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Since the Civil War, historians have tried to understand why eleven southern states seceded from the Union to form a new nation, the Confederate States of America. What compelled the South to favor disunion over union? While enduring stereotypes perpetuated by the Myth of the Lost Cause cast most southerners of the antebellum era as ardent secessionists, not all southerners favored disunion. In addition, not all states were enthusiastic about the prospects of leaving one Union only to join another. Secession and disunion have helped shape the identity of the imagined South, but many Georgians opposed secession. This dissertation examines the life of U.S. Supreme Court Justice James Moore Wayne (1790-1867), a staunch Unionist from Savannah, Georgia. Wayne remained on the U.S. Supreme Court during the American Civil War, and this study explores why he remained loyal to the Union when his home state joined the Confederacy. Examining the nature of Wayne’s Unionism opens many avenues of inquiry into the nature of Georgia’s attitudes toward union and disunion in the antebellum era. By exploring the political, economic and social dimensions of Georgia Unionism and long opposition to secession, this work will add to the growing list of studies of southern Unionists.

This thesis traces the growth the United States Senate's role in the Supreme Court confirmation process from the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the nomination of Robert H. Bork in 1987. Beginning with an examination of the intellectual origins of the Advice and Consent Clause of the United States Constitution, the thesis goes on to demonstrate that the Senate's role in the confirmation process has expanded well beyond the boundaries established by the Framers of the Constitution, and that this has resulted in a usurpation of the presidential power of appointment. The thesis concludes by arguing that the growth of the Senate's role in the confirmation process has harmed the integrity of the judicial branch by infringing upon the separation of powers, specifically demonstrating how the modern confirmation process has threatened to undermine the independence of the Judiciary.

Un autre essai sur la sempiternelle question de l'unite canadienne, deplorez-vous presentement. Pis encore, ajoutez-vous, on y aborde une fois de plus l'ennuyeuse et l'ennuyante problematique constitutionnelle. Et pourquoi l'auteur a-t-il choisi un tel sujet? Parce qu'il fait partie de la race des fatigants mais infatigables maniaques de cet incessant debat qu'est celui des Deux Solitudes? Possible. Surement meme. Mais il y a plus: le Renvoi relatif a la secession du Quebec ne represente pas qu'un simple episode de la saga constitutionnelle canadienne. Vraisemblablement, ces implications pratiques pourraient un jour sceller l'issue du debat. Certes, le mouvement separatiste quebecois, loin d'etre moribond, ne s'eteindra pas sur la seule base d'une decision de la Cour supreme du Canada. Pretendre le contraire releve de la fantaisie, de l'outrecuidance ou encore, d'un manque tangible de pragmatisme politique. Toutefois, un fait persiste: applique in extenso, l'Avis s'avere une serieuse embuche sur le chemin menant a l'independance. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Techn. Univ., Diss.--Dresden, 1999.

Thesis (Doctor of Philosophy)--Miami University, Dept. of Political Science, 2004. / Title from second page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 150-158).

Ce travail de recherche a pour but d'apporter des éléments théoriques ainsi que pratiques au débat sur le causes et conséquences de la politisation des deux hauts tribunaux en Colombie, à fin d'enrichir la discussion. Concrètement, cette thèse doctorale analyse la manière dont les hauts juges sont élus et les conséquences les plus visibles de ces processus de sélection. A partir d'une analyse quantitative et qualitative, cette étude explore la façon dont l'autonomie de juges est conditionnée par le processus qu'ils suivent pour être élus. Pour conclure, cette thèse se penche aussi sur l'état actuel du bilan entre l'indépendance des juges et leur responsabilité vis-à-vis de leur fonction. / This researching work intends to provide theoretical and practical elements to enrich the debate about the causes and consequences of the politicization of two high tribunals in Colombia. In fact, this doctoral project analyses the way the election of the high judges is carried out and the respective consequences of these selection processes. Throughout a quantitative and qualitative analysis, we explore the way the autonomy of the judges is conditioned by their election process. Finally, the current state of the assessment between independence and responsibility of the judges is also tackled.

Cette thèse s'inscrit dans un mouvement de reconnaissance de l'importance accrue de l'institution judiciaire, et de questionnement actuel sur la légitimité démocratique du juge. Dans ce cadre, elle enquête sur le rôle, dans la fonction et la pratique judiciaire, de l'opinion publique, largement considérée comme un élément de légitimité démocratique. Pour obtenir un éclairage plus complet sur cette question, une approche comparative est adoptée et appliquée à l'œuvre protectrice d'une cour nationale constitutionnelle et d'une cour internationale dans le domaine des droits et des libertés : la Cour suprême des États-Unis et la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme. Le raisonnement suivi est le suivant. Au niveau théorique, il s'agit de clarifier le concept protéiforme d'«opinion publique» et d'établir les différentes sources de la légitimité judiciaire, afin de déterminer si l'opinion publique peut en faire partie. Au niveau procédural, l'étude se penche sur la pratique judiciaire des deux cours, les différentes règles et pratiques qui permettent d'impliquer directement ou indirectement le public dans le processus judiciaire, que ce soit les parties, les tierces-parties, ou les médias. On se penche enfin sur la substance des décisions de justice, qui révèlent la manière dont les juges conçoivent le rôle de l'opinion publique dans la démocratie et dans l'évolution judiciaire des droits et libertés. L'étude de la substance des décisions se concentre d'une part sur la relation entre opinion publique et démocratie dans la protection de la liberté d'expression, et d'autre part sur le rôle de l'opinion publique dans l'évolution des droits des personnes homosexuelles. / This dissertation is part of a larger movement, both national and international, acknowledging the growing importance and inquiring about the democratic legitimacy of judicial institutions. In looking at the judicial office and its practice, it investigates the role of public opinion, largely considered an element of democratic legitimacy. To obtain a more complete perspective on judicial institutions and public opinion, a comparative approach is adopted and the United States Supreme Court, and the European Court of Human Rights are examined. This study adopts the following reasoning. At a theoretical level, it attempts to clarify The multifaceted concept of “public opinion” and to establish the different sources of judicial legitimacy, in order to determine whether public opinion can be considered such a source. At a process level, the study inquiries about the judicial practice of both courts, and the different rules and practices that allow for a direct or indirect involvement of the public, whether parties, third-parties, or the media. It then studies the substance of judicial decisions, which reveal judges' conception of the role of public opinion in democracy and in the judicial evolution of rights and liberties. The content-study of judicial decisions focuses on first on the relationship between public opinion and democracy in the protection of freedom of expression and second on the rote of public opinion in the evolution of the rights of homosexual persons.

Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-26T15:13:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 GABRIELA COSTA E SILVA.pdf: 1168427 bytes, checksum: a8e9c486e26b38b7cbefac31f8dcef81 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-26T15:13:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 GABRIELA COSTA E SILVA.pdf: 1168427 bytes, checksum: a8e9c486e26b38b7cbefac31f8dcef81 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-26T15:13:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 GABRIELA COSTA E SILVA.pdf: 1168427 bytes, checksum: a8e9c486e26b38b7cbefac31f8dcef81 (MD5) / A presente dissertação tem por finalidade demonstrar que mesmo em existindo no ordenamento jurídico pátrio vasto rol de direitos fundamentais positivados e instrumentos processuais destinados a sua tutela e fomento, ainda existe na realidade prática vigente grande déficit de concretização desses valores. Essa circunstância é agravada pelo fato de, em determinados casos de complexidade julgados pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro, muitos desses reclames serem extintos prematuramente ou de maneira não satisfatória em virtude da aplicação de discursos limitativos ligados à aplicação restrita da vertente procedimentalista às atividades da jurisdição constitucional. Sendo assim, será criticada a adoção isolada dessa teoria, uma vez considerado que seu desenvolvimento em outros países está ligado a realidades conjunturais distintas a do Estado brasileiro. Por isso é que seu intuito é o de indicar que a adoção complementar do substancialismo visa a equilibrar as necessidades da realidade concreta aos anseios dispostos vinculativamente pela Constituição Federal. Assim, apontam-se métodos de aplicação e interpretação constitucionais que visam a potencializar as normas de direito fundamental, sem que os resultados produzidos pelo processo constitucional possam ser considerados como atividades de natureza política ou arbitrariamente invasivas face às atribuições institucionais de outras instâncias de Poder. Formulado em cinco capítulos, o estudo apresentará em primeiro plano, as justificativas dogmáticas que o fundamentam, mormente os fenômenos do pós-positivismo jurídico e do neoconstitucionalismo. Após o desenvolvimento e encadeamento das ideias de diversos autores que já se debruçaram sobre o tema, será realizado estudo prático no derradeiro capítulo a fim de se concluir que a aplicação do método reconstrutivo é capaz de contribuir para a missão de conferir efetividade aos direitos fundamentais por meio das ações e recursos da tutela abstrata movidos no âmbito do Supremo Tribunal.

O presente trabalho tratou das sentenças aditivas e das sentenças substitutivas no Direito italiano e no Direito brasileiro (mais especificamente, na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal). Tais técnicas alternativas (ou “atípicas”) de decisão no controle de constitucionalidade foram criadas pela Corte Constitucional na Itália e, com o tempo, passaram a ser utilizadas por outros tribunais ao redor do mundo, inclusive – conforme a doutrina mencionada no trabalho – pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal no Brasil. O objetivo do trabalho foi analisar como tais modelos (ou tipos) decisórios são utilizados pela Corte Constitucional na Itália e como foram “importados” para o Brasil pela jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Inicialmente, estudou- se, de modo detalhado, o controle de constitucionalidade na Itália, que é exercido pela Corte Constitucional por via incidental (ou por via de exceção) ou por via principal (ou por via de ação). Em seguida, abordou-se o “arsenal” de modelos (ou tipos) decisórios da Corte Constitucional no controle de constitucionalidade, do qual fazem parte as sentenças aditivas e as sentenças substitutivas. Por fim, examinaram- se algumas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal que – de acordo com a doutrina mencionada no trabalho – são tidas como exemplo de sentenças aditivas e de sentenças substitutivas. Verificou-se que o Supremo Tribunal Federal não utiliza as fórmulas que, na Itália, são encontradas no dispositivo das sentenças aditivas e das sentenças substitutivas da Corte Constitucional nem admite expressamente – no dispositivo das decisões – que emprega sentenças aditivas e sentenças substitutivas, o que pode indicar que tais modelos (ou tipos) decisórios não precisam ser “importados” para o Brasil. Constatou-se, ainda, que as referências às sentenças aditivas, do modo como são feitas pelos Ministros nas decisões do Tribunal, representam grave violação à ideia de segurança jurídica, que está contida no princípio do Estado de Direito, e vulneram, pois, a própria Constituição. / The present essay adressed the additive sentences and the substitutive sentences in Italian Law and in Brazilian Law (more especifically, in the Federal Supreme Court jurisprudence). Such alternative (or “atypical”) techniques of decision in judicial review were created by the Constitucional Court in Italy and, with time, started being used by other courts around the world, including – according to the doctrine mentioned in this essay – the Federal Supreme Court in Brazil. The goal of this essay was to analise how these decision models (or types) are used by the Federal Supreme Court. Initially, the judicial review in Italy, which is exercised by the Constitutional Court by incidental via (or exceptional via) or by mainly via (or through action), was studied, in detail. Then, the “arsenal” of models (or types) of decision of the Constitutional Court in judicial review, which comprises the additive sentences and the substitutive sentences, was approached. Lastly, some decisions of the Federal Supreme Court that – according to the doctrine mentioned in this essay – are considered as example of additive sentences and of substitutive sentences were examined. It was found that the Federal Supreme Court does not use the formulas that, in Italy, are found in the device of the additive sentences and of the substitutive sentences of the Constitutional Court, nor expressly acknowledges – in the device of decisions – that employs additive sentences and substitutive sentences, which may indicate that such models (or types) of decision-making do not need to be “imported” to Brazil. It was also found that the references to the additive sentences, the way they are made by Justices in the Court’s decisions, represent a serious violation of legal certainty idea, which is contained in the Rule of Law principle, and undermines, therefore, the Constitution itself.