Abstract Users’ information systems (IS) security behavior continuously draws attentions from scholars and practitioners. While previous studies usually focused on one context (e.g., employees’ compliance with IS security policies in an organizational context), little research has focused on the possible explanations for users’ IS security behavior if the context changes. To address this gap, this dissertation discusses the role of context in IS security behavior research. An analysis of the differences between the organizational context and the home context suggests a need to study users’ IS security behavior solely in a specific context, such as home. This study provides guidelines for applying and developing contextualized theories in IS security behavior research. Based on the guidelines, this dissertation includes two empirical studies. First, drawing on rational choice theory, it compares specific IS security behavior in two contexts: the work context (N = 210) and the personal context (N = 202). Second, drawing on stewardship theory, this dissertation develops a contextualized theory explaining employees’ IS security risk-taking behavior in the organizational context (N = 170). The findings of this dissertation show different explanations for users’ IS security behavior in different contexts and highlight the importance of taking context into account when doing IS security behavior research. The results of each empirical study provide both theoretical contributions to research as well as actionable advice to practice. / Tiivistelmä Tietokoneenkäyttäjien tietoturvakäyttäytyminen on jatkuvan kiinnostuksen kohteena niin tutkijoiden kuin käytännön ammatinharjoittajienkin keskuudessa. Aiempi tutkimus on keskittynyt tarkastelemaan tietoturvakäyttäytymistä yleensä yhdessä kontekstissa (esim. työntekijöiden tietoturvaohjeiden noudattaminen organisaatiokontekstissa), kun taas vähemmälle huomiolle on jäänyt se, kuinka kontekstin muuttuminen selittää tietoturvakäyttäytymistä. Tämä väitöskirja vastaa kyseiseen ongelmaan, sillä se käsittelee kontekstin roolia tietoturvakäyttäytymistutkimuksessa. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan organisaatiokontekstin ja kotikontekstin eroja. Analyysi osoittaa, että on tarpeellista tutkia tietokoneen käyttäjien tietoturvakäyttäytymistä tietyissä konteksteissa, kuten esimerkiksi kotikontekstissa. Tutkimus tarjoaa ohjeita siihen, kuinka kontekstisidonnaisia teorioita sovelletaan ja kehitetään tietoturvakäyttäytymistutkimuksessa. Väitöskirja sisältää 2 empiiristä tutkimusta, jotka pohjautuvat edellä mainittuihin ohjeisiin. Ensimmäisessä vaiheessa tutkimuksessa sovelletaan rational choice -teoriaa, jonka pohjalta vertaillaan tiettyä tietoturvakäyttäytymistyyppiä 2 kontekstissa: työkonteksti<br clear="none"/> (N = 210) ja henkilökohtaisen käytön konteksti (N = 202). Toiseksi, tutkimus soveltaa stewardship -teoriaa ja kehittää siihen pohjautuen kontekstisidonnaisen teorian, joka selittää organisaation työntekijöiden käyttäytymistä liittyen tietoturvariskin ottamiseen<br clear="none"/> (N = 170). Väitöskirjan tutkimustulokset esittävät erilaisia selityksiä tietokoneen käyttäjien tie-toturvakäyttäytymiselle eri konteksteissa. Tutkimus korostaa sitä, kuinka tärkeää on ottaa konteksti huomioon tutkittaessa tietoturvakäyttäytymistä. Kummankin empiirisen tutkimuksen tulokset tarjoavat teoreettisen kontribuution lisäksi käytännöllisiä neuvoja tietoturvan toteuttamiseen.

Earnings management has had consequence in financial disasters, such as Enron, WorldCom and Nortel. More recently, it is alleged in the Lehman bankruptcy, which ushered in a global financial meltdown. Yet despite increased regulation and focus on governance and auditing, researchers find that earnings management remains a common practice. Accounting academics have responded to the earnings management problem by conducting studies using secondary data for governance variables and financial models to measure earnings management indirectly. Meanwhile, governance variables measured with secondary data now show little variability because of improved best practice and regulation, and there is strong evidence that the agency causal model and the earnings management measures are seriously flawed. This study uses a mixed-mode research model based on agency and stewardship theory to explain earnings management, and uses a more direct measure of its occurrence, namely the level of board information asymmetries and board monitoring and control actions, as a proxy for earnings management. Primary data is used to provide direct measures of important governance variables, which produce mixed results relative to earnings management using secondary data. In a survey of 245 Canadian public company directors, this study finds that an independent chair, less busy directors, and a smaller board does reduce earnings management, but that this impact is strongly moderated by the CEO's attributes. A CEO with stewardship attributes reduces earnings management, and a CEO with agency attributes increases earnings management. There also is evidence in the study that agency conflict variables improve governance outcomes, in this case, reducing the level of earnings management, and that board processes around monitoring and control actions could be a problem.

Abstract Background &amp; Problem: During recent years there have been disclosed instances of labor union representatives wrongfully using the members’ funds. Considering the nature of the labor unions this kind of behavior is surprising, and therefore there is an interest in what motivates these representatives in their actions. Agency theory and Stewardship theory suggests two opposing views of corporate governance and motivation. The authors of this study attempt to contribute to this discussion by exploring the environment within labor unions.  Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explore whether the management representatives within labor unions are acting as agents or stewards as well as whether they are perceived as such in the eyes of the members. Method: This study is based on a deductive research approach using a qualitative research strategy. The primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews from representatives of the unions as well as members of the unions. This was complemented with information from the websites and documents from the labor unions. A thematic analysis approach was used to analyze the findings. Conclusion: This study concluded that the representatives of the different labor unions are leaning more towards acting as stewards rather than agents and that they are perceived as such by the members.  The authors found that there was a lot of focus on member recruitment and the importance of recognizing what type of relationship that exists.

Background: CEO compensation as a phenomenon is a well explored topic in both forprofit and non-profit organisations but limited research is made on sports organisations. Due to the important social role that sports organisations entails, one can argue for the need to investigate the purpose of CEO compensation in these organisations as well. Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to explore the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations. The purpose of executive compensation will further be studied from both a CEO perspective as well as from the board perspective. Method: This thesis has an abductive research approach and proceeds from previous theories within corporate governance to investigate the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations. The empirical part consists of a qualitative interview study to investigate if previous theories are applicable to explain the purpose of CEO compensation in these organisations or if there exists other, unexplored purposes. ii Findings: The findings of the study suggests that the view on the purpose of CEO compensation in sports organisations is different from the board perspective and the CEO perspective. From the board perspective, the purpose appears to be to control the behaviour of the CEO, to gain organisational legitimacy, to make the organisation more business-oriented and to attract individuals with shared interests. On the other hand, from the CEO perspective, the purposes appear to be to increase the motivation and to attain individual legitimacy.

Development aid currently given by developed countries is increasingly criticised in terms of its effectiveness and because dependencies are created or reinforced between the donor and receiver. This study focuses on aid given by non-governmental organisations. In the meantime, a new legal form has beenintroduced for private companies that follow the principles of steward-ownership, which means that the generated profit needs to serve a purpose and is self-governed. These principles ensure a more responsible and sustainable way of business making.This study seeks to determine the influence of the steward-ownership tenets on the efficiency and selfsustainment of aid projects, the role of steward-ownership in decision-making processes in project management and tries to understand how steward-ownership manages dependencies within aid projects for sustainable development. This study focuses on Nepal, a state which heavily relies on aid from other countries and where it thus is essential to make it as effective as possible. For the study, one steward-based company was the object of focus, as it is based in Germany but establishing social enterprises in Nepal. The empirical research was carried out with ten semi-structured interviews. The sample consisted of four Nepalese employees, four German employees, one follow-up with a German employee and finally, one interview with a journalist who served as an expert about current aid and its problems. The qualitative study used directed content analysis with open coding. Five propositions were formulated and discussed based on an analytical framework derived from the literature and relevant theories.It was found that steward-ownership plays an essential role in project management. An influence on the internal corporate structures of the company itself was discovered as well as in the implemented projects and social businesses in Nepal. Moreover, the findings indicated that the principles of steward-ownership affect the management of dependencies, especially concerning knowledge transfer and developing symmetric relationships by ensuring an equal distribution of responsibility and voting rights. The findings of this study contribute to research conducted on aid development and finding ways towards more sustainable development. However, further research is necessary to identify the cause-and-effect relationship between steward-ownership and the mindset of all stakeholders. The changes in internal corporate structures and work processes through the incorporation of steward-ownership could not be specified in perfect detail due to the limitations of this study.

Bakgrund: Den tredje januari 2018 trädde EU-direktivet Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) i kraft. Direktivet ämnar öka investerarskyddet genom att eliminera informationsasymmetri och intressekonflikter på finansmarknaden, och samtidigt harmonisera reglerna mellan EU-länder. Inom investeringsrådgivning innebär det nya regelverket ökad dokumentation, ett större fokus på att försäkra sig om att investerarna förstår risker, hårdare krav på hur avgifter kommuniceras och striktare regler kring incitament. Allt detta för att skydda investerarna, som ofta visat sig ha en bristfällig finansiell kunskap och ett lågt intresse för privatekonomi. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att utifrån värdepappersföretagens perspektiv skapa förståelse för vilken påverkan EU-direktivet MiFID II har haft på principal-agent problem som uppstår vid investeringsrådgivning. Genomförande: Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ fallstudie. Vidare har ett fenomenologiskt forskningsperspektiv använts, med en abduktiv ansats. Det empiriska materialet har samlats in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med sammanlagt sju respondenter som alla jobbar på värdepappersföretag, vilka valdes ut med ett målstyrt bekvämlighetsurval. Resultat: Uppsatsen kommer fram till att principal-agent problemen inom investeringsrådgivning inte har eliminerats. Informations- asymmetrin är enligt vår tolkning av de traditionella teorierna närmast obefintlig, men utgör fortfarande ett stort problem på grund av investerarnas ointresse och relativt låga förmåga att ta till sig informationen. Vi argumenterar därav att dessa dimensioner bör inkluderas i teorin för vilka trösklar som kan orsaka informationsasymmetrin. Intressekonflikterna har reducerats, men finns till viss mån fortfarande kvar. Motivationen att agera i ett egenintresse har dock inte påverkats. Uppsatsen visar således på att MiFID II inte har förflyttat principal-agent relationen till en stewardship relation. Kunskapsbidrag: Det teoretiska bidraget gällande informationsasymmetri utmanar antagandet om att principalen vill ha information som är relevant för denne. Uppsatsen visar att så inte alltid är fallet. Förutom att det uppstår informationsasymmetri om det är kostsamt eller svårt att ta reda på agentens handlingar, kan det även uppstå i situationer där principalen är ointresserad av, eller oförmögen att ta till sig av informationen enligt vår mening. Vidare har MiFID II inneburit att det är svårare för agenten att tillgodose sitt egenintresse om detta strider mot principalens. Däremot har direktivet inte inneburit att den interna motivationen ändrats och det går därför inte att förutsätta att ett kontraktsförhållande som haft en principal-agent relation övergår till en stewardship relation när dessa problem elimineras. Genom en ökad förståelse för hur tvingande lagstiftningar påverkar principal-agent problem kan det empiriska bidraget hjälpa tillsynsmyndigheter i sitt arbete att hantera principal-agent problem. Uppsatsen skulle således kunna underlätta vidareutveckling av regleringen som finns idag, likväl som utformningen av framtida direktiv och lagar. Med ett utomstående perspektiv på vilka intressekonflikter som kan uppstå vid investeringsrådgivning skulle det empiriska bidraget också kunna vara gynnsamt för värdepappersföretag och deras arbete för att hantera intressekonflikter. / Background: On January 3, 2018, the EU directive Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) came into effect. The directive is intended to expand investor protection through eliminating information asymmetry and conflicts of interest in the financial market, while also harmonizing the regulations between nations within the EU. For investment advising, the directive results in more extensive documentation and stricter regulation of how fees and risks are communicated, as well as how incentives are handled; all with the aim of protecting investors. At the same time, the general public shows low interest in personal finance, as well as inadequate financial knowledge. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to further the understanding of how the introduction of the EU directive MiFID II has affected the principal-agent problem that arises during investment advising, from an investment firm perspective. Completion: This is a qualitative case-study which utilizes a phenomenological research perspective and an abductive approach. The empirical material has been collected through semi-structured interviews at investment firms with a total of seven respondents, whom were selected through goal-oriented convenience sampling.  Conclusion: The study concludes that the principal-agent problems in investment advising have not been eliminated. According to our interpretation of the traditional theories, information asymmetry is nearly non-existent. Yet it remains a significant problem due to lack of interest and an inability to assimilate the information. Thus, we argue that the theoretical framework should be revised to include these barriers, as they may lead to information asymmetry. Conflicts of interest have been reduced, but still remain to some extent. Furthermore, the motivation to act based on self-interest still remain. Hence, the study shows that MiFID II has not turned the principal-agent relationship into a stewardship relationship. Contribution: The theoretical contribution to information asymmetry challenges the assumption that the principal is interested in all the information that is of relevance for them. The study show that this is not always the case. Apart from information asymmetry arising when ascertaining the actions of the agent is expensive or difficult, it can also arise due to the principal’s lack of interest or inability to assimilate the information. Moreover, MiFID II has made it more difficult for the agent to act in their own self-interest, should it deviate from the interest of the principal. The directive has not, however, affected the intrinsic motivation of the agent. Thus, we cannot assume that the elimination of these problems causes a principal-agent relationship to transform into a stewardship relationship. Through an increased understanding of how binding legislation affects principal-agent problems, the empirical contribution can help regulatory bodies in their work to mitigate the aforementioned problems. Hence, the study may help to not only expand existing legislation, but also in the development of future legislation and directives. By providing an outside perspective of what conflicts of interests could arise in investment advising, the empirical contribution could also be of use for investment firms in their work to identify and manage conflicts of interest

Background: Family Businesses represent the highest proportion of businesses in the world (Lin, 2012). Globalisation offers new business opportunities for growth and in-ternational diversification. Generally the internationalisation of family businesses is a well-studied field in family business research (Kontinen &amp; Ojala, 2009). Still, there are certain shortcomings when it comes to the specific area of corporate governance adapta-tion in family firms that open subsidiaries (Calabro &amp; Mussolino, 2011). Hence, this paper analyses the proceedings of family firms that internationalise through a subsidi-ary. From a methodological standpoint, existing studies concerned with family business internationalisation focus on quantitative research approaches. The results of these in-clude some limitations, since they cannot account for questions such as how and why family firms proceed during diversification (Kontinen &amp; Ojala, 2009). Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate the rationale behind corporate gov-ernance structures in family businesses, focusing on the special case of internationalisa-tion through a subsidiary. Frame of Reference: A summary of recent research regarding the three main issues family businesses, internationalisation, and corporate governance will be given in the frame of reference. This theoretical background will serve as the basis for a solid analy-sis of our empirical data. Method: A qualitative approach with an extensive literature review and a case study based on in-depth interviews with employees of the company Väderstad-Verken AB was chosen in order to fulfil the purpose. Conclusion: The rationale behind corporate governance structures when setting up a subsidiary abroad is driven by the ambition to preserve a family firms’ stewardship ori-ented culture and its informal structures. The result of this is better collaboration, which serves the mission of the business.

Purpose: Understand different needs for accountability and governance among financial firms,based on environmental and structural factors. Design/methodology/approach: By using disciplinary reports published by SFSA the interpretation of corporate governance regulation will be studied. Findings: The study identified important corporate governance factors which can be explained and understood by analyzing through the multiple-theory. Complex environmental aspects, such as regulations and multiple stakeholders, demands for extensive internal and external controls. However, the aspect of knowledge does not seem to be fully explained by previous studies. Originality/value: The result could be a contribution to further discussions on how regulations can develop. Moreover, the result can add empirical data to further develop the multiple-theory.

Background: Formal CEO board membership is a unique feature of Swedishboards. The share of firms having Formal CEO board membership hassignificantly decreased in the last 20 years and thus, this feature might haveevolved to be used as a signal of high CEO quality. CEO quality is in turnlikely to, through Formal CEO board membership, serve as a moderator of therelationship that both CEO power and CEO discretion has to firm performancewhich has previously been somewhat ambiguous. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain how the CEO’s power anddiscretion is related to firm performance and if this relation is moderated byFormal CEO board membership. Method: To fulfill the purpose of this thesis, a deductive research approachwas used. The theoretical model used is built on four theories namely,Stewardship theory, CEO power, CEO discretion and Signaling theory. With a five-year interval stretching between 1998 to 2018, the quantitative empiricalmethod relies on compensation and financial data from Swedish firms. Conclusion: The results indicate that the relation that both CEO power andCEO discretion have to firm performance, consistent with the theoreticalmodel, is positive. The results further indicate that Formal CEO boardmembership as a signal of CEO quality can moderate these relationships. Thisfinding is, however, exclusive to the years after 2008.

This dissertation examines whether managers influence corporate boards of directors in their auditor selection, change, and compensation decisions. This topic is important because it addresses concerns that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is not effective in eliminating managerial influence over auditor engagement decisions and that it may provide a false sense of security to investors. These concerns are based on the implicit assumption that managers prefer weaker governance oversight and lower audit quality. However, empirical research testing associations between managerial influence and audit-related decisions post-SOX is scarce and generally guided by agency theory. Incorporating agency, stewardship, and resource dependence perspectives, I find that managerial preferences for auditor selection are not aligned. Specifically, CEOs positively influence the selection of higher quality auditors, whereas CFOs have the opposite effect. Further, CEOs who hold powerful roles as chairs of their companies' boards of directors appear to mitigate the negative influence of CFOs and inside directors on audit quality. CEOs serving in dual roles also oppose auditor turnover when lower earnings quality prompt higher demand for audit effort. Finally, my study provides some evidence that management exercises downward pressures on audit fees, suggesting that managers utilize their authority beyond the regulations established by SOX to negotiate auditor compensation.