Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1975. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 374-382). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

The cosmologist Dennis W. Sciama (1926-1999) was a long-standing advocate of the steady state model of the universe. This theory, originally proposed in 1948 by Hermann Bondi, Thomas Gold, and Fred Hoyle, suggested that the universe was eternal, and unchanging on the largest scales. Contrary to the popular image of a scientist as a dispassionate, unbiased investigator of nature, Sciama fervently hoped the steady state model to be correct. In addition, and also pace the stereotypical image of a scientist, Sciama was motivated significantly by "extrascientific" or aesthetic factors in his adoption of the model. Finally, Sciama, in a stark contrast to the naive falsificationism usually presented as a virtue of the "scientific method," went through a several-year period of attempting to "save" the model from hostile data. However, Sciama abandoned the model in 1966 due to increasingly reliable data relating to the distribution of quasars. Thus the Sciama case also stands as a counterexample to irrationalist criticisms of science, according to which scientists can and will always find ways to hold on to their "pet" theories until they die, regardless of contradictory data. Sciama's conversion also sheds light on the iterative process that goes on as scientists localize and attempt to repair faults in their theories. / Ph. D.

abstract: The present essay addresses the epistemic difficulties involved in achieving consensus with respect to the Hayek-Keynes debate. In particular, it is argued that the debate cannot be settled on the basis of the observable evidence; or, more precisely, that the empirical implications of the theories of Hayek and Keynes are such that, regardless of what is observed, both of the theories can be interpreted as true, or at least, not falsified. Regardless of the evidence, both Hayek and Keynes can be interpreted as right. The underdetermination of theories by evidence is an old and ubiquitous problem in science. The present essay makes explicit the respects in which the empirical evidence underdetermines the choice between the theories of Hayek and Keynes. In particular, it is argued both that there are convenient responses one can offer that protect each theory from what appears to be threatening evidence (i.e., that the choice between the two theories is underdetermined in the holist sense) and that, for particular kinds of evidence, the two theories are empirically equivalent (i.e., with respect to certain kinds of evidence, the choice between the two theories is underdetermined in the contrastive sense). / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2012

Como cientistas escolhem teorias? O objetivo de nossa tese é entender a resposta de Thomas Kuhn a este problema clássico da filosofia da ciência. Ao retirar o problema da escolha de teorias do campo metodológico e transportá-lo para o campo sociológico, Kuhn expõe os fundamentos de uma abordagem sociológica do desenvolvimento científico. Como tantos outros filósofos, Kuhn defende que teorias científicas são escolhidas a partir de valores epistêmicos critérios como precisão, consistência, abrangência, simplicidade e fecundidade. Segundo ele, porém, estes valores estão sujeitos a interpretações distintas: cientistas podem concordar quanto ao que se deve esperar de uma teoria, mas, em função de históricos pessoais e profissionais particulares, podem discordar em relação a qual delas melhor manifesta essas características. Mas se os cientistas aplicam os valores de maneiras distintas, em que sentido estes valores ditariam as suas escolhas? E, principalmente, como seria possível, dada a variabilidade dos valores, o consenso em uma comunidade de cientistas? A resposta de Kuhn, inaugurando sua abordagem sociológica, é a de que o acordo entre os membros da comunidade seria gerado por uma série de mecanismos sociais. Em primeiro lugar, a pedagogia e o treinamento dos cientistas, que tornaria as avaliações dos cientistas mais parecidas. Depois, a teoria de onda: a produção de novas evidências e argumentos responsáveis por convencer os adeptos de teorias rivais. Por último, a reestruturação da comunidade: a exclusão de membros resistentes e a divisão da comunidade em disciplinas distintas. A fim de esclarecer a natureza desta sociologia, discutiremos dois conjuntos de temas relacionados: os tipos de explicações de crença: racional e causal; e os níveis explicativos desta sociologia: indivíduos, comunidades e grupos. A última parte de nossa tese consiste em uma tentativa de sistematizar um modelo de explicação sociológica da dinâmica das controvérsias científicas, assim como apontar alguns caminhos para uma pesquisa empírica direcionada a estes tópicos. / How do scientists choose theories? The aim of our thesis is to understand Thomas Kuhn\'s answer to this classic problem in Philosophy of Science. By removing the theory-choice problem from the methodological field and transporting it to the sociological field, Kuhn sets out the foundations of a sociological approach to scientific development. Like so many other philosophers, Kuhn argues that scientific theories are chosen based on epistemic values criteria such as accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. However, these values are, according to him, subject to different interpretations: scientists may agree on what to expect from a theory, but depending on particular personal and professional histories, they may disagree as to which theory best expresses these characteristics. But if scientists apply values in different ways, in which sense would these values dictate scientists choices? And, especially, how could a consensus in a community of scientists be achieved, given the variability of values? Kuhn\'s answer, inaugurating his sociological approach, is that agreement among community members would be generated by a series of social mechanisms. First, the pedagogy and training of scientists, which make scientists appraisals more similar. Secondly, the wave-theory: the production of new evidence and arguments that convince the followers of rival theories. Finally, the restructuring of the community: the exclusion of resistant members and the division of the community into distinct disciplines. In order to clarify the nature of this sociology, we will discuss two sets of related themes: the types of explanations of belief: rational and causal; and the explanatory levels of this sociology: individuals, communities and groups. The last part of our thesis consists of an attempt to systematize a model of sociological explanation for the dynamics of scientific controversies, as well as to point out the ways to an empirical research directed to these topics.

Como cientistas escolhem teorias? O objetivo de nossa tese é entender a resposta de Thomas Kuhn a este problema clássico da filosofia da ciência. Ao retirar o problema da escolha de teorias do campo metodológico e transportá-lo para o campo sociológico, Kuhn expõe os fundamentos de uma abordagem sociológica do desenvolvimento científico. Como tantos outros filósofos, Kuhn defende que teorias científicas são escolhidas a partir de valores epistêmicos critérios como precisão, consistência, abrangência, simplicidade e fecundidade. Segundo ele, porém, estes valores estão sujeitos a interpretações distintas: cientistas podem concordar quanto ao que se deve esperar de uma teoria, mas, em função de históricos pessoais e profissionais particulares, podem discordar em relação a qual delas melhor manifesta essas características. Mas se os cientistas aplicam os valores de maneiras distintas, em que sentido estes valores ditariam as suas escolhas? E, principalmente, como seria possível, dada a variabilidade dos valores, o consenso em uma comunidade de cientistas? A resposta de Kuhn, inaugurando sua abordagem sociológica, é a de que o acordo entre os membros da comunidade seria gerado por uma série de mecanismos sociais. Em primeiro lugar, a pedagogia e o treinamento dos cientistas, que tornaria as avaliações dos cientistas mais parecidas. Depois, a teoria de onda: a produção de novas evidências e argumentos responsáveis por convencer os adeptos de teorias rivais. Por último, a reestruturação da comunidade: a exclusão de membros resistentes e a divisão da comunidade em disciplinas distintas. A fim de esclarecer a natureza desta sociologia, discutiremos dois conjuntos de temas relacionados: os tipos de explicações de crença: racional e causal; e os níveis explicativos desta sociologia: indivíduos, comunidades e grupos. A última parte de nossa tese consiste em uma tentativa de sistematizar um modelo de explicação sociológica da dinâmica das controvérsias científicas, assim como apontar alguns caminhos para uma pesquisa empírica direcionada a estes tópicos. / How do scientists choose theories? The aim of our thesis is to understand Thomas Kuhn\'s answer to this classic problem in Philosophy of Science. By removing the theory-choice problem from the methodological field and transporting it to the sociological field, Kuhn sets out the foundations of a sociological approach to scientific development. Like so many other philosophers, Kuhn argues that scientific theories are chosen based on epistemic values criteria such as accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. However, these values are, according to him, subject to different interpretations: scientists may agree on what to expect from a theory, but depending on particular personal and professional histories, they may disagree as to which theory best expresses these characteristics. But if scientists apply values in different ways, in which sense would these values dictate scientists choices? And, especially, how could a consensus in a community of scientists be achieved, given the variability of values? Kuhn\'s answer, inaugurating his sociological approach, is that agreement among community members would be generated by a series of social mechanisms. First, the pedagogy and training of scientists, which make scientists appraisals more similar. Secondly, the wave-theory: the production of new evidence and arguments that convince the followers of rival theories. Finally, the restructuring of the community: the exclusion of resistant members and the division of the community into distinct disciplines. In order to clarify the nature of this sociology, we will discuss two sets of related themes: the types of explanations of belief: rational and causal; and the explanatory levels of this sociology: individuals, communities and groups. The last part of our thesis consists of an attempt to systematize a model of sociological explanation for the dynamics of scientific controversies, as well as to point out the ways to an empirical research directed to these topics.

This thesis addresses key issues of scientific realism in the philosophy of biology and chemistry through investigation of an underexplored research domain: olfaction theory, or the science of smell. It also provides the first systematic overview of the development of olfactory practices and research into the molecular basis of odours across the 19th and 20th century. Historical and contemporary explanations and modelling techniques for understanding the material basis of odours are analysed with a specific focus on the entrenchment of technological process, research tradition and the definitions of materiality for understanding scientific advancement. The thesis seeks to make sense of the explanatory and problem solving strategies, different ways of reasoning and the construction of facts by drawing attention to the role and application of scientific representations in olfactory practices. Scientific representations such as models, classifications, maps, diagrams, lists etc. serve a variety of purposes that range from the stipulation of relevant properties and correlations of the research materials and the systematic formation of research questions, to the design of experiments that explore or test particular hypotheses. By examining a variety of modelling strategies in olfactory research, I elaborate on how I understand the relation between representations and the world and why this relation requires a pluralist perspective on scientific models, methods and practices. Through this work I will show how a plurality of representations does not pose a problem for realism about scientific entities and their theoretical contexts but, on the contrary, that this plurality serves as the most reliable grounding for a realistic interpretation of scientific representations of the world and the entities it contains. The thesis concludes that scientific judgement has to be understood through its disciplinary trajectory, and that scientific pluralism is a direct consequence of the historicity of scientific development.

Das vorliegende Buch stellt eine überarbeitete und deutlich erweiterte zweite Ausgabe meines gleichnamigen Buches von 2012 dar. Es wendet sich in Form eines Lehrbuchs sowohl an Anfänger wie Fortgeschrittene der Wissenschaftstheorie sowie an Wissenschaftler, die sich dafür interessieren, wann Daten eine bestimmte Theorie begründen und wie stark die Bestätigung der Theorie durch die Daten ist. Im Vordergrund steht dabei immer die erkenntnistheoretische Frage, ob bestimmte Begründungsverfahren die Ziele der Wissenschaften in überzeugender Weise verfolgen oder ob es dagegen substantielle Einwände gibt. Leider wird sich herausstellen, dass kein Verfahren ohne Fehl und Tadel ist, und wir sollten die Schwächen unserer Begründungsverfahren genau kennen, um sie korrekt einsetzen zu können.

Im Buch werden verschiedene Ansätze zum induktiven Schließen vorgestellt und daraufhin analysiert, welche Erfolgsaussichten sie jeweils bieten, die erkenntnistheoretischen Ziele der Wissenschaften zu erreichen. Dabei werden u.a. die konsverativen Induktionsschlüsse, Falsifikationsverfahren und die eliminative Induktion, der Schluss auf die beste Erklärung und vor allem der Bayesianismus besprochen. Außerdem geht es um die Verfahren der klassischen Statistik sowie moderne Verfahren des kausalen Schließens. Dazu wird ein erkenntnistheoretischer Rahmen angegeben, in dem die verschiedenen Begründungsverfahren untereinander verglichen werden.

Das vorliegende Buch stellt eine überarbeitete und deutlich erweiterte zweite Ausgabe meines gleichnamigen Buches von 2012 dar. Es wendet sich in Form eines Lehrbuchs sowohl an Anfänger wie Fortgeschrittene der Wissenschaftstheorie sowie an Wissenschaftler, die sich dafür interessieren, wann Daten eine bestimmte Theorie begründen und wie stark die Bestätigung der Theorie durch die Daten ist. Im Vordergrund steht dabei immer die erkenntnistheoretische Frage, ob bestimmte Begründungsverfahren die Ziele der Wissenschaften in überzeugender Weise verfolgen oder ob es dagegen substantielle Einwände gibt. Leider wird sich herausstellen, dass kein Verfahren ohne Fehl und Tadel ist, und wir sollten die Schwächen unserer Begründungsverfahren genau kennen, um sie korrekt einsetzen zu können.

Im Buch werden verschiedene Ansätze zum induktiven Schließen vorgestellt und daraufhin analysiert, welche Erfolgsaussichten sie jeweils bieten, die erkenntnistheoretischen Ziele der Wissenschaften zu erreichen. Dabei werden u.a. die konsverativen Induktionsschlüsse, Falsifikationsverfahren und die eliminative Induktion, der Schluss auf die beste Erklärung und vor allem der Bayesianismus besprochen. Außerdem geht es um die Verfahren der klassischen Statistik sowie moderne Verfahren des kausalen Schließens. Dazu wird ein erkenntnistheoretischer Rahmen angegeben, in dem die verschiedenen Begründungsverfahren untereinander verglichen werden.