In August 2017, the Myanmar military initiated what the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights called a text-book example of ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya ethnic minority. In 2020, Myanmar is called to the International Court of Justice to answer to allegations of committed genocide. As the UN has failed to invoke the responsibility to protect, the world has turned to regional organizations as a prevention mechanism in mass atrocity prevention. The research objective of this study is to examine how Myanmar’s regional organization ASEAN has responded to the oppression of the Rohingya minority, as to explain why the atrocities targeting the Rohingya in Myanmar could not be prevented regionally and add to the research on mass atrocity prevention. This thesis is an abductive text analysis with an analytical framework based on Regional Security Complex Theory, which is used to investigate power relations within the region. This thesis argues that the reason the crisis could not be prevented by ASEAN was due to problems on the national, regional, and international levels. Myanmar’s disinterest in human rights, ASEAN’s norm of non-interference, and the international community’s interest in Myanmar’s rich resources all became obstacles in preventing the atrocity from happening. Since genocide prevention has failed several times since the UN’s genocide convention was adopted and entered into force, it is important to add more research to previous work to understand why mass atrocities continue to happen and how we could prevent these atrocities from happening again. The research looks at the Rohingya crisis to draw learnings that can be added to the research on mass atrocity prevention.

This essay conducts a Plausibility Probe Case Study focused on how the UN and the wider international community have approached the civil war in Ethiopia. Because the Ethiopian Government has been unable to protect its population, Ethiopia can be considered a typical case for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P was introduced in response to the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica and builds upon the idea of the international community having a responsibility to assist states to protect their populations. R2P’s normative status remains debated, however, due to criticism directed against R2P’s third pillar which prescribes the international community a responsibility to act when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its population. Therefore, scholars have started to analyse R2P’s status by the use of Finnemore & Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle Theory, disagreeing about R2P’s normative strength and whether R2P will ever be able to enter the third stage of the Norm Life Cycle (NLC). This essay applies the same theory to the empirical findings from the Ethiopian case with the primary aim to contribute to the debate about R2P’s normative status. Findings show how R2P seems to be positioned at the second stage of the NLC. This does not necessarily mean that R2P should be considered a weak norm as the UN and the international community have indirectly complied with R2P when approaching the Ethiopian conflict. Yet, the fact that none of the relevant actors under study has mentioned R2P explicitly indicates how R2P still remains a controversial norm within international politics.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Many scholars perceive state sovereignty as absolute, inviolable, indivisible, final, binding and stagnant. That perception emanates from inter alia political, social, cultural and environmental contexts of the modern era. Most literature converge that the doctrine of sovereignty first received official codification at the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Contemporary international norms, particularly the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, are arguably an environment and culture of current global politics. With human rights and democracy having taken centre-stage in contemporary political discourses, sovereignty is affected and influenced by such developments in international politics. Hence the argument that globalisation, among others, has eroded, weakened and rendered the doctrine of sovereignty obsolete. This study, using Zimbabwe‟s Operation Murambatsvina as a case study, demonstrates that sovereignty is neither unitary in practice, nor sacrosanct; it is dynamic and evolves, thus, in need of constant reconfiguration. To this end, the study uses the qualitative research methodology. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

Paragraphs 138 to 140 of the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit not only elevated the element of prevention to a prominent place within the principle of “responsibility to protect” (R2P), but also restricted the scope of R2P to four specific crimes under international law: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This thesis explores the conceptual and practical consequences of linking R2P to the concept of international crimes, with a particular focus on the preventive dimension of R2P, the socalled “responsibility to prevent”. To date, much of what has been written about the “responsibility to prevent” borrows primarily from conflict prevention theory and practice. Such conflict prevention inspired accounts of the “responsibility to prevent” tend to depict the principle as a long-term agenda that seeks to build societies resilient to atrocity crimes; that rests primarily on pillars one (state responsibility) and two (international assistance and capacity-building); that is supportive rather than undermining of state sovereignty; and that can largely adhere to the traditional conflict prevention principles of impartiality, consent, and minimal coercion should more direct prevention efforts become necessary. Drawing on literature from criminology, this thesis develops an international crimes framework for operationalizing the preventive dimension of R2P. The framework, combined with three case studies of international crime prevention (Bosnia 1991-1995; Kenya 2007-08; and Libya 2011), challenges key assumptions of the conflict prevention accounts, arguing that linking R2P to the concept of international crimes turns the “responsibility to prevent” into a principle that is more focused on the short-term, rather than on so-called root causes of atrocity crimes; more focused on individuals, rather than on state structures and capacity; more partial regarding perpetrators and victims; and more coercive, intrusive, and controversial than is commonly acknowledged in academic writing and policy debates on the subject. More broadly, the thesis concludes that taking R2P’s focus on the prevention of international crimes seriously requires re-rethinking the “responsibility to prevent” in important respects.

The aim of the work is to analyze the concepts of humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect (R2P) with special emphasis on their development in the light of the ongoing Syrian crisis. The text follows the evolution of humanitarian intervention into R2P and introduces theoretical assumptions behind both concepts. It is argued that at the moment, R2P does not bring particularly novel concepts into the international law and can be generally described as a hybrid of legal, political and moral obligations. Consequently, the text includes a case study of the Syrian conflict and an evaluation of the way R2P has been applied during the crisis. Final section of the work is devoted to a suggestion of a new solution for R2P - responsibility while protecting.

Inicialmente, esta dissertação apresenta o marco teórico conceitual em que se situa a sociedade internacional contemporânea, as fontes tradicionais do direito internacional expostas no art. 38 do Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça, as possíveis novas fontes do direito internacional atos unilaterais de Estados, atos de organizações internacionais e Soft Law. É abordado em seguida o paradigma da soberania decorrente da modificação da sociedade internacional. Os fundamentos da Responsabilidade de Proteger (R2P) são levados a uma análise sob as diversas fontes do direito internacional. A R2P não se verifica como fonte autônoma do direito internacional nos princípios gerais de direitos, nas convenções internacionais e nos meios auxiliares da doutrina e da jurisprudência. Todavia, seu enquadramento é feito em duas teorias: branda e dinâmica. Em razão de seu caráter de formação de opinio juris e da prática reiterada, a teoria branda considera a R2P uma manifestação do costume internacional. Enquanto isso, a teoria dinâmica leva em consideração a evolução do direito internacional contemporâneo, que considera a Soft Law uma fonte autônoma, bem como as manifestações da R2P. Conclui-se, então, que a teoria da R2P está sedimentada nas fontes do direito internacional contemporâneo e clássico. / Firstly this thesis presents the conceptual framework in which lies the contemporary international society, the traditional sources of International Law - exposed in art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the possible new sources of International Law - unilateral acts of States, international organizations and acts of Soft Law. Then, it brings forward the paradigm of sovereignty resulting from the modification of the international society. The foundations of the Responsibility to Protect are subject to an analysis emphasizing the variety of International Law sources. The R2P is not embraced as an autonomous source of International Law in the general principles, international conventions, doctrine and jurisprudence. However, its framing is analyzed in this thesis with two theories: \"mild\" and \"dynamic\". Considering the formation of opinio juris and the repeated practice, the mild theory considers R2P as a manifestation of international custom. Meanwhile, the dynamic theory takes into account the evolution of contemporary International Law, which considers Soft Law as an autonomous source, as well as the manifestations of R2P. So the conclusion is that the theory of R2P is based in the sources of contemporary and classic International Law.

Este trabalho tem dois grandes objetivos: analisar a intervenção internacional ocorrida na Líbia em 2011 pelas perspectivas do direito internacional e das relações internacionais, e tratar da atual conjuntura do país no pós-intervenção. Quanto ao primeiro objetivo, aborda-se toda a evolução do uso da força no sistema internacional até o desenvolvimento do conceito de Responsabilidade de Proteger, que constitui o ponto de confluência da longa tradição de guerra justa, do adensamento normativo do direito internacional (sobretudo do jus ad bellum e do jus in bello), da ampliação das atribuições do Conselho de Segurança da ONU e das transformações dos conflitos armados. Após, verificam-se as resoluções aprovadas entre fevereiro e outubro de 2011, sobretudo a Resolução 1973, que autorizou o uso da força para a proteção de civis. Passa-se a estabelecer os limites jurídicos do mandato interventor, visando a determinar se as ações dos Estados mandatados se coadunaram com os parâmetros jurídicos existentes. Nesse sentido, recorre-se ao contexto político no Conselho de Segurança da ONU existente na aprovação da Resolução 1973 e no decorrer da intervenção. Conclui-se que a coalition of the willing violou a Resolução 1973 e o direito internacional ao promover mudança de regime, ao fornecer aos rebeldes armamentos ofensivos e treinamento militar, bem como ao coordenar-se com eles, ao bombardear civis, ao rejeitar propostas de paz da União Africana após a proteção a Benghazi e ao procurar derrotar militarmente o regime de Kadafi. Em seguida, estudam-se as políticas externas dos Estados-membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança da ONU em 2011, tanto suas diretrizes gerais quanto os objetivos específicos para o Oriente Médio e a Líbia. São analisadas as razões por que Estados Unidos, França e Reino Unido decidiram intervir e por que não houve vetos de Rússia e China. Quanto ao segundo objetivo, estuda-se a atual situação da Líbia, a fim de verificar as principais causas de sua presente instabilidade, bem como os fatores por que Estados mandatados pouco se comprometeram com a reconstrução do país após a intervenção. Apontam-se como fatores de instabilidade a proliferação de grupos armados fora de efetivo controle estatal, fronteiras porosas aliadas a crescimento de tráficos e contrabando, vazio institucional desde a independência, hesitante identidade nacional e constante dicotomia centro-periferia. Iniciativas de reconstrução pós-conflito tampouco constituíram norma jurídica a obrigar os Estados. Alto custo financeiro e político de missões de paz/estabilização (capacetes azuis), a exemplo daquelas no Afeganistão e Iraque, em contexto de crise econômica, falta de apoio popular nos principais Estados mandatados e entre as novas lideranças líbias contribuíram para missão da ONU de baixo perfil. Eventos na Líbia de 2011 indicam que intervenções para proteção de civis seguem lógica de maximizar benefícios pretendidos e minimizar custos (Rationality to Protect). Spillover regional da instabilidade e novas intervenções internacionais na Líbia pós-2011 seguido de Mea culpa das principais lideranças dos Estados mandatados. / This research has two objectives: to analyse the 2011 international intervention in Libya through the lenses of both international law and international relations, and to discuss Libya\'s post-intervention political process. Regarding the first objective, the historic evolution of the use of force in international law until the development of the concept of Responsibility to Protect is discussed. Responsibility to Protect is the point into which the long tradition of just war, the development of international law (especially the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello), the growing responsibilities of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of world peace and security, and the changing nature of armed conflicts converge. Also, all the resolutions passed by the UN Security Council between February and October 2011 are examined in detail, especially Resolution 1973, which authorised the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, in order to verify if the actions of the states that took part in the intervention were consistent with the existing legal parameters. In this regard, the political context of the UN Security Council when Resolution 1973 was passed and during the intervention is taken into consideration. It is therefore concluded that the coalition of the willing violated Resolution 1973 and international law by promoting regime change, by sending weapons to the rebels, by training and coordinating with them, by bombing civilians, by rejecting the African Union peace overtures after Benghazi was secured, and by pursuing the military defeat of Gaddafi\'s forces. Moreover, the foreign policies of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are analysed, including the strategies concerning the Middle East and North Africa, as well as those concerning Libya in 2011. Thus, the motives that led the United States, France, and Great Britain to push for intervention, as well as those that drove Russia and China to abstain, are explained. As for the second objective, the current political situation of Libya is analysed, especially the reasons for its post-intervention instability, as well as the causes of the intervening states\' lack of commitment to post-conflict reconstruction. Libya\'s political instability derives mostly from the proliferation of armed groups that are not placed under effective government control, from porous borders, from the growth of human and drug trafficking as well as smuggling routes, from the inexistence of strong state institutions since independence, from a hesitant national identity, and from a constant dichotomy between centre and periphery. Post-conflict reconstruction does not constitute a binding legal obligation. High financial and political costs of peace/stabilisation operations, like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, economic crisis, lack of popular support in the leading members of the coalition of the willing and among new Libyan leaders contributed to a low-key UN mission. Interventions to protect civilians are influenced by political calculations of minimising risks and maximising benefits (Rationality to Protect). Libya\'s instability has spread to its neighbours and new international interventions have taken place in the country, as the leaders of the 2011 intervening states have recognised their mistakes.