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11	Optimal Legislative Funding / Financiamento ótimo do legislativo Beatriz Silva Garcia 05 July 2016 (has links) We propose a model to study government formation by a legislative body composed by parties elected with a proportional representation rule. Once the legislative configuration is determined, the elected parties must form a government, choose a government policy and a distribution of legislative resources and benefits among the elected parties through a bargaining game. A mass of voters is assumed capable of voting strategically. Our goal is to study how a limitation on the available resources among legislators may affect the behavior of the agents involved in this system, both voters and legislators. We show that a decrease in the relative distance between ideologies increases the social welfare and decreases the necessary amount of resources to keep the optimal agreement. Moreover, there is an upper limit to this amount when the ideological distance increases / Propõe-se um modelo teórico para estudar a formação de governo por um corpo legislativo, composto por partidos eleitos em representação proporcional. Uma vez que a configuração do Legislativo é definida, os partidos eleitos devem formar um governo, escolher uma política de governo e uma distribuição de recursos e benefícios legislativos entre os partidos presentes na casa através de um jogo de barganha. Uma massa de eleitores é assumida capaz de votar estrategicamente. Nosso objetivo é estudar como uma limitação nos recursos disponíveis entre os legisladores pode afetar o comportamento dos agentes envolvidos no sistema, tanto eleitores quanto legisladores. Mostra-se que uma queda da distância relativa entre as ideologias aumenta o bem-estar social e diminui a quantia necessária de recursos que mantem o acordo legislativo ótimo. Ademais, há um limite superior para essa quantia quando a distância ideológica aumenta. Barganha Barganha legislativa Economia política Financiamento do legislativo Formação de governo Microeconomia teórica Poder legislativo Rent-seeking Teoria dos jogos Votação estratégica Government formation Legislative bargaining Legislative funding Rent-seeking Strategic voting
12	台灣縣市長選舉預測模型之研究：一個基礎模型的建立及其應用 / Election Forecasting: the Construction and Its Applications of a Logistic Model of Conuty Magistrate Elections in Taiwan 范凌嘉, Fan, Ling-Jia Unknown Date (has links) 本研究以1997年台灣縣市長選舉為標的，彙整政治學有關投票行為的相關理論，包含社會學研究途徑、社會心理學研究途徑與理性抉擇途徑的研究成果，整合該年度之總體與個體資料而設計出「特質調整模型」。特質調整模型是透過兩階段的操作模式進行預測，首先以基礎模型反應全國一致的因素，使之適用於台灣所有縣市，這些因素包括政黨認同、候選人取向與社會人口學變項。但由於各縣市狀況仍有不同，因此再進一步用延伸模型來考量各縣市的特殊選舉因素。延伸模型在基礎模型的規模上，以描述性統計來觀察選區情形後，再加入各地特質於模型之中，使其預測結果能反映各地特殊狀況。在延伸模型中，考量的因素包括議題取向、環境系絡因素、策略性投票、在位者表現、派系取向與賄選問題等。在特質調整模型中，本研究嘗試以對數迴歸模型對各地區進行模擬計算，並用機率論的方式呈現每一位受訪者的投票可能，以反應政治學理論中的不確定性。研究結果發現基礎模型確能相當地反應出台灣各縣市的選舉狀況，描繪各地的一般狀況，而延伸模型又能更精確地貼近各地的選舉結果，反映各地的特殊選情。在資料完整的狀況下，最後各縣市的預測誤差均不超過抽樣誤差。第一章緒論 1 壹、研究動機與目的 1 貳、文獻檢閱 3 第二章研究方法 25 壹、研究範圍與資料來源 25 貳、模型建構 28 參、研究架構 33 肆、模型評估 35 第三章基礎模型 38 壹、變數建構 38 貳、基礎模型的探討 42 參、討論 84 第四章延伸模型：基礎模型的應用 87 壹、延伸模型的設計 87 貳、基隆市的延伸模型 89 參、台北縣的延伸模型 98 肆、桃園縣的延伸模型 115 伍、新竹市的延伸模型 123 陸、台中市的延伸模型 129 柒、彰化縣的延伸模型 140 捌、台南市的延伸模型 153 玖、台南縣的延伸模型 166 拾、小結 172 第五章結論 174 壹、研究回顧 174 貳、研究效果評估 178 參、研究限制與未來研究建議 179 參考文獻 184 / This research is focused on Taiwanese county magistrates election in 1997, and based on the aggregate and individual data to design a forecasting model, named "Joined Idiosyncrasies Adjusted Model" (JIA Model). This model is operated by two stages. First, I compute a basic model, which reflects some general factors in every county. Second, I design extended models to adjust the output of basic models. Those extended models can precisely show the situation of every single county. In this model, I try to use logistic regression to compute the candidate's votes, and present the final forecast output in probability. This model made the county magistrates election more predictable, and the model errors are less than the sampling errors. 選舉預測投票行為政黨認同候選人取向議題取向策略性投票政治版圖對數迴歸模型 election forecasting voting behavior party identification candidate orientation issue orientation strategic voting political map logistic regression
13	Majority-Preferential Two-Round Electoral Formula: A Balanced Value-Driven Model for Canada Esmaeilpour Fadakar, Shahin 06 May 2014 (has links) This research is an enquiry to find an electoral formula that conforms to Canadian constitutional values. Three core values that are pertinent to the issue of electoral systems are identified: democracy, diversity, and efficiency. Each of these core values is divided into different aspects. These aspects will form the backbone of the evaluation of different electoral systems in this work. I will begin with an evaluation of the plurality model of elections, which is currently used in Canada. I will demonstrate that many of the attributes of the current system are not in tune with Canadian constitutional values, in particular with the progressive interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada has given to the right to vote as enshrined in Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Although the interpretation of the right to vote will be the main thrust of the constitutional scrutiny in this work, attention will also be given to other pertinent rights such as equality rights, minority rights, and the freedom of expression. Next, I will examine provincial electoral reform initiatives that were initiated in five Canadian provinces. All of these initiatives - three of which were put to referenda and eventually defeated - proposed adopting a variant of proportional representation. Accordingly, I will evaluate proportional systems according to the intended values. I will conclude that these systems have problems of their own and they also cannot strike a fine balance between competing values. In the final stage, I will make a new proposal for elections to the Canadian Parliament. First, I will demonstrate that majority systems are better candidates to attain the envisioned values. Then I will introduce a new variant of the majority model, which I call a majority-preferential two-round variant. I will demonstrate that this new variant will outperform the other variants in the attainment of values if adopted for elections to the House of Commons. Finally, I will argue that the combination of a House of Commons elected through the majority-preferential formula and a proportionally elected Senate will result in a more balanced approach to the relevant constitutional values. Electoral Systems Electoral Reform Electoral Law Elections Constitutional Law Constitutional Law of Canada Comparative Law Comparative Politics Democracy Diversity Efficiency Equality Multiculturalism Fundamental Rights Rights Accountability Geographical Diversity Political Diversity Social Diversity Moderation Stability Strategic Voting Turnout House of Commons Senate The Right to Vote Proportional Representation Preferential Voting Preferential Ballot Political Parties Political Expression Plurality Majority Majoritarianism Judicial Review
14	Majority-Preferential Two-Round Electoral Formula: A Balanced Value-Driven Model for Canada Esmaeilpour Fadakar, Shahin January 2014 (has links) This research is an enquiry to find an electoral formula that conforms to Canadian constitutional values. Three core values that are pertinent to the issue of electoral systems are identified: democracy, diversity, and efficiency. Each of these core values is divided into different aspects. These aspects will form the backbone of the evaluation of different electoral systems in this work. I will begin with an evaluation of the plurality model of elections, which is currently used in Canada. I will demonstrate that many of the attributes of the current system are not in tune with Canadian constitutional values, in particular with the progressive interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada has given to the right to vote as enshrined in Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Although the interpretation of the right to vote will be the main thrust of the constitutional scrutiny in this work, attention will also be given to other pertinent rights such as equality rights, minority rights, and the freedom of expression. Next, I will examine provincial electoral reform initiatives that were initiated in five Canadian provinces. All of these initiatives - three of which were put to referenda and eventually defeated - proposed adopting a variant of proportional representation. Accordingly, I will evaluate proportional systems according to the intended values. I will conclude that these systems have problems of their own and they also cannot strike a fine balance between competing values. In the final stage, I will make a new proposal for elections to the Canadian Parliament. First, I will demonstrate that majority systems are better candidates to attain the envisioned values. Then I will introduce a new variant of the majority model, which I call a majority-preferential two-round variant. I will demonstrate that this new variant will outperform the other variants in the attainment of values if adopted for elections to the House of Commons. Finally, I will argue that the combination of a House of Commons elected through the majority-preferential formula and a proportionally elected Senate will result in a more balanced approach to the relevant constitutional values. Electoral Systems Electoral Reform Electoral Law Elections Constitutional Law Constitutional Law of Canada Comparative Law Comparative Politics Democracy Diversity Efficiency Equality Multiculturalism Fundamental Rights Rights Accountability Geographical Diversity Political Diversity Social Diversity Moderation Stability Strategic Voting Turnout House of Commons Senate The Right to Vote Proportional Representation Preferential Voting Preferential Ballot Political Parties Political Expression Plurality Majority Majoritarianism Judicial Review

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