Diss.-Inaug.--Berlin. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis will explore the epistemological and ontological content of logos as it appears in Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist. As a tether between the realms being and becoming, logos occupies the dianoetic space in which meaningful, objective communication of ideas takes place. Complex in nature, logos exists as the combination of simple units; namely the forms, which provide themselves as the elements of this combination, of human knowledge, and the communication thereof. At issue is thus how, in response to the objections to the theory of forms raised in the Parmenides, the forms can exist as relational entities, and therefore as well how Plato understands the process by which logos is constructed.

Socrates and Theaetetus consider and reject three different definitions of knowledge in the Theaetetus. The first of these is the thesis that knowledge is perception. According to the received reading Plato's consideration of the thesis that knowledge is perception is limited to the consideration of the naive and implausible thesis that immediate sense-perception is knowledge and there is no knowledge apart from immediate sense-perception. This reading, which limits the philosophic interest of Platos consideration of the thesis that knowledge is perception, follows from a widespread misunderstanding of Socrates' reasons for introducing Protagoras and Heraclitus which circumscribes their role in the dialogue to supplying two theses, epistemological relativism and metaphysical flux, which are sufficient or perhaps necessary conditions for the thesis that knowledge is perception. I will show that Socrates introduces Protagoras and Heraclitus, not simply because they provide the epistemological or metaphysical framework within which Theaetetus' definition holds good, but because each man is committed to the thesis that knowledge is perception. Protagoras' sophistic expertise will be classed as a kind of empirical knowledge which bases itself on past and present perceptions and makes educated predictions of future perceptions. While Heraclitus' theory of flux will lead to a radical skepticism which rejects the possibility that there should be any knowledge of the world apart from perception. Socrates will give arguments against both of these ways of understanding the thesis that knowledge is perception. Plato thus articulates, develops, and ultimately rejects three different ways of understanding Theaetetus' initial definition of knowledge. / text

In keeping with Socrates’ advice that it is “a better thing to accomplish a little well than a lot inadequately” (Theaetetus, 187d), this master’s report provides a detailed study of a few relatively short sections of Plato’s Theaetetus. After an analysis of the beginning of the work and its opening themes, I examine the Protagorean thesis as it is first revealed in Theaetetus’ second endeavor to say what knowledge is. Rather than follow the entire course of Socrates’ account of Protagoras’ position, I bring out a few of the essential features of this initial presentation and attempt to gain some clarity as to the possible meaning and purpose behind Protagoras’ enigmatic declaration that man is the measure of all things. The final section of my paper entails a close analysis of the dialogue’s last definition of knowledge: true opinion with speech. Although this account does not answer all of the questions posed by the Protagorean thesis, we find within it the most promising approach to answering the question of the dialogue: “What is knowledge?” While the Theaetetus comes to a close with this final attempt and ultimate failure to answer the question with which it began, I show that Socrates’ spurious arguments often serve more as pointers toward the truth than as refutations of the “truths” proposed. / text

Esta tese tem como objetivo oferecer uma interpretação da questão da memória no diálogo Teeteto de Platão. O enfoque específico, todavia, não trata da discussão da reminiscência, tema esperado quando se aborda o problema da memória na filosofia platônica. Minha proposta de leitura de parte de dois conceitos novos, um de caráter literário a memória dramática e outro de caráter filosófico a memória filosófica. O primeiro tem como objetivo analisar o jogo entre a lembrança e esquecimento apresentado como recurso literário na construção do diálogo. O segundo, por sua vez, examina a memória como argumento explícito para a definição do tema principal do diálogo, o conhecimento. Por fim, apresento a tradução integral do diálogo Teeteto como complemento ao trabalho. / This thesis aims to offer an interpretation of the issue of memory in the Theaetetus Plato\'s dialogue. The specific focus, however, is not about the discussion of reminiscence, expected issue when addressing the problem of memory in Platonic philosophy. My proposal for reading parts of two new concepts, one of a literary nature - the dramatic memory - and another philosophical nature - the philosophical memory. The first aims to analyze the interplay between remembering and forgetting presented as literary resource in the construction of the dialogue. The second, in turn, examines the memory as an explicit argument for the main theme of the definition of dialogue, the knowledge. Finally, I present the full translation of the dialogue Theaetetus as a complement to work.

I will argue that Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus demonstrates that knowledge is never caused by sense perception. While various kinds of qualities appear to the soul or mind as a result of sense perception—as a result of external bodies impacting with the sense organs—the being (einai or ousia) of these qualities is something different from the mere appearance of the qualities that occurs through the senses. While white colors appear to the soul through vision, perception itself does not reveal that these many appearances are all instances of one white quality. However, I will demonstrate that it is impossible to know anything, even something as basic as “the chalk is white,” if the knower does not recognize that “white” is some one thing and not merely a plurality of instances. Since sense perception does not disclose the one being of what appears within it, knowledge always requires the soul or mind to go beyond what is receptively disclosed to it through sense perception. In order to demonstrate this conclusion, Plato uses a reductio ad absurdum argument. He develops a theory that argues for the opposite conclusion. According to this theory, perceiving and knowing are the same. In order to justify this result, the theory posits that qualities have no one being that is distinct from their many appearances. I will show that the theory entails a series of unacceptable consequences. The worst of these consequences is that it makes reality itself is unintelligible—according to the theory, the world cannot be linguistically described because the world does not possess any concrete determinacy to describe as a result of the theory denying the difference between being and appearances. Plato’s Socrates demonstrates that these conclusions are unacceptable on the theory’s own terms. As a result, the theory fails and the postulate that being and appearances are identical must be rejected. It is impossible for the mere appearance of a quality through sense perception to ever be knowledge. It will only be possible for knowledge to come about through an activity of the soul that discovers the being of what appears to it.

My goal in the present work is to add to our understanding of Socratic protreptic. I do so by focussing on psychological traits and qualities of character in Socrates’ young associates. There are a number of candidates throughout the dialogues whose colourful depiction and careful psychological rendering offer us ample material for study. In this study, I focus on two characters in particular. First, I look at the presentation of Alcibiades in the final scene of Symposium. Here I explore how Plato uses hubris and shame to explain the failure of protreptic in this gifted Socratic associate. Next, I look at Theaetetus as presented in the eponymously named dialogue. His characterization as an able, intelligent and model candidate for philosophy gives us a penetrating insight into the Socratic ideal. Finally, I offer a reading of Eros in Phaedrus that examines the psychological dynamic between the lover and his beloved. While a number of types of lovers are envisioned in this dialogue, I argue that if a beloved is to succeed in turning toward philosophy his lover must be a philosophical lover motivated by other-regarding care for his beloved’s soul. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-04-02 11:04:07.292

Esta tese tem como objetivo oferecer uma interpretação da questão da memória no diálogo Teeteto de Platão. O enfoque específico, todavia, não trata da discussão da reminiscência, tema esperado quando se aborda o problema da memória na filosofia platônica. Minha proposta de leitura de parte de dois conceitos novos, um de caráter literário a memória dramática e outro de caráter filosófico a memória filosófica. O primeiro tem como objetivo analisar o jogo entre a lembrança e esquecimento apresentado como recurso literário na construção do diálogo. O segundo, por sua vez, examina a memória como argumento explícito para a definição do tema principal do diálogo, o conhecimento. Por fim, apresento a tradução integral do diálogo Teeteto como complemento ao trabalho. / This thesis aims to offer an interpretation of the issue of memory in the Theaetetus Plato\'s dialogue. The specific focus, however, is not about the discussion of reminiscence, expected issue when addressing the problem of memory in Platonic philosophy. My proposal for reading parts of two new concepts, one of a literary nature - the dramatic memory - and another philosophical nature - the philosophical memory. The first aims to analyze the interplay between remembering and forgetting presented as literary resource in the construction of the dialogue. The second, in turn, examines the memory as an explicit argument for the main theme of the definition of dialogue, the knowledge. Finally, I present the full translation of the dialogue Theaetetus as a complement to work.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2017-09-21T12:18:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1831840 bytes, checksum: dc86a1490bdd642eb9e4bf0010e7d5ec (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-21T12:18:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1831840 bytes, checksum: dc86a1490bdd642eb9e4bf0010e7d5ec (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The main objectives of the actual research consist in showing that there is a sense theory developed by Plato from what he considered mistaken in the theses of previous thinkers like Protagoras and Heraclitus, that were considered like truths, bringing in the Theaetetus a detailed evaluation on aspects of sensitivity and knowledge. This sense theory is presented and maintained in the course of the work, so that we can include it in the process towards knowledge, which will be another important point in our investigation. We must, at a first moment, show the authenticity of the sensory theory developed in what we will call the Secret Doctrine, so that later, in the final chapter, we fit such theory into the process toward knowledge. By properly developing these two points, we will conclude that the sensibility can not be discarded in the cognitive process necessary to approach the truth. For this, we will dialogue directly with the work in question to emphasize the necessary aspects of the sense theory of the Secret Doctrine in order to show that it’s complexity is not compatible with the thinking of the nominee thinkers. Detailed aspects, such as slow movements as powers of becoming, rapid movements as pair-formers, sensation quality, momentaneity of sensation, unrepeatability and particularity evident in each of them will be studied in order to highlight the complexity presented by Plato when describing nature of sensitivity. Having shown such complexity, we shall set out for the appointee's own thinkers, namely Protagoras, Heraclitus and Parmenides, and the fragments of his writings which have come down to us, and we shall evaluate the content therein to see if there were the aspects presented by Plato when he explained the functionality of sensible things. Our intention in this part of the research will be to present that there was no such complex investigation of perception and knowledge in the pre-socratics. With this, we will be ready to complete the first stage of the research, granting the sense theory of the Secret Doctrine to Plato himself. Having achieved this success, the research will turn to the phases of the process toward knowledge, examining in it the function of aisthesis. Aisthesis will have refined and become two distinct things in the process, namely, pure sensation and perception, from which the second is always accompanied by discourse and consequently judgment, and this is due to the presence of psyché in this activity. The psyché will be shown in the Theaetetus present in the most primitive sensations and also responsible for the highest reasonings, having begun these calculations and analyzes through the senses, progressing in such a way as to obtain simple results such as whiteness, heat, and also obtaining more complex results Like the beautiful, the different, the equal, until the reaching of entity, which is common to everything and thus will approach the truth. We will suggest a way of knowing that it is not the Forms, given the absence of these in the work, and also based on Franco Trabattoni, which offers us a different view on the possibility of there being three types of knowledge in Plato's thinking and one of them is exactly a process that begins with sensations, passes through the opinion and results in something especially articulated by the psyché. We will evaluate the condition of possibility of this type of knowledge and we will reach a conclusion that will bring us the following situation: man, not being able to discard all his cognitive capacities, and this includes the sensations, will be able to know not infallible knowledge, but what will come closest to it. The sensations, as detailed in the Theaetetus, and thought are together, indispensable tools for knowing human. / A presente pesquisa tem como principais objetivos mostrar que há uma teoria sensista desenvolvida por Platão a partir do que ele considerou equivocado nas teses de pensadores anteriores como Protágoras e Heráclito, que eram consideradas enquanto verdades, trazendo no Teeteto uma avaliação detalhada sobre aspectos da sensibilidade e do conhecimento. Essa teoria sensista é apresentada e mantida no decorrer da obra, de maneira que podemos inclui-la no processo em direção ao saber, que será outro ponto importante na nossa investigação. Temos que, em um momento primeiro, mostrar a autenticidade da teoria sensista desenvolvida no que chamaremos de Doutrina Secreta, para que posteriormente, no capítulo final, encaixemos tal teoria no processo em direção ao saber. Desenvolvendo devidamente esses dois pontos, concluiremos que a sensibilidade não pode ser descartada no processo cognitivo necessário para se aproximar da verdade. Para isso, iremos dialogar diretamente com a obra em questão para salientarmos os devidos aspectos da teoria sensista da Doutrina Secreta a fim de mostrar que a complexidade ali existente não é compatível com o pensamento dos pensadores de nomeada. Aspectos detalhados, tais como os movimentos lentos como potências do vir a ser, movimentos rápidos como formadores do par sensação qualidade, momentaneidade da sensação, irrepetibilidade e particularidade evidentes em cada uma delas serão estudados de maneira a destacar a complexidade apresentada por Platão quando descrevia a natureza da sensibilidade. Tendo sido mostrada tal complexidade, partiremos para os próprios pensadores de nomeada, a saber, Protágoras, Heráclito e Parmênides e os fragmentos de seus escritos que chegaram até nós, e avaliaremos o conteúdo neles inseridos para verificar se havia ali os aspectos apresentados por Platão quando este explicava a funcionalidade das coisas sensíveis. Nosso intuito nessa parte da pesquisa será mostrar que não havia nos pré-socráticos, investigação tão complexa sobre a percepção e o saber. Com isso, estaremos prontos a concluir a primeira etapa da pesquisa, concedendo a teoria sensista da Doutrina Secreta ao próprio Platão. Tendo obtido esse êxito, a pesquisa se voltará para as fases do processo em direção ao saber, examinando nele a função da aisthesis. Aisthesis terá se refinado e se tornará duas coisas distintas no processo, a saber, sensação pura e percepção, a partir da qual a segunda está sempre acompanhada de discurso e, consequentemente, julgamento, e isso se dá devido a presença da psyché nessa atividade. A psyché se mostrará no Teeteto presente nas mais primitivas sensações e também responsável pelos mais elevados raciocínios, tendo começado esses cálculos e análises por meio dos sentidos, progredindo de maneira a obter resultados simples como a brancura, o calor, e também obtendo resultados mais complexos como o belo, o diferente, o igual, até que se chegue a entidade, que é comum a tudo e assim se aproximará da verdade. Iremos sugerir uma forma de saber que não é o das Formas, dado a ausência destas na obra, e também nos baseando em Franco Trabattoni, que nos oferece uma visão diferenciada sobre a possibilidade de haver três tipos de conhecimento no pensamento de Platão e um deles se trata exatamente de um processo que começa nas sensações, passa pela opinião e resulta em algo especialmente articulado pela psyché. Avaliaremos a condição de possibilidade desse tipo de conhecimento e chegaremos a uma conclusão que nos trará a seguinte situação: o homem, não podendo se desfazer de todas as suas capacidades cognitivas, e isso inclui as sensações, estará apto a conhecer não o infalível saber, mas aquilo que mais se aproximará dele. As sensações, conforme detalhada no Teeteto, e o pensamento são juntos, ferramentas indispensáveis para conhecer humano.

本文試圖藉由梳理前人對於『泰鄂提得斯』篇之研究觀點，重新理解此篇談論知識的對話錄之意義。此文不採取過去對話錄間系統性的比較取徑，而專注於從此文本本身發掘柏拉圖所欲呈現之知識觀點。 藉由帶出『助產術』、『普羅塔哥拉斯』、『偏題』等主題，配合重新閱讀原文『知識即感知』的知識定義的討論，呈現在對話錄中，對話者於追求知識過程中所經歷的種種心智轉變，進而描繪柏拉圖所刻畫之人與知識間的關係，凸顯此對話錄中『內化政治』的面向以及對話錄真正的核心關懷。 與其說此對話錄意圖定義知識是什麼，不如說柏拉圖試圖傳遞一種心智教育的指引，來引領我們轉換跟知識追求活動間的關係。 / The aim of this thesis is to portray what may be the real spirit of the dialogue Theaetetus. While most of the researches focus on the systematic position of this dialogue, this dialogue seems to offer us less than it might do. While the midwifery and the digression are taken to be peripheral in other scholarly works, this thesis intends to bring out the connotation of these passages. Together with re-reading of the first part of the definition of knowledge, I tried to show the “inner-political” facet and the real concern of this dialogue. I suggest that, in Theaetetus, what we really get is not the result of a certain definition of knowledge; instead, what Plato tries to transmit is a mental-pedagogical guideline, informing us how to transform our relations with the pursuit of knowledge.