This thesis analyzes the economic crises of recent years through the lens of the Regulation Theory. It focuses on the Greek Crisis of 2009 and the Turkish Financial Crises of 2000 and 2001. Furthermore it also analyzes the crisis in the United States to give a better grounding for the current crises. The thesis tries to answer the questions of whether or not Regulation Theory proves to be a sufficient tool for analyzing these crises and whether or not these fit the definition of crisis that the Regulation Theory puts forward. It is argued that Regulation Theory explains to a great extent both the causes and the structure of the crises.

不同股市的報酬關聯隨時間動態改變，本研究欲了解近期美國、台灣與亞太地區的中國大陸、香港、日本及韓國的報酬連動關係，並進一步觀察次級房貸風暴期間美股對這些地區的關聯改變趨勢。本論文採用灰色理論與時間序列兩種方法，實證發現次級房貸風暴發生期間，台股及亞太地區主要指數不論在報酬率或是報酬率波動性受美股影響的程度大多增強。 實證結果顯示，在風暴期間的報酬率傳導關係，亞太以韓國影響台股最顯著，美股則全面影響亞太指數；在報酬率波動性溢傳上，亞太以日本、美股以道瓊工業影響台股最強，台股則是電子類股被美股影響最重，但營建類股在與美股或是亞太指數的關聯趨勢變化卻最明顯。另外，灰關聯分析對時間序列檢定的關聯組合可以提供互補的關聯強弱關係說明，且具有相當的正確性。 / Connections between stock markets are dynamically changing, and it affects investor's transnational investment portfolio. We focus on the relationships of stock markets among the United States, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, China and Hong Kong, and eager to understand the connection tendency between Untied States and Asian-Pacific area during the subprime mortgage crisis period. The identified research methods are time series and grey theory, including Granger causality test, GARCH model and grey relational analysis. We find out the returns and volatility in Asian-Pacific stock markets were all affected increasly by U.S. market during the subprime mortgage crisis. The main empirical results are as follows: In the relationships of returns, Korea affects Taiwan mostly in the Asian-Pacific area, and U.S. market affects all the others entirely during the subprime crisis. In the relationships of volatility, Japan and Dow Jones index affects Taiwan deeply during the period; within all the Taiwan indexs, Electronic Sector Index was affected by the U.S. market mostly than others during the same period, but the connection tendency in the Construction Sector Index with other markets changes more obviously. Otherwise, grey relational analysis can provide complementary explainations as compared to time sereies in the strength of relationships, and the explainations are with plenty credibility.

美國次級房貸風暴自2007年7月爆發以來，除重創金融市場外，亦導致相關會計準則之修訂。本研究以我國金融業為對象，探討：（1）以公平價值認列之金融商品及相關金融資產負債之損益，其財務報導是否具有價值攸關性；（2）金融資產減損損失對投資人之影響是否重大；（3）可能產生減損損失之金融資產其財務報導是否具有價值攸關性；以及（4）財務會計準則第34號公報第二次修訂對投資人之影響為何。 / 本研究之主要發現如下：（1）以公平價值認列之金融商品具有價值攸關性，亦即其對投資人具有參考價值；（2）金融資產減損損失及無活絡市場之債券投資具有價值攸關性，金融資產減損損失增加時，會降低公司之價值，而影響投資人決策；以及（3）第34號公報第二次修訂之內容，對股價具有負向之解釋能力，亦即投資人並不認為金融商品重分類規定之放寬，有助於降低金融風暴對於金融業可能帶來的衝擊。 / Since the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis broke out in July, 2007, it not only inflicted heavy losses to global financial markets, but also caused changes in accounting standards. Using the financial industry in Taiwan as research sample, this study examines: (1) whether financial instruments measured at fair value and their reported gains and losses in the financial statements have value-relevance; (2) the influence of impairment losses of financial assets; (3) whether the financial instruments related to impairment losses of financial assets are value-relevant; and (3) the influence to investors before and after the Statements of Financial Account Standard (SFAS) No. 34 second revised. / This study’s major findings are as follows. The financial instruments measured at fair value are value-relevant and can provide incremental information to investors. Impairment losses on financial assets and non-active market investments also have value-relevance. If a company has more impairment losses on its financial assets, it may negatively affect the firm’s value and change investors’ decisions. As for the second revision of SFAS No. 34, it did not reverse investors’ expectations of the negative effect of the aforementioned financial crisis on the financial industry in Taiwan.

Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised. In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not. In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time stochastic modeling and optimization is required. The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised. In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not. In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time stochastic modeling and optimization is required. The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Subprime residential mortgage loan securitization and its associated risks have been a major topic of discussion since the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) in 2007. In this regard, the thesis addresses the issues of subprime residential mortgage loan (RML) securitization in discrete-, continuous-and discontinuous-time and their connections with the SMC. In this regard, the main issues to be addressed are discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In Chapter 2, we investigate the risk allocation choices of an investing bank (IB) that has to decide between risky securitized subprime RMLs and riskless Treasuries. This issue is discussed in a discrete-time framework with IB being considered to be regret- and risk-averse before and during the SMC, respectively. We conclude that if IB takes regret into account it will be exposed to higher risk when the difference between the expected returns on securitized subprime RMLs and Treasuries is small. However, there is low risk exposure when this difference is high. Furthermore, we assess how regret can influence IB's view - as a swap protection buyer - of the rate of return on credit default swaps (CDSs), as measured by the premium based on default swap spreads. We find that before the SMC, regret increases IB's willingness to pay lower premiums for CDSs when its securitized RML portfolio is considered to be safe. On the other hand, both risk- and regret-averse IBs pay the same CDS premium when their securitized RML portfolio is considered to be risky. Chapter 3 solves a stochastic optimal credit default insurance problem in continuous-time that has the cash outflow rate for satisfying depositor obligations, the investment in securitized loans and credit default insurance as controls. As far as the latter is concerned, we compute the credit default swap premium and accrued premium by considering the credit rating of the securitized mortgage loans. In Chapter 4, we consider a problem of IB investment in subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) and Treasuries in discontinuous-time. In order to accomplish this, we develop a Levy process-based model of jump diffusion-type for IB's investment in subprime RMBSs and Treasuries. This model incorporates subprime RMBS losses which can be associated with credit risk. Furthermore, we use variance to measure such risk, and assume that the risk is bounded by a certain constraint. We are now able to set-up a mean-variance optimization problem for IB's investment which determines the optimal proportion of funds that needs to be invested in subprime RMBSs and Treasuries subject to credit risk measured by the variance of IE's investment. In the sequel, we also consider a mean swaps-at-risk (SaR) optimization problem for IB's investment which determines the optimal portfolio which consists of subprime RMBSs and Treasuries subject to the protection by CDSs required against the possible losses. In this regard, we define SaR as indicative to IB on how much protection from swap protection seller it must have in order to cover the losses that might occur from credit events. Moreover, SaR is expressed in terms of Value-at-Risk (VaR). Finally, Chapter 5 provides an analysis of discrete-, continuous- and discontinuous-time models for subprime RML securitization discussed in the aforementioned chapters and their connections with the SMC. The work presented in this thesis is based on 7 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [25], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48] and [55]), 4 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [42], [50j, [51J and [52]) and 2 peer-reviewed conference proceedings papers (see [11] and [12]). Moreover, the article [49] is currently being prepared for submission to an lSI accredited journal. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2010.

Many analysts believe that problems in the U.S. housing market initiated the 2008–2010 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination and securitization that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the thesis, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), SOR mortgage insurers (SOMIs), trustees, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit enhancement providers (CEPs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). Furthermore, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned agents and banks are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of subprime SORs' risk and profit as well as their valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete–time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as mortgage losses. In addition, we show how high loan–to–value ratios due to declining housing prices curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 3 investigates the securitization of subprime mortgages into structured mortgage products such as subprime residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this regard, our discussions focus on information, risk and valuation as well as the role of capital under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. Our research supports the view that incentives to monitor mortgages has been all but removed when changing from a traditional mortgage model to a subprime mortgage model. In the latter context, we provide formulas for IB's profit and valuation under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. This is illustrated via several examples. Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between mortgage securitization and capital under Basel regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under the Basel II paradigm where risk–weights vary. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of RMBSs, RMBS CDOs as well as capital under Basel regulation. Furthermore, we investigate subprime RMBSs and their rates with slack and holding constraints. Also, we examine the effect of SMC–induced credit rating shocks in future periods on subprime RMBSs and RMBS payout rates. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 4 explores issues related to subprime data. In particular, we present mortgage and securitization level data and forge connections with the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The work presented in this thesis is based on 2 peer–reviewed chapters in books (see [99] and [104]), 2 peer–reviewed international journal articles (see [48] and [101]), and 2 peer–reviewed conference proceeding papers (see [102] and [103]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Many analysts believe that problems in the U.S. housing market initiated the 2008–2010 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination and securitization that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the thesis, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), SOR mortgage insurers (SOMIs), trustees, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), credit enhancement providers (CEPs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). Furthermore, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned agents and banks are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgages, securitization, as well as data - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of subprime SORs' risk and profit as well as their valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete–time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as mortgage losses. In addition, we show how high loan–to–value ratios due to declining housing prices curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 3 investigates the securitization of subprime mortgages into structured mortgage products such as subprime residential mortgage–backed securities (RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this regard, our discussions focus on information, risk and valuation as well as the role of capital under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. Our research supports the view that incentives to monitor mortgages has been all but removed when changing from a traditional mortgage model to a subprime mortgage model. In the latter context, we provide formulas for IB's profit and valuation under RMBSs and RMBS CDOs. This is illustrated via several examples. Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between mortgage securitization and capital under Basel regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under the Basel II paradigm where risk–weights vary. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of RMBSs, RMBS CDOs as well as capital under Basel regulation. Furthermore, we investigate subprime RMBSs and their rates with slack and holding constraints. Also, we examine the effect of SMC–induced credit rating shocks in future periods on subprime RMBSs and RMBS payout rates. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 4 explores issues related to subprime data. In particular, we present mortgage and securitization level data and forge connections with the results presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The work presented in this thesis is based on 2 peer–reviewed chapters in books (see [99] and [104]), 2 peer–reviewed international journal articles (see [48] and [101]), and 2 peer–reviewed conference proceeding papers (see [102] and [103]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Subprime residential mortgage loan securitization and its associated risks have been a major topic of discussion since the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) in 2007. In this regard, the thesis addresses the issues of subprime residential mortgage loan (RML) securitization in discrete-, continuous-and discontinuous-time and their connections with the SMC. In this regard, the main issues to be addressed are discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In Chapter 2, we investigate the risk allocation choices of an investing bank (IB) that has to decide between risky securitized subprime RMLs and riskless Treasuries. This issue is discussed in a discrete-time framework with IB being considered to be regret- and risk-averse before and during the SMC, respectively. We conclude that if IB takes regret into account it will be exposed to higher risk when the difference between the expected returns on securitized subprime RMLs and Treasuries is small. However, there is low risk exposure when this difference is high. Furthermore, we assess how regret can influence IB's view - as a swap protection buyer - of the rate of return on credit default swaps (CDSs), as measured by the premium based on default swap spreads. We find that before the SMC, regret increases IB's willingness to pay lower premiums for CDSs when its securitized RML portfolio is considered to be safe. On the other hand, both risk- and regret-averse IBs pay the same CDS premium when their securitized RML portfolio is considered to be risky. Chapter 3 solves a stochastic optimal credit default insurance problem in continuous-time that has the cash outflow rate for satisfying depositor obligations, the investment in securitized loans and credit default insurance as controls. As far as the latter is concerned, we compute the credit default swap premium and accrued premium by considering the credit rating of the securitized mortgage loans. In Chapter 4, we consider a problem of IB investment in subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) and Treasuries in discontinuous-time. In order to accomplish this, we develop a Levy process-based model of jump diffusion-type for IB's investment in subprime RMBSs and Treasuries. This model incorporates subprime RMBS losses which can be associated with credit risk. Furthermore, we use variance to measure such risk, and assume that the risk is bounded by a certain constraint. We are now able to set-up a mean-variance optimization problem for IB's investment which determines the optimal proportion of funds that needs to be invested in subprime RMBSs and Treasuries subject to credit risk measured by the variance of IE's investment. In the sequel, we also consider a mean swaps-at-risk (SaR) optimization problem for IB's investment which determines the optimal portfolio which consists of subprime RMBSs and Treasuries subject to the protection by CDSs required against the possible losses. In this regard, we define SaR as indicative to IB on how much protection from swap protection seller it must have in order to cover the losses that might occur from credit events. Moreover, SaR is expressed in terms of Value-at-Risk (VaR). Finally, Chapter 5 provides an analysis of discrete-, continuous- and discontinuous-time models for subprime RML securitization discussed in the aforementioned chapters and their connections with the SMC. The work presented in this thesis is based on 7 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [25], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48] and [55]), 4 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [42], [50j, [51J and [52]) and 2 peer-reviewed conference proceedings papers (see [11] and [12]). Moreover, the article [49] is currently being prepared for submission to an lSI accredited journal. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2010.

The aim of this research is to show the effects of financial liberalisation on emerging market economies, how these economies removed restrictions on financial institutions so that they can be globally integrated, and to show the flow of international finance in and out of a country. This research also illustrates how the financial system in these economies moved from being government-led to being market-led. The main finding of this research is that many countries failed to reap the benefits of liberalisation because of weaknesses in the regulatory structure, undercapitalised banks, volatile markets and contagion effects. The research concludes that the long-term gains of liberalisation certainly supersede short-term instability of liberalisation. Thus, for financial liberalisation to have predominantly positive effects, attention should be drawn to the importance of a more prudent regulatory and supervisory environment. Furthermore, financial liberalisation must be accompanied by a sound institutional infrastructure, proper conduct of monetary and fiscal policies, a reduction in corruption, and an increase in transparency. In addition, liberalisation should be a gradual process whereby the right measures are taken in the right sequence. / Economics / M. Comm. (Economics)