earnings information more appropriately through more understanding on the moderating effect of free cash flow. The study shows that free cash flow exactly has the moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and financial reporting quality, especially for stocks holding ratio by directors and supervisors and CEO duality. Firms having more free cash flow are less likely to restate statements. However, free cash flow might trigger agency problem, which might having negative moderating effects, causing higher possibilities to restate statements. Otherwise, the finding of this study shows that there is no significantly moderating effect on the relation between managerial ownership and financial reporting quality.

本研究針對國內1996至2003年68筆受證期局強制重編財報事件為研究對象，採個案與實證兼具之研究方法，探討財報強制重編之成因、外顯徵兆與經濟後果。 就財報強制重編之成因而言，本研究發現盈餘管理誘因亦適用於財報強制重編之情形；公司治理機制中控制權與所有權偏離程度的縮小、外部審計品質的提升與關係人交易之透明與簡單化，皆可以降低財報強制重編之機率。就財報強制重編之外顯徵兆，則發現會計師出具無保留以外之意見與損益品質的下降，為公司錯誤報導財務報表之重要指標。就財報強制重編之經濟後果，實證顯示財報強制重編與財務困難間具有顯著的關聯性。此外，本研究並發現財報重編影響的報表數愈多、金額幅度愈大、涉及業外非核心盈餘與投資損益之重編時，公司發生財務困難的可能性將顯著增加。 / This research employs both case study and empirical approaches to investigate the causes, demeanors and economic consequences of a sample of firms that were enforced by the Securities and future Bureau to restate their financial statements over the period of year 1996 to year 2003. The analysis of the causes of mandatory restatements shows that the motivations of earnings management also apply to the context of financial restatements. The firms with smaller deviation of control rights from the cash flow rights, higher audit quality and more transparency in related-party transactions help alleviate the probability of restatements. The results also indicate that unclean audit opinions and decrease in quality of earnings are important demeanors of misstatement of financial statements. In addition, firms are enforced to restate their financial statements are found to be significantly related to the occurrence of financial difficulties in the future. The findings show that the severer the materiality of the restatement in terms of the length of period, dollars, and the nature of the restatements, the higher the possibility of firms will experience financial difficulties.

Cette thèse a pour objectif principal d’apporter une contribution à la littérature concernant la structure et l’efficacité du conseil d’administration (CA). Elle s’articule autour de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre est une revue de la littérature, tandis que les trois autres portent sur des questions de recherche distinctes. La première étude présentée dans le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier les déterminants de la taille du CA, de l'indépendance de ses membres et de la dualité des fonctions de direction et de présidence du CA. Les principaux apports de cette étude peuvent être résumés comme suit : tout d'abord, nos résultats sont fondés sur l'analyse d'un des plus grands échantillons utilisés dans ce domaine, avec à peu près 16000 observations (entreprises-années) pour près de 2300 entreprises américaines observées de 1997 à 2010. De plus, sur le plan méthodologique, une batterie de tests statistiques a été réalisée afin de vérifier la robustesse de nos résultats, notamment des tests tenant compte des biais d'hétérogénéité et de simultanéité. Enfin, cette étude est probablement la première à démontrer que le passage de la loi SOX a limité la capacité des dirigeants à influencer la composition du CA. La deuxième étude s’attache à analyser les deux principales fonctions du CA, qui sont le conseil au chef d'entreprise et le contrôle de ses activités. Ainsi, comprendre la capacité du CA à remplir ces fonctions est une question fondamentale que nous nous proposons d’approfondir. Cette étude vient enrichir la littérature émergente sur la fonction consultative du CA en fournissant de nouveaux éléments de preuves sur l'importance de cette fonction dans la création de valeur de l'entreprise. Ces résultats apportent également des éclairages sur le conflit potentiel existant entre les deux principales fonctions du CA. Enfin, cette étude s'inscrit dans le courant de pensée qui cherche à évaluer l'impact des caractéristiques des entreprises sur l'efficacité de leurs structures de gouvernance. Le principal objectif de la troisième étude présentée dans le dernier chapitre de cette thèse est de déterminer si la rémunération à base d’actions des administrateurs peut affecter les décisions futures en matière d'acquisition, et le cas échéant, comment. Les résultats de cette étude apportent un nouvel éclairage concernant la rémunération des administrateurs. Cette étude met en exergue l'importance des pratiques de rémunération incitative sous forme d’actions et d’options pour les membres du CA. Par ailleurs, bien que de nombreuses études aient été réalisées afin d'analyser la relation existante entre les mesures incitatives à destination des administrateurs et la performance de l'entreprise, notre étude est l'une des premières à explorer les mécanismes à travers lesquels ces mesures peuvent influencer la valeur de l'entreprise. / This thesis aims at providing contributions to the existing literature on the structure and effectiveness of corporate boards. It comprises three essays that address distinct research questions. The first study examines the trends and determinants of corporate board structure using a panel data sample. This study extends the existing literature on the determinants of board structure in three important ways. First, our results are based on one of the largest samples used in this area, with almost 16,000 firm-year observations for nearly 2,300 firms observed from 1997 to 2010. Second, in terms of methodology, a set of statistical tests was performed in order to check the robustness of our findings, including tests that account for heterogeneity and simultaneity. Finally, this is probably the first study to show that the enactment of SOX has reduced the ability of CEOs in influencing board composition. Specifically, while SOX does not fundamentally alter the economic determinants of board structure, our results show that the documented negative impact of well performing CEOs on board independence in the pre-SOX era is no longer significant post-SOX. In the second study, the principal objective is to investigate the effects of advisory directors' presence on the board and monitoring intensity on the board's overall effectiveness in value creation. This study makes some significant contributions to the literature. First, it complements and extends the growing literature on the board's advisory function by providing strong new evidence on the importance of this board function in value creation. Second, it also provides some evidence on the potential conflict between the two primary functions of corporate boards. Finally, this study adds to the literature that attempts to assess the impact of firm and industry characteristics on the effectiveness of specific governance structures. The last study has as main objective to examine the relation between director compensation structure and shareholder interests in the context of acquisitions. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the recent but burgeoning literature that deals with the determinants of director compensation. Guided by theoretical work in this area, we show that director compensation is mainly consistent with firm's needs for monitoring and advising. Second, we extend the body of research that highlights the importance of equity-based compensation by providing evidence that the use of incentive-based compensation schemes to reward directors also matters. Finally, although many studies have examined the relation between directors' incentives and firm performance, this work is one of the first to examine the channels through which directors' equity-based pay affects shareholders' value.