Background: Sweden has a tradition of a concentrated ownership structure where many owners use dual asset classes to maintain corporate control by possessing small portions of the dividend rights. Financial literature has shown that these controlling owners find more incentives to divert corporate resources for private use, at the expense of shareholders. Recent studies also show that involvement in extraction of private benefits leads to long maturity debt as controlling owners avoid frequent monitoring by lenders. As this causes a conflict over corporate debt maturity between controlling and minority shareholders, we investigate if the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) mitigates this conflict through control contests. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyze how different ownership structures affect the informative environment within a firm. In addition, the thesis investigates how ownership structure affect debt maturity structure and what this mean for large and minority shareholders. Method: The study uses a quantitative approach with panel data of 74 publicly traded non – financial Swedish firms over the period of 2006 – 2014. A deductive approach has been applied in order to explain empirical results from theory and previous literature. Results: We find evidence that controlling owners with a separation in control and cash flow rights tend to insulate themselves through long term debt, creating a bad informative environment with information asymmetry and agency costs. Furthermore, our results show robust evidence that MLS mitigates these problems since control contest between large shareholders leads to a shorter debt maturity, yielding a better informative environment. In addition, our results imply that MLS may be an important factor in facilitating financing as investors associate these firms with less risk of extraction of private benefits.

Notre recherche s'intéresse aux déterminants de la rémunération des plus hauts dirigeants exécutifs des entreprises françaises cotées au SBF 120. Ce sujet trouve tout son intérêt du fait de la survenue de scandales liés aux montants de rémunération des dirigeants et dans un contexte national marqué par un fort tabou quant à cette question. Pour traiter de notre problématique, nous mobilisons le cadre de la théorie de l'agence complété par des approches permettant de prendre en compte le rôle actif des dirigeants dans la fixation de leurs montants de rémunération (théorie du pouvoir managérial et théorie de l'enracinement). Notre démarche empirique s'inscrit dans une perspective exploratoire en contexte français. Une première étape a consisté, par une étude qualitative, à préciser notre angle de recherche afin de dégager des hypothèses par l'administration d'entretiens semi-directifs et de questionnaires auprès des dirigeants. Ceci a permis de faire émerger des relations entre la performance boursière et économique passées des entreprises (en « t »), le pouvoir du dirigeant, le contrôle du conseil et de l'actionnariat et le montant de rémunération en espèces des dirigeants (salaire et bonus) (en « t +1 »). Nos résultats montrent l'absence de relation entre la performance boursière et économique passées de l'entreprise et le montant de rémunération en espèces des plus hauts dirigeants exécutifs. Par ailleurs des mécanismes de contrôle du conseil et de l'actionnariat externes (administrateurs indépendants et investisseurs institutionnels) affecteraient positivement la rémunération en espèces des dirigeants / Our research focuses on the determinants of CEO remuneration for French companies listed on the SBF 120. This topic is of crucial importance because of the occurrence of scandals about the amounts of CEO compensation and in a national context characterized by a strong taboo on this issue. To address this problem, we mobilize the framework of the agency theory complemented by approaches that take into account the active role of CEOs in setting their remuneration amounts (managerial power theory and entrenchment theory). Our empirical approach is exploratory in the French context. A first step consists, thanks to a qualitative study, in clarifying our terms of research to generate hypotheses by administering semi-structured interviews and questionnaires with CEOs. This has led to the emergence of relationships between past corporate stock market and economic performance (in "t"), CEO power, the control of the Board of Directors and shareholders and the amount of CEO cash remuneration (salary and bonus) (in "t+1"). Our results show no relationship between corporate stock market and economic performance and the amount of CEO cash remuneration. We found a positive and significant relationship between the control of the Board of Directors and shareholders independent directors and institutional investors) and the amount of CEO cash remuneration. Finally, the CEO power positively and significantly affects their amount of cash remuneration

[pt] Qual é o efeito de um mercado de controle corporativo mais ativo sobre a estrutura de propriedade das firmas? Nós mostramos que, em economias com severas imperfeições no mercado de crédito, empreendedores ilíquidos elevam seus blocos de controle para que, numa disputa pelo controle, os limitados recursos que dispõem sejam suficientes para derrotar as tentativas de aquisições. À medida que a restrição financeira do empreendedor se afrouxa, a ameaça de aquisições perde força e o tamanho do bloco de controle se reduz. O modelo prevê que o tamanho dos blocos de controle em carveouts deve ser menos sensível ao nível de atividade do mercado de controle do que aquele em aberturas de capital de firmas independentes. / [en] What is the effect of greater activity in the market for corporate control on firms´ ownership structure ? We show that, in economies with malfunctioning credit markets, illiquid entrepreneurs increase their blocks´ size, so that in a context for control, their limited resources suffices to defeat takeover attempts. As entrepreneur´s financial restriction is softened, the threat of takeovers dwindles and the size of the controlling blocks falls. The model predicts that sales of shares in carve-outs should be less sensitive to the level of activity in the market for control than thos in IPOs of independent firms.

Throughout the last century there has been an extensve discussion regarding the optimal capital structure.Excessive research has further been conducted to understand the relationbetween the market debt and equity on an aggregated market-level. However, it is observed that the research on thefirm-specific co-movement of stock and bondsis scarce. Since the last financial crisis,the bond market has especiallyseen a rapid growth. The growthstemsfrom the low interest rate climate togetherwithmore restrictive lending policies from banks. Based on this discussion the purpose of this research is to investigate if Swedish corporationsare making the optimal capital structure decision. This based on a potential co-movement of stocks and bonds. To answer the purpose the research question was therefore: What is therelationship between a corporation’s bond returnand stock return?The scientific method that was used in this research is a quantitative method witha deductive process and a positivistic angle. Because the research uses the whole population that is available, this is a censusstudy. In the population companies that have been active on the stock and the bond market sometime during the period from 2008 to 2018. Although, companies that have been delisted during this period have been excluded. From a population of 75 companies and 1972 observations, two regressions were made due to the inconclusive results regarding the dependency of stock return and bond return. No significant result between the returns was found. However, a significant result between marketcapitalizationand the returns togheter with stock standard deviation and the returns was found. Based on the result, the authors could conclude that there seems to be a demand for the issuance of both stocks and bonds. This follows a discussion regarding the possibility of diversification of the securities based on the modern portfolio theory. Further, the authors can conclude that the theories regardin the irrelevance of capital structure are applicable. Finally,the authors can conclude that the stakeholder theory can explain the value creation in a more appropriate fashion in relation to the result. The authors canthereforeconclude that the debt-equity dilemma still is present and further research within the area is required.

Slogan ou oxymore pour les uns, prix convoité ou formule vertueuse pour les autres, l’expression de démocratie actionnariale est présente dans les discours relatifs aux entreprises depuis les années 2000. l’étude ici présente s’intéresse à cette expression dans le cadre des discours juridiques portant sur les sociétés par actions. pour ce faire, la démocratie actionnariale a été considérée comme un mythe juridique, c’est-à-dire une représentation à la fois littéraire, politique et historique dans un contexte juridique. le mythe de la démocratie actionnariale incarne et véhicule une dynamique : celle de la rencontre entre la dimension démocratique et la dimension actionnariale. l’histoire et les sciences de gestion ont été parfois sollicitées pour le dévoiler dans son ensemble. le mythe de la démocratie actionnariale apparaît à la fois fondateur et structurant. fondateur, il accompagne les sources, les origines de la législation sur les sociétés par actions. dans sa forme traditionnelle, il est apparu au dix-neuvième siècle. il procède alors d’un rapport analogique assimilant sociétés par actions à une miniature politique. la société est une version réduite de la démocratie. dans sa forme moderne, il est né au vingtième siècle et rend compte de l’encastrement progressif des valeurs démocratiques de la communauté civique dans les sociétés par actions par le biais des mouvements rse. structurant, il participe à la pratique de ce type de société. autour de l’actionnaire, il nourrit ses droits politiques mais peine à rendre compte des droits financiers. autour des dirigeants, il s’associe à d’autres représentations pour en encadrer les pouvoirs. / Slogan or oxymoron for some, coveted reward or virtuous formula for others, the term shareholder democracy has been a part of the discourse on companies since the years 2000. this study discusses the term in the context of the legal discourse related to corporations. for the purposes of this discussion, shareholder democracy is considered a legal myth, meaning it is, at the same time, a literary, political, and historical representation in a legal context. the myth of shareholder democracy represents and conveys a dynamic: the junction between the democratic dimension and the shareholding dimension. history and managerial sciences have sometimes been solicited to unveil it in its entirety. the myth of shareholder democracy appears to be both foundational and structuring. foundational, it accompanies the sources, the origins of the laws and regulations on corporations. in its traditional form, it appeared during the nineteenth century. at that time, it was founded on an analogy assimilating corporations with a political scale model. a company is a smaller version of a democracy. in its modern form, it appeared during the twentieth century and is the product of the progressive inclusion of democratic values from society into the corporations through the csr movements. structuring, it participates in the life of such companies. as applied to the shareholder, it nourishes his political rights but struggles to advance his financial rights. as applied to the directors, it associates with other representations to monitor and provide a check on their powers.

Notre étude porte sur la protection des actionnaires à l’occasion de l’augmentation de capital des sociétés anonymes - étude comparée des droits français et irakien en vue d’une amélioration du droit irakien. Elle se focalise sur les risques pouvant toucher les droits pécuniaires, les droits politiques et les droits patrimoniaux des actionnaires et sur leurs traitements. Nous remarquons que la protection en droit français paraît plus avantageuse pour les actionnaires qu’en droit irakien. Nous démontrons que, même si cette protection des actionnaires dans le droit irakien comprend des points forts, elle n’est pas suffisante afin de garantir leur égalité de traitement. Cette protection peut être améliorée par le législateur irakien en s’inspirant des propositions auxquelles nous arrivons dans la conclusion générale de notre recherche. / Our study focuses on the protect shareholders during the capital increase of the joint stock companys - comparative study French and Iraqi law in order to improve Iraqi law. It focuses on the risks that may affect financial rights, political rights and the property rights of shareholders and their treatments. We note that the protect under French law seems more beneficial to shareholders that Iraqi law. We demonstrate that, although the protect of shareholders in Iraqi law includes strengths, it is not sufficient to guarantee their equal treatment. This protect can be improved by the Iraqi legislature on the basis of proposals which we reach the general conclusion of our research.

Este trabalho apresenta uma investigação sobre o alcance da aplicação da teoria da onerosidade excessiva, prevista nos artigos 478 a 480 do Novo Código Civil, aos acordos de acionistas, tipo contratual cada vez mais presente na realidade empresarial brasileira. Especial atenção é dada ao fato de que o acordo de acionistas está inserido em um contexto marcado não só por um ambiente negocial e mercadológico sujeito a acontecimentos imprevisíveis que podem desequilibrar as prestações de forma excessivamente onerosa para uma das partes, mas também marcado por um equilíbrio na composição do conteúdo contratual e na alocação de riscos correspondente combinados pelas partes. Para isso, serão analisadas as questões relativas ao alcance da aplicação do mecanismo de reequilíbrio contratual mencionado em acordo de acionistas, à identificação do objeto do conteúdo contratual que contém o programa de alocação de risco e ao elemento-guia utilizado pela jurisprudência nesse sentido, uma vez que foi o uso desenfreado do reequilíbrio contratual que fez com que este fosse quase expulso da sistemática contratual durante o período clássico. A pesquisa apontou como elemento-guia autorizador da aplicação da onerosidade excessiva pelos órgãos judiciais estudados a conjunção da identificação dos critérios legais com a identificação do fato de a onerosidade excessiva estar além daquele risco implícito e da álea normal da natureza do negócio jurídico celebrado. Tais resultados apontam para uma criteriosa possibilidade de correção de desequilíbrio contratual compatível com a dinâmica e o ambiente dos acordos de acionistas / This work presents an investigation concerning the scope of application of the excessive onerous theory, provided in articles 478 to 480 of the Brazilian Civil Code, in the sharesholders agreement matter, a contractual type increasingly present in the Brazilian business reality. Special attention is given to the fact the sharesholders agreement is inserted in a context characterized not only by the negotial and market environment subject to unpredictable events that may disrupt the provision in an excessive onerous way to a relevant party, but also characterized by a balance in the composition of the content and of the contractual allocation of risks combined by the relevant parties. For this, we analyze the issues related to the scope of application of the mentioned contractual rebalancing mechanism in the shareholders agreement matter, to the identification of the contractual content object that contains the risk allocation program and to the guide-element used in the jurisprudence in this sense, since it was the umlimited use of contractual rebalancing that caused this was almost kicked out of the contractual systematically during the classical period. The survey pointed out as guide-element to the application of excessive onerous by the legal courts studied the association of the legal criteria identification with the identication of the fact that the excessive onerous being beyond that inherent and normal risk concluded of the nature of the legal business. These results point to the possibility of a careful correction of contractual imbalance compatible with the shareholders agreements dynamic and environment.

O acordo de acionistas é instrumento que serve à adequação da disciplina societária aos interesses pessoais e patrimoniais dos acionistas. Tais acordos têm natureza jurídica contratual e parassocial, em razão de estarem intrinsecamente ligados aos pactos sociais. Em razão de serem contratos e, portanto, estarem submetidos à teoria geral dos contratos, e, ao mesmo tempo, estarem tão fortemente coligados à seara social, surgem dificuldades na resolução de questões limítrofes entre o direito civil e o direito societário. Esses problemas aparecem especialmente quando se trata da extinção por causa superveniente do acordo, existindo dúvidas na doutrina e na jurisprudência quanto à possibilidade de aplicação aos pactos parassociais das hipóteses de extinção aplicáveis aos contratos em geral. Com o objetivo de auxiliar na solução dessa questão, no presente estudo, são examinadas as causas supervenientes de extinção dos contratos, mais especificamente, as hipóteses de expiração de termo ou de implemento de condição resolutiva, de resilição, de resolução, por inadimplemento ou por onerosidade excessiva, de impossibilidade superveniente inimputável, de morte das partes, e, ainda, os cenários em que existe insolvência ou dissolução das partes ou da própria sociedade, os quais têm, após um exame genérico quanto a seus aspectos conceituais, verificada a sua aplicabilidade ao acordo de acionistas e os efeitos que produzem em sua esfera. São respeitados, contudo, os temperamentos necessários em decorrência de sua natureza parassocietária. / The shareholders’ agreement is an instrument that serves the adequacy of the corporate discipline to the shareholders’ personal and equity interests. Such agreements have the legal nature of contracts that are inserted in the companies’ corporate structure, being intrinsically connected to the bylaws and to the companies’ articles of associations. Because they are contracts, and therefore are subject to the general theory of contracts, and at the same time are so strongly linked to the corporate sphere, difficulties arise in solving border issues between Civil Law and Corporate Law. These problems appear especially when it comes to the termination of the agreements because of supervening causes, leaving scholars and courts in doubt as to the possibility of applying to the shareholders’ agreements the extinction hypotheses applicable to contracts in general. With the aim of assisting in the solution of this issue, the present study examines the supervening causes of termination of shareholders’ agreements, more specifically, the hypothesis of expiration of the term or implementation of a condition, terminations with and without cause, unenforceable supervening impossibility, death of the parties, and also the scenarios in which there is insolvency or dissolution of the parties in the agreement or of the company itself, which, after a general examination of their conceptual aspects, were submitted to a verification concerning their applicability to the shareholders' agreement and concerning the effects to be produced on such agreements, respecting, however, their nature as contracts inserted in the corporate structure.

In this thesis it is recognised that marketing has a dual role to satisfy both customer and shareholder objectives. The issue of shareholder value creation of marketing is an important and immediate agenda for marketing executives, management and academics. To date, marketers have not been able to adequately quantify and measure shareholder value creation through marketing assets and marketing expenditure. This has led to a dilution of marketing power and influence in the boardroom with management tending to treat marketing as discretionary expenditure and not as an asset. Academics have responded with conceptual models that relate marketing assets back to shareholder value, generally through cash flow or sales models. The creation of shareholder value through marketing assets and expenditure is then conceptualised and tested empirically. The conceptual model builds on the theory of agency and incomplete markets setting to illustrate the flow effects through marketing assets to shareholder value. The conceptual model also demonstrates that marketing expenditure can have stock and/or flow impacts on shareholder value. Flow effects are indirect effects that are mediated through sales, cash flows, and earnings and can be either temporary or longer term. It is concluded that in listed markets stock prices are the general surrogate for shareholder value, and risk adjusted earnings are the appropriate surrogate in non-listed markets. The thesis then empirically illustrates and tests the relationships between marketing communications expenditure on two data sets representing firms in listed and non-listed settings. The empirical results reveal that marketing expenditure does play an important role in the creation of shareholder value and that stock and flow effects are both present. Knowledge of the various empirical impacts from marketing across firm size, industry and listed and non-listed market settings observed in this thesis should prove highly valuable for marketers and managers. Finally, a conceptual understanding by marketers of the financial metrics that are required to be influenced in order to increase shareholder equity will provide greater clout in negotiations with management and boards of directors.

<p> </p><p>This paper is focusing on the responsibility corporations have toward society and what role stakeholders play in this responsibility. By providing a historical background of how corporations have used their responsibility toward society, it is clear that corporations have been responsible. Before, this responsibility was focused toward the shareholders of the corporation but with time it changed to include more actors within the society. By focusing on what kind of responsibility the corporation has towards the society it is active in, this paper will explain the notion of a corporation that has a social responsibility in terms of being morally responsibility for its actions. This is why the concentration of the this paper will be on the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR).</p><p>The notion of CSR has became more significant with time. In today's society corporations are expected to take more responsibility. A reason for this increased expectations from society on corporations could have to do with the fact that stakeholders have gained greater transparency through technological development, mainly the development of information technology.</p><p>The aim of this paper will be to show what role CSR plays for a corporation in today’s society and why a corporation should work more with its different stakeholders and not as before with almost solely its shareholders. To be able to conduct this aim, the notion of CSR will be described and put into perspective by the two main theories behind the concept of CSR: the monetary and ethical theories. This is done by first describing the development of CSR abroad and in Sweden, with a focus on “Den Svenska Modellen”. Second to show the different perspectives of the monetary and ethical approach in connection to the concept of CSR. Thereafter, the theories will be analyzed and discussed solely, in connection to each other and the development of CSR through time.</p><p>The analysis and discussion about the concept of CSR indicates that the monetary and ethical theories can not be considered to have the only impact on the concept of CSR but they have affected each other. Another conclusion is that the corporation's actions can lead to a responsible behavior that would benefit the whole society which the corporation is active in.</p><p> </p>