<p>The objective of this thesis is to intervene into the ongoing dispute surrounding the political import of Gilles Deleuze’s single-authored work, specifically <em>Difference and Repetition</em> and <em>The Logic of Sense</em>. This thesis presents an alternative explanation to the question of whether or not Deleuze’s philosophy is political. By situating the debate surrounding Deleuze’s political implications in the contemporary ontological turn in political theory, this thesis argues that Deleuze’s works can be considered to be political in the non-conventional sense of the term, that is, insofar as a conceptual distinction is made between <em>politics</em> and <em>the political</em>. I further argue that Deleuze’s univocal ontology influences a concept of <em>the political </em>that is immanent to his thought, and in this respect he can be said to present a <em>political ontology</em>. The reading of Deleuze’s political ontology addresses not only the common critiques of his philosophy as posed by thinkers such as Alain Badiou, Peter Hallward, and Slavoj Žižek, but also sheds light on the problematic relationship between philosophy and politics.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Most of the limited scholarship on Sedulius Scottus focuses on his poems and treatise, De Rectoribus Christianis. As the product of a central ecclesiastical figure in Liège, the intellectual capital of Louis the German’s kingdom, Sedulius’ biblical exegesis also deserves study. The Carolingians revered classical society and culture and at the same time sought to become a wholly Christian empire, thus, it is not surprising that the content of Sedulius’ Collectaneum in Apostolum contains both classical and Christian elements. In 1997, J. Frede published a critical edition of Sedulius’ Collectaneum in Apostolum, but there remains today neither a translation nor specific study of this work in any modern language. My thesis seeks to provide an introduction and translation for the Prologue and commentaries on Galatians and Ephesians as contained in Frede’s critical edition of Sedulius Scottus’ Collectaneum in Apostolum. After situating Sedulius in his historical context and highlighting the tradition of biblical collectanea, I present external evidence – which demonstrates Sedulius’ familiarity with Donatus’ Vita and Servius’ commentary on the Aeneid – as well as intertextual links to the latter works to argue that Servius’ pedagogical commentary served as a literary model for Sedulius’ Collectaneum. I also introduce and explain Sedulius’ organizing template for the Prologue, which is his employment of the classical rhetorical schema, “the seven types of circumstance”. This schema is an important rhetorical tool of many classical and medieval authors that has heretofore been misrepresented as originating from Hermagoras. Sedulius’ literary style and format are examined as matters of introduction, which further reveals the influence of Servius. The commentaries within the Collectaneum in Apostolum are essentially based on older, formative religious writers such as Jerome, Augustine, and Pelagius. Not only do I survey Sedulius’ doctrinal stances on important theological and ecclesiastical issues of his time, but I discuss Sedulius’ reception of the above three authors in particular and demonstrate how his Collectaneum in Apostolum attempts to harmonize their sometimes discordant voices.

Irländskfödda Johannes Scottus Eriugena (c. 810-877) verkade som teolog vid Karl II:s hov i det västfrankiska riket. Unikt för honom var att han kunde både grekiska och latin och ägnade sig åt att sammanföra grekiska och latinska kyrkofäders tänkande. I sitt filosofiska, exegetiska och teologiska verk Periphyseon kartlägger han varats ursprung och mål med hjälp av Augustinus, Ambrosius, Dionysius Areopagita, Gregorios av Nyssa, Gregorius av Nazianzus och Maximus Bekännaren. Eriugena är också en självständig tänkare. Den här uppsatsen lyfter fram några aspekter av hans tolkningar av Genesis 1-3 som ger honom hans särprägel som exeget. Kännetecknande för Eriugena är bl.a. att han hävdar att Bibeln ska tolkas allegoriskt. I uppsatsen belyses att hans allegoriska metod leder honom till en tolkning av paradiset som en framtidsvision. Han tar avstånd från den historiska tolkningen av Bibeln som Augustinus gör i De Genesi ad litteram. Kännetecknande för Eriugenas tänkande är också att det utgår från en systematisk nyplatonism. Uppsatsen visar hur detta kommer till uttryck i hans tolkning av Genesis 1-3. Ett övergripande syfte med uppsatsen är att väcka intresse för det teologiska tänkandet som föregick renässansen och för tidig medeltid i synnerhet. Genom det här arbetet hoppas jag inspirera till ett ökat intresse för tidig medeltid som en källa till intellektuell fördjupning.

The present dissertation concerns cognitive psychology--theories about the nature and mechanism of perception and thought--during the High Middle Ages (1250-1350). Many of the issues at the heart of philosophy of mind today--intentionality, mental representation, the active/passive nature of perception--were also the subject of intense investigation during this period. I provide an analysis of these debates with a special focus on Durand of St.-Pourçain, a contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Durand was widely recognized as a leading philosopher until the advent of the early modern period, yet his views have been largely neglected in the last century. The aim of my dissertation, then, is to provide a new understanding of Durand's cognitive psychology and to establish a better picture of developments in cognitive psychology during the period. Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages held, in one form or another, the thesis that most forms of cognition (thought, perception) involve the reception of the form of the object into the mind. Such forms in the mind explain what a given episode of cognition is about, its content. According to what has been called the conformality theory of content, the content of our mental states is fixed by this form in the mind. Durand rejects this thesis, and one of the primary theses that I pursue is that Durand replaces the conformality theory of content with a causal theory of content, according to which the content of our mental states is fixed by its cause. When I think about Felix and not Graycat, this is to be explained not by the fact that I have in my mind the form of Felix and not Graycat, but rather by the fact that Felix and not Graycat caused my thought. This is both a controversial interpretation and, indeed, a controversial theory. It is a controversial interpretation because Durand seems to reject the thesis that objects are the causes of our mental states. In the first half of the present dissertation, I argue that Durand does not reject this thesis but he rejects another nearby thesis: that objects as causes give to us 'forms'. On Durand's view, an object causes a mental state even though it does not give to us a new 'form'. In the second half of the dissertation I defend Durand's causal theory of content against salient objections to it.

The present dissertation concerns cognitive psychology--theories about the nature and mechanism of perception and thought--during the High Middle Ages (1250-1350). Many of the issues at the heart of philosophy of mind today--intentionality, mental representation, the active/passive nature of perception--were also the subject of intense investigation during this period. I provide an analysis of these debates with a special focus on Durand of St.-Pourçain, a contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Durand was widely recognized as a leading philosopher until the advent of the early modern period, yet his views have been largely neglected in the last century. The aim of my dissertation, then, is to provide a new understanding of Durand's cognitive psychology and to establish a better picture of developments in cognitive psychology during the period. Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages held, in one form or another, the thesis that most forms of cognition (thought, perception) involve the reception of the form of the object into the mind. Such forms in the mind explain what a given episode of cognition is about, its content. According to what has been called the conformality theory of content, the content of our mental states is fixed by this form in the mind. Durand rejects this thesis, and one of the primary theses that I pursue is that Durand replaces the conformality theory of content with a causal theory of content, according to which the content of our mental states is fixed by its cause. When I think about Felix and not Graycat, this is to be explained not by the fact that I have in my mind the form of Felix and not Graycat, but rather by the fact that Felix and not Graycat caused my thought. This is both a controversial interpretation and, indeed, a controversial theory. It is a controversial interpretation because Durand seems to reject the thesis that objects are the causes of our mental states. In the first half of the present dissertation, I argue that Durand does not reject this thesis but he rejects another nearby thesis: that objects as causes give to us 'forms'. On Durand's view, an object causes a mental state even though it does not give to us a new 'form'. In the second half of the dissertation I defend Durand's causal theory of content against salient objections to it.

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The concept of matter as it is treated in the philosophical systems of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus is examined, partly to ascertain the influence which the original Aristotelian concept of matter had on the two medieval thinkers, and partly to determine which of these two thinkers remained more faithful to the original Aristotelian concept. An analysis is carried out of the views of the three philosophers regarding the ontological status of matter; the intelligibility of matter; the issue of the real distinction between matter and form; the role played by matter in individuating composite substances; and its role in defining composite substances and determining their essences. Finally, the views of Aquinas and Scotus regarding the theory of universal hylomorphism and the theory of the plurality of forms are discussed and compared. It is shown that, while most of the Franciscan philosophical tradition up to Scotus's time was far more influenced by Platonist than by Aristotelian principles, Scotus, though a Franciscan, was much closer to Aristotle than to Plato in his views regarding matter. In fact, the few deviations from the original Aristotelian concept found in Scotus's theory can be ascribed to theological concerns. It is argued, furthermore, that Scotus's views on the concept of matter are far closer to the original Aristotelian theory than our analysis shows Aquinas himself to be.

Ce travail examine et analyse les positions d'Avicenne, Thomas d'Aquin et Duns Scot concernant la connaissance des notions premières, à la lumière de leurs arguments pour cette position et de leurs autres engagements théoriques, en particulier aristotéliciens. Chacun à sa façon, ces philosophes affirment que l'étant ou l'existant est ce premier concept. Ils lui donnent une primauté logique, au sens où l'étant est présupposé par nos autres concepts. Ils lui donnent aussi une primauté cognitive, au sens où il est le premier objet à être conçu par l'intellect. / This work reviews and analyzes a view shared by Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus concerning the primary notions, examining their arguments in the light of their other philosophical commitments, especially Aristotelian ones. Each in their own way, these philosophers claim that being is this primary notion. Being has a twofold priority. In the logical order, being is presupposed by all other notions. In the cognitive order, being is the first conceived by the intellect.

Ce mémoire propose une étude critique des chapitres 14 à 17 de la première partie de la Summa logicae de Guillaume d’Ockham (v. 1285-1347), philosophe et théologien du bas Moyen-Âge. Ces quatre chapitres présentent la position d’Ockham dans la querelle des universaux, débat intellectuel marqué qui a opposé plusieurs écoles de pensée du milieu universitaire médiéval. Pour sa part, Ockham défend une position nominaliste selon laquelle 1. tout ce qui existe est de soi singulier; et 2. les universaux, ces concepts uniquement accessibles par l’esprit, n’existent pas. S’opposant au réalisme, Ockham s’y adresse notamment à l’un de ses collègues franciscain, Jean Duns Scot (v. 1266-1308). Ce mémoire a pour objectif d’identifier d’abord les mérites de la position nominaliste face au réalisme quant au statut des universaux et à la philosophie du langage et ensuite les tensions internes au nominalisme ockhamiste lorsque nous tentons de concilier celui-ci à l’ontologie et à la théologie catholique. Il s’agira donc de montrer que l’antiréalisme parvient à défaire le réalisme dans une perspective logique, mais que certains problèmes demeurent lorsque nous l’analysons dans une perspective ontologique ou théologique. Mots-clés : Guillaume d’Ockham, philosophie médiévale, Moyen-Âge, universaux, Jean Duns Scot, scolastique, ontologie, théologie catholique, logique, sémantique / This thesis proposes a critical study of chapters 14 to 17 of the first part of William of Ockham’s Summa logicae, a philosopher and theologian of the late Middle Ages (c. 1285-1347). These four chapters present Ockham's position in the problem of universals, a marked intellectual debate that opposed several philosophical and theological schools of the medieval academic world. For his part, Ockham defends a nominalist position according to which 1. everything that exists is inherently singular; and 2. universals, those concepts only accessible to the mind, do not exist. Opposing realism, Ockham addresses one of his Franciscan colleagues in particular, John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308). This thesis’s first aim is to identify the merits of a nominalist position vis-à-vis realism in regard to the status of universals, and second, to mark the tensions internal to Ockham’s nominalistic approach in its conciliation with ontology and catholic theology. It will thus be shown that antirealism succeeds in defeating realism from a logical perspective, but that some problems remain when we analyse it from an ontological or theological perspective. Keywords: William of Ockham, medieval philosophy, Middle Ages, universals, John Duns Scotus, scholastic, ontology, catholic theology, logic, semantics.