State compensation is considered a complementary tool for victims of crimes’ access to restorative justice. Particular benefits with state compensation for trafficked persons is the non-involvement of the offender, which by the nature of the crime usually implies a major obstacle for their access to financial compensation. The access to compensation for cross border victims - which includes victims of trafficking - and the importance of enforcing victims of crimes’ right to justice and equality before the law, has undergone a major actualization in step with the free movement - which led to an increased mobility across EU-borders. The correlation between equality before the law -as an expression for cross border victims’ access to state compensation regardless of citizenship- and the prevailing increasement of freedom of movement in the EU will among others be analyzed down Dworkin’s perception on equality and freedom as reciprocal musts. The right to compensation for victims of trafficking is established in binding EU-acts and therefore requires compliance, particularly since Directive 2004/80/EG - which enforces cross border victims’ right to compensation - was adopted. Due to the lack of contrasting research in the area of victims’ access to state compensation in the EU-member states five different countries is hereby being analyzed, intending to compare national policies on compensation and their compliance with Directive 2004/80/EG. The member states in focus are Spain, Greece, Portugal, Malta and Italy. My conclusion asserts that the member states do comply with the EU-obligations on compensation but the protection of trafficked persons’ right - and access to- state compensation is notwithstanding beneath contempt and requires urgent progress.

What do we require from the labor market in order for it to contribute to a free life? And will the labor market of the future live up to what we expect from it? This study examines how a political philosophy of Hegelian inspiration helps us understand the conditions by which the labor market could be capable of providing for what Axel Honneth refers to as ’social freedom’. An analysis by French jurist Alain Supiot is presented as an informative example of this theoretical framework. Supiot develops a sophisticated critique of the deficiencies of the contemporary labor market, while simultaneously pointing at some professions whose function testify of the possibility of the labor market of generating social freedom under proper conditions. As such, I show that a critical framework of Hegelian inspiration is immensely potent as to its capacity of understanding what we require from the labor market at this time of history. Immensely potent, but perhaps insufficient. Indeed, by introducing the research of Aaron Benanav pertaining to the development of the global labor market, this study corroborates the critique of Honneth and Supiot—a critical framework already introduced by Karen Ng and Timo Jütten—concerning the possibilities of the labor market of providing social freedom at any significant scale and thus hints at the probable necessity of overcoming capitalism during the time to come.

La recherche théorique et spéculative qui fait l’objet de cette thèse permet de propo-ser un modèle d’éducation à la citoyenneté qui aurait des visées émancipatrices. S’inscrivant dans la tradition des sciences critiques et de la pédagogie critique de Freire (1968), elle défend d’abord l’idée que malgré la charge idéologique ou politique qui y est associée, l’éducation à la citoyenneté, comme toute forme d’éducation formelle ou informelle, devrait poursuivre la liberté et l’autonomie comme finalités. C’est en prenant appui sur les thèses récentes du philosophe Axel Honneth (2015 et 2017), attaché à l’École de Francfort, portant sur le concept de liberté sociale et en exploitant les outils de l’herméneutique défendue par Ricœur notamment, qu’il a été possible dans un premier temps de proposer un modèle de citoyenneté de liberté sociale et, dans un deuxième temps, de définir certaines des caractéristiques des citoyen·ne·s de liberté sociale. Enfin, ce travail a permis de faire émerger des habiletés et des aptitudes que l’éducation à la citoyenneté qui aurait la liberté et l’émancipation comme finalités devrait contribuer à développer ou à entre-tenir. En raison de leur portée, nous nommons ces habiletés des vertus démocratiques. Les six vertus démocratiques que notre travail permet de faire émerger et qui devraient faire l’objet d’un enseignement ou d’un apprentissage sont 1) l’autonomie critique ; 2) la capacité à délibé-rer et à décider collectivement ; 3) la reconnaissance ; 4) la solidarité ; 5) la créativité ; et 6) la capacité d’action. / The theoretical and speculative research that is the subject of this thesis proposes a model of citizenship education that would have emancipatory aims. Following the tradition of critical sciences and Freire's critical pedagogy (1968), it first defends the idea that despite the ideological or political charge associated with it, citizenship education, like any form of formal or informal education, should pursue freedom and autonomy as its goals. By taking as a basis the recent theses of the philosopher Axel Honneth (2015 and 2017), attached to the Frankfurt School, on the concept of social freedom and by exploiting the tools of the hermeneutics defended by Ricœur in particular, it was possible, firstly, to pro-pose a model of citizenship of social freedom and, secondly, to define some of the characteristics of citizens of social freedom. Finally, this work allowed us to identify skills and aptitudes that citizenship education, which would have freedom and emancipation as its goals, should help to develop or maintain. Because of their scope, we call these skills democratic virtues. The six democratic virtues that should be the object of teaching or learning and that our work pro-poses are 1) critical autonomy; 2) the capacity to deliberate and decide collectively; 3) recog-nition; 4) solidarity; 5) creativity; and 6) the capacity for action.

Abstract The starting point for the research is to examine the educational perspectives of Axel Honneth’s recognition theory to find useful contents for educational institutions. The method of the thesis is conceptual analysis which gets a dual role: chapters two and three of the treatise define and analyse Honneth’s concept of recognition and its historic-philosophical context and with help of critical analyses, the articles (I, II and III) and chapter four of the dissertation connects the concept of recognition to the field of educational science. The starting points in the articles and the summary aim to respect Honneth’s own methodological starting points to discover new perspectives through criticism of criticism. Honneth’s methodological starting points, differing from the first and the second generations of critical theory, lie in a critique of critical theory resulting in the idea of normative reconstruction. The articles and chapter four elaborate on the central argument of the dissertation, demonstrating how social freedom as an ideal of democratic education leads to insurmountable problems. The argument is that from the perspective of education, Honneth’s idea of social freedom appears a rough initiation and socialisation to the prevailing culture. In these formulations, intentional pedagogical action vanishes in the background, and the process of Bildung gets a controversial character as an adaptation process. Education and Bildung are defined as homing processes on which the educator is unable to have an influence. This study concludes that this problem, peculiar to pragmatism, compels Honneth’s critical theory at a cross-roads; whether to follow the commitments to German idealism in the old critical theory or to abandon them by following pragmatism and Dewey. The danger is that by choosing the road of pragmatism, all the critical potential inherent in German idealism and old critical theory might be lost. / Tiivistelmä Tutkimuksen lähtökohtana on selvittää Axel Honnethin kriittisen teorian kasvatuksellisia ja sivistyksellisiä ulottuvuuksia. Tutkielman metodologiassa sovelletaan käsiteanalyysin kaksoistulkinnallista luonnetta; toisaalta tutkimus analysoi Honnethin tunnustamisen käsitteen semanttisia rakenteita ja toisaalta historiallisen tarkastelun avulla sovittaa nämä määritelmät kansankielelle kytkien ne relevantteihin kasvatustieteellisiin diskursseihin. Tutkielman luvut kaksi ja kolme vastaavat tulkinnan ensimmäistä ulottuvuutta ja tutkielman artikkelit (I, II ja III) sekä neljäs luku toista ulottuvuutta. Tutkimuksen lähtökohdat pyrkivät tekemään kunniaa Honnethin omia lähtökohtia kohtaan; löytää kritiikillä kritiikistä hedelmällisiä näkökulmia. Honnethin kritiikin kritiikki, poiketen ensimmäisen ja toisen sukupolven kriittisestä teoriasta, kulminoituu normatiivisen rekonstruktion ideaan pyrkien palauttamaan Hegelin Oikeusfilosofialle ominaisen intention filosofis-normatiivisesta rekonstruktiosta, jota aikaisempi kriittinen teoria ei Honnethin mukaan kyennyt toteuttamaan. Tutkimuksen artikkelit ja luku neljä tuovat esille tutkimuksen keskeisimmän tuloksen osoittaen kuinka sosiaalinen vapaus demokratiakasvatuksen ideaalina johtaa ylitsepääsemättömiin ongelmiin. Honnethin muotoilema sosiaalisen vapauden idea näyttäytyy kasvatuksen kannalta pelkkänä initiaationa ja sosialisaationa olemassa olevaan kulttuuriin. Näin pedagogisen toiminnan kehittelyt jäävät taka-alalle ja sivistysprosessien kuvaukset muistuttavat luonnon prosesseille ominaista sopeutumista. Kasvatus ja sivistys kuvataan ongelmallisesti itsestään tapahtuvina prosesseina kasvattajan kykenemättä vaikuttamaan näihin prosesseihin. Tutkielman teesinä onkin, ajautuuko Honneth tienhaaraan sivuuttaessaan pragmatismin ongelmat – seuratako ensimmäisen sukupolven kriittistä teoriaa pysyen uskollisena saksalaiselle idealismille vai kulkeako pragmatismin tietä hyläten saksalaisen idealismin ja kriittisen teorian kriittinen potentiaali?