A teoria tradicional sobre o poder identifica a violência do Estado como sendo a manifestação última do poder político, chegando mesmo a encontrar na demonstração de força física a essência do poder. Esta relação repercute na teoria do Estado definindo-o, não sem bases históricas, como monopólio dos instrumentos de violência. Já para o direito, a identificação entre poder e violência leva a uma sobrevaloração da sanção na atribuição de juridicidade à norma. Ainda que não de modo pioneiro, Hannah Arendt e Niklas Luhmann definiram o poder em oposição à violência, ainda que a ela relacionado. Esta similaritude na descrição do poder como oposto à violência leva a indagações acerca da compatibilidade entre as reflexões políticas de Arendt e as observações sociológicas de Luhmann. Este trabalho realiza uma comparação entre as obras dos dois autores no que diz respeito à relação entre poder e violência dentro do Estado de Direito. Para tanto, o estudo parte da premissa de que é possível a uma teoria do Estado aplicar tanto Arendt, quanto Luhmann a seus próprios conceitos. A distinção de posições, se interna ou externa à política, permite que uma assimetria entre as obras seja estabelecida e, deste modo, viabiliza a comparação. O trabalho conclui pela compatibilidade dos autores devido à semelhança entre os conceitos de ação e comunicação, entretanto, reconhece que o conceito de poder de Arendt é muito mais amplo do que aquele de Luhmann. Por fim, este trabalho propõe possíveis pontos de partida para novas abordagens da política e do direito que reúnam características dos dois autores analisados. / The traditional theory of power identifies State violence as the ultimate expression of political power, to the point of perceiving in the demonstration of physical strength the essence of power. The liaison between political commands and violent attitudes reaches the definition of State itself, establishing it, not without any Historical grounds, as the monopoly of instruments of force. In Law the relation between power and violence leads to overestimating the role of sanction in define a norm as lawful. Even though not as pioneers, Hannah Arendt and Niklas Luhmann defined power as opposite to violence, yet connected. Such similarities induce the question of the possibility of combining both theoretical approaches. This essay compares the works of the authors regarding the bearing of power and violence under the rule of law. As premise, this essay adopts the assumption that it is indeed possible for a theory of State to develop both Arendts and Luhmanns concepts as its own. Different theoretical positions inside and outside polity allow the creation of an asymmetry, which enables the comparison. This essay reaches the conclusion favorable to the compatibility of the authors, due to the similarity of both the concept of action and that of communication. Nonetheless, it recognizes that Arendts concept of power is much broader than Luhmanns. Finally, this essay suggests new approaches to political and legal theories that may pursuit the theoretical path of any or both the authors in comparison.

O termo judicializar significa tratar judicialmente, chegar a um julgamento ou decisão. Judicialmente, nesse sentido, diz respeito ao julgamento legal, aos tribunais. Por outro lado, nas democracias a tomada de decisão baseia-se no princípio da maioria, no debate aberto entre iguais, nas assembleias eleitas pelo voto popular. Se na democracia quem decide é o povo, através de representantes eleitos, é porque o poder é do povo. Decisões judiciais e decisões políticas são duas formas distintas de solução de conflitos. O tema da judicialização da política remete à tensão entre democracia e o Estado de Direito. Sob o argumento de que vivemos em democracias de direitos, a política e as relações sociais vêm sendo cada vez mais orientadas menos pela ótica da política do que pelo direito. Este trabalho de pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar o fenômeno da judicialização da política como um problema político e não jurídico, analisando também as condições sociais que favorecem o afastamento da política nas democracias cada vez mais judicializadas. Pensar o político da democracia e da própria política é uma forma de refletir a respeito do obscurecimento da própria noção de democracia. / The term judicialize means treating judicially, to reach a judgment or decision. Judicially, in this sense, regards to legal judgement, to courts. On the other hand, decision-making in democracies is based upon on the principle of the majority, on the open debate among equals, on assemblies elected by popular vote. If, in the democracy is the people who decides, through elected representatives, this is due to the fact that the power belongs to the people. Judicial decisions and political decisions are two distinct ways of conflict resolution. The theme of judicialization of politics refers to the tension between democracy and the Rule of Law. Under the argument that we live in democracies of rights, politics and social relations have been increasingly more oriented to the perspective of law than that of politics. This study aims at analyzing the phenomenon of judicialization of politics as a political problem rather than a legal one. It also analyzes the social conditions that favor the removal of politics in democracies, which have been increasingly judicialized. To think about the political of democracy and about politics itself is a way of reflecting about the obfuscation of the very notion of democracy.

In the last two or three decades, corruption has become a noticeable issue in many countries, especially in developing countries where it has serious effects on the economy. In this paper, the effect of corruption on economic growth will be examined through literature and researches that involve the effect of corruption in economic growth followed by cross-sectional regression analysis to the issue. The focus will be on how much corruption and how much corruption control are present for each country. other different variables that could be expected to affect the economic growth for this period will also, be examined. To answer this question, corruption control as an independent variable while economic growth is the dependent variable will be examined. The second question would be to study corruption control as a dependent variable while using a set of variables as independent variables and see how much they would affect corruption control. Finally, a case study that draws a comparison between the economy in Germany and South Korea where the results from the empirical part will be applied to the two countries and the difference between the true reported numbers and the numbers from the OLS equations will be checked and explained.   From all the directions been taken to study the subject “literatures, empirical and case study “ the results showed that corruption activities have negative effects on economic growth and although it might be in some cases shown to be insignificant, however, it is very important to minimize the corruption activities by boosting variables such as corruption control, rule of law, stability and also education as it is shown that the more years of education will decrease the levels of corruption in some cases.   The conclusion here will be, although corruption may have more effects in some economies more than others, to combat corruption that will take a global effort. The countries that may not suffer greatly from it may be caught in the cost of cleaning it by having to support failed economies. Or worse, corruption may be increased to levels that it could not be ignored.

Submitted by Eunice Novais (enovais@uepg.br) on 2018-06-07T21:42:41Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) Andrea Bulka Sahaiko.pdf: 2053259 bytes, checksum: 00526450425a75f7876001a28ee5b2a1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-07T21:42:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) Andrea Bulka Sahaiko.pdf: 2053259 bytes, checksum: 00526450425a75f7876001a28ee5b2a1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-27 / A presente pesquisa teve como objetivo compreender como a Organização Não-Governamental (ONG) Observatório Social de Irati desenvolve sua participação no Município de Irati, no recorte temporal de 2016 e 2017 (primeiro semestre). A pesquisa teve caráter qualitativo e foi realizada através do seguinte procedimento metodológico: sistematização de referencial teórico a partir das principais categorias: Participação, Sociedade Civil, Estado, Hegemonia e Ideologia. Nesta sistematização foi de fundamental importância a análise sobre os princípios do Estado Democrático de Direito, as formas e representações da participação a partir das teorias liberal e marxista. Também procuramos articular a totalidade das relações sociais, permeadas pelas contradições do modo de produção capitalista e a fragmentação entre público e privado. Na sequência, realizou-se a inserção no campo, com coleta de dados e documentos, bem como observações, com anotações em caderno de campo. Portanto, a pesquisa utilizou-se de documentação direta e indireta, no intuito de coletar dados que pudessem nortear as interpretações propostas. Foram identificadas várias formas de participação da ONG estudada, sendo estas separadas nas seguintes categorias: Educação Fiscal, Mobilização da Sociedade e Fiscalização das Contas Públicas. A interpretação dos dados foi realizada por meio da análise de conteúdo, tentando buscar o significado das mensagens e das formas de participação sob orientação do método histórico-dialético. Os principais resultados encontrados demonstram uma tendência de participação voltada a conteúdos gerenciais, que desconsideram interesses de classe e desigualdades sociais. A participação voltada a estes conteúdos tem concepções próprias sobre o papel do cidadão na ordem jurídico-política, considerando a justiça social como fenômeno de busca individual, aliado a ideologias de mercado (economia e eficiência) na aplicação dos recursos públicos. Tal fato se dá por influência hegemônica do modo de produção capitalista, decorrente principalmente de políticas neoliberais introduzidas no Brasil a partir dos anos 1990. Em certa medida, estas políticas atingem a ação participativa como processo pedagógico, bloqueando a busca por autonomia e consciência política. Mesmo assim, ao refletir sobre os processos participativos no Estado de Direito, não se pode desconsiderar toda a riqueza de atuação da sociedade civil, compreendida como espaço de lutas e conquistas por novas hegemonias, sendo a participação um processo inacabado, contraditório, mas em constante movimento. / The present research had as objective to understand how the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Social Observatory of Irati develops its participation in the Municipality of Irati, in the temporal cut of 2016 and 2017 (first semester). The research was qualitative and was carried out through the following methodological procedure: systematization of theoretical reference from the main categories: Participation, Civil Society, State, Hegemony and Ideology. In this systematization it was fundamentally important to analyze the principles of the Democratic State of Law, the forms and representations of participation from the liberal and Marxist meanings. We also seek to articulate the totality of social relations, permeated by the contradictions of the capitalist production process and the fragmentation between public and private. In the sequence, the field was inserted, with data collection and documents, as well as observations, with annotations in a field notebook. Therefore, the research used direct and indirect documentation, in order to collect data that could guide the proposed interpretations. Several forms of participation of the NGO studied were identified, being these separated in the following categories: Fiscal Education, Society Mobilization and Public Accounts Audit. The interpretation of the data was performed through content analysis, trying to find the meaning of messages and forms of participation under the guidance of the dialectical-historical method. The main results show a tendency towards participation focused on managerial content, which disregards class interests and social inequalities. This is due to ideological and hegemonic influences of the capitalist mode of production, mainly influenced by neoliberal policies introduced in Brazil from the 1990s. To a certain extent, these policies affect participation as a pedagogical process, blocking the search for autonomy and political consciousness. Even so, when reflecting on the participatory processes in the State of Right, one can not disregard all the wealth of civil society, understood as space of struggles and conquests for new hegemonies, participation being an unfinished, contradictory, but constant process movement.

Submitted by Marlene Aparecida de Souza Cardozo (mcardozo@pucsp.br) on 2016-11-22T13:12:55Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leandro Suriani da Silva.pdf: 1080817 bytes, checksum: 350c62fe0540794eb43dae7eb541a59a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-22T13:12:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leandro Suriani da Silva.pdf: 1080817 bytes, checksum: 350c62fe0540794eb43dae7eb541a59a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-10-03 / This thesis reflects a sequence of studies involving neoconstitucionalism theories developed in Brazil and their criticism. It was demonstrated the construction of constitutionalism in Brazil and the reasons for the emergence of the institute called neoconstitutionalism, which introduced a new techniques for interpretation of the Constitution and conferred more freedom to court judges to introduce changes in social, economic and political issues in society, without the intervention of the Congress. At the same time, although recognized as a mechanism able to bring more effectiveness to law, we tried to present in this work the criticism inaugurated against this theory, especially about the risks in moving away persistently the laws issued by the Brazilian Congress, with prevalence of constitutional principles, leaving to the particularly criterion of court judges to settlement the cases, even more in a context of a democratic society, in which exists a real differences of opinions on various themes and issues / A presente dissertação reflete uma sequencia de estudos envolvendo o advento das teorias neoconstitucionalistas desenvolvidas no Brasil e as respectivas críticas. Procurou-se demonstrar a construção teórico científica do constitucionalismo no território brasileiro e as razões que originaram o surgimento do fenômeno intitulado neoconstitucionalismo, o qual introduziu novas técnicas para interpretação dos dispositivos constitucionais e conferiu maior liberdade aos juízes para introduzir mudanças de cunho social, econômico e político na sociedade, sem a interferência do Poder Legislativo. Ao mesmo tempo, ainda que reconhecido como mecanismo apto a trazer maior efetividade aos princípios constitucionais, procurou-se apresentar na presente dissertação as críticas inauguradas contra esta teoria, principalmente sobre os riscos em se afastar com insistência as leis e atos normativos editados validamente pelo Poder Legislativo, com prevalência dos princípios, deixando ao critério subjetivo do julgador a solução dos casos concretos, sobretudo no âmbito de uma sociedade democrática plural, em que evidente a divergência de opiniões acerca dos mais variados temas e assuntos

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-03-22T12:50:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Cristina Teixeira.pdf: 1742608 bytes, checksum: f5f3bbf6f0d171f7327ae9b6ba73a866 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-22T12:50:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Cristina Teixeira.pdf: 1742608 bytes, checksum: f5f3bbf6f0d171f7327ae9b6ba73a866 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-10 / This research focuses on the analysis of important themes in the study of Law, particularly in the development of the Brazilian State: education, citizenship and The Democratic Rule of Law. Education, a fundamental social right, is the pillar of all rights in society and traces a path towards human dignity. Once education as a right is not strongly promoted, an individual’s personal, social and political needs cannot be catered for. Citizenship, viewed as a possible intervention in the State decisions, was outlined in the Constitution of 1988 with active courses of action, namely the plebiscite, the referendum, the popular legislative initiative and popular action. The Democratic Rule of Law is the key principle in Brazil, which sharpens the focus of this research. It is virtually impossible to put citizenship into practice and, subsequently, endeavor The Democratic Rule of Law to take root without quality education, as stated in the constitutional text, which is based on the full development of the individual, citizenship awareness and qualification for the labor market. In order to address the question raised in this investigation, a documentary and bibliographical research was done. In the light of the premises found in the study, as far as education, democracy and The Democratic Rule of Law are concerned, aligned with the citizen’s active participation, it seems non-viable to consider citizenship on the grounds of the aforementioned democratic rule except for education which paves the way for full citizenship / Este estudo tem como objetivo analisar temas importantes para o estudo do Direito e, especialmente, para o desenvolvimento do Estado Brasileiro: a educação, a cidadania e o Estado Democrático de Direito. A educação, direito fundamental social, é requisito para a realização de outros direitos e a obtenção dos bens necessários a uma vida digna. Sem o exercício adequado desse direito não é possível a realização em nível pessoal, social e político da pessoa. A cidadania, aqui considerada como a possibilidade de intervir e participar das decisões do Estado, na Constituição de 1988 foi qualificada com a possibilidade da utilização de instrumentos diretos de atuação, entre os quais destacamos o plebiscito, o referendo, a iniciativa popular legislativa e a ação popular. É princípio fundamental de nosso País o Estado Democrático de Direito e é aqui que se coloca a questão objeto dessa pesquisa: é impossível exercer a cidadania e, em consequência, realizar o Estado Democrático de Direito, sem uma educação adequada, aqui entendida como aquela preconizada no Texto Constitucional, com as finalidades de desenvolvimento integral da pessoa, preparação para o exercício da cidadania e qualificação para o mercado de trabalho. Para responder à questão proposta, foi realizada uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental que embasou as análises elaboradas sobre os temas, objetos desta pesquisa. A partir das premissas estabelecidas, a respeito da educação, da democracia e do Estado Democrático de Direito, bem como dos mecanismos de participação direta dos cidadãos, não é possível falar-se em cidadania como fundamento do Estado Democrático de Direito sem uma educação que prepare as pessoas para o exercício da cidadania

O raciocínio jurídico analógico tem sido visto ora como forma de raciocínio essencial ao Direito, ora como mecanismo pernicioso e arbitrário de tomada de decisões, em prejuízo ao Estado de Direito. O presente trabalho parte da hipótese de que o raciocínio analógico é mecanismo que promove segurança jurídica, e, não, indeterminação. Para sustentar tal ideia, a primeira parte desta discussão apresenta o ponto de vista de diferentes teóricos do direito que procuraram expor ou negar a existência de uma estrutura própria dessa forma de raciocínio. A segunda parte, por sua vez, propõe um balanço acerca dessas perspectivas, identificando-se elementos pertinentes à estrutura do raciocínio analógico e passíveis de análise específica e de crítica, com possibilidade de reformulação ou de melhor compreensão dos pontos colocados em evidência. A terceira parte, por fim, estabelece relação entre raciocínio analógico e coerência, entendendo esta como essencial para compreender de que maneira tal espécie de raciocínio pode promover segurança jurídica; para tanto, discute os conceitos de coerência e de integridade do direito, e, então, propõe que é possível verificar, do ponto de vista prático, relação entre a forma de desenvolvimento de raciocínios analógicos e os institutos jurídicos, de maneira a sustentar, por fim, que a analogia pode constituir mecanismo de segurança jurídica e de densificação do direito. O trabalho conclui que o raciocínio analógico desempenha papel relevante no Estado de Direito, nem sempre percebido como tal. / Analogical legal reasoning has been seen both as a form of reasoning essential to the law and as a pernicious and arbitrary mechanism of decision-making, undermining the rule of law. The present work is based on the hypothesis that analogical reasoning is a mechanism that increases legal certainty, not indetermination. To support this idea, the first part of this discussion presents the point of view of different legal theorists who sought to expose or deny the existence of a proper structure of this form of reasoning. The second part, in turn, proposes a balance on these perspectives, identifying pertinent elements to the structure of analogical reasoning, which are subject to specific analysis and criticism, with the possibility of reformulation or better understanding of the highlighted points. The third part, finally, establishes a relation between analogical reasoning and coherence, understanding this as essential to comprehend how this kind of reasoning can promote legal certainty; for this, it discusses the concepts of coherence and integrity of the law, and then it proposes that it is possible to verify, from a practical point of view, the relationship between the development of analogical reasoning and institutions of law, in order to sustain, lastly, that analogy can constitute a mechanism of legal certainty and densification of the law. This work concludes that analogical reasoning plays a relevant role in the rule of law, not always perceived as such.

A teoria tradicional sobre o poder identifica a violência do Estado como sendo a manifestação última do poder político, chegando mesmo a encontrar na demonstração de força física a essência do poder. Esta relação repercute na teoria do Estado definindo-o, não sem bases históricas, como monopólio dos instrumentos de violência. Já para o direito, a identificação entre poder e violência leva a uma sobrevaloração da sanção na atribuição de juridicidade à norma. Ainda que não de modo pioneiro, Hannah Arendt e Niklas Luhmann definiram o poder em oposição à violência, ainda que a ela relacionado. Esta similaritude na descrição do poder como oposto à violência leva a indagações acerca da compatibilidade entre as reflexões políticas de Arendt e as observações sociológicas de Luhmann. Este trabalho realiza uma comparação entre as obras dos dois autores no que diz respeito à relação entre poder e violência dentro do Estado de Direito. Para tanto, o estudo parte da premissa de que é possível a uma teoria do Estado aplicar tanto Arendt, quanto Luhmann a seus próprios conceitos. A distinção de posições, se interna ou externa à política, permite que uma assimetria entre as obras seja estabelecida e, deste modo, viabiliza a comparação. O trabalho conclui pela compatibilidade dos autores devido à semelhança entre os conceitos de ação e comunicação, entretanto, reconhece que o conceito de poder de Arendt é muito mais amplo do que aquele de Luhmann. Por fim, este trabalho propõe possíveis pontos de partida para novas abordagens da política e do direito que reúnam características dos dois autores analisados. / The traditional theory of power identifies State violence as the ultimate expression of political power, to the point of perceiving in the demonstration of physical strength the essence of power. The liaison between political commands and violent attitudes reaches the definition of State itself, establishing it, not without any Historical grounds, as the monopoly of instruments of force. In Law the relation between power and violence leads to overestimating the role of sanction in define a norm as lawful. Even though not as pioneers, Hannah Arendt and Niklas Luhmann defined power as opposite to violence, yet connected. Such similarities induce the question of the possibility of combining both theoretical approaches. This essay compares the works of the authors regarding the bearing of power and violence under the rule of law. As premise, this essay adopts the assumption that it is indeed possible for a theory of State to develop both Arendts and Luhmanns concepts as its own. Different theoretical positions inside and outside polity allow the creation of an asymmetry, which enables the comparison. This essay reaches the conclusion favorable to the compatibility of the authors, due to the similarity of both the concept of action and that of communication. Nonetheless, it recognizes that Arendts concept of power is much broader than Luhmanns. Finally, this essay suggests new approaches to political and legal theories that may pursuit the theoretical path of any or both the authors in comparison.

This thesis examines the institutional design and the procedures regulating the decree-making in the poleis of the Classical and Hellenistic periods. The main contention of this thesis is that Greek decree-making is to be conceived as the result of a multi-layered system of interaction and delegation of deliberative authority among different institutions: councils, officials, assemblies and lawcourts. My thesis argues, therefore, that decree-making procedures were specifically designed to implement the concept of 'divided power', a value shared by both democracies and non-democratic regimes, and to shape the collective behaviour of the citizens when acting as decision-makers within the institutions. By adopting models from the political sciences, my thesis bridges the gap between institutional approaches to political decision-making and more recent approaches that have stressed the role of values and ideology as key factors to understand ancient Greek politics. Chapter 1 lays out the methodology of the thesis informed by the New Historical Institutionalism. Chapter 2 analyses the practice of delegation of power from the Athenian Assembly to the Athenian Council in order to enact additional measures. The careful study of the delegation-clauses sheds light on the administrative power of the Council by demonstrating that the Council played a proper policy-making role through the enactment of a decree, which was the product of Council's expertise in defined matters, such as religious affairs, foreign policy and the navy. Chapter 3 builds on the findings of the previous chapter, and shows the workings and development of delegation-clauses to the Council in two examples from outside Athens, Mytilene and Megalopolis over the longue durée. Chapter 4 deals with the deliberative procedures of Hellenistic Sparta. The Spartan 'divided power' envisaged that the Gerousia shared the probouleutic power with the ephors who could independently submit the bill to the Assembly. The Gerousia, however, held the power of nomophylakia and could veto the final decree. This chapter shows that divided power and the need of legal stability were addressed by Spartan institutions, but with different results because of the wider powers of officials in the decree-making. This chapter introduces the important issue of the balance between people's deliberation and stability of the legal order, which form an important focus of chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 discusses the role played by legal procedure of the adeia in fifth-century deliberative decision-making in the Assembly. This chapter provides a new comprehensive account of this legal institution. Adeia instituted a pre-nomothetic procedure, according to which the Assembly could change an entrenched piece of legislation or decree without clashing with the nomothetic ideology. Chapter 6 examines the relationship between deliberation and judicial review in the Greek poleis. The first section discusses the Athenian graphe paranomon, the public charge against an illegal decree. A thorough analysis of the legal procedure and of the institutional design shows that deliberative decisions were made within the framework of the rule of law and the graphe paranomon enforced this principle. This did not imply an institutional prominence of the lawcourts in the Athenian decision-making. The lawcourts performed an important role in the deliberative process through providing a safeguard of legal consistency by adding the legal expertise of the judges to the general rationale of the decree-making. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the discussion of evidence of judicial review from outside Athens and the multifaceted role of the Hellenistic practice of appointing foreign judges in adjudicating public lawsuits, and especially in the judicial review of decrees.

Many researchers and political experts have commented on the disenfranchisement of the citizenry caused by irresponsible use of power by the government that potentially violates the 4th Amendment rights of millions of people through secret mass surveillance programs. Disclosures of this abuse of power are presumably protected by the 1st Amendment, though when constitutional protections are not followed by the government, the result can be prosecution and imprisonment of whistleblowers. Using a critical autoethnographic approach, the purpose of this study was to examine the devolution of democratic governance and constitutional rights in the United States since 9/11. Using the phenomena of my signature indictment (the first whistleblower since Daniel Ellsberg was charged under the Espionage Act) and prosecution by the U.S. government, data were collected through interviews with experts associated with this unique circumstance. These data, including my own recollections of the event, were inductively coded and subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. The findings revealed that the use of national security as the primary grounds to suppress democracy and the voices of whistleblowers speaking truth to, and about, power increased authoritarian tendencies in government. These tendencies gave rise to extra-legal autocratic behavior and sovereign state control over the institutions of democratic governance. Positive social change can only take place in a society that has robust governance and social structures that strengthen democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and do not inhibit or suppress them.