Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bernardo Wahl Goncalves de Araujo Jorge.pdf: 1473998 bytes, checksum: 8cefb96903764170d80df6eb0969cfa8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the military transformation that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a new american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of global war on terror , went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions / A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da transformação militar que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um novo modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de guerra ao terror , as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas

I efterbörden av Rysslands annektering av Krim 2014 uppstod diskussioner kring rysk krigskonst och hybridkrigföring. Bland tvetydigheterna som uppstod identifieras bland annat vilka strategier som det samtida Ryssland har för att uppnå strategisk överraskning. Denna studie har syftat till att undersöka rysk militär vilseledning i samband med Rysslands strategiska överraskningsanfall på Krim 2014. Studien har genomförts som en teoriprövande fallstudie varvid såväl västerländska som sovjetiska/ryska vilseledningsteorier prövats på det ryska agerande under annekteringen av Krim 2014. Sammantaget visar studiens resultat på förekomster av ryskt agerande i enlighet med samtliga av studiens prövade teorier varvid det i huvudsak var distraktion, dolda aktiva åtgärder samt desinformation som bidrog till den ryska strategiska överraskningen. Studiens oväntade resultat pekar på ett aktivt deltagande av den ryske presidenten personligen varvid det inte går att underskatta betydelsen av en politisk företrädare som Vladimir Putin. Studiens resultat kan vidare tolkas som att den vilseledning som Ryssland genomförde får ses vilande i huvudsak på tidigare dokumenterade sovjetiska teorier. Vidare visar studiens resultat på en hög rysk förmåga till anpassning där tidigare etablerade sovjetiska/ryska teorier kring vilseledning utvecklats till dagens konfliktmiljöer. Studien visar därmed att äldre sovjetiska/ryska teorier på inget sätt är obsoleta utan i allra högsta grad fortsatt är aktuella i dagens globala världsordning. / In the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea 2014, discussions arose about Russian military art of war and hybrid warfare. Questions were identified regarding strategic surprise and what strategies todays’ modern Russia was using. This study aims to investigate Russian military deception in connection with Russia's strategic surprise attack in Crimea 2014. The study was conducted as a single case study in which Western as well as Soviet/Russian theories of military deception was compared with the Russian activities during the Crimea annexation in 2014.  The result shows Russian activities in accordance with both Western and old Soviet/Russian theories of deception. According to the study Russian main focus was distraction, active measures and disinformation leading to the Russian strategic surprise. The study shows unexpected results regarding the amount of personal activity involving the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. The result shows that the significance of a political representative such as Vladimir Putin cannot be underestimated. Additionally the study also shows that the military deception conducted by Russia in and around the period of the Crimea annexation 2014 mainly extracts from previously documented old Soviet theories. It highlights Russia’s ability to adapt into today's conflict environments by bending and adjusting old theories and doctrines. By that meaning old Soviet/Russian theories are in no way obsolete but instead being very much relevant in today's global world order.

<p>  The world continues to advance at a hastening pace towards a technology enabled, digital-centric future. Legacy organizations, not born in the ‘digital age’ are examining methods to adapt through Digital Transformation (DT). The US Department of Defense (DoD) is one such organization. The DoD emerged their 2018 Digital Engineering Strategy intending on transforming the enterprise from one with ‘engineering process [that] are document-intensive and stove-piped, leading to extended cycle times with systems that are cumbersome to change and sustain’ to one that is ‘transforming its engineering practices to digital engineering, incorporating technological innovations into an integrated, digital, model-based approach’. </p> <p>  The 2018 Strategy acknowledges that the integration of digital engineering will not be exclusive to the engineering communities of the DoD; rather, the integration will impact the ‘research, requirements, acquisition, test, cost, sustainment and intelligence communities’. While the Strategy is designed to explain the ‘what’ necessary to integrate digital engineering, the various DoD Services (and their subordinates) will need to develop the ‘how’ regarding implementation that is culturally appropriate to their commands.</p> <p>  The study sought to examine ‘how’ implementation of digital engineering tenets may be appropriated to the existent culture of one US Special Operations Command subordinate at the Echelon III level (namely Naval Special Warfare Group – FOUR). The results of this study are intended to provide understanding and illuminate meaning behind those themes in Digital Engineering that Subject Matter Experts within Naval Special Warfare view as suitably adaptable to their processes. The intent is to provide themes with utility towards further efforts and research aimed at phasing Digital Transformation initiatives at Naval Special Warfare Group – FOUR.</p>

"A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department." / Title from title screen (viewed June 10, 2008). "February 14, 2005." Faculty advisor: Douglas Hime. "ADA464898"--URL. Includes bibliographical references (p. 24-27).

This study examines the phenomenon of abusive violence (AV) in the context of the American Post-9/11 Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency campaigns. Previous research into atrocities by states and their agents has largely come from examinations of totalitarian regimes with well-developed torture and assassination institutions. The mechanisms influencing willingness to do harm have been examined in experimental studies of obedience to authority and the influences of deindividuation, dehumanization, context and system. This study used Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to examine the lived experience of AV reported by fourteen American military and intelligence veterans. Participants were AV observers, objectors, or abusers. Subjects described why AV appeared sensible at the time, how methods of violence were selected, and what sense they made of their experiences after the fact. Accounts revealed the roles that frustration, fear, anger and mission pressure played to prompt acts of AV that ranged from the petty to heinous. Much of the AV was tied to a shift in mission view from macro strategic aims of CT and COIN to individual and small group survival. Routine hazing punishment soldiers received involving forced exercise and stress positions made similar acts inflicted on detainees unrecognizable as abusive. Overt and implied permissiveness from military superiors enabled AV extending to torture, and extra-judicial killings. Attempting to overcome feelings of vulnerability, powerlessness and rage, subjects enacted communal punishment through indiscriminate beatings and shooting. Participants committed AV to amuse themselves and humiliate their enemies; some killed detainees to force confessions from others, conceal misdeeds, and avoid routine paperwork. Participants realized that AV practices were unnecessary, counter-productive, and self-damaging. Several reduced or halted their AV as a result. The lived experience of AV left most respondents feeling guilt, shame, and inadequacy, whether they committed abuse or failed to stop it.