Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Frank R. Giordano, Gordon H. McCormick. Includes bibliographical references (p. 179-189). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 97). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "5 April 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-89).

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / On 1 October 2003 the USAF transferred control of its CONUS-based combat search and rescue(CSAR) assets from Air Combat Command to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Transferto AFSOC was CSAR's fourth major reorganization in twenty years, and was the latest in a turbulentprocession of attempts to improve the combat effectiveness of CSAR forces. Despite possessing anabundance of brave, motivated, and extremely capable personnel yearning to accomplish their mission, dysfunctional organizational arrays and nagging organizational constraints have prevented USAF dedicatedCSAR forces from "getting to the fight" for the onset of hostilities in three of this nation's past four majorarmed conflicts. Special operations forces had to fill the void. This analysis evaluates CSAR's positionwithin AFSOC's organizational array to determine if this latest reorganization is likely to produce durableimprovements in CSAR combat effectiveness. My conclusion is that "CSAR friendly" organizational cultureand effective organizational constructs within AFSOC Headquarters, combined with highly receptiveattitudes among CSAR crewmembers, form a historically unique organizational mix that favors the long termsuccess of CSAR forces in AFSOC. To ensure AFSOC's favorable organizational posture is translated toimproved combat capability, leadership must immediately increase CSAR representation on HHQ staffs. / Major, United States Air Force

Flygvapnets specialoperationsförband produceras i den konventionella delen av Försvarsmakten vilket innebär högre krav på byråkrati och styrning uppifrån i dess utvecklingsprocesser än okonventionella organisationer. Detta innebär att snabb operativ innovation, som är en framgångsfaktor inom specialoperationer, försvåras. Studiens syfte är att genom en kvalitativ intervjustudie utreda hur en specialoperationsenhet som utvecklas, utbildas och utrustas i en konventionell organisation ges förutsättningar till innovation till stöd för specialoperationer. Till stöd används bland annat Spulaks teori om kreativitet och innovation för specialförband. Studien visar att det går att genomföra snabb innovation nerifrån och upp under förutsättning att det finns en koherent uppdrags- och riskuppfattning samt om det råder en organisationskultur som uppmuntrar till kreativitet och innovation. Snabb anpassning kan även ske uppifrån och ner genom närhet till beslutsfattare som skapar förutsättning för att prioritet kan möjliggöra att resurser frigörs. Ett anpassat regelverk, decentraliserad ledning och förståelse för uppdraget är andra avgörande faktorer som skapar förutsättningar till snabb innovation. För att kunna uppnå detta krävs även en tydlig styrning från central nivå för att undvika att specialoperationsförbandens behov fastnar i försvarsgrenskonkurrens. / The Swedish Air Force's special operations forces is produced in the conventional part of the Armed Forces, which means higher demands on bureaucracy and control from higher hierarchy in its development processes than unconventional organizations. This means that rapid operational innovation, which is a success factor in special operations, is hampered. The purpose of the study is through a qualitative interview study to investigate how a special operations unit that is developed, trained and equipped in a conventional organization is given the conditions for innovation in support of special operations. Spulak's theory of creativity and innovation for special operations forces, alongside with other research, is used as a theoretical framework. The result show that it is possible to implement rapid innovation from the bottom up, provided that there is a coherent view of the mission and risks and whether there is an organizational culture that encourages creativity and innovation. Rapid adaptation can also take place from the top down through proximity to decision-makers, which creates the conditions for priority to enable resources to be allocated. An adapted regulatory framework, decentralized command and understanding of the mission are other decisive factors that create the conditions for rapid innovation. In order to be able to achieve this, a clear guidence from the central level is also required to avoid the requirements of the special operations forces getting caught up in intraservice competition.

Commando Country assesses the nature of more than 30 special training centres that operated in the Scottish highlands between 1940 and 1945, in order to explore the origins, evolution and culture of British special service training during the Second World War. These locations were chosen by virtue of the utility of the physical environment of the highland estate, strongly influenced by associated ideas about the challenge of that environment, individual character and the nature of irregular warfare. By virtue of its Scottish geographical perspective, Commando Country diverges from the existing literature by looking across the training establishments used by different organisations, principally Military Intelligence, the Commandos, and Special Operations Executive (SOE), whose histories tend to be considered in isolation. The book investigates the development and function of each category of training centre, the relationships between them, and their place in the broader framework of British and Allied special operations. Based on research in official documentary sources, unpublished and published memoirs and on fieldwork and interviews with surviving participants conducted by the author, Commando Country also presents rare unpublished photographs from public and private sources and artefacts assembled for the exhibition of the same name held at the National War Museum, Edinburgh in 2007. The resulting thesis is that the philosophy and practice improvised at the original school of irregular warfare at Inverailort House in the summer of 1940 permeated the culture of the training centres that developed thereafter. Close attention is accordingly given to the circumstances, organisation and instructing personnel that created the Inverailort syllabus, and the backgrounds and skills brought to bear, some drawn from civilian professions. The application of similar methods to the newly formed Commando forces is then traced. In this context the original operational purposes of individual aspects of the training became standardised into a general test of fitness and character designed to control admission of volunteers into the Commandos, the raiding and assault units that regarded themselves as a new military elite. Simultaneously, the approach pioneered at Inverailort was adapted to form the paramilitary training element of SOE, the organisation that coordinated and supported Resistance organisations in enemy-occupied countries. Particular attention is paid to the dedicated training establishments for Polish and Norwegian SOE units based in Scotland. The book concludes by considering how techniques and philosophy were applied more widely as conventional military training itself evolved, extending influence even into postwar civilian outdoor recreation.

In this thesis, we examine the current levels of cultural understanding and irregular warfare being taught in U.S. Army conventional military schools. Given engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our view that the military needs a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction between American Soldiers and the local populations. Current analysis of the difficulties being reported suggests U.S. Army Soldiers are having trouble combating irregular warfare due to cultural misunderstandings and a lack of counterinsurgency training, thereby reflecting a likely educational gap in the U.S. Army's formal military educational training system. This thesis analyzes the current problems and difficulties Soldiers are reported to be having while attempting to combat irregular forces in non-western environments. We analyze the amount of training U.S. Army Soldiers receive in cultural understanding and irregular warfare in the military schools pipeline and conclude that there is a connection between problems Soldiers currently face and a lack of training for the conduct of operations in foreign countries. We propose a number of solutions to overcome these suspected gaps in education and suggested changes to the Army's professional education curriculum.

The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, finding success has been far more difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war. Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952. Throughout a relatively short history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in "irregular wars" and low intensity conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent experts in this particular field of warfare. Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments. In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create long-term stability in unconventional conflict areas.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis presents two prescriptive models for approaching challenges to special operations forces with regard to personnel recovery in an urban environment. It begins by developing a model for overt recovery methods, using McRaven's model of Special Operations as the foundation. This model is then tested against three different case studies from operations in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. The original six principles proposed by McRaven are complimented with four newly-prescribed principles that account for the interactions of the isolated personnel. Following this analysis, a nonconventional assisted recovery model is presented for clandestine personnel recovery methods. This model borrows the relative superiority concept from McRaven's theory, but proposes six different principles. This model is evaluated using three case studies from the World War II era through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. These cases support the idea that while the urban operational environment may vary across time and space, the principles supporting successful personnel recovery operations endure. / Major, United States Army / Major, United States Air Force

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