Ce mémoire porte sur la valeur épistémique des intuitions en éthique. Avoir l’intuition que quelque chose est moralement bon ou mauvais justifie-t-il le fait de croire que cette chose est réellement bonne ou mauvaise? Pour répondre à cette question, je tâcherai d’abord d’expliquer ce qu’est une intuition. Ensuite, j’examinerai les deux grandes familles de théories en épistémologies morale : le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme. Je me pencherai sur le rôle que l’intuition peut jouer dans ces deux grandes familles et je défendrai que les théories fondationnalistes sont préférables aux théories cohérentistes. Je consacrerai donc la majeure partie de ce mémoire à analyser le rôle que l’intuition peut avoir dans les théories fondationnalistes en épistémologie morale. On nomme « intuitionnistes » les théories fondationnalistes en épistémologie morale qui soutiennent que l’intuition permet de saisir des réalités morales indépendantes de nous. Suivant une distinction d’Henry Sidgwick, j’identifierai trois sortes d’intuitionnisme : l’intuitionnisme perceptuel, dogmatique et philosophique. Je m’attarderai principalement à l’examen de la plausibilité de ces trois théories. Finalement, je présenterai la conclusion à laquelle j’en suis venu à la suite de cet examen, soit que l’intuitionnisme philosophique est la forme d’intuitionnisme la plus plausible et qu’elle peut répondre à plusieurs objections souvent adressées à l’intuitionnisme. / This memoir is about the epistemic value of moral intuitions. Does having an intuition that something is morally right or wrong gives us good reasons to believe that the thing we have the intuition about is right or wrong? To answer this question, I’ll start by explaining what an intuition is. Then, I’ll look into the two biggest theories in moral epistemology: foundationalism and coherentism and how intuition can have a role in both of them. I’ll come to the conclusion that foundationalist theories are preferable to coherentist theories. The rest of the memoir will be a discussion of foundationalist theories in moral epistemology in which moral intuitions are what can justify some foundational beliefs. Those theories are called ‘’intuitionist’’. Following a distinction made by 19th century philosopher Henry Sidgwick, I’ll identify three ways in which intuitionism can be defended: perceptual intuitionism, dogmatic intuitionism and philosophical intuitionism. I’ll explain in details what are those theories and see if they are good theories in moral epistemology. Then, I’ll consider some general objections directed toward intuitionism and see if intuitionism can resist those objections. I come to the conclusion that philosophical intuitionism can resist most of the best objections addressed toward it and that it’s a very plausible theory in moral epistemology.

Κύριο θέμα αυτής της εργασίας αποτελεί η καντιανή έννοια της αυτονομίας, υπό την αναγκαία προϋπόθεση της ελευθερίας της βούλησης,η οποία καθιστά δυνατή την επιλογή και ως εκ τούτου την ηθική υπευθυνότητα των ανθρώπων. Το ενδιαφέρον εστιάζεται επίσης, και στην προσπάθεια του Καντ να δείξει ότι η ελευθερία και περαιτέρω η αυτονομία, μπορούν να συμβιβαστούν με το αυστηρό αιτιοκρατικό σύστημα. Eπιπλέον, η εργασία προσφέρει μια διεξοδική ανάλυση βασικών καντιανών εννοιών και επιχειρεί να φέρει στο προσκήνιο την αξία της καντιανής αυτονομίας, τονίζοντας ωστόσο τα ερμηνευτικά θέματα τα οποία εγείρονται. Τέλος, παρουσιάζει δυο θεμελιώδεις, αλλά αντίθετες, προσεγγίσεις της καντιανής αυτονομίας. / The main topic of this thesis is the kantian notion of autonomy, under the necessary presupposition of freedom of the will, which enables individuals to make free choices and consequently, to be morally responsible for these choices. Interest also, focuses on Kant's effort to show that freedom of the will, and further autonomy, can be reconciled with the strict deterministic system. Additionally, it offers an extensive analysis of basic kantian notions and undertakes to bring to the fore the value of kantian autonomy, whilst highlighting the interpretative issues which arise. Finally, it presents two fundamental, but different approaches to kantian autonomy.

This thesis addresses the conflict traditionally found within moral philosophy between deontological and utilitarian schools of thought. Using the example of the serious moral ambivalence experienced by individuals who are deciding whether to end or continue a difficult pregnancy, it is argued that this ambivalence is the result of both absolute principles (such as the intrinsic value of human life) and outcome based considerations (such as the desire to avoid causing pain and suffering) appearing to be morally reasonable, while also being fundamentally opposed: Each course of action is at once morally defensible on the basis of its own reasonableness, and, conversely, reprehensible due to the reasonableness of the other. This lived experience of moral ambivalence is directly reflected by the tension between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at the moral philosophic level, where the deontological emphasis on the unconditional rightness of certain principles is seen to be at irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain ends. The thesis’ central claim is that such ambivalence strongly indicates that human morality is neither exclusively one type or the other, and that both types of moral property are in fact reasonable, and thus have moral value. It is theorised that accounting for this dual reasonableness would lead to the most accurate and helpful representation of the human moral experience – but that the philosophic ‘divide’ between the two types of principle has led to an either/or situation, which has largely prevented this sort of understanding from being developed. The thesis argues that Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick developed a view in which neither deontological nor utilitarian principles can be fully realised without reference to the other, precisely on the basis that both can be found to be ultimately rational. This thesis aims to revitalise that theory – represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ - to show that Sidgwick reconciled the divide between absolute and end based principles in such a way that the relationship between them becomes a ‘synthesis’. In this synthesis, deontological and utilitarian concepts are both seen as essential components of morality, that combine to form a dynamic whole in which the value of each principle is both indicated and naturally limited by the value of the other, on account of their respective rationalities. It is argued that this provides a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the human moral experience, and better moral justification for either course of action in situations of complex and sensitive ethical decision making.