¡§Strategic voting behavior¡¨ means that when there are three or more candidates competing in one certain election, voters, under rational consideration, think that their most favorite candidate has no chance of winning at all, and recognize that their voting for this candidate will cause their least favorite candidate to win; therefore, voters can only choose to vote for their second favorite candidate to avoid from their most undesirable outcome. In the 2000 presidential election, the three major contenders of Lien Chan, Chen Shui-bian, and James Soong were equally competitive, which created a context of strategic voting. This study therefore used ¡§strategic voting¡¨ as a main theme to investigate the voters¡¦ voting behavior in the 2000 presidential election. The present study analyzed data at both macro and micro levels. At the macro level, it was found that lots of KMT¡¦s votes shifted to the campaigns of either Chen Shui-bian or James Soong, which more or less demonstrated voters¡¦ low stability for partisan voting in this election, and to some degree was a result of voters¡¦ strategic voting behavior. At the micro level, it revealed that Lien Chan, who was considered the most competent, was always voters¡¦ second best choice before the election. That is, voters felt neutral towards Lien Chan, who was neither voters¡¦ most favorite candidate nor the least desired one, and additionally Lien Chan had long been the weakest in the poll, which made him the most likely to be abandoned. The result of the election also showed that among the voters who adopted the strategy of ¡§abandoning someone to save another¡¨, fewest chose to ¡§save Lien Chan.¡¨ Hence, voters did have ¡§strategic voting behavior¡¨ in the 2000 presidential election, and Lien Chan obviously claimed the highest percentage of voters¡¦ abandoned candidate.

This dissertation consists of three essays investigating questions of politics and policy. The first essay proposes an index that assigns probabilities to all majority coalitions. This index takes as inputs the seat shares and policy positions of the parties represented in parliament. In addition to providing coalition probabilities, it has some desirable properties lacking from the commonly used concept of the minimum-connected winning coalition. In an empirical test, the proposed index slightly outperforms the predictions generated by this standard concept. Furthermore, the probabilities generated by the index are shown to be empirically meaningful. The second essay proposes a model of voter decision-making in proportional representation systems: ultra-rational strategic voters construct expectations of coalitions and policy outcomes based on expected seat distributions and attributed policy positions and vote to maximize their expected utility. The predictions of the model are examined using data from the Netherlands and successfully predict the voting behavior of significant numbers of voters. Nevertheless, other factors matter more than the strategic prediction. Three main take-aways follow: (1) At least to some extent, voters seem to take complex coalition considerations into account. (2) There is a need for large-scale qualitative studies about voter decision-making in proportional representation systems. (3) Narrowly defined strategic voting might matter less in proportional representation systems than in plurality systems. The third essay presents new data on effective corporate income tax rates in 85 countries in 2004. The data come from a survey, conducted jointly with the World Bank’s Doing Business unit and PricewaterhouseCoopers, of all taxes imposed on "the same" standardized mid-size domestic firm. In a cross-section of countries, the estimates of the effective corporate tax rate have a large adverse impact on aggregate investment, FDI, and entrepreneurial activity. Corporate tax rates are correlated with investment in manufacturing but not services, as well as with the size of the informal economy. The results are robust to the inclusion of many controls.

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中華民國第十任總統選舉結果於民國八十九年三月十八日揭曉，這場眾所矚目的選舉終告落幕，然而對選舉研究工作者而言卻是新的開始。選舉預測居選戰中重要的一環，也是研究選舉的學者關心的問題，更提供了一個驗證選民投票行為理論的絕佳機會，近來國內相關論述已有相當成果。但由於它在投票結束，便有答案，其挑戰程度不言而喻。因此，如何結合理論、方法及事實三者為一體的努力，對選舉預測更是別具意義。 本篇研究之範圍，是以公元2000年總統大選為例，對選舉預測工作做更深層的探討，且檢驗邏輯斯預測模型（Logistic Regression Model）及模糊統計（Fuzzy Statistics）分析在本次總統選舉的預測力，考量本次總統選舉中各項可能影響選情的因素，進一步建構選舉預測模式，然而兩種預測模式的初步預測結果並不佳，經過棄保效應的可能性調整後，預測誤差已大幅降低，其中模糊統計（Fuzzy Statistics）分析預測結果經棄保效應調整後，與實際開票結果相當接近，因此與邏輯斯預測模型相較，模糊統計分析的應用對未表態選民投票意向的預測力較佳。一套完整的選舉預測模型研究，應包含問卷設計、抽樣訪問、資料處理、加權除錯、模型設計與預測評估等整套研究流程，然而在本次總統大選中，由於三強激戰，影響選情因素相當複雜，最後此兩種選舉預測模式皆無法獲致精確的預測結果。因此，我們期待選舉預測模型的建構，能突破主客觀環境的侷限，進一步達到「準」與「穩」的要求。 / With the successful staging of the 2000 presidential elections in Taiwan, scholars have been presented with a new opportunity to test their theories. Electoral predictions are an important field within the study of elections and have been among the most keenly studied questions over the past few years. Unlike many other research topics, there is an absolute standard for election predictions: the election results. Thus, combining theory, methodology, and facts to obtain a meaningful result is no simple task. This thesis attempts to predict the 2000 presidential election using both a logistic regression model and a fuzzy statistics model. After constructing models which includes all kinds of different variables that might influence the electoral outcome, we find that neither the logistic regression model nor the fuzzy statistics model is particularly accurate. However, after accounting for the effects of strategic voting, model error decreases dramatically. In particular, after including provisions for strategic voting, the fuzzy statistics model is improved to the point that its predictions are extremely close to the actual outcome. Thus, we show that the fuzzy statistics model is superior to the logistic regression model in analyzing the vote choices of undecided voters. Research on electoral predictions should include such aspects as questionnaire design, sampling, interviewing, data processing, weighting, data cleaning, model design, and evaluation of the prediction. However, because this election featured a particularly intense three way race, the factors affecting the electoral outcome were both numerous and intertwined in complex ways. Unfortunately, it is impossible to evaluate our electoral predictions of the two models precisely. We hope that in the future, election prediction models will be able to break through these environmental limitations and achieve more accurate and stable predictions.

In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given a large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule.

Cette thèse s'intéresse au lien qui existe entre le système électoral et deux comportements importants de la vie civique, soit la participation à une élection et la désertion stratégique du candidat préféré vers un autre candidat. Ces thèmes sont abordés dans de nombreux et de très importants ouvrages en science politique. En passant par la théorie (Downs, 1957) jusqu'à des études de terrain par l'entremise de sondages (Abramson, 2010; Blais, 2010), diverses méthodologies ont été employées pour mieux expliquer les choix des électeurs. Ma contribution à l'avancement des connaissances dans ce domaine passe par l'usage de la méthode expérimentale pour mieux saisir les similitudes et différences dans les comportements des électeurs sous le système uninominal à un tour (UT) et la représentation proportionnelle (RP) ainsi que les mécanismes au niveau individuel qui produisent ces similitudes et différences. Le cœur de la thèse est composé des trois articles dont voici les résumés : Article 1. Des élections expérimentales faites à Montréal, Paris et Bruxelles permettent d'estimer l’influence directe du mode de scrutin sur la décision des électeurs de voter ou non, et de voter pour leur parti préféré ou non. En tout, 16 groupes de 21 électeurs votent sous différents systèmes électoraux, soit le UT et la RP. Les préférences sont attribuées aléatoirement et connues de tous les participants. Nos résultats indiquent que le vote n'est pas globalement plus sincère et que la participation électorale n'est pas plus élevée sous le système proportionnel. Toutefois, nous observons moins de désertion d'un petit parti sous le système proportionnel. Article 2. Les expériences permettent également d'expliquer pourquoi les électeurs votent parfois pour un parti autre que leur parti préféré. La conclusion principale est que la décision de voter de façon sincère ou non est influencée par les préférences individuelles, mais aussi par les perceptions des chances de gagner des candidats ainsi que des chances que son propre vote puisse décider le résultat de l'élection. Les électeurs qui désertent leur premier choix prennent en considération quel candidat est le plus près de leurs positions politiques, mais également de la viabilité de cette alternative. De plus, les électeurs qui aiment prendre des risques ont davantage tendance à déserter. Article 3. Le modèle de l'électeur pivot est mis à l'épreuve pour mieux comprendre la décision de voter ou non lors d'une élection. Nos expériences permettent de répliquer, avec un devis expérimental différent, les résultats importants des travaux de Duffy et Tavits (2008). Nos résultats confirment que la perception d'être pivot augmente la participation, que ces perceptions sont sujettes à la surestimation et que cette surestimation ne décline pas complètement dans le temps. Nous allons également plus loin que les recherches de Duffy et Tavits et nous trouvons que la participation n'est pas plus forte sous RP que sous UT et que la probabilité d'être pivot a un impact plus important chez les électeurs évitant de prendre des risques. / This thesis focuses on the relationship between the electoral system and two important behaviors of civic life: participation in an election and the strategic desertion of the preferred candidate. These topics are addressed in very important books in political science. From theory (Duverger, 1954; Downs, 1957) to empirical research using surveys (Abramson, 2010; Blais, 2010), various methodologies have been used to better explain voter's choices. My contribution to knowledge is the use of experimental methods to better understand both similarities and differences in voter behavior under the plurality system (PLU) and the proportional representation (PR) system and the individual level mechanisms that produce these similarities and differences. The core of the thesis consists of three articles summarized below: Article 1. Experimental elections conducted in Montreal, Paris and Brussels estimate the direct influence of the voting system on the voters' decision whether to vote or not, and vote for their preferred party or another party. In all, 16 groups of 21 voters take part in elections under different electoral systems. The systems are simple plurality and proportional representation. Preferences are randomly assigned and known by all participants. Our results indicate that voting is globally not more sincere and that voter turnout is not higher under the proportional system. However, we observe less desertion of small parties under the proportional system. Article 2. We perform a laboratory experiment to explain why voters sometimes vote for a party other than the preferred one. The main conclusion of the paper is that in addition to voter preferences, perceptions of winning chances and belief in the possibility of affecting the outcome are key factors in the voter’s decision to vote sincerely or not. When they desert their first choice, voters consider their preferences and the viability of the alternatives. Voters who like to take risks are more prone to desert. Article 3. This paper examines the decision to vote or not in experimental elections. We replicate the important findings of Duffy and Tavits (2008) with a different design. Our results support their finding, that is, turnout is affected by the belief that one's vote counts and overestimation of the probability that one's vote counts does not decrease completely over time. Going beyond previous research, we also find that turnout is not higher under a proportional system than under a plurality system, and beliefs about being in a pivotal disposition have a greater impact on turnout among the risk averse.

We propose a model to study government formation by a legislative body composed by parties elected with a proportional representation rule. Once the legislative configuration is determined, the elected parties must form a government, choose a government policy and a distribution of legislative resources and benefits among the elected parties through a bargaining game. A mass of voters is assumed capable of voting strategically. Our goal is to study how a limitation on the available resources among legislators may affect the behavior of the agents involved in this system, both voters and legislators. We show that a decrease in the relative distance between ideologies increases the social welfare and decreases the necessary amount of resources to keep the optimal agreement. Moreover, there is an upper limit to this amount when the ideological distance increases / Propõe-se um modelo teórico para estudar a formação de governo por um corpo legislativo, composto por partidos eleitos em representação proporcional. Uma vez que a configuração do Legislativo é definida, os partidos eleitos devem formar um governo, escolher uma política de governo e uma distribuição de recursos e benefícios legislativos entre os partidos presentes na casa através de um jogo de barganha. Uma massa de eleitores é assumida capaz de votar estrategicamente. Nosso objetivo é estudar como uma limitação nos recursos disponíveis entre os legisladores pode afetar o comportamento dos agentes envolvidos no sistema, tanto eleitores quanto legisladores. Mostra-se que uma queda da distância relativa entre as ideologias aumenta o bem-estar social e diminui a quantia necessária de recursos que mantem o acordo legislativo ótimo. Ademais, há um limite superior para essa quantia quando a distância ideológica aumenta.

一九九八年台北市市長選舉中，影響選舉結果最大的是外省籍選民及新黨選民「分裂投票」現象。大量新黨選民在市長選舉中一面倒地投票給國民黨候選人馬英九，不過市議員、立法委員仍舊投給新黨則是導致這種現象出現的主因。常態下，擁有高滿意度的在位者，常能連任。而在任內施政滿意度常常保持在七成以上的市長陳水扁落選，是相當令人意外的。筆者認為這種現象值得作有系統的分析。 本文利用政治大學選舉研究中心的抽樣調查面訪資料，針對一九九八年台北市選舉中選民分裂投票的行為進行深入分析。本文歸納影響選民分裂投票的六個模型，利用六個模型經過對數成敗比模型的比較，在控制人口基本背景因素之後（性別、年齡、教育程度及籍貫），發現模型影響選民分裂投票的情況：一是政黨認同強度減弱的政黨解組作用導致選民分裂投票。雖然政黨認同在模型中具有明顯的影響力，但台北市近年來並未有政黨解組的趨勢，因此政黨認同減弱並非分裂投票的主因。二為選民的省籍，尤其是外省籍選民分裂投票行為相當明顯，其中年輕世代比年紀大的世代更形嚴重。第三則是統獨議題及相關的中國人/台灣人認同。研究結果發現統獨議題對選民分裂投票不具顯著影響力，但中國人/台灣人則對於市長與立法委員之間的分裂投票有明顯影響力；第四是候選人形象中的裙帶效應並不顯著，對分裂投票與否之間不具明顯差異。五為選民分立制衡觀念。在相同層級的市府及議會之間選民具有分立制衡的觀念，想藉政黨之間相互制衡的方式保護民眾的最大福祉，故採取分裂投票的行為。中央及地方制衡的觀念則不具影響力。第六則為新黨的選民策略投票是影響選民分裂投票的重要因素。新黨選民對於尋求連任的民進黨市長候選人陳水扁相當反感，且新黨市長候選人王建□當選機會不大的情況下，選擇轉投給國民黨馬英九之策略投票，並進而形成分裂投票。從六個模型最後推論的結果，真正決定選民分裂與否最重要的因素是選民的省籍背景導致的情感反應及新黨選民的策略投票。而這兩者的關聯又非常密切。 / Split ticket voting by New Party identifiers and Mainlanders had a crucial influence on the outcome of the 1998 Taipei City mayoral election. Large numbers of voters who identified themselves as New Party supporters voted for the KMT mayoral candidate. However, in the concurrent Legislative Yuan and City Council elections, they voted for New Party candidates. Normally, an incumbent with extremely high approval ratings will win re-election easily, but in this case Chen Shui-bian lost the mayoral race. This surprising result is worth researching. This thesis uses face-to-face interview data collected after the 1998 election. To analyze split ticket voting behavior, we consider six different logit models. After controlling basic demographic variables, including sex, age, education, and ethnic background, it is possible to discover what influences split ticket voting. First, weakening party identification can induce a dealignment process. This, in turn, gives rise to split ticket voting. In the data, the intensity of party identification has an obvious effect on split ticket voting. However, there has been no dealignment. Thus, weakening party identification is not the main reason for split ticket voting. The second factor is ethnic background. Mainlanders, especially young and middle aged voters, are more likely to split their tickets. Third, the related questions of unification or independence and Taiwanese or Chinese identification also have influence. The effect of the unification/independence position is not significant, but the respondents’ ethnic identity is. A fourth finding is that there is no significant coattail effect influencing split ticket voting. Fifth, many voters wish to balance the parties against each other, and so they split their votes. However, this only holds for offices at the same level (mayor and city council) and not for different levels (local and national). Sixth, strategic voting by New Party supporters was very important. New Party supporters were very opposed to Chen Shui-bian, and the New Party nominee did not have much chance of winning. As a result, many split their votes, voting strategically for the KMT mayoral candidate. After examining the six models, we find that the most important factors influencing split ticket voting are ethnic background and strategic voting by New Party supporters. These two factors are intimately connected, of course.

Cette thèse s'intéresse au lien qui existe entre le système électoral et deux comportements importants de la vie civique, soit la participation à une élection et la désertion stratégique du candidat préféré vers un autre candidat. Ces thèmes sont abordés dans de nombreux et de très importants ouvrages en science politique. En passant par la théorie (Downs, 1957) jusqu'à des études de terrain par l'entremise de sondages (Abramson, 2010; Blais, 2010), diverses méthodologies ont été employées pour mieux expliquer les choix des électeurs. Ma contribution à l'avancement des connaissances dans ce domaine passe par l'usage de la méthode expérimentale pour mieux saisir les similitudes et différences dans les comportements des électeurs sous le système uninominal à un tour (UT) et la représentation proportionnelle (RP) ainsi que les mécanismes au niveau individuel qui produisent ces similitudes et différences. Le cœur de la thèse est composé des trois articles dont voici les résumés : Article 1. Des élections expérimentales faites à Montréal, Paris et Bruxelles permettent d'estimer l’influence directe du mode de scrutin sur la décision des électeurs de voter ou non, et de voter pour leur parti préféré ou non. En tout, 16 groupes de 21 électeurs votent sous différents systèmes électoraux, soit le UT et la RP. Les préférences sont attribuées aléatoirement et connues de tous les participants. Nos résultats indiquent que le vote n'est pas globalement plus sincère et que la participation électorale n'est pas plus élevée sous le système proportionnel. Toutefois, nous observons moins de désertion d'un petit parti sous le système proportionnel. Article 2. Les expériences permettent également d'expliquer pourquoi les électeurs votent parfois pour un parti autre que leur parti préféré. La conclusion principale est que la décision de voter de façon sincère ou non est influencée par les préférences individuelles, mais aussi par les perceptions des chances de gagner des candidats ainsi que des chances que son propre vote puisse décider le résultat de l'élection. Les électeurs qui désertent leur premier choix prennent en considération quel candidat est le plus près de leurs positions politiques, mais également de la viabilité de cette alternative. De plus, les électeurs qui aiment prendre des risques ont davantage tendance à déserter. Article 3. Le modèle de l'électeur pivot est mis à l'épreuve pour mieux comprendre la décision de voter ou non lors d'une élection. Nos expériences permettent de répliquer, avec un devis expérimental différent, les résultats importants des travaux de Duffy et Tavits (2008). Nos résultats confirment que la perception d'être pivot augmente la participation, que ces perceptions sont sujettes à la surestimation et que cette surestimation ne décline pas complètement dans le temps. Nous allons également plus loin que les recherches de Duffy et Tavits et nous trouvons que la participation n'est pas plus forte sous RP que sous UT et que la probabilité d'être pivot a un impact plus important chez les électeurs évitant de prendre des risques. / This thesis focuses on the relationship between the electoral system and two important behaviors of civic life: participation in an election and the strategic desertion of the preferred candidate. These topics are addressed in very important books in political science. From theory (Duverger, 1954; Downs, 1957) to empirical research using surveys (Abramson, 2010; Blais, 2010), various methodologies have been used to better explain voter's choices. My contribution to knowledge is the use of experimental methods to better understand both similarities and differences in voter behavior under the plurality system (PLU) and the proportional representation (PR) system and the individual level mechanisms that produce these similarities and differences. The core of the thesis consists of three articles summarized below: Article 1. Experimental elections conducted in Montreal, Paris and Brussels estimate the direct influence of the voting system on the voters' decision whether to vote or not, and vote for their preferred party or another party. In all, 16 groups of 21 voters take part in elections under different electoral systems. The systems are simple plurality and proportional representation. Preferences are randomly assigned and known by all participants. Our results indicate that voting is globally not more sincere and that voter turnout is not higher under the proportional system. However, we observe less desertion of small parties under the proportional system. Article 2. We perform a laboratory experiment to explain why voters sometimes vote for a party other than the preferred one. The main conclusion of the paper is that in addition to voter preferences, perceptions of winning chances and belief in the possibility of affecting the outcome are key factors in the voter’s decision to vote sincerely or not. When they desert their first choice, voters consider their preferences and the viability of the alternatives. Voters who like to take risks are more prone to desert. Article 3. This paper examines the decision to vote or not in experimental elections. We replicate the important findings of Duffy and Tavits (2008) with a different design. Our results support their finding, that is, turnout is affected by the belief that one's vote counts and overestimation of the probability that one's vote counts does not decrease completely over time. Going beyond previous research, we also find that turnout is not higher under a proportional system than under a plurality system, and beliefs about being in a pivotal disposition have a greater impact on turnout among the risk averse.

No description available.