What is the relationship between networks and unit-level outcomes, such as the international trade network among states and domestic rule of law or repression? Do these effects hold after accounting for actors' strategic selection of network ties? I explore these questions by building a multi-player game, in which players make two simultaneous decisions: (1) whether to form trade links and with who, and (2) whether to increase their trade benefits by improving their type, associated with the level of domestic economic risk factors. The model predicts an endogenous relationship between the number of direct trade partners and the probability of playing High Type: High Type states have more direct trade partners, and the number of trade partners has a positive effect on the probability of choosing High Type. A state's type is also affected by indirect trade connections--counter-intuitively, indirect trade has a negative effect on the probability of choosing High Type. In Chapters 3 and 4, I test the general predictions of the theoretical model, by applying them to two distinct areas of international research. In Chapter 3, I conceptualize a state's type as the level of domestic rule of law enforcement. States with strong rule of law enforcement are regarded as High Type states, because they guarantee lower cost of operations within their borders, by enforcing property rights and contractual law. Weak rule of law states, on the other hand, can be thought of as Low Type states, as business operations within such states are constantly threatened by a risk of expropriations, inefficiencies associated with corruption within the judicial system, and other manifestations of poor business practices. In Chapter 4, I recast the theoretical model by showing how a state's type can be conceptualized as a state's domestic respect for human rights. Highlighting the economic costs of repression, such as higher economic risk, negative publicity, and decreased quality of human capital, I argue that these costs are suffered by both the domestic economic elites and their international business partners. These business elites can, however, alleviate their losses resulting from such costs by either pressuring their government to embrace stronger human rights protections or, when this option is unavailable, by setting up channels for indirect economic transactions through states with more favorable political environments. To test each Chapter's empirical predictions, model the simultaneity between network formation and effect, using a statistical estimator developed by Ripley, Snijders, and Preciado (2012). This statistical estimator, referred to as a continuous Markov Chain exponential random graph model (MC ERGM), allows for a close mimicking of the theoretical model by simultaneously modeling two dependent variables: network formation and its effect on actors' behavior. The results of the statistical tests provide some support the theoretical predictions.

O presente trabalho se estrutura em torno da resposta a duas questões: O que é uma decisão motivada? e Quais as consequências de uma decisão imotivada?. Nesta perspectiva, partese da definição da motivação como um discurso cuja função é a de justificar racionalmente a decisão judicial. Esta justificativa racional tem funções endoprocessuais e extraprocessuais. Dentre as funções extraprocessuais, destaca-se a de conferir legitimidade à atuação jurisdicional no Estado Democrático de Direito. Ainda no âmbito da norma constitucional que impõe ao juiz o dever de fundamentar suas decisões, demonstra-se que ela se estrutura sob a forma de regra, nos termos da teoria dos princípios de ALEXY, com a consequência de que os limites para a caracterização de uma decisão como motivada são rígidos. Passa-se, então, à construção de um modelo teórico de estrutura da motivação sob a ótica funcional. Na construção desse modelo, demonstra-se que a estrutura e conteúdo da motivação no caso concreto dependem da interação de um modelo mínimo de justificação adequada, um modelo intermediário delimitado pelo contraditório e um limite máximo delimitado pela linguagem. A partir desse modelo interativo exploram-se as consequências dos vícios de motivação segundo uma teoria das nulidades dos atos processuais e, assim, conclui-se que a motivação só será considerada inexistente em caso de omissão gráfica e que qualquer vício de fundamentação é uma atipicidade relevante que deve ser nulificada. / The present work is structured around answering two questions: \"What is a motivated decision?\" and \"What are the consequences of an unjustified decision?. In this perspective, we start from the definition of motivation as a speech whose function is to rationally justify the decision. This rational justification has legal and constitutional functions. Among the constitutional functions one that stands out is to legitimate the courts role under in the rule of law. Also as part of the constitutional rule determining courts to motivate their decisions, it is shown that it is structured in the form of a rule in accordance with the principles theory of ALEXY, resulting that the limits for the characterization of a motivated decision are rigid. Then it is possible to create a theoretical model of the structure of motivation from a functional perspective. When building this model, we demonstrate that the structure and content of motivation depends on the interaction of a minimal model of proper justification, an intermediate model bounded by the adversarial principle, and another model, bigger than the others, defined by the language. From this interactive model it becomes possible to explore he consequences of the defects of motivation according to a nullity of procedural acts theory and thus it is concluded that motivation wont be considered existent only in case of graphical omission and that any defective reasoning must be nullified.

In examining the role of the �legal rule� in Indonesian law, and in particular environmental law related to water quality management, this thesis questions the often expressed view that laws in Indonesia are sound, they merely fail to be implemented. It proposes that this appraisal of the situation does not take a sufficiently deep assessment and that a cause for non-implementation lies within the drafting of the laws themselves. It is argued that the ineffective system for environmental protection in Indonesia can be related to a failure to recognise the role of the �legal rule� in environmental law. A proposition presented in this thesis is that the arrangements for environmental law making in Indonesia lacks a strong rule foundation and, for this reason, it is not capable of producing shared understandings by lawmakers about producing and reproducing environmental law as legal sub-system. Another central proposition is that Indonesian environmental law has a form and style, which negates the role of the legal rule in environmental management and control. Despite the changes brought by reformasi, the central position of the legal rule in environmental law and, indeed, the necessary rule foundation to the development of the legal system, has yet to achieve full recognition. If this situation is related to the system of water quality management and pollution control in Indonesia, it can be seen that environmental improvement will not be achieved until underlying issues concerning the structure, form and style of environmental law making are addressed.

<p>Under de senaste decennierna har rättsliga reformer ökat kraftigt. Idag satsas stora summor pengar och mycket tid på området. Ett stort antal organisationer och länder ser idag rättsreformer som något av det viktigaste i utvecklingssamarbeten med länder i tredje världen. Som grund för de flesta av reformerna finns principerna om rättsstaten. Organisationerna och ett stort antal av världens ledare ser rättsstaten som en lösning för olika problem, inte bara rättsliga utan även ekonomiska och politiska. Med rättsstaten menas bland annat att ett lands rättssystem skall vara rättssäkert och effektivt, att det skall råda likhet inför lagen och att ingen skall stå ovanför lagen. Det är dock inte så enkelt att definiera rättsstaten utan den har en mängd olika betydelser.</p><p>Det finns dock idag en skepticism mot hur rättsstatsbegreppet används. Kritiken mot biståndsaktörerna är omfattande och mycket allvarlig. Den riktar sig mot allt från problemen med att definiera rättsstaten, hur rättsstaten används av organisationerna, hur reformerna genomförs och resultaten av dem. Enligt kritikerna gör biståndssamfundet många fel och det är mycket som behöver förändras.</p><p>Redan på 1960-talet genomfördes rättsreformer, fast då i mindre skala än nu. De genomfördes av en rörelse kallad rätt och utvecklingsrörelsen. Den bestod främst av en grupp amerikanska akademiker och jurister, som ville övertala andra om vikten av rättsliga reformer. I mitten av 1970-talet dog dock rörelsen ut efter mycket kritik mot den. Bland annat kritiserades den för att vara etnocentrisk och för att den inte lyckats med vad den föresatts att göra. Om man ser på kritiken mot dagens rättsstatsrörelse liknar den på många sätt kritiken mot rätt och utvecklingsrörelsen. Flera forskare menar därför att dagens rörelse borde ha lärt sig mer av sin föregångares misstag och inte göra alla de fel den gör idag. De tror att det finns risk att rättsstatsrörelsen kommer att dö ut precis som rätt och utvecklingsrörelsen.</p>

Résumé : La thèse s’intéresse aux sanctions prises par des exécutifs internationaux et qui ont pour cibles des personnes physiques ou morales : gels et confiscations d’avoirs, interdictions de voyager, amendes et même inscriptions sur des listes à caractère infâmant. La licéité de ces sanctions est examinée à l’aune des règles du droit international qui leur sont applicables : d’une part, les règles de procédure et, de l’autre, le droit international des droits de l’homme. L’analyse permet d’identifier deux types de sanctions illicites : 1°) Le premier type comprend les sanctions qui sont pénales et qui, par ailleurs, répriment de graves infractions. Ces sanctions devraient être imposées par des juges et non par des organes politiques ce que sont les exécutifs internationaux qui les infligent. 2°) Le second type de sanctions illicites regroupent les sanctions dépourvues de recours au sens du droit international des droits de l’homme. Les personnes affectées par ces sanctions devraient pouvoir en contester le bien-fondé devant un organe indépendant et impartial. Il n’existe, par ailleurs, aucune circonstance de nature à exclure l’illicéité de l’un ou l’autre de ces deux types de sanctions. Ces sanctions, dès lors, n’ont aucun caractère contraignant. Qui plus est, les Etats se trouvent mis dans l’obligation de ne pas y donner suite. Les sanctions qui n’appartiennent à aucun de ces deux types sont, en principe, licites. Abstract : The thesis concerns the sanctions taken by international executives and which targets individuals and legal entities: freeze and confiscation of assets, ban on travels, fine and even inscription on dishonourable lists. The legality of the sanctions is checked in relation to the international rules which are applicable to the sanctions: firstly, rules of procedure and, secondly, human rights. This work concludes to the existence of two types of wrongful sanctions: 1°) the first type groups together the sanctions which are penal and, moreover, punish serious offenses. These sanctions should be decided by judges and not by political organs like international executives. 2°) the second type of wrongful sanctions contains those without recourse complying with human rights. The persons targeted by these sanctions should be able to contest them before an independent and impartial organ. In addition, there are no circumstances precluding wrongfulness of these two types of sanctions. So, these sanctions are not binding and the States are under obligation not to apply them. The other sanctions which do not belong to one of these two types of sanctions are, in theory, legal.

<p>The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Commission) began its work in October 2004 and provided its final report only three months later on 25 January 2005.2 There, it concluded, inter alia, &ldquo / that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide&rdquo / and that at least the central Government authorities did not act with genocidal intent.3 However, these findings would not exclude the possibility that the atrocities committed by individuals against victims were carried out with the specific intent to destroy and therefore could possibly fulfil all necessary requirements of the crime of genocide.</p>

Under de senaste decennierna har rättsliga reformer ökat kraftigt. Idag satsas stora summor pengar och mycket tid på området. Ett stort antal organisationer och länder ser idag rättsreformer som något av det viktigaste i utvecklingssamarbeten med länder i tredje världen. Som grund för de flesta av reformerna finns principerna om rättsstaten. Organisationerna och ett stort antal av världens ledare ser rättsstaten som en lösning för olika problem, inte bara rättsliga utan även ekonomiska och politiska. Med rättsstaten menas bland annat att ett lands rättssystem skall vara rättssäkert och effektivt, att det skall råda likhet inför lagen och att ingen skall stå ovanför lagen. Det är dock inte så enkelt att definiera rättsstaten utan den har en mängd olika betydelser. Det finns dock idag en skepticism mot hur rättsstatsbegreppet används. Kritiken mot biståndsaktörerna är omfattande och mycket allvarlig. Den riktar sig mot allt från problemen med att definiera rättsstaten, hur rättsstaten används av organisationerna, hur reformerna genomförs och resultaten av dem. Enligt kritikerna gör biståndssamfundet många fel och det är mycket som behöver förändras. Redan på 1960-talet genomfördes rättsreformer, fast då i mindre skala än nu. De genomfördes av en rörelse kallad rätt och utvecklingsrörelsen. Den bestod främst av en grupp amerikanska akademiker och jurister, som ville övertala andra om vikten av rättsliga reformer. I mitten av 1970-talet dog dock rörelsen ut efter mycket kritik mot den. Bland annat kritiserades den för att vara etnocentrisk och för att den inte lyckats med vad den föresatts att göra. Om man ser på kritiken mot dagens rättsstatsrörelse liknar den på många sätt kritiken mot rätt och utvecklingsrörelsen. Flera forskare menar därför att dagens rörelse borde ha lärt sig mer av sin föregångares misstag och inte göra alla de fel den gör idag. De tror att det finns risk att rättsstatsrörelsen kommer att dö ut precis som rätt och utvecklingsrörelsen.

No description available.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the democratization process in Kurdistan on the basis of consolidation democracy with focus on arenas defined by Linz and Stepan (1997), namely economic, political, legal, civil society and arenas of state bureaucracy. Furthermore, I intend to explain Kurdistan’s road toward democratization in Kurdistan from 1991 until today, with a focus on the years 2003-2012. The main results are that Kurdistan has developed conditions that support a future consolidation of democracy. However, there are weaknesses in the economic situation, rule of law and the arena of bureaucracy. The arena of the political and civil society grew stronger after the US war on Iraq in 2003 and as effect new institutions such as political parties, opposition, election, political governance and alliances arose.

The aim of this essay is to describe and analyse the legal complications that arise in connection with preliminary investigations involving several juvenile offenders, where all suspected persons have not attained the age of criminal liability. It is also intended to give a broad analysis of the concept preliminary investigation, with particular emphasis on juvenile offenders. It further analyses the legislation and legal complications on the basis of a rule of law perspective. The method previously used is court dogmatic, where in front law text, preparatory work, case law and legal doctrine have been used in order to present the existing sources relating to the subject matter of discussion. The criminal investigative bodies consider juvenile offenders are regulated under the Swedish RB 23 - 28 chapters, FUK and LUL. The fundamental basis used in deciding whether to commence a preliminary investigation, is that of evidence gathered and if it can be reasonably concluded that a crime has been committed under general legislation. A preliminary investigation is initiated and led by either the police authority or the prosecutor. The preliminary investigation is always led by the prosecutor in serious criminal matters. There are certain specific rules that apply when juvenile offenders become the subject of a criminal investigation. The rules applied vary dependant upon and with due regard to the age of the offenders. The age of criminal liability is a crucial and definite factor in this context, where by preliminary investigations can be initiated only against young people that have attained an age of 15 years, but not against those yet to have reached that age. Criminal investigations may however under certain circumstances be initiated against juvenile offenders that have not reached the age of 15 years, as per LUL 31§. The most significant conclusion reached is that the rule of law be applied and met when young people become subjects of a criminal investigation. A majority of the regulations contained within the legislation limit and make the investigative process problematic, particular emphasis being under the interrogation process and the use of means of compulsion. A discussion or inquiry should be entered with regard to the effectiveness of the preliminary investigative process pertaining to juvenile offenders, with a means to improving the procedure whilst maintaining rule of law.