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A presente tese tem por objeto o estudo da disciplina normativa e dos pressupostos teóricos do controle conjunto nas companhias brasileiras, conduzido a partir da diferenciação dos conceitos de controle conjunto e controle compartilhado, de grupo de controle e bloco de controle, e pela análise comparativa entre o poder de controle do tipo individual e o poder de controle do tipo conjunto nas sociedades anônimas. A figura do grupo controlador é examinada, ao longo do trabalho, a partir da contraposição entre suas perspectivas interna e externa, como ângulos analíticos sobre os quais é erigida grande parte das conclusões, assentadas na noção de titularidade unitária do controle. O estudo é motivado pela identificação de uma falha na Lei nº 6.404/76, a qual, apesar de referir o controle em sua forma plurissubjetiva, foi construída sobre a figura do controlador individual e, por isso, necessita ser adaptada. Tendo isso presente, o exame da disciplina do controle conjunto parte da diferenciação entre a hipótese de controle conjunto por grupo de pessoas vinculadas por acordo de voto e a de controle conjunto por grupo de pessoas sob controle comum, tal qual definido pelo artigo 116 da Lei nº 6.404/76, com especial destaque para a primeira, por sua maior complexidade. Feita a análise dos aspectos legais do controle conjunto, identificam-se os seus pressupostos teóricos, a saber, a titularidade unitária do controle, a pluralidade subjetiva, a comunhão de objetivos e a conjugação de interesses, e a coordenação decisória consensual. A partir desses pressupostos são elaboradas as regras para imputação do status de acionista controlador e da titularidade do poder de controle nos casos de controle conjunto. Em seguida, são apresentadas orientações interpretativas para adaptação de algumas regras societárias ao controle conjunto, pela aplicação da tese aos casos de conflito de interesses, de responsabilidade do controlador e de alienação de controle. Ao final, identificados os aspectos dogmáticos do controle conjunto, o objetivo é fornecer as diretrizes para distinguir os casos de controle conjunto daqueles que não o são e, assim, orientar a interpretação e a aplicação das regras relativas ao poder de controle e ao acionista controlador para os casos em que for devidamente identificada essa fattispecie de poder de controle nas sociedades anônimas brasileiras. / This doctoral thesis adresses the legal aspects and theorethical premises of joint corporate control in Brazilian corporations, and builds upon the distinctions between joint corporate control and shared corporate control, controlling group and controlling block, and the comparative analysis between individual corporate control, on the one hand, and joint corporate control, on the other. The control group is examined in light of the contrast between its internal and external perspectives, analytical angles from which a large part of the conclusions stem, based on the idea of corporate control as a unified power. The thesis is motivated by the identification of a failure in Law n. 6.404/76 (Brazilian Corporations Act), which, although expressly referring to the hypothesis of joint control, was built entirely upon the notion of individual control, and therefore needs to be adapted. Taking this into account, the legal regime of joint control considers two distinct hypotheses: the group of persons bound by voting agreements and the group of persons under common control, as defined by Article 116 of Law n. 6.404/76, with particular emphasis on the first, due to its complexity. Analysed the legal aspects of joint control, the thesis then identifies its theoretical premises: the unified nature of corporate control, the plurality of persons who are in control, the common objectives and conjunction of interests between them, and the decision-making coordination. From these premises, the thesis elaborates criteria to attribute controlling shareholder status and corporate control in joint control cases. Then, the thesis proposes interpretative guidelines to adapt certain rules of corporate law to deal with joint control, applying these guidelines to cases of conflict of interests, controlling shareholders responsibility and transfer of joint corporate control. Finally, having identified the doctrinal earmarks of joint control, the thesis aims to provide criteria to distinguish joint control from other types of corporate control, and to guide legal interpretation of the rules relating to corporate control and controlling shareholders in those cases where joint corporate control is identified.

A presente tese tem por objeto o estudo da disciplina normativa e dos pressupostos teóricos do controle conjunto nas companhias brasileiras, conduzido a partir da diferenciação dos conceitos de controle conjunto e controle compartilhado, de grupo de controle e bloco de controle, e pela análise comparativa entre o poder de controle do tipo individual e o poder de controle do tipo conjunto nas sociedades anônimas. A figura do grupo controlador é examinada, ao longo do trabalho, a partir da contraposição entre suas perspectivas interna e externa, como ângulos analíticos sobre os quais é erigida grande parte das conclusões, assentadas na noção de titularidade unitária do controle. O estudo é motivado pela identificação de uma falha na Lei nº 6.404/76, a qual, apesar de referir o controle em sua forma plurissubjetiva, foi construída sobre a figura do controlador individual e, por isso, necessita ser adaptada. Tendo isso presente, o exame da disciplina do controle conjunto parte da diferenciação entre a hipótese de controle conjunto por grupo de pessoas vinculadas por acordo de voto e a de controle conjunto por grupo de pessoas sob controle comum, tal qual definido pelo artigo 116 da Lei nº 6.404/76, com especial destaque para a primeira, por sua maior complexidade. Feita a análise dos aspectos legais do controle conjunto, identificam-se os seus pressupostos teóricos, a saber, a titularidade unitária do controle, a pluralidade subjetiva, a comunhão de objetivos e a conjugação de interesses, e a coordenação decisória consensual. A partir desses pressupostos são elaboradas as regras para imputação do status de acionista controlador e da titularidade do poder de controle nos casos de controle conjunto. Em seguida, são apresentadas orientações interpretativas para adaptação de algumas regras societárias ao controle conjunto, pela aplicação da tese aos casos de conflito de interesses, de responsabilidade do controlador e de alienação de controle. Ao final, identificados os aspectos dogmáticos do controle conjunto, o objetivo é fornecer as diretrizes para distinguir os casos de controle conjunto daqueles que não o são e, assim, orientar a interpretação e a aplicação das regras relativas ao poder de controle e ao acionista controlador para os casos em que for devidamente identificada essa fattispecie de poder de controle nas sociedades anônimas brasileiras. / This doctoral thesis adresses the legal aspects and theorethical premises of joint corporate control in Brazilian corporations, and builds upon the distinctions between joint corporate control and shared corporate control, controlling group and controlling block, and the comparative analysis between individual corporate control, on the one hand, and joint corporate control, on the other. The control group is examined in light of the contrast between its internal and external perspectives, analytical angles from which a large part of the conclusions stem, based on the idea of corporate control as a unified power. The thesis is motivated by the identification of a failure in Law n. 6.404/76 (Brazilian Corporations Act), which, although expressly referring to the hypothesis of joint control, was built entirely upon the notion of individual control, and therefore needs to be adapted. Taking this into account, the legal regime of joint control considers two distinct hypotheses: the group of persons bound by voting agreements and the group of persons under common control, as defined by Article 116 of Law n. 6.404/76, with particular emphasis on the first, due to its complexity. Analysed the legal aspects of joint control, the thesis then identifies its theoretical premises: the unified nature of corporate control, the plurality of persons who are in control, the common objectives and conjunction of interests between them, and the decision-making coordination. From these premises, the thesis elaborates criteria to attribute controlling shareholder status and corporate control in joint control cases. Then, the thesis proposes interpretative guidelines to adapt certain rules of corporate law to deal with joint control, applying these guidelines to cases of conflict of interests, controlling shareholders responsibility and transfer of joint corporate control. Finally, having identified the doctrinal earmarks of joint control, the thesis aims to provide criteria to distinguish joint control from other types of corporate control, and to guide legal interpretation of the rules relating to corporate control and controlling shareholders in those cases where joint corporate control is identified.

A tese propõe uma análise multidisciplinar e dogmática da arbitragem societária, notadamente do processo de inclusão de cláusula compromissória no estatuto social de sociedades anônimas fechadas, com base em uma deliberação assemblear tomada pela regra da maioria (fase pré-arbitral). O ponto de partida do trabalho é o exame da dimensão jurídica do contrato de sociedade aliado à verificação dos limites da autonomia privada dos sócios na definição da estrutura do negócio jurídico societário, à compreensão da categoria dos direitos subjetivos e dos traços fundamentais que formam a tipologia das anônimas fechadas, incluindo o tratamento dado aos direitos individuais dos acionistas. Ato contínuo, desloca-se a discussão para as esferas arbitral e constitucional, com especial atenção para os pressupostos da arbitragem como método de resolução de conflitos. O cerne do trabalho reside na relação entre a situação subjetiva ativa do acionista de manifestar sua vontade favorável ou contrariamente à escolha da arbitragem e a eficácia da regra da maioria como pilar de funcionamento das sociedades anônimas. Sustenta-se que a escolha da arbitragem constitui um direito fundamental de todo o acionista, cuja renúncia depende de manifestação, expressa ou tácita, de sua vontade, a qual não pode ser elidida ou alterada pelo estatuto ou pela assembleia geral majoritária sem o seu consentimento. Após examinar as correntes doutrinárias sobre o tema no Brasil e as possíveis alternativas para resolver o imbróglio, o estudo concluiu que a alteração legislativa que cria uma hipótese adicional de recesso representa a melhor solução para a problemática. / The thesis examines arbitration in corporate law, namely the inclusion of a statutory arbitration clause in the by-laws of a closely held corporation based on a deliberation taken by the majority rule (pre-arbitration phase). The study starts by analyzing the legal aspects of the corporate contract together with the limits of shareholders autonomy in defining the structure of such contract and the characteristics that form the typology of corporations, including shareholders individual rights. The discussion then moves on the arbitration and constitutional spheres, particularly to the premises of arbitration as a form of settling conflicts. The core of the thesis is the relation between the prerogative of a shareholder to express its will in favor of or against arbitration and the incidence of the full effects of the majority rule as an essential element in the structure of a corporation. The study sustains that the choice for arbitration is a fundamental right of all shareholders, which is why renunciation depends on their express or tacit individual manifestation and therefore, majority deliberation cannot in itself insert or remove it from by-laws. Finally, the thesis provides different scholars understandings on the issue as well as the main possible alternatives to dealt with it. The creation of an additional hypothesis of appraisal right within the existing law is suggested as the best solution to solve this conundrum.

Esta dissertação analisa os limites e a conveniência da vinculação de administradores a acordo de acionistas. Com a promulgação da lei nº 10.303, de 31 de outubro de 2001, foram incluídos os §§ 8º e 9º, ao art. 118 da lei nº 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 (LSA), que indisputavelmente passaram a vincular os administradores de companhias aos termos dos acordos de acionistas arquivados em suas sedes. Desde então, inexiste consenso doutrinário e jurisprudencial acerca dos limites de tal vinculação. A dissertação analisa, pois, as principais posições doutrinárias que variam desde a vinculação genérica, até a vinculação relativa. A primeira é capaz de abranger todos os atos da administração; a segunda, por sua vez, limita a possibilidade de vinculação da administração apenas com relação aos atos que não sejam de sua competência privativa previstos em lei ou pelo estatuto e, ainda, preserva o poder (dever) finalístico do administrador, previsto no art. 154 da LSA, de buscar e privilegiar o interesse da companhia. A dissertação tece, ainda, diversos comentários e posicionamentos sobre a conveniência de se vincular administradores. / This dissertation analyses the limits and the convenience of binding administrators to the shareholders\' agreement. With the promulgation of law nº 10,303, of October 31, 2001, §§ 8º and 9º were included to the article 118 of law nº 6,404, of December 15, 1976 (LSA), which indisputably began to bind companies administrators to the terms of the shareholder agreements filed in their headquarters. Since then, there is no consensus in the doctrine or the precedents about the limits of such binding situation. The dissertation analyses, thus, the main doctrinal positions ranging from the generic binding form until the relative one. The first is able to cover all acts of the administration; the second, on it turn, limits the possibility of binding the administration only with respect to acts that are not part of its competence provided for by law or by companies by-laws, and also preserves the finalistic power (duty) of the administrator provided for in article 154 of the LSA, of pursuing and giving priority to the companies interest. The dissertation also weaves several commentaries and positions on the desirability to bind administrators.

A tese propõe uma análise multidisciplinar e dogmática da arbitragem societária, notadamente do processo de inclusão de cláusula compromissória no estatuto social de sociedades anônimas fechadas, com base em uma deliberação assemblear tomada pela regra da maioria (fase pré-arbitral). O ponto de partida do trabalho é o exame da dimensão jurídica do contrato de sociedade aliado à verificação dos limites da autonomia privada dos sócios na definição da estrutura do negócio jurídico societário, à compreensão da categoria dos direitos subjetivos e dos traços fundamentais que formam a tipologia das anônimas fechadas, incluindo o tratamento dado aos direitos individuais dos acionistas. Ato contínuo, desloca-se a discussão para as esferas arbitral e constitucional, com especial atenção para os pressupostos da arbitragem como método de resolução de conflitos. O cerne do trabalho reside na relação entre a situação subjetiva ativa do acionista de manifestar sua vontade favorável ou contrariamente à escolha da arbitragem e a eficácia da regra da maioria como pilar de funcionamento das sociedades anônimas. Sustenta-se que a escolha da arbitragem constitui um direito fundamental de todo o acionista, cuja renúncia depende de manifestação, expressa ou tácita, de sua vontade, a qual não pode ser elidida ou alterada pelo estatuto ou pela assembleia geral majoritária sem o seu consentimento. Após examinar as correntes doutrinárias sobre o tema no Brasil e as possíveis alternativas para resolver o imbróglio, o estudo concluiu que a alteração legislativa que cria uma hipótese adicional de recesso representa a melhor solução para a problemática. / The thesis examines arbitration in corporate law, namely the inclusion of a statutory arbitration clause in the by-laws of a closely held corporation based on a deliberation taken by the majority rule (pre-arbitration phase). The study starts by analyzing the legal aspects of the corporate contract together with the limits of shareholders autonomy in defining the structure of such contract and the characteristics that form the typology of corporations, including shareholders individual rights. The discussion then moves on the arbitration and constitutional spheres, particularly to the premises of arbitration as a form of settling conflicts. The core of the thesis is the relation between the prerogative of a shareholder to express its will in favor of or against arbitration and the incidence of the full effects of the majority rule as an essential element in the structure of a corporation. The study sustains that the choice for arbitration is a fundamental right of all shareholders, which is why renunciation depends on their express or tacit individual manifestation and therefore, majority deliberation cannot in itself insert or remove it from by-laws. Finally, the thesis provides different scholars understandings on the issue as well as the main possible alternatives to dealt with it. The creation of an additional hypothesis of appraisal right within the existing law is suggested as the best solution to solve this conundrum.

Esta dissertação analisa os limites e a conveniência da vinculação de administradores a acordo de acionistas. Com a promulgação da lei nº 10.303, de 31 de outubro de 2001, foram incluídos os §§ 8º e 9º, ao art. 118 da lei nº 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 (LSA), que indisputavelmente passaram a vincular os administradores de companhias aos termos dos acordos de acionistas arquivados em suas sedes. Desde então, inexiste consenso doutrinário e jurisprudencial acerca dos limites de tal vinculação. A dissertação analisa, pois, as principais posições doutrinárias que variam desde a vinculação genérica, até a vinculação relativa. A primeira é capaz de abranger todos os atos da administração; a segunda, por sua vez, limita a possibilidade de vinculação da administração apenas com relação aos atos que não sejam de sua competência privativa previstos em lei ou pelo estatuto e, ainda, preserva o poder (dever) finalístico do administrador, previsto no art. 154 da LSA, de buscar e privilegiar o interesse da companhia. A dissertação tece, ainda, diversos comentários e posicionamentos sobre a conveniência de se vincular administradores. / This dissertation analyses the limits and the convenience of binding administrators to the shareholders\' agreement. With the promulgation of law nº 10,303, of October 31, 2001, §§ 8º and 9º were included to the article 118 of law nº 6,404, of December 15, 1976 (LSA), which indisputably began to bind companies administrators to the terms of the shareholder agreements filed in their headquarters. Since then, there is no consensus in the doctrine or the precedents about the limits of such binding situation. The dissertation analyses, thus, the main doctrinal positions ranging from the generic binding form until the relative one. The first is able to cover all acts of the administration; the second, on it turn, limits the possibility of binding the administration only with respect to acts that are not part of its competence provided for by law or by companies by-laws, and also preserves the finalistic power (duty) of the administrator provided for in article 154 of the LSA, of pursuing and giving priority to the companies interest. The dissertation also weaves several commentaries and positions on the desirability to bind administrators.

This study addresses the problem of explaining the emergence and viability of coalitions among shareholder activists. The formation of coalitions for purposes of shareholder activism is generally unexpected from a theoretical perspective. Potential shareholder activists typically rely on the exit mechanism rather than becoming actively involved in the governance of corporations, and they tend to be in a prisoner’s dilemma type of situation, which has a non-co-operative outcome. Moreover, unless co-operation can be expected from others, no individual shareholder will make costly contributions to a coalition. Still, minority shareholder coalitions exist. The purpose of this study is to develop a model that accounts for the emergence and viability of minority shareholder coalitions. Two ideal-typical minority shareholder coalitions are developed: the offensive minority shareholder coalition, and the defensive minority shareholder coalition. These are based primarily on contractual theory (transaction cost economics, agency theory and property rights theory) and take form under the assumption that economic ends alone motivate actors. The offensive minority shareholder coalition emerges to seize an opportunity to increase share price by means of voice; it is led by a coalitional entrepreneur who carries all costs, thereby inducing co-operation from passive shareholders. The defensive minority shareholder coalition emerges to safeguard the members’ investments from risks of expropriation, which arise from increasing costs of using the exit mechanism; it is characterised by widespread active participation, since free riding further increases the risk of being expropriated. The model integrates the ideal types with results from three case studies of minority shareholder coalitions. These case studies show that under certain conditions, coalition members act as if they consider the effects of their actions on their reputation within networks of shareholders; this has implications for a coalition’s emergence and viability. The case studies further show that controlling shareholders, under certain circumstances, will tend to act as if they consider the effects of their actions on their public image as perceived by relevant (present or future) stakeholders; this places a shareholder coalition in a different bargaining position.

The thesis examines the efficacy of the provisions of Saudi Company Law 1965 in terms of protecting the rights of minority shareholders in joint stock companies (JSCs). The aim is to assess the effectiveness of the current form of SCL 1965 in this regard and to suggest a reform scheme. This research finds that SCL 1965 does not adequately provide minority shareholders with all the rights that they should enjoy. Accordingly, minority shareholders are often subject to the controlling influence of majority shareholders, who are generally in charge of the company’s management. As a result, minority shareholders either do not exercise or do not enjoy certain rights, and they therefore forfeit their natural and intended role under this law, which is to oversee and control the activities of the board of the company, and in so doing to defend their interests. Despite the Saudi government intentions to conduct a range of reforms, particularly in the field of trade, SCL 1965 has not been modified to any significant degree; it is still not sufficiently effective, and does not address many important points relating to shareholders’ rights in listed companies. Therefore, there are important decisions that need to be made on the part of the Saudi legislature in terms of improving the investment environment in KSA, including improving the level of protection for investors in JSCs; these decisions will help to attract more investors into the Saudi financial market. This thesis suggests ways in which to improve the level of protection for minority shareholders in Saudi listed companies against any encroachment on their interests within the company. In this respect, it suggests recasting the provisions relating to minority shareholders, especially SCL 1965.

This study is motivated by one of the most prevalent properties of modern corporations: separation of ownership and control. Ownership concentration has been one of the corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem between shareholders and management. Existing literature is mainly concerned with the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance. Little evidence is provided on the impact of general ownership concentration, including multiple large shareholders, on firm performance. This study aims to examine the efficiency of ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism, and to explore relevant policy implications to improve firm performance. Based on the company ownership data across a sample of 1291 European companies in the year of 2004, this study shows that European companies' ownership are highly concentrated with the largest three shareholders own more than 60% ownership of company. Industrial companies hold direct controls of European non-subsidiary companies, while private shareholders turn out to be the ultimate owners. On average, there is more than one large shareholder who owns more than 10% of the shares in a European company. A further sample of 655 European companies is used to investigate the relationship between ownership, control and firm performance. A significant non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm performance with multiple turning points is confirmed. Specifically, Tobin's Q is highest when the Herfindahl index, which incorporates the degree of dispersion of shareholdings other than the largest one, reaches a value of 0.08. The largest shareholding of 10% might also be able to deliver relatively strong performance. Restructuring owner identities could be another efficient governance approach. Direct control from founder owners, ultimate control from insurance companies, and management ownership are beneficial for firm performance, while government, financial institutions except insurance companies and ultimate control of non-financial corporate owners are found to be detrimental for firm performance. Firm performance can also be improved by strengthening the contestability of the controlling coalition's power. The impacts of ownership and control on firm performance are found conditioned by country and industry. Therefore policies should be adjusted according to the companies' institutional environments. Although the endogeneity of ownership concentration and current firm performance is rejected in this study, past firm performance seems to affect current ownership concentration level. Higher accounting rates of return four years ago could result in lower current ownership concentration, while higher last year's Tobin's Q could result in higher current ownership concentration. Capital structure is found to be a significant substitute mechanism for ownership. These elements should be taken into account when the ownership governance mechanism is implemented.