This thesis is concerned with pragmatic factors of deontic reasoning, namely scale of violation, aggravating and mitigating circumstances and power of source. Nine experiments are reported investigating deontic reasoning and judgement revision. Experiment 1 established scale of violation as a modifying factor of a working rule with an inferential reasoning task, however, the effects were not transferred to a deductive reasoning task in Experiment 2. Scale of violation and circumstances were found to influence the reasoning of motoring violations with a major offence and aggravating circumstances being rated as more serious and receiving greater fines than a minor offence or mitigating circumstances (Experiments 3 & 4). These effects were also observed with a judgement revision task (Experiment 5). Power of source was included as an additional pragmatic factor and was found to influence the reasoning of conditional statements (Experiment 6), inducements (Experiment 7) and ratings of credibility and probability of outcomes (Experiment 8). The final study (Experiment 9) found significant effects for scale of violation / compliance and power of source within a judgement revision task. However, no difference was observed in the reasoning of superordinate and non-superordinate statements. The findings are explained in terms of the conditional probability hypothesis.

Dual Processing theory proposes that the ability to over ride associative (System 1) in favour of analytical (System 2) processed in deductive reasoning may depend on inhibitory control. The present study applies this association to a spatial reasoning task by adapting a mental rotation task to a multichoice format including System 1 (mirror) and System 2 (rotated image) responses. Fifty undergraduate volunteers from the University of Canterbury responded to a Stroop task as a measure of inhibitory control that was compared with System 1 and System 2 responding from a spatial and a deductive reasoning task. It was expected that people with weaker inhibitory potential would make more System 1 and fewer System 2 responses in both deductive and visual-spatial reasoning tasks. Contrary to expectation System 2 responding dominated for both tasks and correlations between both reasoning tasks and measures of inhibitory control were non-significant. The differing idiosyncratic demands of each task may have obscured any common variables associated with inhibitory control. This research initiated a test for the presence of System 1 and System 2 in spatial reasoning.

Dual Processing theory proposes that the ability to over ride associative (System 1) in favour of analytical (System 2) processed in deductive reasoning may depend on inhibitory control. The present study applies this association to a spatial reasoning task by adapting a mental rotation task to a multichoice format including System 1 (mirror) and System 2 (rotated image) responses. Fifty undergraduate volunteers from the University of Canterbury responded to a Stroop task as a measure of inhibitory control that was compared with System 1 and System 2 responding from a spatial and a deductive reasoning task. It was expected that people with weaker inhibitory potential would make more System 1 and fewer System 2 responses in both deductive and visual-spatial reasoning tasks. Contrary to expectation System 2 responding dominated for both tasks and correlations between both reasoning tasks and measures of inhibitory control were non-significant. The differing idiosyncratic demands of each task may have obscured any common variables associated with inhibitory control. This research initiated a test for the presence of System 1 and System 2 in spatial reasoning.

Den här studien syftar till att undersöka hur riskhantering fungerar som ett stödsystem vid beslutssituationer. Människor kan ofta ta snedsteg och förenkla bedömningar och beslut. Inom organisationer kan man av den anledningen implementera stödsystem. Den här studien utgår från frågan: Hur påverkar riskhantering bedömningar i beslutssituationer? Genom en kvalitativ studie har tre organisationer undersökts utifrån ett teoretiskt ramverk som omfattar riskhantering, systemets verktyg och kognitiva bedömningsprocesser. Resultatet visar att det främst är genom regleringar och ansvar som riskhantering som system kan påverka bedömningar och dess utförande. Andra typer av verktyg kan aktualisera risker som ett problem, men ha varierande effekt på bedömningarna i sig. Verktygen kunde vid osäkerhet förlita sig på organisationens aktörer, hur detta verkligen fungerar och gruppdynamikens förmåga att ifrågasätta individuella uppfattningar är relevanta frågor för framtida forskning inom riskhantering.

Nudging är ett verktyg som används inom fler och fler områden. Så även inom re- kryteringsområdet där nudging bland annat nyttjas för att hjälpa rekryterande chefer att undvika vanliga fallgropar vid urvalsbedömningar och beslut. Uppsatsen granskar och analyserar Thaler & Sunsteins definition av nudging, för att sedan undersöka om några utvalda nudingtekniker inom rekryteringsområdet med rätta kan kallas nud- ging enligt Thaler och Sunsteins definition, samt om de kan matchas in under Sunsteins tio viktigaste nudgingtekniker. Uppsatsen försöker identifiera vilket tanke- system nudgarna är tänkta påverka utifrån Kahnemans koncept om system 1 och sy- stem 2, samt om risken för fallgropar är mer förekommande under vissa delar under rekryteringsprocessen. Slutligen diskuteras om det föreligger en konflikt mellan nyttjande av nudging och statens krav på förtjänst och skicklighet som grund vid stat- lig anställning. Resultatet visar att de utvalda nudgarna i sju fall av åtta kunde kate- goriseras som nudgar enligt Thaler och Sunsteins definition, trots att rekryte- ringsnudgarna är framtagna för specifika tillämpningsområden. Definitionen skulle tjäna på en referens till kognitiva beteendebarriärer för att visa kopplingen till den beteendevetenskapliga grunden. Den skulle också tjäna på att tydligare koppla valar- kitekturen till en i tid närliggande valsituation. Forskningen pekar på att beslutsfat- tare faller offer för snabba system 1-beslut när de rekryterar, samt upplyser om hur detta kan undvikas; genom att antingen nudga system 1 att undvika vanliga fallgro- par eller genom att aktivera beslutsfattarens system 2, så att beslutsfattaren aktivt tänker igenom sina val. Endast tre av åtta valda nudgarna kunde matchas mot Sunste- ins tio viktigaste nudgingtekniker. Ingen konflikt eller etiskt dilemma identifierades i samband med användning av nudgar vid rekrytering i staten, då nudgarna syftar till att säkerställa att det är förtjänst och skicklighet som tillämpas vid urval och beslut. / Nudging is used in more and more situations to help people make better decisions. It is also used in the field of recruitment to help recruiting managers to avoid com- mon pitfalls when making decisions. This thesis reviews and analyses Thaler and Sunstein ́s definition on nudging, then examines whether a few selected nudging techniques qualify as nudging based on Thaler and Sunstein’s definition, criteria and tools, and if they can be matched with Sunstein ́s ten most important nudging tech- niques. The thesis seeks to identify which thought system the nudges are intended to influence based on Kahneman's concept of system 1 and system 2, as well as whether the risk of pitfalls is more prevalent during certain parts of the recruitment process. Finally, the thesis seeks to identify whether there is a conflict between the use of nudging and the state's requirement for merit and skill as the basis for state employment. Theresultsshowthatinsevencasesoutofeight,theselectednudges could be categorised as nudges according to Thaler and Sunstein's definition, even though the recruitment nods are designed for specific application areas. The defini- tion would benefit from a reference to cognitive behavioral barriers to make the connection to the behavioral science basis. It would also benefit from more clearly linking the choice architecture to the time of the decision situation. Research sug- gests that decision-makers fall victim to rapid system 1 decisions when recruiting and shed light on how to avoid it; either by nudging system 1 avoid pitfalls or by ac- tivating the decision maker's system 2, to make them actively think through their choices. Only three of the selected nudges could be matched against Sunstein's 10 most important nudging techniques. No conflict or ethical dilemma was identified in connection with the use of nudges in recruitment in the state, since the nudges aim to ensure that it is merit and skill that are the basis for all decisions.

In an attempt to understand how humans make decisions, a wealth of researchers have explored the commonalities of different decision making demands. Two ranges of systems have been classified. Whereas Type 1 decision making is fast, automatic, and effortless, Type 2 judgments are slow, contemplative, and effortful. Here, I sought to determine underlying mechanisms of these processes. To do this, I present an extensive review and two electroencephalogram experiments. My review addresses theoretical models defining Type 1 and Type 2 decision making, discusses the debate between dual-process and continuous frameworks, proposes a novel insight into how these processes are selected and executed, and outlines neuro-anatomical findings. In one experiment, participants retained digits (Type 1 processes) and completed mathematical computations (Type 2 processes). I found that cognitive control – as reflected by frontal theta – and attentional mechanisms – as reflected by parietal alpha – are core mechanisms in Type 1 and Type 2 decision making. In a second experiment, I sought to replicate these findings when trained students diagnosed diseases. Differences in theta and alpha activity were not seen. I posit that the discrepancy between experiments may be because cognitive control relies on uncertainty which existed in experiment one but not experiment two. Moreover, attentional mechanisms involve the retrieval of knowledge in which the demands would have differed in experiment one but not two. I conclude by describing how cognitive control and attention fit into my hypothesis of different decision making steps: process selection and execution. These findings are important as they could lead to the assessment of decision making processes in real-world contexts, for example with clinicians in the hospital. Moreover, they could be used in biofeedback training to optimize decisions. / Graduate

In today’s constantly evolving technological environment, businesses have more tools to support decision-making and these can be categorized as Decision Support Systems (DSS). One of the tools is Business Intelligence (BI), which is regarded as a high-priority investment in organizations nowadays. Even though there exists a vast amount of research in the DSS area, most of the influential work is conducted in time incomparable to today’s technological environment. In addition, most of the research focuses on profit-seeking organizations, as BI has been regarded as a tool to increase profits. However, non-profit organizations also use BI, but are not portrayed in the BI research area. The aim with this study is to explore how BI is used in relation to decision-making in a non-profit organization and to investigate the crucial factors in the usage of BI in relation to decision-making. A qualitative case study approach is applied where the Swedish non-profit organization Systembolaget AB is the case company. The main findings indicate that interaction between the two decision-making types is needed when using BI in a non-profit context. Moreover, having data literacy, data reliability, and data accessibility is found crucial in order to achieve BI success in relation to decision-making, especially when more and more decisions are made at the operational level. Finally, the results of this study amplify the need for an update in the DSS framework.

Effects of Interactive Read-Aloud and Literature Discussion on Reading Comprehension for First-Grade Students With Language Impairments in a Title 1 School. Elizabeth Vultaggio Salah, 2014: Applied Dissertation, Nova Southeastern University, Abraham S. Fischler School of Education. Language Impaired, First-Grade, Title 1 Schools, Reading Comprehension, Interactive Read-Aloud, Literature Discussion, Fountas and Pinnell. This applied dissertation was designed to determine the effects of the interactive read-aloud and literature discussion on reading comprehension for first-grade students with language impairments in a Title 1 School. This study was conducted as an embedded case study design using a quantitative method for data collection and analysis. The de-identified data was collected and analyzed from two consecutive school years (i.e., 2012-2013, 2013-2014). Data on the students' overtime (i.e., from kindergarten to first-grade) was collected and analyzed based upon a multiple case study design. Data points were collected using the A-B design, a two phase, basic signal-subject design. The A in the A-B design was the individual student's baseline data point; whereas B, was the data point after the intervention. The researcher observed and measured individual student data from the kindergarten school year (A). The researcher administered the read-aloud intervention, and observed and measured multiple data points after the intervention (B). The students' scores were determined using ongoing data collection. Since the overall design was to measure improvement in the four students overtime, no comparison groups were used. An analysis of the de-identified data revealed how individual language impaired students responded to the intervention. The researcher concluded that interactive read-aloud coupled with literature discussions improved reading comprehension of first-grade language impaired students based on results of the Oral Language Assessment and the Comprehension Conversation Assessment of the Fountas and Pinnell Benchmark System 1. Recommendations were made for future research.

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Decisions are performatives - or at least, they share important features with performative utterances that can elucidate our theory of what type of thought they are, and what they do. Namely, decisions have an analogous force to that of performatives, where the force of a propositional attitude or utterance is constituted by (i) its point, or purpose, which is mainly a matter of its direction-of-fit, and (ii) its felicity conditions. The force of both decisions and performatives is to bring into being the states of affairs represented in their intentional contents, merely in virtue of the decision or performative’s occurrence and the satisfaction of the felicity conditions they presuppose. The first chapter of the thesis explicates this general framework, and the second and third attempt to show some of the work it can do for a theory of decisions.